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Candidate countries: Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
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Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244/99 and Iceland 
EFTA: EU-27 + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland 
Groups of NUTS 3 regions 
This report includes a wide variety of classification of NUTS 3 regions. The Directorate-
General for Regional Policy will publish a Regional Working Paper with a detailed 
methodology for each of these classifications.  VIII
Metropolitan regions 
This classification was developed in cooperation with the OECD and consists of NUTS 3 
approximation of all urban agglomerations of more than 250 000 as defined by the Urban 
Audit's Larger Urban Zones. 
Predominantly urban, intermediate, predominantly rural regions 
This is classification is based on the OECD classification, but revised by the 
Commission. A detailed methodology is included in the Eurostat Regional Yearbook 
2010. 
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programmes under the European Regional Development Fund regulation.  
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These are NUTS 3 regions where or 50% of the population or 50% of the area is 
considered mountainous. 
Island regions 
These are NUTS 3 regions where the majority of the population live on one or more 
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Sparsely populated regions are NUTS 3 regions with a population density of less than 
12.5 inhabitants per km². 
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https://circabc.europa.eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b35d4432-3434-496a-9726-
641f55f8abaf/5CR_data_and_typologies.zip.   IX
Executive Summary of the Fifth Report on economic, social 
and territorial cohesion 
The fifth Cohesion Report is adopted in the aftermath of the worst financial and 
economic crisis in recent history. The EU and its Member States responded to this crisis 
by taking measures to keep businesses in operation and people in employment, to 
stimulate demand and increase public investment. 
Subsequently, several governments have faced difficulties refinancing their debts due to 
a combination of falling revenue and increasing expenditure on welfare payments and 
stimulus measures. Faced with large deficits and pressure from financial markets, most 
EU governments are in the process of implementing fiscal consolidation measures. 
In the midst of this, the EU has adopted an ambitious new strategy for long-term 
recovery, Europe 2020. Its key objective is smart, inclusive and sustainable growth. Even 
more than its predecessor, the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 emphasises the need for 
innovation, employment and social inclusion and a strong response to environmental 
challenges and climate change in order to meet this objective. 
The aim of this Cohesion Report is to support the Europe 2020 strategy and highlight the 
contribution that regions, and Cohesion Policy, can make to meet these objectives. The 
report argues that the Europe 2020 headline targets cannot be achieved by policies 
formulated at EU or national level alone. Such an ambitious agenda can only succeed 
with strong national and regional participation and ownership on the ground. This is one 
of the main lessons learnt from the Lisbon Strategy. For example, reaching the 
employment target of 75% in the Convergence regions would have required almost 10 
million extra jobs in 2008, more than in all other regions combined. 
In addition, the regional diversity in the EU, where regions have vastly different 
characteristics, opportunities and needs, requires going beyond ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies 
towards an approach that gives regions the ability to design and the means to deliver 
policies that meet their needs. This is what Cohesion Policy provides through its place-
based approach. 
The report argues that an efficient Europe 2020 strategy requires close coordination 
between Cohesion Policy and other EU policies. In many domains, public policies have a 
greater overall impact if they are closely coordinated rather than being implemented in 
isolation. Recent work by the OECD suggests that it is important to combine investment 
in transport infrastructure with support for businesses and human capital development to 
achieve sustainable economic and social development. 
The fifth Cohesion Report is the first report adopted under the Lisbon Treaty, which 
added territorial cohesion to the twin goals of economic and social cohesion. To cover 
this, the report, first, analyses the territorial dimension of access to services. Second, it 
pays more attention to climate change and the environment. Third, it considers how the 
territorial impact of policies can be measured. 
The report also includes a number of other novelties as compared with earlier reports. 
The analysis of regional economic disparities has been expanded to include issues 
relating to institutions and a new index of competitiveness is presented. Moreover, 
analysis of social cohesion, following the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, covers both   X
objective and subjective indicators of well-being and several indicators which have never 
been presented at the regional level before. 
The report contains four chapters. The first focuses on the economic, social and territorial 
situation and trends in the EU by considering how to (1) promote economic 
competitiveness and convergence, (2) improve well-being and reduce social exclusion, 
and (3) enhance environmental sustainability. The second chapter assesses the 
contribution of national policies to cohesion. The third chapter presents an overview of 
how other EU policies have contributed to cohesion. The last chapter summarises the 
evidence on the positive impact of Cohesion Policy in furthering cohesion objectives and 
highlights the areas where there is room for improvement. 
Economic, social and territorial situation and trends 
Chapter 1 provides an extensive overview of the situation and trends in EU regions from 
an economic, social and environmental perspective. All three perspectives reveal striking 
regional disparities from differences in productivity, to infant mortality rates and 
vulnerability to climate change. Many of these disparities have shrunk over the past 
decade, some quite quickly, but overall there remains a wide gap between the less 
developed and the highly developed EU regions. 
Although some of these regional disparities will never (completely) disappear, many of 
them are inefficient, unfair and unsustainable. To achieve real progress towards the goals 
of smart, green and inclusive growth, these regional disparities have to be reduced. 
Promoting competitiveness and convergence 
The EU is not alone in facing significant regional development disparities. Many large 
countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia also have wide differences in regional 
GDP per head and have turned to EU Cohesion Policy to learn how to reduce them. 
Differences in GDP per head between the US States are relatively narrow, but the 
differences within the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), which also 
includes Canada and Mexico, are much larger than those in the EU. These regional 
disparities in NAFTA have not diminished over time. This implies that belonging to a 
large free trade zone alone is not sufficient to enable less developed regions to catch up, 
especially when the gap in infrastructure, institutional efficiency and innovation is wide. 
The EU's single market has grown to half a billion people today. Such a large market 
creates new opportunities in terms of economies of scale and specialisation. Both can 
help to make EU firms highly productive and globally more competitive. The value 
added of EU firms lies more and more in knowledge-intensive and other services, where 
the EU has a competitive edge as shown by a positive and growing trade balance in 
services with the rest of the world. 
The internal market of the EU guarantees free movement not only of goods but also of 
people, services and capital. This allows people to travel more easily for leisure or work. 
The internal market opens up new horizons for investment or retirement and allows more 
people to find a job and more vacancies to get filled. This increasing integration can also 
be seen in growing trade and financial flows. Within the EU, trade in goods and services 
has expanded significantly, especially between countries in the EU-12 and between the 
EU-12 and the EU-15. Foreign direct investment and remittances from people working in   XI
another country have become crucial sources of capital for many of the less developed 
Member States. The crisis, however, has disrupted many of these flows. 
Economic growth per head is linked to changes in population, employment and 
productivity. Since population grew only slightly in most regions between 2000 and 
2007, it had little effect on regional growth and hardly any effect at EU level. Increases 
in employment had a strong effect in Transition regions and a moderate one in regional 
competitiveness and employment regions. In Convergence regions, employment made 
only a small contribution to growth, but the (very) low employment rates reveal a 
significantly underutilised resource. The main source of growth in all EU regions was 
higher productivity. Productivity growth was particularly high in Convergence regions 
fuelled by both increases within sectors (linked to innovation in the broad sense) and 
shifts in employment to sectors with a higher value added (restructuring). In 
Competitiveness regions, higher productivity came almost exclusively from innovation. 
Productivity growth came mostly from innovation in Transition regions, but, true to their 
name, was partly due to restructuring. 
Innovation 
To become more productive, the EU needs more innovation (in a broad sense) and more 
investment in education, training and life-long learning. Europe 2020 emphasises the 
need for more innovation. For example, only one region in ten has reached the Europe 
2020 target of investing 3 % of GDP in R&D.  
Innovation is important for all regions, whether or not they are at the forefront of 
research. In regions that are not, i.e. most regions, the focus should be more on absorbing 
and spreading innovative practice developed elsewhere, than on radical innovations. 
Accordingly, these regions need to support investment in the capability of firms to 
internalise innovative practice and train their work force as well as helping to strengthen 
the links between private enterprise, research centres and government (the triple helix 
model). 
The Europe 2020 target increasing the proportion of those aged 30-34 with a tertiary 
education degree or equivalent to 40% has been reached in less than one in six regions 
and most others will need to increase greatly the capacity of universities and the number 
of young people remaining in education in order to meet this target by 2020. 
The Europe 2020 ‘early-school leaving’ target of at most 10 % of young people aged 18-
24 with no education beyond basic schooling has been reached in one in three regions , 
but it will require a substantial effort in many regions to achieve it, especially in the 15 
regions in Spain and Portugal where the rate is still above 30 %. 
In many cases, public action is necessary to ensure that these economies can exploit their 
assets and opportunities efficiently. Investment in innovation and education can boost 
economic growth markedly, but only if the right infrastructure and institutions are in 
place. 
Infrastructure 
Innovations lead to more growth if they can easily reach a large market. The 
infrastructure needed to reach a large market is changing as more and more services can 
be purchased and distributed online, providing even remote regions with direct access to 
an EU-wide or even global market. Within the EU, this requires establishing a single   XII
digital market and increasing access to broadband. Broadband access, however, is far 
from universal. In thinly populated areas in Romania, only 13 % of households had a 
broadband connection in 2009, compared to Finland where 77 % of households in thinly 
populated and 84 % in densely populated areas had broadband access.  
Despite the growing importance of digital networks, the capacity to move people and 
goods by rail, road, air or water remains critically important. Transport infrastructure, 
however, is unevenly distributed across the EU. Most central and eastern Member States 
still have considerably fewer motorways than other parts of the EU and much lower 
speeds on their rail network. Access to air transport in most of these countries is also 
poor due to fewer flights and poor connections to airports.  
Border regions often have lower grade transport infrastructure and less access to services 
and markets, especially along the external borders. This tends to reduce their GDP per 
head and employment rates. Cross-border cooperation can enhance welfare, but it may 
involve relatively high transaction costs due to different institutional systems, cultures 
and languages. EU support can help overcome such obstacles to bring untapped 
resources into use. 
Institutions 
Strong institutions are crucial for sustainable economic growth and social welfare. This is 
increasingly recognised by policy markers and researchers alike. The crisis has 
highlighted the need for stable macro-economic conditions, but the strategies for 
recovery should balance the need for fiscal consolidation with the need for sufficient 
levels of public investment. Wider availability and use of e-government services can also 
help to increase the transparency and efficiency of public administrations, and cross-
border and inter-regional cooperation can help to strengthen institutional capacity. 
Combined efforts to improve infrastructure, institutions and the pace of innovation can 
help the EU’s economy become more productive and more competitive, which is key to 
sustaining adequate rates of growth and creating more and better jobs. To reach the 
Europe 2020 targets, a wide-ranging strategy is essential.  
Improving well-being and reducing exclusion 
Life expectancy and health 
The EU has one of the highest life expectancies in the world. The average age and share 
of population of 65 are also among the highest in the world as a result. This has 
consequences for both health services and the labour force. An increase in the share of 
older people implies an increased demand for health and related services. As the average 
age of the labour force increases and people continue in employment until later in life, 
the demand for (re-)training will increase as may the demand for more flexible working 
arrangements. 
Despite life expectancy being high overall, differences between regions remain relatively 
wide. The reasons are manifold, ranging from differences in income, education and 
living conditions to uneven access to high quality health care. Infant mortality, for 
example, is substantially higher in Romanian and Bulgarian regions, but also in some of 
the more remote or economically depressed regions in the EU-15. The same is true of 
death rates from cancer and heart disease. Road deaths per head of population differ by a  XIII
factor of ten across EU regions, not so much because of the state of the road network but 
because of driver behaviour and the degree of law enforcement.  
Living conditions 
Unemployment fell substantially between 2000 and 2008. Nevertheless, regional 
unemployment rates remained high in Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Southern 
Spain, even before the crisis. Since 2008, unemployment has risen dramatically in many 
Member States, notably in Spain and the Baltic States, where average rates were around 
20 % by early 2010. Considerable efforts will be needed to bring people back into 
employment in the years to come. 
Labour mobility in the EU remains low, especially compared to the US, and this alone 
will not reduce the large regional disparities in unemployment across the EU. 
Nevertheless, regions with high unemployment have experienced larger outward 
migration, though the pattern of migration differs between the EU-12 and the EU-15. In 
the EU-12, migration has tended to be into predominantly urban regions, especially 
capital cities. In the EU-15, there has been more migration to predominantly rural regions 
than predominantly urban ones. Migration from outside the EU was until recently the 
most important source of population growth in EU regions, but the successful integration 
of the people concerned remains uneven and they have considerably lower employment 
rates than average in many Member States. 
Within one generation, women have achieved and surpassed the level of education 
attained by men. In virtually all EU regions, many more women aged 25-34 than men 
have a university degree, while for women aged 55-64, this is the case in only a small 
minority of regions. This tendency has not yet led to more equal employment rates. In 
particular in southern European regions, employment rates of women are considerably 
lower than elsewhere, despite significant increases over the past decade, and 
unemployment among women is much higher than among men.  
Access to services differs in two main ways, the most important is the difference between 
more and less developed countries and the second is the difference between thinly and 
densely populated areas. In most of the more developed Member States access to 
services, such as education, health care or banking, is not a problem in all types of area. 
In the less developed Member States, however, access is more limited, especially in 
thinly populated areas.  
Densely populated areas, however, suffer from a combination of problems in all Member 
States, including from crime, violence, vandalism, pollution and noise. The share of 
population in densely populated areas experiencing these problems is two to three times 
larger than in other areas. Surveys of those living in cities, accordingly, show a high level 
of dissatisfaction with air quality and safety and, in several cases, low levels of trust. 
Poverty 
Europe 2020 aims to reduce poverty and exclusion. The indicator used to monitor this 
combines two absolute indicators (severe material deprivation and living in low work-
intensity households) and a relative one (income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold).   XIV
Severe material deprivation is highly concentrated in the less developed Member States 
and regions where up to a quarter of people are indentified as being severely deprived. In 
the EU-12, the relative number tends to be larger in thinly populated areas, while in the 
EU-15 it is larger in densely populated ones. 
Households with low work intensity are most common in the UK, Hungary and Ireland, 
where at least one in 10 lives in such a situation. In the Baltic States, Cyprus and 
Slovakia, by contrast, the number is less than one in 20. 
The share of population with an income level that puts them at risk of poverty (less than 
60 % of national median disposable income) also differs markedly between countries, 
ranging from one in four (in Romania) to one in 10 (in the Czech Republic). But the 
range is far wider at regional level: from around one in 17 in two Czech regions and 
Trento in Italy to more than one in three in three southern Italian regions, two Spanish 
and one Romanian region. In several Member States, including the UK, Spain, Italy, 
Germany and Poland, the proportion is twice as large in the least prosperous regions than 
in the most prosperous ones. 
Prior to the financial crisis, household income had increased markedly in many central 
and eastern Member States. This lifted many people out of material deprivation and 
increased their overall life satisfaction and happiness. Unfortunately, the crisis not only 
brought this increase to an end but reversed it. Consequently, it is likely to have 
increased deprivation, especially in the most affected countries, such as the Baltic States. 
Promoting active inclusion and reducing poverty means investing in education, training 
and skills, modernising labour markets, training and education systems and social and 
health services to help people anticipate and manage change and to build a cohesive 
society. 
Enhancing environmental sustainability 
Adapting to climate change 
Adapting to climate change will be most difficult in southern cities and regions and 
coastal and mountain areas. Even if greenhouse gas emissions were drastically reduced 
today, temperatures would still increase in the coming years and extreme weather events 
become more frequent, with more droughts, floods and reduced snow cover. Several 
regions which rely heavily on agriculture and winter or summer tourism are likely to 
have more droughts and less snow in the near future which could undermine these 
activities. At the same time, floods are likely to increase in other regions with many cities 
being particularly vulnerable. 
Limiting climate change 
Reaching the Europe 2020 target of 20 % energy consumption from renewables will 
require substantially more investment in solar energy, particularly in southern Europe 
where there is most potential,, and in wind energy, especially along the Atlantic and 
North Sea coasts. 
The target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% is ambitious and will require 
investment by both the private and the public sector. The private sector will largely be 
covered by the emissions trading scheme, but the public sector will still need to make 
substantial changes and investment to reduce emissions and energy consumption. 
Increasing energy efficiency will require investing in the insulation of buildings,  XV
different heating systems, more efficient modes of transport and perhaps promoting 
urban living and more compact cities. 
Improving environmental quality 
The number of cities where waste water treatment is below EU standards has fallen over 
the past decade. Nevertheless, in several of the eastern Member States, more investment 
is still needed to comply fully with the urban waste water directive, which is why the 
accession treaties have foreseen a staggered transition. Though recycling of waste has 
increased and the use of landfills diminished, more progress in treating waste efficiently 
is still needed in some southern and eastern Member States.  
Air quality is poor in many regions, especially in city centres and in the south, with 
detrimental effects on health and the quality of life. Reducing ozone levels and 
particulate matter in the air will require increased efforts at local and regional level. 
Moreover, both the Natura 2000 areas and green infrastructure in the wider countryside 
need to be properly managed and protected. 
National Policies and Cohesion 
National governments have implemented various regional development policies to 
further economic, social and territorial cohesion. While some Member States give 
priority to tackling regional disparities, others focus more on national competitiveness or 
on specific territorial features. Irrespective of the approach pursued, the emphasis is 
increasingly on stimulating endogenous development by providing support to areas of 
comparative advantage, rather than compensating regions for disadvantages. 
Sub-national governments in virtually all Member States are responsible for a relatively 
large share of public investment. On average, some two-thirds of public investment is 
implemented by regional and local authorities across the EU, underlining the importance 
of their contribution to the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Public investment is critical to improving the competitiveness of less developed regions, 
especially in those less well endowed with infrastructure. A number of recent studies 
have concluded that public investment boosts growth under certain conditions, among 
which good institutional governance is critical. Cohesion Policy support ensures that less 
developed countries and regions can maintain the rates of public investment required to 
increase their growth potential and equally helps them strengthen their institutional 
capacity. 
Cohesion Policy funding means that public investment is higher relative to GDP in 
Cohesion countries than in the rest of the EU. The past decade has seen a positive 
correlation between rates of public investment and rates of economic growth, suggesting 
both that public investment is important for convergence and that economic growth is 
important for public investment. 
Higher rates of public investment in Cohesion countries have mostly gone to improving 
infrastructure, notably transport networks, and Cohesion Policy has played a crucial role 
in helping to narrow the gap with more advanced parts of the EU in this respect.  XVI
Unlike in the case of their entitlement to EU funding under Cohesion, the relative 
prosperity of regions is not a major determinant of their access to national funds for 
investment, except in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in France. Other factors such as 
geophysical features, the extent of fiscal and political autonomy or the attraction of 
capital cities seem to be at least as important as cohesion objectives in determining the 
regional distribution of public investment. 
Cohesion Policy is important for boosting the competitiveness of more advanced regions 
as well as less-developed ones. On average it accounts for around 25 % of total public 
investment at regional level in non-Convergence regions in Spain and France. It totals 
around 15 % of public expenditure on environmental protection in the West Midlands 
and London and some 25 % of public expenditure on improving the adaptability of 
workers and helping disadvantaged groups find employment in Central and Northern 
Italy. 
The economic crisis led most national governments and some regional authorities to 
introduce ‘ad hoc’ stimulus packages to mitigate the effects on growth and employment. 
Public investment was a major component of these packages. The legacy of the crisis, 
however, is a dramatic increase in government borrowing and debt. While this mostly 
stems from a fall in tax revenue, restoring macroeconomic stability and reducing 
government deficits in the coming years to more sustainable levels is likely to put 
pressure on public expenditure programmes and on public investment in particular. 
Cohesion Policy, which accounts for a substantial proportion of financing for investment 
in many countries, is therefore likely to become increasingly important in the future. On 
the other hand, fiscal and budgetary constraints on Member States will have a significant 
impact on the environment in which Cohesion Policy operates. This might trigger a 
review of co-financing rules, which is a fundamental principle of Cohesion Policy 
underpinning the joint approach to EU funding and ensuring ownership of the policy on 
the ground. 
The way that the additionality principle is verified to ensure that Cohesion Policy 
funding is used to support investment which is additional to what national governments 
would have otherwise undertaken needs to be revised. Currently, the method used is 
contested on grounds of reliability and lack of comparability between Member States, 
because of its ad-hoc nature and complexity. A reform of the system is needed to make it 
more reliable, transparent and straight-forward. 
Structural and institutional reforms are important to maximise the impact of Cohesion 
Policy. However, the pace of reform over the past decade has been relatively slow and 
this has affected the impact of the policy ‘on the ground’. The Europe 2020 strategy has 
set a new framework to which Cohesion Policy needs to adapt. A key aspect of this will 
be to establish closer links between the design and implementation of t policy and the 
macroeconomic objectives and structural and institutional reforms pursued. 
Cohesion Policy in the current period includes conditions linked to the macroeconomic 
situation only in respect of the Cohesion Fund (apart from administrative requirements 
on financial management and control systems). For the next programming period, the 
issue of whether this kind of macroeconomic conditionality should be extended, and if so 
how, should be explored. Whether other conditions, such as incentives for reform in 
areas closely linked to the operation of Cohesion Policy and which might increase its 
impact, and value for money, might also be usefully examined.   XVII
Other EU Policies and Cohesion 
According to the EU Treaty, the design and implementation of all EU policies should 
take account of their effect on economic, social and territorial cohesion. Currently some 
policies have a clear territorial dimension, like transport or environment policy. Other 
policies have a partial territorial dimension, such as research, information society or 
health policy. Some policies do not or cannot distinguish in their implementation 
between different parts of the EU, for example the single market or trade.  
Policies do not need to have a specifically regional thrust to be able to assess their effect 
on cohesion. However, it does require having a thorough understanding of the local 
impact of a policy, whether it is spatially targeted or not. Such assessments of the 
territorial impact could be carried out, prior to the approval of a policy, or as part of an 
ex-post evaluation. 
Policies also tend to have inter-dependent effects. Without proper coordination, the 
impact of any one policy is likely to be severely diminished and might even be negative. 
The impact of policies cannot therefore be maximised if a fragmented approach is 
adopted and policy decisions are taken in isolation.  
Infrastructure improvements, for example, do not lead automatically to higher growth 
and, in fact, might even result in a net reduction in economic activity in less developed 
regions (‘leaking by linking’). Investment in infrastructure needs to be combined with 
investment in education, enterprise, and innovation to ensure not only that it has  a 
positive effect on development but that this effect is maximised by taking account of the 
complementary effects of this other investment.  
Similarly, innovation may be spatially concentrated, but its benefits are not. Investment 
in R&D and businesses therefore need to be complemented by investment in human 
capital, not only to foster the efficiency of the regional innovation process, but also to 
ensure that the benefits of innovation are distributed widely in spatial and social terms. 
As regards R&D and innovation, Cohesion Policy needs to complement the activities 
carried out under the Research Framework Programme and the Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework programme. This can be achieved by focusing the role of 
Cohesion Policy on spreading and applying examples of innovative practice across the 
EU at regional level (‘smart specialisation’) and on supporting investment in basic 
infrastructure, institutions and human resources  in less developed regions so that they 
can participate fully in the knowledge economy. 
Given the tightening budget constraints which will limit public expenditure over the next 
few years across the EU and the parallel need to support economic recovery, these 
limited public resources should be used to maximum effect, which, as the Europe 2020 
strategy makes clear, can only happen if all EU policies are mutually reinforcing.  
The Impact of Cohesion Policy 
Cohesion Policy is the EU’s main instrument for pursuing harmonious development 
across the Union. It is based on a broad vision, which encompasses not just the economic 
development of lagging regions and support for vulnerable social groups, but also 
environmental sustainability and respect for the territorial and cultural features of 
different parts of the EU. This breadth of vision is reflected in the variety of programmes, 
projects and partners that are supported under the policy.   XVIII
In terms of the regional economy, the funding provided by Cohesion Policy over the 
period 2000-2006 created some 1 million jobs in enterprises across the EU, as well as 
perhaps adding as much as 10% to GDP in Objective 1 regions in the EU-15. As various 
studies indicate, this tended to boost the trade and exports of net contributor countries, 
which helps to offset their contribution to funding the policy. Accordingly, 
macroeconomic model simulations indicate that Cohesion Policy had the net effect of 
raising the level of GDP in the EU as a whole.  
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement: grants to enterprise provide valuable 
support, but too often in the past there has been an over-reliance on them. The trend 
towards a more balanced mix, including financial engineering (loans and venture capital) 
as well as more indirect measures, such as advice and guidance and support for 
networking and clustering, is a welcome one. The European Commission, in close 
partnership with the EIB, is actively encouraging such diversification of support 
measures through initiatives such as JEREMIE, JASMINE, JASPERS and JESSICA. 
In addition, Cohesion Policy investment in motorways and roads in the less developed 
parts of the EU-15 over many years means that the job is now largely done. Investment 
should shift towards more environmentally-friendly modes of transport (notably rail and 
urban transport systems), though in the EU-12 the need to improve all transport links 
remains a priority. 
Cohesion Policy also supports the training of around 10 million people a year, with a 
strong focus on young people, the long-term unemployed and the low skilled. Through 
various local development initiatives, Cohesion Policy has a strong track record of cross-
border co-operation, regenerating deprived urban neighbourhoods, and improving access 
to services in rural areas. 
Involving regional and local communities can improve policies. Evaluation evidence has 
demonstrated that the active participation of people and organisations in projects at 
regional and local level, from the design to the implementation stage, is a crucial success 
factor. Indeed, such partnership is one of the key sources of added-value of Cohesion 
Policy, mobilising the skills and knowledge of those concerned to make programmes 
more effective and inclusive. 
In terms of protecting the environment, more than half the Member States are tracking 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as a target in their Cohesion Policy 
programmes for the 2007-2013 period.  
More than 23 million people were connected to wastewater collection and treatment 
systems and at least 20 million people connected to clean supply of drinking water 
through ERDF and Cohesion Fund support in 2000-2006. As a result, Cohesion Policy 
has helped many regions to meet the requirements of EU environmental Directives and 
by so doing has helped to protect the environment and to improve the quality of life. 
However, the sustainability of the facilities constructed needs more carefully 
consideration to ensure that investment in environmental infrastructure is made with 
clear plans for long-term financing.   XIX
In terms of policy management, strong and sound administration at national, regional 
and local levels is important for the success and lasting effect of cohesion policy. 
Evaluations have found that the EU-12 countries have significantly improved 
administrative capacity since accession. Nevertheless, continued efforts are needed to 
ensure that all government levels in the EU have the necessary administrative capacity to 
deliver Cohesion Policy effectively. 
A recurrent evaluation finding across all areas of investment was a preoccupation with 
"absorption", i.e., with spending the money more than focusing on what the programmes 
were actually designed to achieve. While the former is obviously a precondition for 
success, the latter is ultimately what matters. For example, monitoring systems typically 
prioritise spending and outputs (such as the number of people trained or kilometres of 
new roads constructed) rather than results (such as the number of people getting a job 
after training or the amount of journey time saved) let alone on impacts (the effect of a 
better trained work force or more efficient transport networks on regional development). 
Cohesion Policy needs to cultivate a focus on performance. This has to start from 
programmes identifying a limited number of policy priorities (concentration) with a clear 
view of how they will be achieved and how their achievement will contribute to the 
economic, social and territorial development of the regions, or Member States, 
concerned. 
Monitoring and evaluation systems need to be improved across the EU to track 
performance and to help redirect efforts as necessary to ensure that objectives are 
attained. This requires a clear strategic vision of what the programme aims to achieve 
and how success will be recognised and measured (proper target setting). It also requires 
a strong and reliable monitoring system, as well as greater recourse to rigorous 
evaluation methods, including counterfactual impact evaluation, cost benefit analysis, 
beneficiary surveys, as well as a more rigorous use of qualitative methods such as case 
studies.  
 
 
Chapter I: Economic, social and territorial situation 
and trends 
This is the first Cohesion Report adopted under the Lisbon Treaty, which added 
territorial cohesion to the twin goals of economic and social cohesion. To cover this new 
dimension, this report includes more analysis on four issues. First it examines the 
territorial dimension of access to services. Second, it pays more attention to the 
environmental dimension of sustainable development. Third it focuses on functional 
regions and territorial cooperation. Fourth, it considers how the territorial impact of 
policies can be measured. 
The report also includes a number of other novelties as compared with earlier reports. 
The analysis of regional economic disparities has been expanded to include issues 
relating to institutions and a new index of competitiveness is presented. Moreover, 
analysis of social cohesion, following the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report and the 
Commission's GDP and beyond Communication
1, covers both objective and subjective 
indicators of well-being and several indicators which have never been presented at the 
regional level before. 
1.  PROMOTING COMPETITIVENESS AND CONVERGENCE 
This section provides a broad overview of the main determinants of regional economic 
development. It starts by putting EU development and regional disparities into a global 
context and shows the impact of growing trade in goods and services on regional 
development. It then highlights the diverse geography of growth of the EU economy and 
how all types of regions have contributed to this.  
The next section examines the main drivers of growth, identifying the regional sources of 
growth and the central and increasing role of productivity growth and identifies the 
sectors which have contributed most to output and employment growth.  
The next three sections look at the main determinants of regional economic development: 
the level of innovation, the quality of infrastructure and the capacity of institutions.  
The last section brings these different issues together in a new regional competitiveness 
index developed in cooperation with the Joint Research Centre.  
1.1.  Globalisation and internal integration 
Compared to the United States (US), Japan and Canada, the EU experienced higher 
economic growth per head
2 between 2000 and 2007 (Table 1.1), largely due to the 
higher growth rates of the less developed and moderately developed EU Member 
States. 
                                                 
1   COM(2009) 433. 
2   Measuring GDP growth per head corrects for difference in population growth. It is a more comparable 
and more accurate measure of the additional value added created per person (Stiglitz, J., Sen, A.,  
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Figure 1- 1 
GDP per head (PPS), 2008
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In the highly developed EU Member States, growth rates were almost identical to 
those in the US, Canada and Japan.  
Table 1. 1 
Brazil* 3.1
Russian Federation 7.7
India 5.2
China 9.9
Mexico** 0.6
United States of America 1.4
Canada** 1.4
Japan 1.5
EU27 1.8
Highly developed MS 1.4
Moderately developed MS 2.9
Less developed MS 5.2
Note: * 2002-2007,** 2000-2006
Source: OECD and National Statistical Institutes
Average Annual GDP per capita growth 
in real terms, 2000-2007
 
Growth of GDP per head was higher in Brazil, Russia, India and China than in the 
EU. However, in the less developed Member States, it was much the same as in 
India or Brazil 
Growth in the less developed Member States was particularly high between 2002 
and 2008 - almost three times higher than in the highly developed ones. This 
contributed strongly to regional convergence in the EU. Growth in the moderately 
developed Member States was also much higher than in highly developed ones, so 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fitoussi, J., Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress.  2009. ). These results may come as a surprise as the media usually only reports GDP 
growth, which is higher in the US than in the EU due to its higher population growth.   
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that as the overall gap in GDP per head between the most and the least developed 
countries narrowed, so did regional differentials. 
Figure 1- 2 
Real GDP per capita growth, 2000 - 2011
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Box: Regional impact of the crisis 
Although the impact of the economic crisis has been extreme in some regions, it 
was no worse, on average, in the less developed regions than in the highly 
developed ones. Accordingly, overall regional disparities have barely changed. In 
general, EU-12 Convergence regions seem to have been affected less than those in 
the south of the EU-15. 
The economic crisis hit regions specialised in manufacturing, in particular. The 
highest increases in unemployment, however, were in regions highly dependent on 
construction. Regions specialised in tourism, most of them with a GDP per head 
below the EU average, have not yet been affected significantly, just as regions with 
large shares of public employment. Regions specialised in financial and business 
services, most of them capital city regions or buoyant metropolitan regions, have 
been affected to an average extent in terms of the impact on GDP and employment.  
In general, more rapid recovery is projected to occur in industrial regions 
specialised in manufacturing and those with a large share of financial and business 
services, while those more dependent on tourism, construction and public 
administration are projected to recover more slowly. 
Some 64 Convergence regions and 15 Transition regions are estimated to have 
fared better than the EU average during the crisis, while a number of previously 
buoyant regions in Ireland, the South of Finland and the North and Centre of Italy 
have been hit hard. 
The performance of Convergence regions, however, has varied greatly.  Most 
Polish regions  have been affected relatively little, which is also the case for Greek 
regions specialised in tourism, the Eastern German Länder and the EU-12 capital 
city regions. In contrast, all three Baltic States, Western Hungarian regions, the  
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Italian Mezzogiorno and the South of Spain have experienced significant economic 
contraction. Outside the Convergence regions, some regions in the Netherlands, 
Austria and West and South Germany have performed better than the rest of the 
EU. 
A relatively fast recovery is projected in some prosperous regions in Germany and 
the North of Belgium as well as some capital city regions in the North and the 
Centre of the EU. Regions in Poland are also projected to continue to perform 
relatively well and most other regions in the EU-12 are projected to recover quite 
quickly. By contrast, prospects are much less favourable for Convergence regions 
in Greece and, to a lesser extent, in Spain, Italy, Portugal and France. 
So far, regions in Germany have managed to avoid large increases in 
unemployment, to a large extent because of the short-time working scheme and 
employers reducing working hours. Unemployment has also remained low in the 
North of Italy despite the depth of the recession. On the other hand, in virtually all 
regions in Spain, the Baltic States and Ireland, unemployment has increased 
dramatically. At the end of 2009, the highest unemployment rates (of between 17% 
and 30%) were in Southern Spain, the French outermost regions, Latvia and 
Brussels. 
Prospects are not good for a quick reduction in unemployment, which in most 
regions is projected to increase further.  
1.1.1.  Globalisation and regional development 
The trade in goods between the EU and the rest of the world grew 
significantly up until the recent crisis. Between 1999 and 2008, exports to 
third countries increased from 8% of EU GDP to 10.5%. Imports from 
outside the EU rose by even more, from 8.5% of GDP in 1999 to 12.5% in 
2008, the trade deficit widening over the period. In 2009, the recession, 
which hit the EU more than some other parts of the world, led to imports 
declining even more than exports and to a narrowing of the trade deficit 
(Figure 1.3).  
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Figure 1- 3: Ratio of goods trade on the GDP (EU-27) 
Trade in goods between EU and the rest of the world, 1999 - 2009
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Source: Eurostat database 
This increase in trade in goods reflects growing globalisation. The growth 
consists in large part of intra-sectoral and intra-firm trade, as major firms 
increasingly locate different parts of production in different parts of the 
world. This more dispersed production system at the same time increases the 
demand for logistics and ordering and control systems. 
Such a process creates both opportunities and threats for EU regions. The 
sectors where the EU has become less competitive include textiles, metals 
and electric and optical equipment. The Fourth Cohesion Report highlighted 
the challenge of globalisation to regions specialised in vulnerable sectors. A 
follow-up study
3, however, indicated that although the EU is losing 
employment in the sectors concerned, these losses tend to be concentrated in 
the less specialised regions. Many, but by no means all, regions specialised 
in vulnerable sectors have, therefore, been able to move up the value chain 
to higher value-added activities such as high-end production, niche markets 
or high-tech products. This has often allowed them to maintain employment 
and increase output. 
Nevertheless, some regions have not been able to move up the value chain 
and have lost markets by competing for low-cost and low-quality products 
with emerging economies outside the EU. This highlights the critical role of 
investment in human capital, entrepreneurship and a favourable business 
environment and the problems created by delaying restructuring and failing 
to encourage a move to activities where regions have the potential to 
develop a new comparative advantage. 
The service sector has also witnessed strong trade growth. Indeed, the EU 
has a larger market share of services than of goods – 20% of the global 
                                                 
3   Regions vulnerable to globalisation and increased trade. 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/study_en.htm  
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market as against only 13% in 2007.
4 Between 2003 and 2008, exports of 
services rose from 3.4% to 4.2% of GDP, while imports grew from 3% to 
3.5% (Figure 1.4). In some specialised countries, exports far exceeded the 
EU average in 2008. For instance, Luxembourg (31.6% of its GDP) and 
Ireland (13.3%) have large trade surpluses in services thanks to financial 
services and Cyprus (18.1%) and Malta (10.6%) thanks to transport services. 
In contrast to goods, where the trade deficit widened from 2003 on, the 
surplus on trade in services expanded, especially after 2005. Trade in 
services has also been less affected by the economic crisis.  
Figure 1- 4 Ratio of services trade on the GDP (EU-27) 
Trade in services between EU and the rest of the world, 2003 - 2008
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Source: Eurostat database 
The increase in the trade surplus on services has boosted output and 
employment in financial and business services and logistics. Regions which 
have gained most from the growth of these exports tend to be highly 
specialised in the services concerned, be the locations of international 
headquarters and have strong transport connections to other parts of the 
world
5.  
A second group of regions has also gained from increased trade in goods and 
services and, in particular, from the stimulus to restructure faster and focus 
on higher value-added activities. As a result, productivity growth has tended 
to be higher in traded goods and services than in regions less linked into the 
global market and with a smaller share of employment in the sectors 
concerned. Regions can clearly gain from the increasing integration of 
global trade by raising the skill and technological content of their activities 
and using their specialisation to diversify into related areas.  
                                                 
4   WTO - International Trade Statistics 2008  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its2008_e.pdf. 
5   Regions benefitting from globalisation and increased trade. 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/study_en.htm   
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Brazil, Russia, India and China 
Brazil, Russia, India and China all have internal disparities in GDP per head between 
regions which are much wider than in the EU. Whereas the top quartile of regions have 
a GDP per head which is 2.8 times higher than the bottom quartile in the EU, in Brazil 
and India, it is 3.6 times higher and in Russia 4.9 times higher (World Bank). 
Map 1.1: Russia, India, China, and Brazil: Regional GDP per head, 2007 
The ratio is also wider in China (3.2), but it cannot be compared to the EU, since data 
are published only for 31 regions. These have an average population of 43 million as 
against less than 2 million for NUTS 2 regions in the EU.  
Of the four countries, India is the least developed with a GDP per head of only USD 
3000 in PPP terms (World Bank), just 10% of the EU average. China has a GDP per 
head twice that of India, Brazil over three times as high and Russia five times as high. 
GDP per head in Brazil is similar to that in Bulgaria, while in Russia, it is similar to 
that in Poland or Latvia. 
Given the scale of regional disparities, Brazil, China and Russia have taken a keen 
interest in Cohesion Policy. The Commission has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with each of the three countries to help them develop their own regional 
strategies based on the EU's long experience and incorporating open market principles, 
respect for the environment and partnership in their conception and implementation. 
The exchanges with Brazil, which have been at both national and regional level, have 
already led to policy changes. Moreover, the OECD, with DG Regional Policy support, 
is carrying out a ''Territorial Review'' of Brazil to help the authorities develop their 
strategic capacity in regional development.  
Cooperation with China has led to a study comparing its regional policy with that in 
the EU and focussing on the definition of regions and multi-level governance, to be 
published at the end of 2010. A future study will focus on the role of regional clusters 
in interregional cooperation, especially as regards innovation.  
Cooperation with Russia has involved seminars in Moscow on multi-level governance, 
capacity building, on the management of large projects and inter-regional and cross-
border cooperation. 
 
1.1.2.  EU integration through the flows of goods, services, investments, 
remittances and people 
The EU has created a unique environment for businesses to trade freely in 
the Single Market and for individuals to move freely to live and work in 
other Member States. No other group of Nation States has gone so far in 
economic integration. The effect of this integration is evident in the growth 
of intra-EU trade after each enlargement, the large and growing flows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) between Member States, the remittances 
sent back to their home country by migrants and the movements of labour 
across the EU. This section shows the positive effects of integration.  
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1.1.2.1.Trade 
Intra-EU trade has become increasingly important for the countries which 
joined the Union in 2004 and 2007 (the EU-12). In 2000, exports of goods of 
the EU-12 countries to each other and to the EU-15 amounted to 27% of 
their GDP. In 2008, this had risen to 35%. At the same time, their imports of 
goods from other EU Member States rose from 30% of GDP to 38% (Figure 
1.5). 
Trade increased markedly in countries that were already export oriented, 
such as the Czech Republic, where trade to the rest of the EU rose from 44% 
of GDP to 58% over the period, but also in the less export oriented, such as 
Poland, whose exports to the rest of the EU rose from 15% of GDP to 25%. 
Figure 1- 5: Exports and imports to other EU Member States, 2000-2008 
Intra EU trade, 2000-2008
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Source: COMEXT database and Eurostat 
Figure 1- 6 Trade in the single market between EU-15 and EU-12 
Trade between EU-15 and EU-12, 2000-2008
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Flows between the EU-12 and EU-15 almost doubled between 2000 and 
2008. Exports from the EU-12 to the EU-15 rose from 1% of EU-15 GDP to 
2% and exports from the EU-15 to the EU-12 increased by more (from 1.4% 
of EU-15 GDP to 2.4%), reflecting the higher growth of the latter countries 
(Figure 1.6).  
1.1.2.2. FDI 
Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) averaged 4.6% of GDP in the EU 
over the period 2004-2008 and FDI outflows, 6.1% of GDP (Figure 1.7). 
The EU, therefore, invested more abroad than foreign companies in the EU. 
Inflows, however, substantially exceeded outflows in all the countries which 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. FDI has, in fact, proved an important 
engine of growth in these countries. FDI flows from the EU-15 amounted on 
average to 4.5% of GDP in the EU-12 Member States. In Bulgaria, net 
inflows averaged over 20% of GDP, in Malta, over 13% and in Romania, 
Estonia and Latvia, over 5%. In the EU-15, inflows exceeded outflows only 
in Belgium and Finland and in all the other countries, the reverse was the 
case. 
Figure 1- 7 
Balance of Net FDI inflows and outflows 2004-
2008 as a share of GDP
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FDI is volatile and highly sensitive to the economic cycle. It contracted 
markedly in the economic crisis and ensuing period of uncertainty about 
economic prospects. Both inflows and outflows declined much more than 
GDP in 2009. Total FDI inflows amounted to just under 3% of GDP in 2009 
and net outflows to around 4% (Figure 1.8), well below the average for the 
2004-2008 period.  
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Figure 1- 8 
Balance of FDI inflows and outflows in 2009 as a share of GDP
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The collapse hit those Member States with significant net inflows in 
particular, net FDI to the EU-12 countries declining from over 5% of GDP 
in 2007 to less than 1.5% in 2009. In Bulgaria and Estonia, the decline 
relative to the 2004-2008 average was over 10 percentage points of GDP. 
1.1.2.3. Romania and Bulgaria are the main recipients of remittances 
With enlargement and the opening up of employment opportunities in the 
EU-15 to people in the EU-12, remittances from the former to the latter have 
grown markedly as people have moved to take up jobs in the EU-15. The 
total sum of intra-EU remittances amounted to over EUR 44 billion in 2008. 
Bulgaria and Romania were by far the largest recipients of net remittances 
from other parts of the EU. In 2008, these amounted to EUR 5.7 billion, or 
4.2% of GDP, in Romania and to EUR 1.5 billion, 4.5% of GDP, in Bulgaria 
(Figure 1.9). Remittances are, therefore, an important source of income for 
households in the two countries. Over 80% of remittances to Romania were 
sent from Italy (EUR 2.5 billion) and Spain (EUR 2 billion) and some 55% 
of those to Bulgaria from Germany (EUR 450 million) and Greece (EUR 
425 million). 
The other countries where remittances were significant were the three Baltic 
States (between 1.2% and 1.8% of their respective GDPs) and Poland (1.4% 
of GDP). 
In the main countries from which remittances were sent, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands, the sums involved amounted to less than 0.2% of GDP. 
Remittances grew rapidly in Romania from 2004 to 2007, by around EUR 1 
billion a year. As a result of the crisis, however, they remained unchanged in 
2008 and fell markedly in 2009. The increase before the crisis was also 
substantial in Lithuania and Poland.  
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In Romania and Lithuania, remittances were 40% lower in the first three 
quarters of 2009 than in the same period in 2008. This reduction was less in 
Bulgaria, Poland and the two other Baltic countries (around 15% or less). 
These differences reflect the non-uniform effect of the crisis on jobs in the 
countries from which the remittances were sent. Job losses were substantial 
in Spain (which accounts for a third of Romanian remittances) and, because 
of the decline in construction, hit migrant workers especially. By contrast, 
job losses have been relatively small in Germany from where 30% of 
Bulgarian remittances come. 
Figure 1- 9 
Net personal remittances as share of GDP (2008)
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1.1.2.4. Labour mobility in the EU and the US 
People in the US are much more likely to move to a different US State than 
people in the EU are to move to another EU region (Map 1.2 and Map 1.3)
6. 
In the EU, those of working age who changed their region of residence in 
2008 amounted to only 1.2% of total working-age population as against 
2.8% in the US. This higher internal mobility gives the US a more flexible 
labour market, which responds more to regional differences in wages and 
job opportunities, and tends to reduce both disparities in unemployment and 
labour shortages. Given the prospective decline in working-age population 
and the labour shortages which it could give rise to, there is likely to be an 
increasing need for more labour mobility in the EU. 
Map 1.2: Share of working age residents who moved from a different EU region 
within the last year, 2007-2008 
                                                 
6  The data do not take into account seasonal work, education or training without a change in permanent 
residence.  
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Map 1.3: Share of working age residents who moved from a different US State 
within the last year, 2008 
Within the EU, however, there are significant differences between countries 
in the extent of regional movements, with a clear distinction between the 
countries in the Eastern and the Western part. In the EU-15, some 1.4% of 
working age population moved between regions in 2008, nearly four times 
more than in the Central and Eastern Member States. The regions which 
attracted the highest number of working-age residents were located in 
France: Limousin (4.8%), Midi-Pyrénées (4.5%), Poitou-Charentes (3.8%) 
and Languedoc-Roussillon (3.8%). Portugal (2.4%) was ranked second 
because of Lisbon (5.6%). The UK was ranked third, many regions having 
relatively large inflows of people of working age from other regions, from 
Inner and Outer London (4.7%) in particular. 
In the EU-12 countries, the inflows were highest (at as around 1% of 
working-age population) in Opolskie and Dolnośląskie in Poland and 
virtually zero in Centru and Bucureşti-Ilfov in Romania. Only 16% of 
working age population moving between EU regions moved to regions in the 
EU-12. 
In the US, where those moving to another State made up 2.8% of total 
working age population, the States with the largest inflows were the District 
of Columbia (10%), Alaska (6.7%), Wyoming (6.1%), Delaware (5.4%) and 
Montana (5.3%). 
On average, more than 85% of the labour movement in the EU comprised 
movements between regions in the same country. Less than one in seven 
cases involved crossing a national border. Only 0.15% of people of working 
age, therefore, moved between Member States, less than movements into the 
EU from third countries (0.2% of working-age population). Despite the 
freedom to move, very few people so far take advantage of this. 
The low movement between Member States can be explained in terms of 
linguistic, cultural and labour legislation differences. In the case of those 
from the EU-12, it is also due to a number of restrictions on their mobility, 
which will be completely phased out by 2011. Currently, only Germany and 
Austria still limit the inflow from these countries, though Bulgarians and 
Romanians still have restricted access to employment in 10 EU-15 countries, 
which are due to be removed by 2013 at the latest. 
1.1.3.  Regional growth and convergence  
Growth in EU-12 regions especially has led to a marked narrowing of 
regional disparities in GDP per head in PPS terms across the Union. 
Nevertheless, disparities remain pronounced with levels less than a third of 
the EU average in 7 Romanian and Bulgarian regions and levels over 50% 
higher than the EU average in 19 regions, of which 11 are capital city 
regions (Map 1.4). 
Map 1.4: GDP per head (PPS), 2007  
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Map 1.5: Growth of GDP per head in real terms, 2000-2007 
The coefficient of variation, a common measure of disparities, fell from 42.7 
in 1996 to 39.1 in 2007 in the EU. Other dispersion measures, such as the 
Gini index or the S80/20 ratio (the ratio of the top 20% of regions to the 
bottom 20%), show much the same reduction (Figure 1.10). 
Figure 1- 10: Coefficient of variation, Gini index and S80/20 (normalised), 
GDP per head, EU-27 NUTS 2 regions, 1996-2007 
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Gini
CV
S80/S20
EUROSTAT dispersion indicator
  Source: Eurostat database. DG REGIO's calculation.   
The fact that regional disparities have declined over the EU as a whole has 
not prevented disparities from increasing in a number of Member States, in 
particular in the EU-12. For instance, in Romania the coefficient of variation 
rose from 15 in 1995 to 44 in 2007, reflecting the relative concentration of 
growth in one or two regions, especially the capital city region. 
However, widening internal disparities has not prevented GDP per head in 
almost all regions in the EU-12 converging towards the EU average (Map 
1.5). In fact, between 2000 and 2007, only 8 regions in the new Member 
States recorded a lower average growth rate than the EU-27 average (Figure 
1.11). 
Figure 1- 11: Average growth rates 2000-2007, EU-12 NUTS 2 regions 
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  Source: Eurostat database. DG REGIO's calculation.  
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Measures of disparities such as the Gini or coefficient of variation can 
summarise a lot of information. However, they do not take account of the 
movement in the relative level of GDP per head of individual regions, 
examination of which can add considerable insight into the forces at work in 
the convergence process. 
Examining individual movements in GDP per head serves to identify which 
regions are converging and which are falling behind. For example, 11 
regions moved from the group of regions with a GDP per head below 50% 
of the EU average to the group between 50% and 75%. These are the three 
Baltic States, Yugozapaden (Bulgaria), Közép-Dunántúl (Hungary), four 
Polish regions and two Slovak regions. Bucureşti–Ilfov (Romania) stands 
out in moving from below 50% of the average to above 75% in just over 10 
years. The crisis has almost certainly had a significant effect on this pattern 
of convergence, though it will be some time before the data are available to 
assess what kind of effect. 
Map 1.6: Change in regional GDP per head (PPS), 1995-2007 
Convergence is driven by a catching-up process as less developed EU 
regions grow faster than the highly developed ones. Regional disparities in 
GDP per head widened in some of the less developed Member States 
between 1995 and 2007. Nevertheless, virtually all regions in less developed 
Member States converged towards the EU-27 average.  
34 
 
Box: Changing regional disparities in the EU-15 
Convergence between regions in the EU-15 Member States was strong up to the mid 1990s, but 
the process since then has slowed down. From 1980 to 1996, there was clear narrowing of 
disparities the coefficient of variation falling from 33 to 29. Since 1996, it has remained between 
29 and 30. The results are in line with the findings regularly reported in the literature.  
Figure 1- 12 : Coefficient of variation 1980-2007*, EU-15 NUTS 2 regions 
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* The methodology currently in use to compute regional GDP per head differs from the one on which 
Cambridge Econometrics based its historical time series from 1980 to 2001. This explains the difference 
between the coefficient of variation obtained from Eurostat and Cambridge Econometrics data 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, Eurostat database. DG REGIO's calculation. 
As indicated earlier, measures of disparities do not capture the movement in individual regions. 
Looking in detail at these shows that convergence is still taking place in the EU-15. In almost 
half of the regions with a GDP per head below 60% of the EU-15 average in 1995, GDP per 
head had increased above the threshold by 2007. In one in three regions with a GDP per head 
between 60% and 75% of the EU-15 average in 1995, GDP per head had risen above 75% by 
2007. This shows that while the convergence has already taken place for regions with a GDP per 
head above 75% of the EU-15 average, the process continues for those with a GDP per head 
below 75%.  
This tendency, however, is not captured by dispersion indices as both the number of regions with 
lower levels of GDP per head and their weight is relatively small.  
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Economic and social development in candidate countries and the Western Balkans 
Croatia, FYROM and the Western Balkans 
In 2007 and 2008, the European Council has repeatedly reaffirmed that: ''the future of the 
Western Balkans lies within the European Union.'' The Western Balkans include Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, 
as well as Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244/99. 
Croatia, which is expected to conclude accession negotiations in 2010, is closest to EU 
membership. It also has the highest GDP per head, the level in all three Croatian regions being 
above the Western Balkan average. In Sjeverozapadna Hrvatska, it is twice as high, in the coastal 
region of Jadranska Hrvatska, 66% higher and in Središnja i Istočna (Panonska) Hrvatska 22% 
higher.  GDP in the last region grew fastest in the 10 years 1995–2005, at a rate of 5.6 % year, as 
against 4.7% a year in Sjeverozapanda Hrvatska and 2.8% a year in Jadranska Hrvatska. 
Between 1995 and 2008, GDP in Croatia grew by nearly 4% a year, but as a result of the global 
crisis, it fell by an estimated 5.8% in 2009 and it is forecast to grow very little in 2010. 
Though the level of economic development has increased since 1995, major structural 
imbalances remain. Participation and employment rates are low and long-term unemployment is 
high. In 2008, the employment rate was only 58% and for women just 50%. The unemployment 
rate was 8.4% in 2008, having fallen gradually from 15% in 2002. Because of the recession, it 
rose above 9% again in 2009 and may reach 10% in 2010. Over half of the unemployed in 2009 
had been looking for a job for over a year. Over a third of the population aged 25-64 has only 
basic education and only 16% tertiary education. 
Improvements in higher education and in the operation of the labour market, together with 
judicial and administrative reforms, are included in the country’s Pre-accession Economic 
Programme (PEP) for 2009–2011. These are important for the further development of the 
economy and to enable companies to cope with the competitive pressures they will face once 
Croatia joins the EU. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has been a candidate country since 
December 2005. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed in 2001 and 
entered into force in 2004. The Council adopted the Accession Partnership, defining the main 
priorities for progress in the accession process in February 2008. It also set 2010 as the start date 
for the process to begin. 
The other countries in the region which are considered potential candidates for EU entry, 
Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed SAAs in 2008. 
Montenegro has the second highest GDP per head in the region after Croatia (130% of the West 
Balkan average)) followed by Serbia (105% of the average), FYROM (93% of the average), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania (both just over 70% of the average), with Kosovo having 
by far the lowest level (only 20% of the average). Except for FYROM, where growth of GDP 
was just under 3% a year between 2000 and 2008, the growth rate in the other countries averaged 
around 5% a year or more. As a result of the crisis, GDP declined in 2009 in all the countries. 
Except in Serbia and Kosovo, population either remained unchanged over the period 2000-2008 
or increased – by 0.8% a year in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the highest growth in the region. 
All the potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans have similar structural problems to 
other transition countries. Overcoming them will be key to determining economic performance 
and EU entry. 
Map 1.7 Western Balkan: GDP per head in the Western Balkans (PPS), 2008 
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Box: Turkey 
The Turkish economy is a complex mix of modern industry, commerce and a traditional 
agricultural sector that still accounts for around 25% of employment. There is a strong and 
rapidly growing private sector and, while it remains a major participant in basic industry, 
banking, transport, and communications, the role of the State has been diminishing as the 
privatisation programme proceeds. The largest industrial sector, textiles and clothing, which 
accounts for a third of industrial employment, faces stiff competition in international markets. 
Other sectors, however, notably the automotive and electronics industries are growing in 
importance as regards exports. 
Real GDP growth has frequently exceeded 6% a year, but has been interrupted by sharp declines 
in output in 1994, 1999 and 2001. Growth was particularly strong between 2002 and 2007 
largely due to inward investment and IMF backing. GDP, however, declined in 2008 and 2009 
as a result of the global recession. Despite the large current account deficit and substantial 
foreign debts, further economic and judicial reforms and prospective EU membership are 
expected to boosting foreign direct investment in the future. 
GDP per head in Turkey in PPS terms was less than half the EU average in 2006. Moreover, 
regional disparities in GDP per head are relatively wide, with the level well above the national 
average in regions in the West and well below in those in the East. The Istanbul region, which 
accounts for 20% of the total population (70 million), had a GDP per head in 2006 which was 
70% above the national average, whereas in Van, on the Iranian border, it was almost 70% below 
the average. Between 1995 and 2005, GDP per head tended to increase by more in the regions 
with the lowest levels. 
Map 1.8: Turkey: GDP per head, 2006 
 
Box: Iceland: 
Iceland was one of the countries most severely hit by the financial crisis. GDP declined by 
around 10% in real terms in 2009 and unemployment leapt from only 1.3% in September 2008 to 
7.6% in October 2009. The banking system collapsed and the exchange value of the currency fell 
markedly. 
Iceland submitted an application for EU membership in July 2009, a prospect which is expected 
to have a stabilising effect on the economy. Iceland is already integrated into the EU economy 
through its membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) and since it is part of the 
Schengen area, its citizens can travel and work freely throughout the EU.   
The population of Iceland was 319 368 at the end of 2009, smaller than any of the current 
Member States.  
In 2009, its GDP per head in PPS terms fell by over 10 percentage points of the EU average to 
just 9% above. Domestic investment in 2009 was under a third of the level it had been two years 
earlier, with foreign direct investment halving. Inflation rate increased sharply in 2008 and was 
over 16% in 2009. Public sector debt doubled in 2008 to over 57% of GDP. Nevertheless, the 
country's economic base remains strong. 
GDP growth in Iceland was around 2 percentage points higher on average over the period 2000-
2008 than the EU average and over 5 percentage points higher in 2004 and 2005. As a result, the 
employment rate was much higher than in the EU and unemployment was just 1.6% of the 
labour force in 2008. Productivity, on the other hand, has fallen over time in relation to that in 
the EU to 2% below the EU average in 2008. 
 
Box: Economic and social development in the NAFTA countries 
When the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) was set up in 1994, most economists  
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expected that Mexico as the least developed member country stood most to gain from the free 
trade area. However, the expected economic convergence has been limited at best
7. Between 
2000 and 2006, for example, regional disparities in GDP per head inside NAFTA did not change. 
Major factors inhibiting a stronger economic convergence identified in the literature include the 
low quality of institutions, which can hinder or even block regional economic convergence, and 
the development gap. An analysis of the convergence process indicates that the more developed 
Mexican regions gained more from trade integration than the less developed
8. In 7 Mexican 
regions with among the lowest levels of GDP per head, GDP per head declined between 2000 
and 2006 (Map 1.9 and Map 1.10). 
Regional disparities in employment and unemployment rates in NAFTA in 2006 were also 
substantial. Employment rates were below 65% in 23 Mexican regions, Newfoundland and 
Labrador and Northwest Territories in Canada and Mississippi and West Virginia in the US. 
Unemployment was above 7% in 6 of the Northern Canadian provinces and Michigan compared 
to less than 3% in 19 Mexican regions and 6 US States. 
Regional disparities in GDP per head in the EU-27 are narrower than in NAFTA. Whereas in 
NAFTA disparities were not reduced between 2000 and 2006, in the EU, they diminished 
significantly partly because of a focus of policy support on the least developed regions. 
 
Map 1.9: NAFTA GDP/ per head (USDPPS), 2006 
Map 1.10: NAFTA Growth of GDP/ per head growth in real terms, 2000-2006 
1.1.4.  Geography of growth  
Metropolitan regions 
Metropolitan regions
9 accounted for 60% of the EU population in 2007 and 
68% of GDP. Between 2000 and 2007, these shares remained much the 
same, though there was a marginal increase in their share of population.  
This overall stability, however, hides significant variation across the EU. In 
most EU-12 countries, growth was much higher in the metropolitan regions 
than in others. Disparities which were already pronounced between the 
capital city region and the rest of the country in 2000 widened further. In the 
EU-15, the difference in GDP per head between the capital city region and 
the rest of the country was much smaller in 2000 and in most cases the 
difference narrowed between 2000 and 2007.  
                                                 
7   Wise, Carol, Great Expectations: Mexico's Short-Lived Convergence under NAFTA (January 2007). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=964913. 
8   Easterly, William et al, NAFTA and Convergence in North America: High Expectations, Big Events, 
Little Time in Economía, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Fall, 2003), pp. 1-53  Published by: The Brookings Institution. 
9    Metropolitan regions are NUTS 3 regions or groups of NUTS 3 regions that represent all EU 
agglomerations with more than 250 000 inhabitants. See Regional Focus 1/2009, Dijkstra as updated 
by  Metropolitan regions: towards a harmonisation of the OECD and European commission 
definitions. OECD, 2009 GOV/TDPC/TI(2009)6.  
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In the EU-15, the difference between the capital city region and the second 
metropolitan region
10 tends to be small. In 9 Member States, the second city 
region has a higher GDP per head than the capital. Moreover, employment 
rates are not necessarily higher in metropolitan regions: in France, Germany 
and the UK, they are higher elsewhere. 
In the EU-12, the situation is more extreme and the differences between the 
capital city region and the other metropolitan regions are much larger. These 
differences are partly due to a less favourable business environment outside 
the capital city region. Accessibility, IT usage, transport infrastructure and 
the level of education all tend to be significantly lower outside the capital 
city region. Employment rates in the capital city region are also typically 
much higher than elsewhere. These large discrepancies limit the possibility 
of rapid dispersion of economic growth, which may in turn reduce aggregate 
economic growth. The tendency in the EU-12 to concentrate public 
investment in the capital city region (see Chapter II) contributes to this.  
Predominantly rural, intermediate and predominantly urban regions 
In the EU-27, around 24% of the population live in predominantly rural 
regions
11, around 35% live in intermediate regions and slightly more than 
40% live in predominantly urban regions (Table 1.2). In most of the EU-12 
countries, a larger proportion of the population live in intermediate and 
predominantly rural regions, over 40% living in predominantly rural regions 
and only around 20% in predominantly urban ones (Map 1.11). 
In the EU-15, less than 20% of population live in predominantly rural 
regions and over 46% live in predominantly urban ones. These proportions, 
however, differ between countries. In Ireland, Finland, Greece and 
Denmark, between 43% and 72% of population live in predominantly rural 
regions, while in the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium, around 70% of the 
population live in predominantly urban ones. 
Map 1.11: Urban-rural typology of NUTS3 regions 
                                                 
10   See ESPON 2013 study on Secondary Growth Poles (ongoing)). 
11   See Dijkstra, L. and Poelman, H. A revised urban-rural typology. Chapter 15 of the Eurostat Regional 
Yearbook, 2010.  
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Table 1. 2 
as % of population in EU-12, EU-15 and EU
Predominantly 
Urban
Intermediate Predominanlty 
Rural
Total
EU-12 20.6 38.6 40.8 100
EU-15 46.2 34.7 19.2 100
EU 40.9 35.5 23.7 100
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
Share of population according to the urban-rural typology, 2007
 
In the EU-12, GDP per head in predominantly rural regions was only 73% of 
the national average in 2007 and almost 60% below the average in 
predominantly urban regions. In the EU-15, GDP per head in predominantly 
rural regions was more than 30% below that in predominantly urban ones 
(see also box on remote rural regions in the next section). 
The high concentration of economic activity and growth in urban regions 
and the large disparities between types of region is a major feature of the 
transition process and occurs primarily in less developed countries with high 
growth rates.  
Indeed, in 2000-2007, GDP in the EU-12 has grown at twice the rate in the 
EU-15. Not all regions gained equally from economic growth, however, and 
for many, their share of national GDP declined. This decline occurred 
mainly in intermediate and rural regions. Nevertheless, GDP per head in 
these regions still increased relative to the EU average. In the EU-15, GDP 
per head in rural regions increased in relative terms (Table 1.3).  
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Table 1. 3 : GDP per head (pps) in 2007 and change, 2000-2007  
according to the urban-rural typology 
Predominantly 
Urban
Intermediate Predominanlty 
Rural
Total
EU-12
GDP per head index 167 92 73 100
Change in GDP per head index* 4.6 -0.3 -2.6 0.0
EU-15
GDP per head index 114 91 82 100
Change in GDP per head index* -0.2 -0.7 1.2 0.0
EU-12
GDP per head index 94 52 41 56
Change in GDP per head index* 20.4 10.0 6.9 10.9
EU-15
GDP per head index 128 101 91 112
Change in GDP per head index* -4.5 -4.1 -1.6 -3.7
EU-27
GDP per head index 124 90 73 100
Change in GDP per head index* -1.6 -0.3 2.1 0.0
Note * change in index points
GDP per head (pps) in 2007 and change, 2000-2007 according to the urban-rural typology
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
relative to the EU-12 GDP per head index
relative to the EU-15 GDP per head index
relative to the EU-27 GDP per head index
 
As underlined in a recent study
12, as countries become more developed, the 
advantages of agglomeration become more widely spread throughout the 
country due to improvements in the business environment, communication 
and transport infrastructure and the education of the labour force outside the 
main urban regions. At the same time, some of the benefits of agglomeration 
are offset by congestion costs and high rents. As a result, economic activity 
will start to spread to less developed regions, often rural, and the gap 
between these and urban areas will start to close, leading to more balanced 
development. This seems to have occurred in the EU-15. 
Box: Territorial cohesion: new themes and new geographies 
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, a third dimension was added to the 
objective of cohesion: the EU 'shall promote economic, social and territorial 
cohesion.' As with economic and social cohesion, territorial cohesion highlights a 
number of issues that merit more attention. Economic and social cohesion focuses 
on regional disparities in competitiveness and well-being; Territorial cohesion 
reinforces the importance of access to services, sustainable development, 
‘functional geographies’ and territorial analysis.  
(a)  Access to services of general economic interest 
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced territorial cohesion in the article on 
access to services of general economic interest, which include education, health 
care and commercial, financial and business services. In remote and sparsely 
                                                 
12   ESPON 2013 Programme, CAFE: The Case for Agglomeration Economies in Europe, Applied 
Research Project 2013/2/1, Interim report, 2009.  
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populated regions, physical accessibility is a prominent concern. This is 
increasingly being overcome by e-services such as e-health, e-education, e-
government and e-banking. In other regions, access may be hindered by cost or a 
lack of knowledge of the system or, among migrants, of the local language. In 
some cases, discrimination may also limit this access. 
(b)  The environmental dimension of sustainable development
13 
Environmental protection, climate change and renewable energy production all 
have a strong territorial dimension. The territorial dimension of environmental 
protection, which ranges from air quality and waste water treatment to protected 
habitats and species under Natura 2000 and the provision of ecosystem services, is 
increasingly recognised. The growing threat of climate change and the political 
goal to radically increase the share of renewable energy in the EU underlines the 
fact that policies at different levels will need to be coordinated to respond to these 
various threats and opportunities in an efficient and effective way and to avoid 
them counteracting each other.  
(c) Functional  geographies 
Whereas most policies focus on a single administrative geographic level, the 
pursuit of territorial cohesion implies a more functional and flexible approach. 
Depending on the issue, the appropriate geographical dimension ranges from a 
macro region, such as the Baltic Sea or the Danube region, to metropolitan and 
cross-border regions or a group of rural areas and market towns. Such a flexible 
geography can better capture the positive and negative externalities of 
concentration, improve connections and facilitate cooperation and so be more 
effective in furthering territorial cohesion. 
(d) Territorial  analysis 
There is need for a better knowledge of the EU in territorial terms and more robust 
ways of estimating the territorial impact of EU policies. On this front, Eurostat, the 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the European Environmental Agency (EEA) have 
already significantly increased the data available for more finely defined 
geographical areas. For example, the Urban Audit and the Urban Atlas provide 
more indicators for cities, Eurostat and the National Statistical Institutes have 
increased data at NUTS 3 level and the JRC and EEA are providing more grid data 
and developing more detailed models. ESPON is making use of these new data and 
undertaking territorial trend analyses, impact assessments and prospective studies 
(see section on Territorial Impact Assessment in Chapter 3). 
 
Box: Border regions 
Border regions
14 consist of those along the internal borders of the EU, some 
external borders, maritime borders separated by a maximum distance of 150 km 
and regions that share borders with European Free Trade Area countries. Regions 
included in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and 
the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) are also included.  
A large proportion of the EU population lives in border regions – in 2007, over 196 
                                                                                                                                                 
13   See also The territorial dimension of environmental sustainability. Technical report No 9/2010, EEA, 
2009, Copenhagen 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/the-territorial-dimension-of-environmental-sustainability . 
14  NUTS 3 level regions eligible for cross-border cooperation programmes under the ERDF regulation.  
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million people, or almost 40% of the total. Most of these live in internal border 
regions (36% of the EU population). Population growth between 2000 and 2007 
was much the same in both internal and external border regions (at around 0.3% a 
year).  
On average, GDP per head is less than the EU average (89% of the average in 
2007), though the gap narrowed slightly between 2000 and 2007. GDP per head is 
less in the external border regions (65% of the EU average) than in internal border 
regions (92% of the average), though growth was higher in the former group, 
because many of them are in the EU-12, than in the latter. 
Unemployment was also higher in external border regions (8.3%) than in internal 
ones (7.3%). In addition, external border regions also have, on average, a larger 
share of their employment in agriculture than internal border regions. 
Access to basic services is, on average, more limited in border regions, particularly 
in external ones, where proximity to a hospital or a university is much less than in 
the rest of the Union. This is also true of access to an airport, especially for regions 
in and around the Carpathian Mountains in Romania, in North-East Poland, 
Hungary, Lithuania, and Estonia.  
One of the major features of border regions is that levels of development between 
regions located on the two sides of the border are sometimes very different. This is 
the case between Eastern external border regions of the EU and neighbouring 
regions, but also between some internal border regions. For instance, GDP per head 
is up to three times higher in border regions of Lithuania as in neighbouring 
regions of Belarus, though almost the same gap exists between Luxembourg and 
the neighbouring regions in Belgium (though here commuting between the two is a 
significant reason for this).   
The challenges faced by internal and external border regions differ. For internal 
border regions, the main challenge is to develop further cross border cooperation so 
as to overcome the remaining political and administrative barriers that hinder 
regional integration. For external border regions, especially in Central and Eastern 
Member States, the challenge is more one of expanding and improving basic 
infrastructure, including cross border transport and communication links. It is also 
one, in some cases, of having neighbouring regions with very low levels of 
development, such as for Dél-Alföld in Hungary which is one of the poorest 
regions in the EU and shares a border with Serbia, which has a GDP per head of 
less than 20% of the EU average. 
Environmental changes can equally have important cross-border effects. Already 
there are several nature reserves which cross national borders, such as the 
Kalmthoutse Heide in Belgium and the Netherlands and the Thayatal and Podyjí 
International Park in Austria and the Czech Republic. Environmental disasters such 
as floods or fires and air or water pollution also frequently cross borders. Good 
cross-border cooperation is key to minimising the damage to the environment from 
such events. 
 
1.2.  Sources of growth 
The growth of GDP of a region is determined by the value added of the goods and 
services it produces for internal and external markets. Increases in value added, 
depending on efficiency gains and the capital and labour intensity of the sectors  
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concerned, can lead to employment growth. The balance a regional economy needs 
to strike is to ensure that, on the one hand, the services and goods it produces are 
competitively priced and, on the other, wages provide workers with a good quality 
of life. Productivity growth is key to providing higher wages without losing 
competitiveness. It is also the main source of growth of GDP per head and it is 
likely to become even more so as the share of people of working age in total 
population shrinks.  
Growth of GDP per head can be broken down into changes in labour productivity, 
employment rates and the share of the working age population in the total. Table 1.4 
shows the breakdown of growth in GDP per head over the period 2000-2007 
between these three components. 
Table 1. 4 
 Sources of economic growth, 2000-2007(annual average % changes)
15 
                          
     
Change in GDP 
per head 
= 
Change in 
productivity
+
Change in 
employment 
rate  + 
Change in the 
share of working 
age population 
                          
EU-27     1.79 =  1.40 + 0.40 + 0.00 
CONV     3.03 =  2.54 + 0.21 + 0.26 
TRAN
S    2.26 =  1.00 + 1.26 + 0.00 
RCE     1.39 =  1.10 + 0.38 + -0.10 
 
Source: DG REGIO, Eurostat 
Over the period, GDP per head in the EU regions as a whole grew by 1.8% a year. 
Productivity grew at an annual rate of 1.4% and was responsible for nearly 80% of 
the growth. Employment increased by 0.4% a year and was responsible for 20% of 
the growth. The share of the working age population in the total remained broadly 
unchanged. 
In the Convergence regions (i.e. those that from 2007 have been eligible for ERDF 
support under this Objective), productivity grew by more than the EU average. 
Many of these regions are in the EU-12 and in a phase of transformation, with 
output and employment shifting from the less productive activities to those with 
higher value added. As a consequence, the employment in this group grew by only 
0.2% a year contributing just 7% to the total growth in GDP per head. On average, 
Convergence regions have a larger share of population in the younger age groups 
than the rest of the EU, resulting in working-age population increasing relative to 
the total despite its decline in absolute terms. 
By contrast, changes in the employment rate contributed more to growth of GDP per 
head than productivity in the Transition
16 regions. The number of people employed 
                                                 
15   The formula for this decomposition is GDPn/Populationn = GDPn/Employment * 
Employmentn/Working Age populationn * Working Age populationn /Populationn   
By dividing each of the components by the value in year n-1, changes can be calculated and summed 
to produce the overall effect on GDP per head as in table 1.4.   
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increased at the same time as productivity, indicating that there is no necessary 
trade-off between the two. The share of working age population in the total 
remained unchanged. 
The growth in RCE regions came almost entirely from productivity growth, while a 
decline in the share of working age population in total, reflecting demographic 
ageing, lowered the growth in GDP per head slightly. While the increase in GDP 
per head was highest on average in the Convergence regions (3%), there were 
widely different experiences within the group. 
In the 10 fastest growing regions
17, GDP per head increased by over 8% a year over 
the period. These were all located in the EU-12. The 10 slowest growing regions,
18 
many of them in Italy, had an average rate of growth of GDP per head of only 0.2% 
a year. 
In the group of top performers, productivity made the largest contribution to growth. 
With the exception of three Romanian regions, productivity increased along with an 
increase in the demand for labour - and the employment rate - and the share of 
working-age population. 
In slow-growing regions, sluggish growth of GDP per head was associated with 
declining productivity, which occurred in all the regions except Franche-Comté, the 
only region in which employment fell.  This suggests a clear trade-off between 
growth of labour productivity and employment in these cases, any growth of the 
former being a result of lower employment rather than of a long-term improvement 
in productive capacity. In addition, in all the regions in the group, except Illes 
Balears, the share of population of working age declined. This reflects outward 
migration and a lack of inward movement, since migration flows consist 
disproportionately of younger people. In a region with low employment rates, 
outward migration can help to free up jobs for those who stay, but it can also lead to 
less productive workers being employed and a decline in productivity. 
Among the RCE regions, growth was highest in the Slovak and the Czech capital 
city regions followed by regions in Ireland (Southern and Eastern), Finland 
(Pohjois-Suomi, Länsi-Suomi), the Netherlands (Flevoland), the UK (East Anglia, 
Hampshire and Isle of Wight), and Sweden (Västsverige). Along with little change 
or a slight decline (Pohjois-Suomi, Länsi-Suomi) in the share of working age 
population, both, productivity and the employment rate increased simultaneously in 
these regions. Overall, the increase in GDP per head was largest in regions that 
succeeded in increasing productivity together with employment (see also the box 
Factors of growth below). 
                                                                                                                                                 
16   Transition regions are regions eligible for phasing in or phasing out. They are called transition to 
highlight their intermediate stage between convergence and competitiveness regions. 
17   Latvia, Yugozapaden (Bulgaria), Lithuania, Vest (Romania), Estonia, Nord-Vest (Romania), Západné 
Slovensko (Slovakia),Sud-Muntenia (Romania), Bucureşti-Ilfov (Romania), Bratislavský kraj 
(Slovakia)  
18   Lombardia (Italy), Piemonte (Italy), Puglia (Italy), Franche-Comté (France), Emilia-Romagna (Italy), 
Abruzzo (Italy), Umbria (Italy), Berlin (Germany), Privincia Autonoma Trento (Italy), Illes Balears 
(Spain)   
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1.2.1.  A declining share of working-age population 
The share of working age population indicates the potential supply of labour 
relative to total population. As in the EU, life expectancy continues to 
increase and the number of births to fall (further) below the replacement 
level, the share of the working age population is likely to decline in the 
coming decades. At the EU level, the change in the share of working age 
population has been close to zero but in many regions it has already started 
to decline, so reducing the potential growth in GDP per head. In 2009, two 
out of three regions had a declining share of working-age population. By 
2013, this is projected to be the case in 9 out of 10 regions and will continue 
to be so over the next two decades.  
The Eurostat regional population projections indicate that the decline in the 
share of working age population could be particularly pronounced in parts of 
Germany, France, Poland, Finland and Sweden. On the other hand, 
Romania, Greece, Portugal and Ireland are likely to have considerably 
smaller reductions. 
1.2.2.  Growth in employment rates can help less developed regions  
Growth in employment rates was the main source of growth in the Transition 
regions. In Convergence and RCE regions, the contribution of employment 
was much smaller
19. This, however, hides substantial differences between 
regions and the potential for increases in employment rates to push up GDP 
per head.  
This potential contribution can be estimated by examining the effect of 
increasing employment rates of people aged 20-64 to 75%, a target set by 
the Europe 2020 strategy. Achieving this target will require not only a 
reduction in unemployment but also many of the inactive to enter the labour 
market, particularly in the Convergence regions where labour participation 
tends to be lower than in the more developed regions. This target can only be 
reached if there is an increase in the participation in the labour market of 
women especially. This might require more favourable, or flexible, 
employment conditions and sufficient child care provision to allow parents 
of young children, especially mothers, to combine employment with raising 
a family.  
Raising the employment rate to 75% would increase GDP per head
20 in the 
EU by more than 6%. While the effect would be much more important in the 
Convergence regions (17%), it is also significant in RCE regions (3% and 
from a higher base value)  (Map 1.12). 
                                                 
19   In this growth decomposition, employment rates are calculated based on employment figures from 
regional accounts. As a result, these rates and their changes over time may not correspond exactly with 
employment rates as measured by the Labour Force Survey. 
20    Assuming the additional employment created has the same average productivity as the current 
employment.  
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Map 1.12: Potential increase in GDP per head  
from raising the employment rate 20-64, to 75%, 2007 
The main issue is how to achieve these results and to overcome the main 
obstacles. For example, the positive employment growth in Transition 
regions could be the result of a sufficiently high output growth to allow 
employment to grow at the same time as productivity gains are realised. 
Convergence regions, on the other hand, are still in the process of 
restructuring with rapid falls in employment in agriculture (see next section) 
and increases in employment in the other sectors. Increasing output 
sufficiently to allow Convergence regions to reach 75% employment rates 
while productivity catches up with that in the rest of the EU could take more 
than a decade. Output and productivity in RCE regions are already high, but 
employment rates could still increase in some RCE regions. Here the 
constraint on increasing employment further could be a lack of incentive to 
pursue higher rates of output growth, coupled with rigidities in the labour 
market which obstruct employment growth, underlining the need for 
continuing structural reforms. 
Employment rates in the Nordic countries, the UK and the Netherlands are 
already in most regions above the 75% target. On the other hand, in 
Southern Spain, Southern Italy, Greece, and many of the regions in the EU-
12 rates are considerably below 65% (Map 1.13). 
Map 1.13: Employment rate, 20-64, in 2008 and distance to the Europe 2020 target 
Map 1.14: Change in employment rate, 20-64, 2000-2008 
In regions with high levels of employment rates, employment rates cannot 
increase much more and so cannot make an important contribution to 
economic growth. In these regions, economic growth depends almost 
entirely on productivity growth, the focus of the next section.  
1.2.3.  Innovation and restructuring have the largest impact 
Productivity growth is the combined effect of improvements in productivity 
within a sector (i.e. innovation) and shifts between sectors (i.e. 
restructuring). Restructuring shifts employment to more productive sectors. 
This occurs mostly in countries at an earlier stage of economic development. 
Productivity growth within sectors can have a long-lasting impact on the 
economy and on competitiveness. Innovation in the broad sense, including 
investment in R&D as well as better use of existing technology and 
resources, new management and organisation techniques, is a major source 
of the latter. 
Map 1.15 shows the increase in productivity growth within sectors. It shows 
that in most regions in the EU-12, the increase has been significant, 
reflecting the introduction of more technically advanced and more efficient 
production and organisation.  
FDI is an important channel for innovation. Regions with a higher share of 
FDI tend to have higher growth of productivity within sectors. The 
Convergence regions in the EU-15 show only small increases in productivity  
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within sectors and in many of them, mainly in Italy and Greece, 
competitiveness declined. The examples of Finland, Sweden, UK and 
Ireland show that innovation can increase productivity at any stage of 
economic development. 
Map 1.15: Productivity growth within sectors, 2000-2007 
Map 1.16: Productivity growth through employment shifts between sectors, 
2000-2007 
The growth of productivity through restructuring and a shift to higher value-added 
sectors – from agriculture to industry and services – has been most marked in the 
Convergence regions (Map 1.16). 
In the Convergence regions, around 48% of the increase in labour productivity was 
due to restructuring and 52% to productivity growth within sectors. In the RCE 
regions, there was limited employment shift between sectors and productivity 
differences were less marked, so almost 90% of the increase in productivity came 
from productivity growth within sectors. 
Table 1.5 shows the effect of restructuring which is strongest in the Convergence 
regions, where it represents mainly a shift from less productive to more productive 
sectors, from agriculture to industry and services. The RCE regions have on average 
a much higher level of productivity and a larger share of employment in high value-
added sectors. Employment shifts occur mainly within sectors, e.g. from low to 
high-tech industry, or from industry to services where deindustrialisation is still 
occurring (as in Germany).  
48 
Table 1. 5 
Sources of growth in labour productivity, 2000 - 2007 
                    
     
Growth of 
productivity
=
Growth of 
productivity 
within sectors  +
Employment 
shifts between 
sectors 
                    
EU-27     1.4 = 1.0 + 0.4 
CONV     2.5 = 1.3 + 1.2 
TRAN
S     1.0 = 0.7 + 0.3 
RCE     1.1 = 1.0 + 0.1 
 
Source: DG REGIO, Eurostat 
1.3.  Innovation is the main driver of regional development 
Financial and business services experienced the highest employment growth in the 
EU between 2000 and 2007. With an annual average growth rate of 2.6%, it was 
much higher than overall employment growth of only 0.6%. This sector also had the 
highest employment growth in all three types of region (Convergence, Transition 
and RCE) (Table 1.6). 
Employment decline was concentrated in agriculture, where it amounted to 5.6% a 
year, and industry, where it was 0.6% a year. The pattern across the three types of 
regions, however, is radically different. The decline in agricultural employment was 
the largest in the Convergence regions, while industrial employment actually 
increased a little in these regions. The largest decline in industrial employment was 
in the RCE regions, where it amounted to 1.3% a year. 
Though these changes led to some convergence in the structure of employment 
across regions, this still differs substantially. Despite the strong decline, 
Convergence regions continue to have a far larger share of employment in 
agriculture – 14% of the total, almost three times that in Transition regions and six 
times that in RCE regions. Although productivity growth in agriculture was very 
high in the Convergence regions (6.4% a year), the modernisation of the sector still 
has a long way to go to close the gap in productivity with RCE regions (where it is 
three time higher). 
The share of employment in industry is also larger in Convergence regions and has 
increased since 2000, whereas it has diminished in Transition and RCE regions. 
This is particularly striking given that industrial productivity is three times higher in 
RCE regions than in Convergence regions. 
The construction sector has grown substantially in Convergence and Transition 
regions and accounts for a larger share of employment than in RCE regions. The 
crisis, however, has reduced employment substantially, especially in countries 
where real estate values fell dramatically, such as in Spain, Ireland and the Baltic 
States. 
The strength of the service sector is linked to the level of regional development. It 
accounts for the largest share of employment in the RCE regions, where the share of  
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business and financial services is also large. In Transition regions, the employment 
share of distribution, transport and communications is larger than in the RCE 
regions, whereas business and financial services are considerably less developed. In 
Convergence regions, the employment share in all three service sectors is below the 
EU average. In particular, the share of employment in business and financial 
services is only half that in the RCE regions and the share of gross value-added, 
two-thirds as high. 
Table 1. 6 
Employment and productivity by sector, 2007
Share in 2007 (%)
CONV TRANSITION RCE EU-27 CONV TRANSITION RCE EU-27
Agriculture,hunting and fishing 13.7 4.8 2.4 5.8 4.1 2.6 1.4 1.8
Total industry, including energy 21.4 14.3 17.3 18.3 21.4 16.1 20.0 19.9
Construction 8.5 10.7 7.1 7.7 8.2 8.6 5.9 6.4
Trade, transport & communication 23.6 29.0 25.2 25.0 22.7 26.1 20.6 21.3
Financial and business services 8.4 11.6 16.8 14.1 20.2 22.3 30.2 28.2
Other services 24.4 29.6 31.2 29.1 23.5 24.4 22.0 22.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Annual average % change, 2000-2007
CONV TRANSITION RCE EU-27 CONV TRANSITION RCE EU-27
Agriculture,hunting and fishing -5.6 -1.7 -1.2 -4.4 -0.6 -0.9 -0.2 -0.4
Total industry, including energy 0.5 -0.3 -1.3 -0.6 4.1 2.1 1.4 1.8
Construction 3.3 3.6 1.7 2.4 2.2 3.7 1.5 1.8
Trade, transport & communication 1.9 2.0 0.6 1.1 3.5 4.1 2.3 2.5
Financial and business services 3.2 4.6 2.3 2.6 3.7 3.9 2.9 3.0
Other services 1.6 2.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.5 1.3 1.4
Total 0.4 2.0 0.6 0.6 2.9 3.1 2.0 2.2
Productivity 
(GVA in PPS per person employed)
CONV TRANSITION RCE EU-27 CONV TRANSITION RCE EU-27
Agriculture,hunting and fishing 20 52 64 34 6 0 1 5
Total industry, including energy 69 109 135 111 4 3 3 3
Construction 62 78 97 84 0 0 0 0
Trade, transport & communication 64 89 95 86 3 2 2 2
Financial and business services 151 189 207 196 1 0 1 1
Other services 59 79 81 76 0 0 0 0
Total 65 98 116 100 4 1 1 2
Source: Eurostat
Index (EU=100), 2007  Annual average % change, 2000-2007
Employment GVA
Employment GVA
 
1.3.1.  Human capital 
Training and higher education can increase labour productivity. Higher 
education also tends to increase people's incomeand life satisfaction 
independently of income levels (see next section). The share of people aged 
25-64 with tertiary education, however, varies greatly across regions (Map 
1.17). In 9 regions, it is over 40% (Inner London, Brussels and the two 
surrounding regions, Utrecht, País Vasco, and the capital city regions of 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland). All of these, except País Vasco, are capital 
city regions or adjoin a capital city region. In all Member States, except 
Germany and Spain, the capital city region has the largest share of people 
with tertiary education (see also the section on metropolitan regions). 
Map 1.17: Population aged 25-64 with tertiary education, 2008 
Map 1.18: Population aged 25-64 with low education, 2008  
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In four regions, the share was less than 10%: Severozápad in the Czech 
Republic, the Açores, and Sud–Muntenia and Sud-Est in Romania. Overall 
regions with small numbers of tertiary educated people are concentrated in 
Italy, Portugal, Romania and the Czech Republic. 
Figure 1- 13 
High education rate by country and regional extremes, 2008
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Figure 1- 13 indicates the extent to which the regional variation is concealed 
by the national averages. For example, Belgium has a smaller average share 
than Ireland, but in Brussels and the surrounding two regions, the share is 
larger than in the capital city region of Ireland. The same holds true for 
Romania and Greece. The more educated also tend to be more mobile. Their 
concentration in capital city regions is a result not only of universities being 
disproportionately located there, but also of people moving there after 
completing their tertiary education elsewhere.  
Differences in the share of highly educated are also apparent between the 
three types of regions. In RCE and transition regions, 26-27% of people 
aged 25-64 have tertiary education. In Convergence regions, the proportion 
is only 18%.  
The younger generation right across the EU is almost twice as likely to have 
completed tertiary education as those aged 55-64 (31% as against 16%). The 
increase between these two generations, however, is bigger in RCE than 
Convergence regions, which means that the gap between the two types of 
regions has widened over the past 30 years. 
Regions with a larger share of tertiary educated have considerably higher 
levels of productivity than those with smaller shares, which is one of the 
reasons why the Europe 2020 strategy aims to increase the share of tertiary 
educated aged 30-34 to at least 40% (Map 1.19). The tertiary educated, and 
in particular researchers, play a key role in production, transfer and 
exploitation of new knowledge. In 2007, the average relationship between 
productivity and the share of tertiary educated aged 25-64 indicated that 
productivity was 780 PPS higher for every percentage point the share of  
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tertiary educated was above average
21. This suggests that raising the share of 
tertiary educated would also lead to an increase in GDP (though not 
automatically so, since other factors may well contribute to the relationship 
observed). Most regions would stand to gain (Map 1.20). On the basis of the 
relationship, GDP per head in the EU, as well as in the Transition and RCE 
regions, would stand to rise by 3-4% and in the Convergence regions by 
10%. 
Map 1. 19 : Population aged 30-34 with a tertiary education in 2008 and distance to 
Europe 2020 target 
Map 1. 20 : Potential increase in GDP per head from raising the share of tertiary 
educated aged 25-34 to 40%, 2007 
Of course, increasing the share of tertiary educated people aged 25-64 
cannot be done overnight. Most people across the EU complete their 
university degree by the age of 25 and almost all by the time they are 35. 
Evidence from the Labour Force Survey indicates that very few people who 
have started working interrupt their career to spend 3-4 years completing a 
tertiary degree course. This underlines the importance of lifelong learning, 
which includes access to training of various kinds as well as university 
courses. As a result, most of the increase in the share of the tertiary educated 
working age population comes from those under 35, one of the reasons why 
they are the focus of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
At present, only a fifth of the EU regions have a tertiary educated share 
among the population aged 25-64 of 30% or more. If current trends 
continue, only half of EU regions will reach 30% by 2020. Simulations show 
that the share of tertiary educated among 25-64 year-olds would increase to 
nearly 30% if the share of tertiary educated among those aged 25-34 were 
raised to 40%. Even achieving this target achieved in all regions from 2010 
onwards, however, would still mean that one in three regions would have a 
share of tertiary educated among those of 25-64 below 30% in 2020. This 
makes it particularly important to push the trend up. 
Nevertheless, tertiary education is neither the only nor an automatic source 
of highly skilled workers. Skills upgrading at all levels can significantly 
increase the number of highly skilled workers, especially when linked to 
labour market needs - a link that can be more easily established at regional 
level
22 (Map 1.21). Researchers in particular need to be fully equipped with 
the skills necessary to participate in a range of roles in the knowledge 
economy. Links between an excellent public research base and business are 
vital. Intersectoral mobility between academia, industry and other partners 
can ensure that highly skilled workers have the skills and competences 
necessary for successful innovation.  
                                                 
21   This estimate is based on the correlation between regional productivity and regional shares of tertiary 
educated aged 25-64 in 2007.  
22   Intangible Assets and Regional Economic Growth (IAREG) Scientific Executive Summary, 2010.  
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Map 1. 21: Participation of adults aged 25-64 in education and training, 2008 
The precise number and nature of the jobs in the future - and of the skills 
they will require – will depend on long-term structural factors such as 
research, innovation, technological change, globalisation and demographic 
trends but also on the extent and pace of the recovery from the current 
economic downturn.  
Projections up to 2020 show that the share of jobs employing those with 
upper secondary (i.e. medium level) qualifications is likely to remain 
substantial, at around 50%
23. Those in work will need to update and upgrade 
their skills, especially the low-qualified, who are far less likely to participate 
in lifelong learning than those with tertiary education.  
Increasing the employment rate (as indicated in section 1.2.2) or the share of 
tertiary educated, alone, can have important benefits on the economy, 
especially in the lagging regions but the effect increases and lasts longer if 
the two occur simultaneously (Table 1.7). Increasing the employment rate at 
the same time as the share of tertiary educated is likely to mean that the 
additional jobs created have a higher productivity then the current one. In 
other words, regions will not only create jobs but they will create the kinds 
of job that raise productivity and living standards. This would lead to an 
increase in GDP per head in the EU of 11% and in the Convergence regions 
of nearly a third. As indicated in the table, an integrated approach to 
investment in both employment and education, especially in regions with 
low employment rates, as in many of the Convergence and Transition 
regions, means that the result is more than the sum of its parts. Moreover, 
the evidence indicates that increasing education levels in less developed 
regions will not only benefit the economy but will also contribute to better 
local institutions. 
Table 1. 7 – Increase in GDP per head (in %) from fulfilling the Europe 2020 target 
for the employment rate and tertiary education, 2007 
   EU-27 
CON
V 
TRAN
S RCE 
1  Increasing the employment rate of 20-64 to 75%  6 17  11  3 
2 
Increasing the share of tertiary educated 
population aged 25-34 to 40%  4 10 4 3 
3  Point 1 and 2 simultaneously  11  29 16 6 
       Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO calculation 
The share of people with low education – who have at the most only 
completed compulsory education – is substantial in all the Southern Member 
States, except Cyprus, varying on average between 40% and 75% of those 
aged 25-64 (Map 1.18 and Figure 1.14). All five countries have regions 
where only half of the potential work force has at most completed lower 
secondary education. People with a low education are less likely to have a 
job and more likely to have low income and low life expectancy. 
                                                 
23   Cedefop 2010. Skills supply and demand in Europe. Medium term forecasts to 2020.  
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Encouraging more people to complete at least upper secondary education is, 
accordingly, not just beneficial for economic growth. 
The Europe 2020 ‘early-school leaving’ target of having at most 10% of 
people aged 18-24 with no education beyond basic schooling has been 
reached in 85 NUTS 2 regions, around one in three, but it will require a 
substantial effort in many regions to achieve it, especially in the 15 regions 
in Spain and Portugal where the rate is still above 30% (Map 1.19). 
Map 1. 22 Early school leavers aged 18-24, 2007-08  
and distance to the Europe 2020 target 
Figure 1- 14 
Low education rate by country and regional extremes, 2008
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The quality of secondary education, however, is as important as the quantity. 
Surveys carried out by the OECD in this regard (Map 1.23) show that also 
the share of low achievers in mathematics, reading and science also differs 
substantially between Member States. Bulgaria and Romania consistently 
show a share of more than 30% of low achievers in these areas. Greece, Italy 
and Portugal have more than 30% of low achievers in mathematics, but 
score slightly better in the other two areas. 
Map 1.23: Low achievers in mathematics, reading and science - 2006 
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Box: Factors of Growth 
As highlighted by the OECD
24, since the end of the 1990's Governments across the EU have 
progressively emphasised the regional dimension of economic policy. At the centre of this 
approach is the challenge of designing policies that are appropriate at the local level. 
However, the prerequisite for the success of such a policy is the ability to identify the key 
determinants of growth at regional level. This is precisely the objective of an on-going 
study commissioned by DG REGIO which seeks to deepen understanding of economic 
development in EU regions and analyse the factors underlying the diversity of performance. 
The literature tends to group determinants of growth into the following broad categories
25: 
Accumulation of factors of production, usually physical and human capital as well as 
technology. Such accumulation is supposed to be facilitated by well functioning financial 
and labour markets and is affected by various other features such as: 
-  The age structure of the population;  
-  Natural geography which includes the endowment of natural resources but also the 
region's topography; 
-  Economic geography which focuses on aspects such as access to large product or factor 
markets or the density of economic activity within the region; 
-  The policy and institutional context which encompasses aspects such as the quality of 
governance or the macroeconomic framework of which the regional economy is a part. 
Up to date econometric techniques have been used to assess which of a large number (more 
than 60) of potential growth determinants included in the categories above are the most 
robust drivers of regional growth:  
-  Education levels (or human capital) appear to be one of the most important growth 
factors, especially the share of working age population with tertiary education. This also 
links to innovation as a higher educated and skilled workforce facilitates a rapid 
diffusion of knowledge and new techniques. The estimates imply that an increase of 
10% in the share of highly educated in working-age population tends on average to raise 
growth of GDP per head by 0.6 percentage points a year. 
-  Gross fixed capital formation is also identified as an important factor. This directly 
affects the productive capacity of regions by increasing the stock of physical capital but 
mainly by increasing productivity and the diffusion of innovation since capital tends to 
embody the latest technology.  
-  Low unemployment rates, which reflect the sound operation of labour markets as well 
as factor accumulation, regional flexibility and social cohesion, also favour growth.  
-  Neighbourhood effects are important, in the sense that the growth performance of a 
region partly depends on growth in surrounding regions.  
Regions with capital cities tend equally to have higher growth rates than other regions. In 
general employment density (rather than population density) has a positive effect on 
growth, reflecting the fact that high job density leads to dense social interaction which 
increases the scope for knowledge dissemination, so in turn stimulating innovations and 
growth. 
                                                 
24   OECD, 'Investing for Growth: Building Innovative Regions', Background Report for the Meeting of 
the Territorial Development Policy Committee at Ministerial Level, March 2009.  
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1.3.2.  Regional innovation systems 
Innovation and creativity have many sources ranging from cultural diversity 
and tolerance, to entrepreneurship and the creative class
26. In this section, 
the focus is mostly on technological innovation and its diffusion and 
absorption. 
Disparities remain wide across both Member States and regions as regards 
innovation capacity. According to the Summary Innovation Index (SII) of 
the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS)
27, the highest innovative capacity 
is found in the Nordic countries, with Sweden and Finland having a higher 
capacity than Japan and the US. Performance is in general lower than 
average in the EU-12 countries, although some of these (Cyprus, Estonia and 
the Czech Republic) perform better than Southern EU-15 Member States. 
The EIS distinguishes four groups of country: 
-  Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and the UK with innovation 
performance well above the EU average; 
-  Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands with 
innovation performance slightly above the EU average; 
-  Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain with performance slightly below the EU average; 
-  Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia with performance well below the EU average. 
Changes which have occurred in innovation performance over recent years 
point to a process of convergence. Except for Italy, Lithuania and Spain, 
Member States with innovative capacity below the EU average recorded 
higher than average increases in performance. At the same time, except for 
Austria and Ireland, in Member States with innovation capacity above the 
                                                                                                                                                 
25   Besides the initial level of development which is at the basis of the process of catching-up. 
26   COM(2009) 295 
27    The SII gives an overview of aggregate national innovation performance. It is calculated as a 
composite of the 29 indicators grouped into 7 different innovation dimensions and 3 major groups of  
dimensions: (i) ‘Enablers’, i.e. the main drivers of innovation external to the firm. It is divided into a 
‘Human resources’ and a ‘Finance and support’ dimensions; (ii) ‘Firm activities’, i.e. innovation 
efforts that firms undertake. It covers 3 dimensions: ‘Firm investments’ (a range of different 
investments firms make in order to generate innovations); ‘Linkages & entrepreneurship’ (capturing 
the entrepreneurial efforts and the related collaboration efforts); and ‘Throughputs’ (capturing among 
others the Intellectual Property Rights generated as a throughput in the innovation process); (iii) 
‘Outputs’, i.e. the outputs of firm activities. It is divided into 2 dimensions: ‘Innovators’ (the number 
of firms that have introduced innovations onto the market or within their organisations) and 
‘Economic effects’ (success of innovation in terms of employment, exports and sales due to 
innovation activities).  
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EU average, innovation performance has risen by much the same or less than 
the EU average.  
According to the Regional Innovation Scoreboard
28 the most innovative 
regions are typically in the most innovative countries. Nearly all of these are 
located in the group of 'Innovation Leader countries identified in the 
European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS). Similarly all of the 'low innovator' 
regions are located in countries that have below average performance in the 
EIS. However, the results also show regions that outperform their country 
level:  
-  Noord-Brabant is a high innovating region located in an 'Innovation 
follower' country (the Netherlands).  
-  Praha in the Czech Republic, País Vasco, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, 
Comunidad de Madrid and Cataluña in Spain, Lombardia and Emilia-
Romagna in Italy and Zahodna Slovenija in Slovenia are all medium-
high innovating regions in moderate innovator and catching up countries.  
-  The capital city regions in Hungary and Slovakia show an innovation 
level around the EU average but are located in catching up countries 
whose overall innovation performance is well below average.  
Regions have different strengths and weaknesses. According to more 
detailed analysis of those regions where good data are available, regions are 
performing at different levels across three dimensions of innovation included 
in the EIS: innovation enablers, firm activities and innovation outputs. 
Although the relationship between levels of performance and relative 
strengths is not straight-forward, many of the 'low innovators' have a relative 
weakness as regards innovation enablers which includes human resources.  
Regional performance appears relatively stable since 2004. The pattern of 
innovation was broadly unchanged between 2004 and 2006, with only a few 
changes in the membership of the different groups. More specifically, most 
of the changes are positive and concern Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana, 
Illes Balears, and Ceuta (Spain), Bassin Parisien, Est and Sud-Ouest 
(France), Unterfranken (Germany), Közép-Dunántúl (Hungary) and Algarve 
(Portugal). Longer time series data is needed to analyse the dynamics of 
regional innovation performance and how this might be related to other 
factors such as changes in GDP, industrial structure and public policies.   
R&D expenditure in EU regions 
Disparities are even wider across EU regions. According to the latest data 
available, expenditure on R&D in the EU averaged around 1.9% of GDP in 
2007. Expenditure, however, ranged from 5-6% of GDP in Braunschweig 
and Stuttgart in Germany and Västsverige in Sweden to less than 0.1% in 
Severen tsentralen in Bulgaria and Lubuskie in Poland. 
                                                 
28   See: http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/regional-innovation-scoreboard .  
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Expenditure exceeds the Europe 2020 target of 3% in only one in 10 regions, 
while it is less than 1% in almost half (48%) the regions (Map 1.24). Among 
the 20 regions with the highest expenditure on R&D, 17 are highly 
developed (with GDP per head above the EU average) and 3 of them are 
capital city regions (in Austria, Sweden and Denmark). With the exception 
of Åland in Finland, the regions recording low levels of expenditure on 
R&D are mostly located in the EU-12 or are regions in the EU-15 with 
relatively low levels of GDP per head. 
The concentration of R&D expenditure in regions with high levels of GDP 
per head also emerges from examination of expenditure on R&D by the 
private sector. In 2007, almost none of the lagging regions had R&D 
expenditure levels above 2% (the Barcelona target for business R&D). The 
only exception is Stredni Cechy (the region surrounding Prague) where 
business R&D expenditure amounts to about 2.5% of GDP. 
Map 1.24: Total expenditure on R&D, 2007 
Human resources in science and technology 
Another common indicator of innovative capacity is the proportion of the 
work force with tertiary level education in science and technology and who 
work in jobs typically requiring this type of qualification (HRSTC). 
Regional disparities in this regard are equally wide. In 2008, HRSTC was 
30% or above in Brabant Wallon in Belgium, Stockholm, Inner London and 
Berlin. It was less than 8% in Corse, Sud-Muntenia in Romania, Açores in 
Portugal and Severozapad in Bulgaria (see Map 1. 25). Again, regions 
highly endowed with an educated workforce generally have higher levels of 
GDP per head and are often capital city regions. Only 4 out of the top 20 
regions in terms of HRSTC have a GDP per head below the EU average and 
12 are capital city regions. 
Map 1. 25: Human resources in Science and Technology (core), 2008 
High-tech employment 
The relative number of people employed in high-tech sectors is also a 
measure of R&D input (see Map 1.26). According to the most recent data 
(2007-2008), the largest proportion (9-11%) is in the EU-15, in Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire in the UK, Stockholm in Sweden and 
Karlsruhe in Germany. The proportion is also high (7-8%) in some regions 
in the EU-12, in the capital regions of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia. The proportion tends to be smallest in regions with low levels of 
GDP per head. Only 4 of the 20 regions with the lowest proportions have a 
GDP per head above 75% of the EU average. 
Map 1. 26: Employment in high-technology sectors, 2008 
Increases in the proportion of employment in high tech sectors also occur 
more often in more developed regions than in lagging regions, only 3 of the 
20 regions where the increase was highest between 2000 and 2007 having a  
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GDP per head below 75% of the EU average (Vest in Romania, Západné 
Slovensko in Slovakia and Moravskoslezsko in the Czech Republic.  
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Patents 
Wide regional variations, which follow the same pattern, are equally evident 
as regards output indicators of R&D, in particular patent applications to the 
European Patent Office. In Convergence regions, these was only 11% of the 
EU average in 2005-2006 (the latest data available), whereas in RCE 
regions, it was 53% above the EU average. Applications are 
disproportionately concentrated in the most developed regions, 87% of 
regions with applications above the EU average also having GDP per head 
above the average. 
The culture of innovation differs substantially between the EU and the US, 
where applying for a patent is much more common. This, however, explains 
only part of the difference in patenting intensity between the two. In the US, 
there were 262 patent applications per million inhabitants in 2007-2008. In 
the EU-15, there were 139 and in the EU-27, 111 (in 2006-2007), though in 
Germany, reflecting the specialisation in medium-to-high tech 
manufacturing, there were 280, more than in the US, and in Sweden and 
Finland, only slightly less (251 and 248, respectively). 
Patent applications vary widely between regions in both the US and the EU 
(Map 1.27 and Map 1.28). In the US, they tend to be higher on the East and 
West coast, in California, Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont and Washington, 
where there were over 400 applications per 1 million. In the EU, the largest 
number is in Noord-Brabant, in the Netherlands (723) and Stuttgart (630), 
Oberbayern (572) and Tübingen (524) in Germany. Numbers at the other 
end of the spectrum are much lower in both areas. In the US, the number 
was less than 100 in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, while in the EU, 
Ionia Nisia and Voreio Aigaio in Greece, Açores in Portugal and Ceuta and 
Melilla in Spain did not record any patents. 
Map 1.27: Patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO),  
average 2006-2007  
Map 1.28: US: Number of patents, average 2007-2008 
Regional Innovation Performance Index 
This general picture of innovative capacity being concentrated in the most 
developed EU regions is confirmed by the Regional Innovation Performance 
Index (RIPI), a composite indicator comprising 16 of the 29 indicators used 
in the EIS
29. It covers 201 regions (Map 1.29) at various geographical levels 
according to data availability
30. 
                                                 
29   Hollanders, H., S. Tarantola and A. Loschky, "Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2009", INNO Metrics 
Thematic Paper, Brussels: European Commission, DG Enterprise, 2009. 
30   Due to data availability, the RIPI is computed at the NUTS 1 level for 3 regions from Austria, 3 
regions from Belgium, 2 regions from Bulgaria, 9 regions from France, 9 regions from Germany, 3 
regions from Greece, 1 region from Hungary, 2 regions from Spain, 12 regions from UK. The 
computation is also made for 1 merged region in Greece (Anatoliki Makedonia Thraki, Dytiki 
Makedonia and Thessalia), 2 merged regions in Italy (Valle d’Aosta and Piemonte; Molise and  
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The indicator suggests, as evident from the above, that the most innovative 
regions are generally located in the most innovative countries and vice versa. 
There are, however, a number of regions which outperformed the average, 
such as Noord-Brabant, Praha, País Vasco, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, 
Comunidad de Madrid and Cataluña in Spain, Lombardia and Emilia-
Romagna in Italy, Zahodna Slovenija and the capital city regions in Hungary 
and Slovakia. 
Map 1.29: Regional Innovation Performance Index, 2006 
Innovation by type of region 
As is also evident from the above, Convergence regions perform less well 
than Transition and RCE regions on all the measures examined (Table 1.8). 
The data, however, also show a catching up process with Convergence 
regions having higher increases than the other two groups. This is a result of 
a number of factors including the transfer of technology from other regions 
(notably through direct investment), changes in their structure towards 
higher value-added sectors and increased access to EU markets which raises 
the expected return from innovation. 
Table 1. 8 : Innovation performance of Convergence,  
Transition and RCE regions 
 Convergence  Transition  RCE  EU-27 
  Levels 
Authors of EPO patents applications 
a 11.9 32.6  153.0  100.0
Total R&D expenditure 
b 0.89 0.99  2.08  1.85
Human resources in S&T 
c 14.7 17.8  18.8  17.6
Employment in high-technology sectors 
d 3.1 3.4  5.1  4.4
  Changes* 
Total R&D expenditure, 2000-2007         
Human resources in S&T, 2000-2008  3.9 2.8  3.0  3.3
Employment in high-tech sectors, 2000-2008  1.1 0.5  -0.2  0.3
a  Inventors per million inhabitants., 2005-2006.         
b  % GDP, 2007.         
c  % of total employment, 2008.         
d  % of total employment, 2008.         
* Percentage points.         
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Abruzzo) and 1 merged region in Portugal (Região Autónoma dos Açores and Região Autónoma da 
Madeira). Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta are included at the 
country level.  
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Productivity 
Although the indicators described above are helpful in measuring regional 
innovation performance, they also have serious limitations
31. In particular, 
they fail in the main to capture some important inputs into the innovation 
process, such as product design, market analysis, training of employees or 
investment in research infrastructure. They also neglect the often informal 
innovation activities of smaller firms. In addition, the regional 
disaggregation of data is a serious problem as all of a company's innovation 
activity may be reported by the head office while in fact occurring in many 
different places. Moreover, many innovations are not patented or indeed 
patentable, such as new software systems. 
Equally importantly, most of the indicators are focused on technological 
innovation and ignore other forms such as in processing, marketing or 
organisation. These may be particularly important for producers in less 
advanced regions which mostly innovate by absorbing technologies 
developed elsewhere, by adapting their product to the needs of new markets, 
or by adopting more efficient methods of organising their operations. 
Innovation is primarily a means of increasing productivity, especially labour 
productivity. It remains, therefore, to examine changes in regional labour 
productivity in industry and services as a broad measure of the outcome of 
various forms of innovation. 
Labour productivity in industry and services is generally higher in more 
developed regions (Map 1.30). The average level in RCE regions is almost 
twice that in Convergence regions. None of the Convergence and Transition 
regions has a level of productivity higher than the EU average which is the 
case for around 69% of RCE regions.  
Map 1.30: Labour Productivity in industry and services, 2007 
However, growth of productivity has tended to be higher in less developed 
regions. The average annual growth rate in Convergence regions was twice 
as high as in RCE regions over the period 2000-2007 (Table 1.9). There are 
also around 36% of RCE regions which experienced higher growth of 
productivity than the EU average and 24% of Transition regions. 
Table 1. 9 : Labour productivity, Convergence, Transition and RCE regions 
   GDP per employee, in PPS 
   Convergence  Transition  RCE  EU-27 
Levels, 2007  65.0  97.6  115.9  100 
Average annual % changes, 2000-2007  3.5 1.3  1.2  1.9 
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO calculation. 
                                                 
31 See for instance: A. Kleinkecht, Van Montfort K. and Brouwer E., 'The non-Trivial Choice Between 
Innovation Indicators', Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Volume 11, Issue 2 2002 , pp. 
109-121.  
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This underlines the fact that a broad definition of innovation
32 is less 
concentrated in developed regions than technological innovation. As 
illustrated in Figure 1.15, high growth in labour productivity in industry and 
services, which is partly due to innovation, occurred in some RCE regions 
but also in a large number of Convergence regions.  
The highest productivity growth among RCE regions (around 4% a year in 
Övre Norrland, Sweden) is in fact not much lower than the highest 
productivity growth among Convergence regions (4.4% in Latvia). 
Figure 1- 15 
Labour productivity growth (industry and services) and 
GDP per head, 2000-2006 
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1.3.3.  Innovation potential and bottlenecks 
The wide variations between EU regions in innovation performance and in 
the process of development reflect their specific features and, in particular, 
their endowment of the basic factors which are important for innovation.  
This is well captured by a synthetic indicator developed by DG REGIO 
which includes different aspects which are central for technological 
innovation (such as R&D spending), innovation absorption (such as 
education attainment) or innovation diffusion (such as the connectivity of 
regions to the rest of the world). The index is helpful for identifying the 
strengths and weaknesses of EU regions in these terms. Three main groups 
of regions can be distinguished (Map 1.31). 
Map 1.31: Regional Innovation Potential, 2008 
                                                 
32   The 6
th Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion defined innovation as 'putting a new and 
useful idea into practice' and new and useful was defined as 'new and useful to the region'.   
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The first group (labelled as strong generators of innovation) includes regions 
which are close to the global technology frontier, which are mostly located 
in the highly developed North-Western Member States. Their main 
characteristic is the capacity to produce new technologies, and their growth 
process hinges on R&D and innovation as well as on the accumulation of 
human capital in order to move the technology frontier outwards. 
The second group (labelled as weak absorbers) are regions which are 
catching up on the first group through a process of technology absorption, 
which requires high levels of human capital. The main challenge for these 
regions is therefore to increase the education level of the workforce. They 
broadly correspond to the moderately developed regions in the EU. 
The third group (labelled as weak diffusers) comprises regions mostly 
located in the EU-12 countries, which are catching up on the first group at an 
even faster pace. This process is generally based on the restructuring of their 
economies and critically rests on their capacity to benefit from technology 
diffusion. For these regions where the level of education is often relatively 
high, the main limiting factor is their low endowment of infrastructure and 
the nature of the business environment. 
This great diversity in development pathways and trajectories of innovation 
across regions is also confirmed by a recent study
33. The main findings 
highlight the multidimensional aspects of a regional knowledge-based 
economy. It includes a variety of knowledge activities and multiple 
interactions among a range of actors including universities, research 
institutes, enterprises, knowledge workers and institutions.  
Accordingly, the spatial patterns and trends for the different aspects of the 
knowledge-based economy vary significantly across the EU. However, 
regional innovation is relevant for all regions: in technologically leading 
regions to remain ahead, in peripheral regions to catch up, though innovation 
strategies should differ. Common to all regions is the need to shift from 
technology-push policies towards those focusing on demand-pull. Promoting 
applications, user-driven innovation, innovation in services and in the public 
sector and addressing societal challenges have increasingly shaped the 
innovation policy agenda. 
                                                 
33   European Commission, The regional impact of technological change in 2020, Synthesis report, 2010.  
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Box Regions matter for innovation policy
34 
The role of innovation in economic growth is expected to increase as other sources 
of growth decline in OECD countries. The challenge for national and regional 
governments is to identify the most appropriate policy levers for different stages of 
the innovation process —from knowledge generation and invention to innovation 
and commercialisation—each of which can have a different spatial dimension. In 
this regard, the OECD and the EU (DG Regio) are working together to identify the 
most effective use of innovation policy funding for regions. 
As in the EU, innovative capacity varies markedly across OECD regions. Only 13% 
of regions account for over half of R&D expenditure in the OECD area, and the top 
10% of regions generate on average around 280 patents per million inhabitants, 
while 40% are responsible for fewer than 20. There are different factors underlying 
this variation. Several of the top regions with high R&D expenditure relative to 
GDP are capital city regions or have major national research centres.  
Spatial proximity continues to matter. Many of the regions which are strongest in 
biotechnology, as reflected in the number of patents, tend also to be the strongest in 
nanotechnology, though there are exceptions. Nevertheless, access to global 
pipelines of knowledge generation and knowledge exploitation remain important 
for all types of region, as innovation processes are increasingly open, global, multi-
disciplinary and multi-actor. 
Many innovations, however, occur without R&D. The share of firms with new-to-
market products that did not invest in R&D is at least 30% in several countries, 
such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Other analysis 
estimates that 52% of innovating firms do not perform R&D for their innovations
35. 
The ''technological'' forms of innovation (in products or processes) are often 
introduced in the same firms that also report ''non-technological'' forms (marketing 
or organisation innovations). There is, therefore, not necessarily a direct mapping 
between technological innovation and leading regions or between non-
technological innovation and lagging regions. 
The relationship between regional growth and innovation is not always linear. It is 
known, however, that human capital is needed to reap the benefits of investment in 
infrastructure and equipment, and, among leading OECD regions closest to the 
''technology frontier'', those that are growing faster have higher values for 
traditional innovation indicators than those growing more slowly. Tailored regional 
approaches with different policy mixes are, therefore, needed to respond to these 
individual growth paths. 
Regional governments in the OECD are also determining their own innovation 
policies. On average, 64% of all capital expenditure in OECD countries comes from 
regional or local governments. Comparable budget information at this level for 
investment and spending in innovation does not yet exist, but according to the 
                                                 
34    For further information, see OECD, Regions Matter for Innovation Policy (forthcoming), 2011; 
OECD, Measuring and Monitoring Innovation, 2010; OECD, Regions Matter: Economic Recovery, 
Innovation and Sustainable Growth, 2009; OECD, Regions at a Glance 2009; OECD, How Regions 
Grow: Trends and Analysis, 2009. 
35   See: 2007 European Innovation Scoreboard thematic paper 'Neglected innovators: How do innovative 
firms that do not perform R&D innovate?' http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/thematic-papers-2 .  
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recent OECD Survey on the Multi-level Governance of Science, Technology and 
Innovation, a wide range of measures to support innovation at regional level are 
being used, with significant budgets. Moreover, it is known that in Germany, for 
example, just over 50% of public R&D expenditure is financed by the Länder. 
1.4.  Infrastructure for the 21
st century 
Regional competitiveness and development prospects are also affected by 
infrastructure endowment, such as transport or telecommunication networks. As 
indicated by many studies, the provision of public infrastructure has a positive and 
large effect on productivity and growth
36.  
1.4.1.  Transport 
A good transport system is important for regional economic development. It 
reduces journey times and, accordingly, production costs, so increasing 
competitiveness. It improves access to markets for consumers, workers and 
business and is an important aspect of the attractiveness of a region for 
investors. 
However, a good transport system in itself is not sufficient to ensure regional 
development. The effect of investment in transport and other infrastructure 
on economic performance also depends on the region’s capacity to use it 
efficiently, as well as on investment in other factors important for 
development, such as in human capital and innovation. This partly explains 
why the return on investment in infrastructure can vary significantly 
between regions. 
Improved transport links between regions and countries facilitate access to 
EU-wide markets, which is likely to create new opportunities for growth. It 
also, however, increases competition between regions, which may adversely 
affect both businesses and workers. The overall effect depends on a region’s 
capacity to exploit and further develop its comparative advantage. 
The situation of EU regions with regard to transport infrastructure 
Endowment of transport infrastructure varies widely across the EU, 
especially in terms of roads. Density of motorways
37 is three times the EU 
average in the Netherlands and Luxembourg but is below 10% of average in 
Romania, while Latvia and Malta have no motorways at all. In 7 Member 
States, 6 of which are EU-12 countries, density is less than half the EU 
average. 
                                                 
36    Physical infrastructure can adversely affect the environment, especially heavy and long-lasting 
infrastructure such as roads, motorways, railway lines and modifications to water courses. In such 
cases, the trade-off between economic and environmental costs and benefits needs to be explicitly and 
properly taken into account. . 
37   The density of motorways is defined as the length of motorway per inhabitant or per square kilometre. 
The indicator used here is an average of the densities per inhabitant and per square kilometre.  
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Differences are even more marked between EU regions with big differences 
in motorway density. In the east many regions have no motorway at all. For 
example, in Poland, 7 of the 16 regions and in Romania, 6 out of the 8 have 
no motorways.  
Map 1.32: Improved road accessibility due to a high speed scenario as compared to 
the current situation 
Map 1.33: Improved road accessibility due existing infrastructure as compared to a 
low speed scenario  
A new way to show the difference in the quality of the infrastructure 
between regions is to compare current accessibility to low speed and high 
speed scenarios
38 (Map 1.32 and Map 1.33). A comparison with the low 
speed scenario highlights the regions which benefit from existing 
motorways. Most German, Austrian and French regions benefit from an 
extensive motorway network, while bringing about a more even distribution 
of high speed roads would significantly increase the accessibility of 
Northern and Eastern Poland and all of Romania (Map 1.34).  
Between 2000 and 2008, new investment in motorways tended to be 
concentrated in less developed regions of the EU. In almost three-quarters of 
Convergence regions, density increased relative to the EU average, while in 
RCE regions, only a quarter experienced an increase. In the EU-15, 
investment was especially high in regions in Spain, Portugal and Germany. 
In the EU-12, there was no clear link between new motorway construction 
and the initial endowment. 
Variations in the quality of the road network are reflected in some degree in 
differences in the number of accidents and road fatalities, though, as 
indicated below, other factors are also important. These remain high in most 
regions of the EU-12 as well as in Greece, Spain, Italy and France. They are 
much lower in Germany, the Nordic countries and the UK.  
The situation in the EU-15 and the EU-12 is radically different as regards the 
extent to which the road network connects urban centres and ensures a high 
level of accessibility. The extremely dense road network in the core part of 
the EU running from the South East of the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and South-West Germany achieves both. Connectivity is also good in France 
(especially around Ile de France), Spain and Northern Italy. In the EU-12, 
the road network overall is limited and fragmented. 
The importance of transport networks for regional development is indicated 
by a territorial impact assessment of a projected enhanced infrastructure 
                                                 
38   The high speed scenario increases the speed to 90 km per hour on all roads to mimic a more even and 
uniform distribution of highways. However, in certain regions such speeds may not be feasible 
because of the type of terrain. In addition, it is not a realistic scenario to increase the actual average 
speed everywhere to 90km. As a result some of the benefits shown may not be capable in reality of 
being achieved in a cost effective way, especially in regions with a small and dispersed population.  
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scenario
39. This shows a general economic benefit for the EU as a whole and 
a much greater one for the EU-12, through increasing market potential, 
regional competitiveness and GDP per head, which could even lead to the 
emergence of a new economic growth area spanning Praha, Krakow, 
Budapest, and Vienna. 
In the EU-15, substantial potential benefits are also identified, in particular, 
through better links between regions inside countries, notably Spain and 
Germany, so enabling development to spread out from the major centres to 
smaller cities. In the EU-12, inter-regional connections are mostly missing, 
even the capital cities not being well connected to each other. 
Map 1.34: Motorways in relation to potential population 
Regional disparities are less as regards railways, at least in terms of the 
density of track, though not of its efficiency (Map 1.35). Some 37% of 
Convergence regions have a density of railways which is less than half the 
EU average as against 25% of RCE regions. In the EU-12, the density of the 
rail network is much higher than for roads. However, despite significant 
investment in the modernisation of the network, much of it remains out of 
date and in a poor state of repair. Many lines are single-track and in most 
countries, few are electrified. The difference with the EU-15 is, therefore, 
predominantly in the average speed of the network.  
Map 1.35: Passenger trains on the TEN-T railway network, 2005 
This difference in speed also emerges from comparing the current situation 
with a low and high speed scenario (Map 1.36 and Map 1.37). Existing high-
speed rail lines benefit most regions in France and Germany, but also several 
regions in Spain, Italy, the UK, Belgium and Austria. The high speed 
scenario
40 shows that regions in the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Romania 
and Bulgaria, especially those which do not include a major city but are 
located close to one, would benefit significantly from improving the speed 
on the railway network to at least 90 km per hour. 
Map 1.36: Improved rail accessibility due to a high speed scenario as compared to 
the current situation 
                                                 
39  This assessment is part of the TIPTAP ESPON project. In particular, the project examined a scenario 
referred as Infrastructure Enhancement, where policies are oriented towards new infrastructure 
provision. It is based on a High Growth 2030 scenario as defined in TRANSVisions study. ESPON 
2013 Programme, TIPTAP: Territorial Impact Package for Transport and Agricultural Policies, 
Applied Research Project 2013/1/6, 2010. 
40   The high speed scenario does not consider whether in practice all the railway links can be improved to 
accommodate higher speeds, which may be very difficult to do, particularly in mountainous regions. 
Accordingly, the increases in accessibility of regions like Corsica or the regions in the Massif Central 
in France which are assumed may not be realistic. As with the high-speed road scenario, this scenario 
is not realistic and investment to increase the speed of certain railway lines may not be cost effective, 
in particular if the population of the region is small and dispersed.  
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Map 1.37: Improved rail accessibility due to existing infrastructure as compared to 
a low speed scenario 
Air travel has continued to grow over the past few years up until the onset of 
the crisis in 2008. The highest growth in traffic has been in secondary 
airports, which are mostly used by low-cost airlines as well as in the airports 
in the capital cities in the EU-12. Despite this, the density of air traffic in the 
latter is much lower than in the EU-15 (the largest airport in terms of traffic, 
Praha/Ruzyne, being ranked only in 30
th position in the EU in 2008). 
The accessibility of airports differs widely across regions (Map 1.38). Only 
around 5% of the EU population lives more than 90 minutes from an airport 
and 51% can access between 10 and 500 flights a day within 90 minutes. 
However, accessibility is much higher in the EU-15, particularly in the core 
part. People in many regions in the EU-12 have access to only 10 flights a 
day within 90 minutes and many live beyond a 90 minute drive. In Spain too 
a significant proportion of people live beyond a 90 minute drive to the 
nearest airport. 
The situation in the EU-12 is expected to improve as the quality of the road 
network and city-airport connections continue to be developed. 
Map 1.38: Accessibility to passenger flights, 2008 
 
1.4.2.  ICT Networks 
Access to high-speed ICT networks is increasingly considered to be a key 
factor of competitiveness, as determining the capacity to compete in, and 
benefit from, the global market. It is also a major determinant of the facility 
to adopt new technologies, which is central to the growth of less developed 
regions. At the same time, it is critical to the development of e-services, 
whether public or private. 
According to the last Digital Competitiveness report
41, the average national 
coverage of DSL networks
42 in the EU increased from 87% of the population 
in 2005 to 94% in 2009. The gap between Member States has narrowed 
substantially as coverage rates have risen in countries where they were 
lowest. For example, in Greece, coverage increased from 12% to 91% over 
the period, while in Slovenia, it rose from 55% to 93%, in Cyprus from 70% 
to 96%, in Poland from 55% to 75% and in Slovakia, from 61% to 82%. 
Broadband coverage in thinly populated areas generally lags behind that in 
densely populated ones. In three countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus, 
broadband covers less than 50% of population in thinly populated areas. In 
                                                 
41   European Commission, Europe’s Digital Competitiveness Report, Main achievements of the i2010 
strategy 2005-2009, 2010. 
42   Coverage of DSL and cable modem networks well summarises broadband coverage. As these two 
networks tend to overlap, DSL coverage has been used as proxy measurement for broadband coverage 
in Europe.  
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some countries, like Slovenia, Italy, Germany and Sweden, efforts were 
concentrated on reducing the gap between thinly and densely populated 
areas with some success. In Austria, Estonia and Ireland, mobile 
technologies have played a key role in closing the gap. Further efforts, 
however, are needed in Greece, Slovakia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, 
where between 48 and 67% of the population in thinly populated areas have 
as yet no access to broadband. The Europe 2020
43 strategy and the EU 
Digital Agenda
44 have the goal of achieving universal coverage of 
broadband internet by 2013 and of increasing the speed to 30Mbps by 2020 
for all and  to 100Mbps for one in two households. This will require a 
substantial amount of investment. 
Regional data on levels of digital, or computer, skills also show that despite 
some recent progress, levels are often lower in less developed regions than 
in more developed ones. The lowest levels are in regions in Southern 
Europe, especially in Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain, as well as Latvia and 
Ireland. Moreover, as central and more advanced regions in the EU invest in 
next generation networks, there is an increased risk that more peripheral and 
thinly populated areas will be left behind. The lack of private investment in 
Next Generation Networks outside large conurbations could lead to another 
digital divide emerging between more developed and less developed regions 
in the EU.  
The actual use of broadband by households (i.e. the take-up) has also 
increased rapidly in recent years along with access. In 2009, around 55% of 
households in the EU had broadband
45. In Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Denmark, the proportion was around 77-79%. At the other extreme, only 
around a quarter or less of households had broadband in Romania and 
Bulgaria, and in Greece 34%, Italy 39% and Portugal 46%. 
In general, disparities remain between thinly and more densely populated
46 
areas, Though these are relatively small in the UK, Sweden, Germany and 
the Netherlands, they are wide in Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Lithuania and 
Ireland (Figure 1- 16). 
                                                 
43   COM(2010) 2020. 
44   COM(2010) 245. 
45   The broadband platforms taken into consideration are primarily ADSL, cable and FTTx (including 
VDSL), WLL/WLAN, satellite and PC.   
46    Definition based on the Eurostat definition at Local Administrative Level 2 based on density, 
contiguity and total population. For map and methodology see annex.  
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Figure 1- 16 : Household with broadband by degree of urbanisation, 2009 
Household with broadband internet, 2009
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The situation, however, is changing rapidly. The proportion of households 
with broadband in the EU increased from 23% in 2005 to 56% in 2009, the 
biggest increases occurring in general in the countries where it was lowest 
initially (Figure 1.17). 
Figure 1- 17: Increase in households with broadband, 2005-2009 
Increase in households with broadband internet, 2005-2009
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Regional disparities across the EU are even wider than between countries. In 
Groningen and Noord-Holland in the Netherlands, around 79% of 
households have broadband as compared with only 12% in Severozapaden 
in Bulgaria and Anatoliki Makedonia and Thraki in Greece (Map 1.39). 
Map 1.39: Households with broadband connection, 2009 
Box: Degree of urbanisation: densely populated, intermediate and  
thinly populated areas 
Map 1.40: Degree of urbanisation 
The concept of the 'degree of urbanisation' was defined as part of the Labour Force 
Survey
47. The same classification has been used in many other surveys as well including 
the EU-SILC and IT surveys.  
Three types of area are defined using a criterion of geographical contiguity in 
combination with a minimum population threshold based on local administrative units 
level 2 (LAU2) and 2001 census data. 
Densely-populated area 
This is a contiguous set of LAU2s, each of which has a density of more than 500 
inhabitants per square km, where the total population for the set is at least 50 000. 
Intermediate area 
This is a contiguous set of LAU2, which is not part of a densely-populated area, each of 
which has a density above 100 inhabitants per square km, either with a total population 
for the set of at least 50 000 inhabitants or adjacent to a densely-populated area. 
Thinly-populated area 
This is a contiguous set of LAU2s which is not part of either a densely-populated nor an 
intermediate area. A set of LAU2s totalling less than square 100 km, not reaching the 
required density, but entirely enclosed within a densely-populated or intermediate area, 
is considered to form part of that area. If it is enclosed within a densely-populated area 
and an intermediate area it is considered to form part of the intermediate area. 
A GIS layer with this information can be downloaded here:  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/gisco/geodata/reference  
Exceptions: France, Greece, Finland and Ireland 
A number of countries have opted to use a modified classification rather than the one 
described above. 
France 
The French National Statistical Institute (INSEE) uses a different methodology to define 
the degree of urbanisation of its communes. 
 
                                                 
47   See  EU Labour Force Survey database User guide Annex: explanatory notes  2008 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/employment/info/data/eu_lfs/lfs_main/lfsuserguide/eulfs_userguide_200
8_annex.pdf  .  
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Greece 
The definition described above has been applied to the LAU1 level by Eurostat as it did 
not have the Greek LAU2 digital boundaries.  However, Greece has classified its LAU2 
regions according to this methodology 
Finland 
Finland has applied the above methodology to a more recent set of LAU2 boundaries. 
Ireland 
Ireland also uses a different approach than that described above, classifying LAU1 
instead of LAU2s. As a result, the following cities (LAU1) are classified as densely 
populated: Cork City, Dublin, Galway, Limerick and Waterford. The remainder of the 
country is thinly populated. 
For more information on these exceptions please see: 
https://circabc.europa.eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b65ef11a-ade2-40e2-8696-
e5224e28b59d/CNTR_DEGURBA.zip 
 
1.4.3.  Energy 
Final energy consumption increased by around 0.4% a year in the EU 
between 1996 and 2007. Growth, however, was much higher in Malta, Spain 
and Ireland (between 3 and 4% a year), and Greece, Luxembourg and 
Cyprus (by around 2.5%). On the other hand, consumption declined in 
Romania and Bulgaria (by around 1-2% a year), partly reflecting the 
progressive modernisation of the production system and the closure of 
inefficient generating plants with high levels of pollution. 
While the share of oil in energy consumption remained relatively constant at 
42% in the EU as a whole over the period, it increased markedly in Bulgaria, 
Poland and the Czech Republic. In other countries, the share declined, 
notably in Germany, Cyprus, Portugal and Sweden.  
Electricity production in the EU relies relatively heavily on coal and lignite, 
which together account for 27% of the total. In five Member States, they 
account for over half; as much as 90% in the case of Poland and Estonia. 
Some coal power plants emit high levels of health and environmentally 
damaging pollutants (SO2, NOx, PM, CO2). Accordingly, further investment 
and technological progress are needed to reduce these emissions and to 
capture the carbon released. 
Efforts are, therefore, needed to increase energy efficiency further, 
particularly that of buildings, lighting and transport. A wider use of 
intelligent energy systems could help. Recent developments in smart energy 
grids, based on digital technology to control appliances in homes to save 
energy and reduce costs, open up promising opportunities in this regard. In 
addition, the growing production of electricity from renewable sources will 
place new demands on the grid, increasing the need for such systems.  
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1.5.  Institutions 
1.5.1.  Macro-economic situation 
It is widely accepted that a necessary condition for sustained growth is the 
stability of the macroeconomic framework. According to the World Bank, 
macroeconomic stability is where inflation is low and predictable, real 
interest rates are appropriate, fiscal policy is stable and sustainable, the real 
exchange rate is competitive and predictable and the balance of payment 
situation is viable. 
These criteria lack precision but they refer in very broad terms to a 
macroeconomic environment which is characterised by a low degree of 
uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is identified as the main reason why the macroeconomic 
situation affects growth. According to Fisher (1993)
48, there are two main 
channels through which this occurs. First, macroeconomic uncertainty 
reduces the capacity of the price mechanism to ensure an efficient allocation 
of resources, which in turn reduces productivity. Secondly, uncertainty 
reduces investment by making assessment of the return more difficult. In 
addition, investment might also be hampered by high interest rates. 
The macroeconomic situation in the EU has been greatly affected by the 
crisis. As indicated by the latest figures, there has been a sharp fall in 
economic activity which was translated into declining prices in many cases 
and large increases in budget deficits and public debt. Both are detrimental 
to growth prospects. Uncertainty concerning the timing of the recovery has 
led to the postponement or even cancellation of investment. At the same 
time, growing public deficits and increasing needs in terms of social security 
spending may lead governments to reduce public investment targeted at 
improving the structure of the economy. In such a context, Cohesion Policy 
and the measures taken under the European Economy Recovery Plan may 
play a key role in facilitating strategic investment which is essential for 
regional development in the future. 
1.5.2.  Institutions 
Economists have increasingly realised that the quality of institutions can 
have a significant effect on economic growth and development in general. 
Poor institutions can, in particular, hinder the effectiveness of regional 
development strategies. This is one of the main reasons that the World 
Bank
49 has put more emphasis on the need to improve institutions and 
governance. They use the following definition of governance:  
                                                 
48   Fisher, S. "The role of macroeconomic factors in growth", Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 
32, Issue 3, pp. 485-512, December 1993. 
49   The World Development Report, 2009. Washington, World Bank  
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The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. 
This includes: (1) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored, and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them
50.  
The World Bank data indicate that overall governance is of a high quality in 
the EU, but that some significant differences between Member States 
remain. It also highlights that several Member States have improved their 
governance since the 1990s, particularly the Baltic countries have made 
significant progress. Bulgaria has benefitted from preparations for EU 
membership leading to improvements in their governance indicators 
compared to the 1990s.  
Improving the quality of government through cross-border learning 
Cooperation between EU-15 and EU-12 regions and Member States can 
significantly increase the institutional capacity in the latter. The improvement in 
the quality of government in Estonia has been helped through its close ties with 
Finland, Sweden and Germany. Finland has consistently provided support through 
exchange of experience and examples of policies to improve institutional capacity. 
Sweden has also been a source of knowledge and good practice. Estonia conducted 
its first elections in 1991, two years before its Baltic neighbours, and introduced 
radical reforms with the help of German experts. 
Jihozápad in the Czech Republic forms part of the Jihočeský Kraj cross-border 
cooperation programme with Austrian and Bavarian regions. In particular, 
cooperation between Jihozápad and Bavaria goes back centuries. This has led to 
better transport connections and more German investment in local industries. 
Cooperation has also helped to improve the institutional capacity of the region, 
judged to be one of the strongest in the Czech Republic in a recent survey
51. 
Prior to joining the Union, EU-12 countries received funding from the PHARE 
programme to help to strengthen public administration and institutions. After 
joining, funding has continued to support capacity building under Cohesion Policy. 
 
E-government services can contribute to making public administrations 
more efficient and transparent. The European Digital Competitiveness 
Report
52 tracks the availability of 20 basic e-government services and the 
share of individuals and enterprises that use e-government services. The UK, 
Portugal, Austria and Malta provided all of these 20 basic services online in 
                                                 
50    Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo, Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2004 (May 2005). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3630. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=718081 
51   See Quality of Government Institute. Measuring the quality of government and subnational variation. 
Financed by DG REGIO. Forthcoming. 
52   Europe's Digital Competitiveness Report 2010,  http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda  
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2009 (Figure 1- 18). In all Member States, with the exception of Romania, 
almost three-quarters (72%) of enterprises interacted with public authorities 
online in 2009 as compared with only 30% individuals. Only in the Nordic 
Member States, the Netherlands and Luxembourg did at least one in two 
individuals interact online with public authorities in 2009.  
Figure 1- 18 
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1.6.  Competitiveness 
The economic crisis has not only changed the global economic landscape, it has also 
highlighted the fact that in many countries sources of growth were not sufficiently 
robust, so emphasising the need for better measures of economic performance that 
incorporate the critical elements of sustainable economic growth. The World 
Economic Forum publishes each year a global competitiveness report for countries. 
Following a similar approach, a new regional competitiveness index has been 
created for all NUTS 2 regions (Map 1.41). It consists of eleven pillars based on a 
total of 69 indicators organised into three groups. These indicators span a far wider 
range than only narrow economic aspects and include many indicators relating to 
quality of life, life expectancy adjusted by perception of health and trust. 
The basic group represents the key drivers of all types of economy: 
(1)  Institutions 
(2)  Macroeconomic stability 
(3)  Infrastructure 
(4)  Health 
(5)  Quality of primary and secondary education  
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The efficiency group represents aspects which become more important as a region 
develops 
(6)  Higher education and lifelong learning 
(7)  Labour market efficiency 
(8)  Market size 
The innovation group includes the drivers of advanced regional economies 
(9)  Technological readiness 
(10)  Business sophistication 
(11)  Innovation 
Map 1.41: Competitiveness Index, 2010 
Each of these pillars allows the performance of a region to be assessed in relation to 
all the other EU regions. As a result, they can be seen as indicating the strengths and 
weaknesses of every NUTS 2 region in an EU perspective. 
As regions move along their development paths, their socio-economic conditions 
change and different determinants become more important for their competitiveness. 
Accordingly, the best way to improve competitiveness of a more developed region 
may not be the same as for a less developed one. To take this into account, the 
weights attached to each of the three groups depends on the GDP per head of a 
region, which is similar to the way the World Economic Forum index is constructed. 
•  In less developed EU regions, the basic group is assigned a weight of 40% and 
innovation only 10% (efficiency has a fixed weight of 50%)  
•  In medium developed regions, the basic group has a weight of only 30%, while 
the weight of innovation doubles to 20%.  
•  In the highly developed regions, the basic group has a weight of only 20% and 
innovation one of 30%.  
This implicitly provides a guide for policy makers. For example, it implies that the 
competitiveness of a less developed region is likely to be strengthened more by 
improving institutions and basic education than by trying to increase the number of 
patent applications or R&D expenditure. It also means that as a region becomes 
more developed, it may lose competitiveness if it does not invest more in 
innovation. 
Overall competitiveness is high in the Nordic regions as well as in South-East 
England, the Netherlands and in Southern Germany.  
In some Member States, differences in competitiveness between regions are large. 
For example in Belgium, Brussels, the two surrounding regions and most Flemish 
regions score very high, but most Walloon regions have low to very low scores. 
Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece also display significant regional differences in  
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competitiveness. These results emphasise the fact that competitiveness has a strong 
regional dimension, which national level measures cannot capture.  
In most countries, whether more developed or less developed, the capital city region 
has the highest competitiveness score, while the outermost regions tend to have 
lower scores than others (Map 1.41). While in the most developed Member States, 
highly competitive regions are surrounded by other competitive regions, the trend in 
the less developed Member States is that their most competitive region tends to be 
surrounded by far less competitive regions. This shows that in the most developed 
Member States factors of competitiveness are more evenly distributed and 
competitiveness tends to spill over into neighbouring regions.  In less developed 
Member States, factors of competitiveness are highly concentrated in the capital city 
region and spillovers to neighbouring regions are still quite limited. This may be 
due to limited transport connections between regions and substantial differences in 
the quality of the business environment in these countries.  
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Box: The Regional index of sustainable economic well-being 
The East Midlands Development Agency has a strong view that sustainable economic 
prosperity and societal well-being are important to regional success, as reflected in their 
objective: 
… by 2020, the East Midlands will be a flourishing region - with growing and innovative 
businesses, skilled people in good quality jobs, participating in healthy, inclusive 
communities and living in thriving and attractive places. (Flourishing Region RES 2006) 
The agency has developed a Regional Index of Sustainable Economic Wellbeing (RISEW) 
with the New Economics Foundation to capture aspects of sustainable economic 
development left out of account by conventional measures of economic progress. 
The index includes costs and benefits not traditionally measured in monetary terms, 
bringing together a wide range of economic, social and environmental aspects. The basis is 
consumer expenditure, which is then adjusted to take account of both positive and negative 
social, economic and environmental factors. For example, unpaid household work and 
volunteering are valued and added to the index, together with public expenditure on 
healthcare and education. At the same time, the environmental costs from habitat loss, 
pollution, depletion of non-renewable resources and climate change; the social costs 
associated with crime, divorce, commuting and unequal income distribution; and the health 
costs of road and workplace accidents are deducted.  
The index was first calculated for the East Midlands in 2005 and used to assess progress 
towards the ''flourishing region'' objective. In 2007, it was calculated for all English 
regions, when the value of the index for the East Midlands was slightly above the average 
for England. 
Figure 1- 19: RISEW per head and gross value-added per head by regions, 2007 
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Source: Regional Index of Sustainable Economic Wellbeing (RISEW) for the English 
regions, NEF, January 2010   
-  The highest value of the RISEW per head was in the South West, above that of 
London, which had a much higher Gross value-added per head; 
-  The lowest value of the RISEW per head was in Yorkshire and Humber, whereas the 
lowest gross value-added per head was in the North East.  
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Between 1994 and 2007, the RISEW per head doubled in the East Midlands, as against an 
average increase of 35% for England. 
A consortium led by the East Midlands Development Agency and including Natural 
England is developing the index further. 
 
1.7.  Conclusions 
Globalisation and the emergence of new major players in world trade have had a 
considerable impact on the EU economy. Importing and exporting goods to the rest 
of the world is now more important for the GDP of the Union. The trade balance in 
goods has shifted from just being positive to just being negative over the last ten 
years. Trade in services, however, has been growing fast and the positive trade 
balance on these has been increasing, underlining the strong global position the EU 
occupies in this area. 
New trade patterns have also emerged. Major firms in many sectors now locate 
different parts of their production in different parts of the world. This more 
dispersed production system increases the demand for logistics and command and 
control functions, which tends to favour the major cities and regions that host these 
services.  
In the EU, productivity growth is the main source of growth in GDP per head. 
Between 2000 and 2007, increased productivity was responsible for 80% of the 
growth which occurred,  the rest being due to increases in the employment rate and 
in working-age population. Productivity is, accordingly, a central element of EU 
competitiveness, generating the income which enables regions to offer both a high 
quality of life and a favourable business environment. 
The productivity growth which has occurred at national and regional level is the 
combined effect of improvements in productivity within sectors, i.e. innovation 
broadly defined, and shifts between sectors, i.e. restructuring. The effect of shifting 
to higher value-added sectors is strongest in less developed regions, while the effect 
of productivity growth within sectors is important in all regions. 
Innovation in a broad sense is the main source of productivity growth within sectors 
and firms. It covers many aspects ranging from technological innovation to the more 
efficient use of existing technology and resources and to new management and 
organisation techniques. Innovation depends on the potential to generate, absorb and 
diffuse knowledge. This is why human capital is a key driver of growth. Education 
and skills are important areas of investment throughout the EU, but particular efforts 
are needed in many regions in Southern Europe to reach the Europe 2020 education 
targets.. 
To obtain the full benefits of innovation, however, the appropriate infrastructure and 
institutions need to be in place. In the 21
st century, digital networks are playing an 
increasingly important role in the development of services and access to them. 
Providing broadband internet access to all individuals and enterprises can, therefore, 
have a real impact on growth and the quality of life. Despite the importance of 
digital infrastructure, good transport networks remain essential. Road and rail  
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networks in many EU-12 regions, however, still require major investment to reach 
comparable levels to those in the EU-15.  
Last but not least, institutions have a strong influence on national and regional 
development. These include a sound macroeconomic framework, integrated EU 
markets, a legislative and regulatory system which facilitates business and job 
creation and online access to e-government services.  
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2.  IMPROVING WELL-BEING AND REDUCING EXCLUSION 
The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples
53 
Well-being is a broad concept, which is difficult to capture in a single measure. 
Accordingly, this section considers a variety of measures ranging from objective ones, 
such as life expectancy and at-risk-of-poverty rates, to subjective ones, including 
perceptions of health and happiness. These measures provide different perspectives on 
well-being. However, they do not necessarily always change in the same direction, 
emphasising their virtual independence in some cases from each other. In combination, 
they show a diverse and interesting picture. 
The first section focuses on a life expectancy, infant mortality and access to health care. 
The second examines issues relating to living standards. The third section focuses on 
people's absolute and relative living conditions.  
The analysis provides insights into people's access to purchasing power and ability to 
live a pleasant life and to participate in society. The point to bear in mind is that living 
standards cannot be measured only in terms of access to market commodities, i.e. goods 
and services which can be acquired for payment of money, disregarding all those items 
which are commonly available outside of the market.  
A pleasant, safe, secure and non-polluted environment, good neighbour relations, clean 
water on tap, reciprocal trust and so on are all ''common goods'' which contribute greatly 
to the standard of living but are largely not marketable. In addition, there are many 
home-produced ‘private’ goods and services, ranging from cleaning, to preparing a meal 
and child care, which equally contribute to living standards, which, though marketable, 
are nevertheless not produced for the market and so not captured by standard accounting 
systems.  
Recently the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi (2009) report has articulated the tension between 
existing national accounts and more complete and meaningful definitions of societal 
well-being and social progress, highlighting the growing awareness of the divergence 
between standard GDP measures on the one side and quality of life measures on the 
other. The report calls on researchers and policy makers to make more consistent use of 
indicators which are alternative or complementary to GDP when trying to assess 
standards of living.  
 Many of these indicators are obvious and readily available, such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality, gender equality; security and unemployment. These are examined here, 
along with the concept of ‘adjusted’ disposable income of households, which includes 
the value of ‘in-kind’ goods and services available free or at subsidised prices income. 
                                                 
53   Article 3 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
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2.1.  Life expectancy and health  
2.1.1.  Living longer and longer  
The EU has an enviably high life expectancy. In 2007, life expectancy at 
birth stood at 79 years in the EU compared to an average global expectancy 
of only 67 (UN). Outside Europe, only 6 countries in the world (Japan, 
Australia, Israel, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore) have a higher life 
expectancy. Neighbouring countries in the east have a considerably lower 
life expectancy, of around 68 years in Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and 
Moldova. It is slightly higher in North African countries, at 70 for men and 
74 for women, but still below the EU average.  
Within the EU, life expectancy also differs and more for men than for 
women. While for women, life expectancy varies from 86 in Comunidad 
Foral de Navarra to 75 in Yugoiztochen in Bulgaria (Map 1.42), for men, it 
varies from 80 in Marche in Italy to a mere 65 in Lithuania (Map 1.43). This 
variation has a wide range of causes including differences in life style, 
climate and diet, but also education, income and access to health care and 
other social services which affect health. This section considers some of the 
main causes of low life expectancy. 
Map 1.42: Female life expectancy a birth, 2007 
Map 1.43: Male life expectancy at birth, 2007 
2.1.2.  Unequal access to quality health care  
Infant mortality in the EU at 5 per 1000 live births in 2006 was among the 
lowest in the world. Only 7 countries outside Europe have a lower rate, the 
six cited above with a higher life expectancy and South Korea. The average 
global infant mortality rate is ten times higher than that of the EU. 
Three out of four EU regions have an infant mortality rate of 5 or less and 
one in five a rate below three. However, all Romanian regions except the 
capital city region have rates between 12 and 15, while the rate is also 
around 12 in Guyane. In Bulgaria, four of the six regions have rates of over 
10 (Map 1.44). This means that a newborn baby in Romania is over six times 
more likely to die before the age of one than in Brabant Wallon in Belgium. 
High infant mortality rates have a major effect on the life expectancy figures 
at birth. Romanian and Bulgarian regions, therefore, also have the lowest life 
expectancy in the EU.  
Map 1.44: Infant mortality rate, 2006-2007 
The two main causes of death for adults under 65 are cancer and heart 
disease. Out of 100,000 people under 65, cancer kills 75 and heart disease 52 
annually. These rates, however, vary substantially across regions. In both 
cases, the highest rates occur in Romanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian regions 
and the three Baltic States. The death rate for cancer, therefore, is over 120 
in all Hungarian regions, while in 10 EU regions it is below 25 (Map 1.45).  
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Map 1.45: Standard death rate from cancer for population under 65, 2006-2008 
Map 1.46: Standard death rate from heart diseases for population  
under 65, 2006-2008 
People living in the countries concerned also tend to judge their health care 
provision as poor (Eurobarometer 315, 2010). In particular, in Romania and 
Bulgaria, less than 25% of respondents to the survey thought that health care 
in their country was good compared to more than 90% in Austria, the 
Netherlands and Belgium.  
The death rate from heart disease for those under 65 is 3-4 times the EU 
average in all Bulgarian regions and over twice the EU average in the Baltic 
States, Hungary, Romania and Eastern Slovakia (Map 1.46). These are also 
regions with low levels of development. Yet the correlation between life 
expectancy and GDP per head is by no means systematic. 
In the more developed regions, some interesting features can be detected. In 
the UK, the death rates from both cancer and heart disease tend to be higher 
in more peripheral regions such as the Scottish regions and West Wales and 
the Valleys, but also in some of the large conurbations, such as Greater 
Manchester, Merseyside (which includes Liverpool) and London.  
The differences in Austria have the opposite pattern to those in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. While the capital city region in Austria has 
substantially higher death rates for both cancer and heart disease than all the 
other regions in the country, the opposite is true in the other two countries. 
These three indicators reveal large disparities in health risks between 
regions. The reasons are many and vary between regions. In regions with 
low disposable income and high poverty, many people may have to wait too 
long before they can visit a doctor. In more remote regions, physical 
accessibility may be a factor, while in others it may be the quality of 
available care. In regions with a large share of foreign-born population (Map 
1.61), the lack of knowledge of the health care system or the language 
spoken in the country may lead to higher death rates. In some regions, access 
to treatment may depend on ability to pay rather than need, despite the 
system being nominally free. Such variations in health risks and the 
underlying factors show the need for a health care policy that can target 
regional needs, and problem in a differentiated manner. 
2.1.3.  Traffic fatalities and suicides  
The two main causes of death for young people are traffic fatalities and 
suicide. Both predominantly affect young men. Three out of four people 
killed in traffic accidents are men, those in the early 20s being especially 
vulnerable. These premature deaths also reduce average life expectancy, but 
many of these traffic fatalities can be avoided.   
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In the EU, traffic fatalities relative to population were reduced by 50% 
between 1991 and 2008
54. On current trends, however, the EU target of 
reducing the number by 50% in 2010 compared to 2000 will not be reached. 
In the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, fatalities average only around 40 
per million people (Map 1.47) because traffic safety has been a political 
priority for many years. As a result, these three countries, which together 
with Malta, already had the lowest rates in 1991, reduced them by 50% by 
2008. In Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, traffic 
fatality rates were all around three times higher at 140 per million, indicating 
that there is still significant room for reduction. 
Map 1.47: Road fatalities, 2004-2006 
Eight regions – three in Greece, Luxembourg and Namur in Belgium, 
Alentejo in Portugal, La Rioja in Spain and Lithuania – had between 200 
and 300 traffic fatalities per million people). This is substantially above the 
EU average of 92, and even further above the regions with the lowest rates, 
Bremen, Berlin, Hamburg, Vienna, and Brussels, which all had rates of less 
than 30 per million, partly because of their urban nature and the low average 
speed of traffic. 
Traffic fatalities depend primarily on the number of accidents. These have a 
range of causes from alcohol consumption and the extent of law enforcement 
to the quality of roads. The countries with the lowest fatalities have taken an 
integrated approach to reducing the figures. They influence driver behaviour 
through clear rules, targeted enforcement and better driver education, and 
they have improved roads by separating pedestrians and cyclists from cars 
where speeds are high and by reducing speeds where separation is not 
possible. A similar approach could lead to significant reductions in traffic 
fatalities in many EU regions.  
Men also have a lower life expectancy than women because they are over 
three times more likely to commit suicide. Standardised death rates
55 from 
suicide vary considerably between regions (Map 1.48). In ten regions – 
Lithuania, three Hungarian regions, Bretagne, Itä-Suomi in Finland and four 
Belgian regions – the rate is above 20 per 100 000 people. By contrast, 30 
regions, all those in Greece, 6 in Spain and Italy, Flevoland in the 
Netherlands, Cyprus, Outer London, Norte in Portugal and Bucureşti – Ilfov 
in Romania, had rates below 5. 
Map 1.48: Standardised death rate from suicide for population under 65, 
2006-2008 
                                                 
54   DG MOVE CARE database. 
55   Standardised death rates correct for the differences in age composition of population between regions. 
As the prevalence of causes of death differs among age groups, standardised death rates are more 
comparable since they are based on assuming that different regions had exactly the same population 
composition.  
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The striking aspect of these differences is that they do not seem to be related 
to socio-economic factors, at least across countries. The regions with the 
lowest suicide rates include both those with high levels of income such as 
Flevoland and Outer London and those with much lower levels, such as 
Norte and some of the Greek and Italian regions.  
Within countries, however, suicide rates tend to be higher in the less 
developed regions. For example, in Romania, all regions outside the capital 
city region have rates which are consistently 2-3 times higher. In part, this 
may be due to better emergency services in the capital, but better 
employment opportunities and higher income are also likely to reduce 
suicides. In Belgium too the highest rates also tend to be in regions with 
lower incomes and higher unemployment. In EU-12 countries which have 
grown rapidly since the mid-1990s, the suicide death rate has dropped 
considerably. For example, in Estonia the rate fell from almost 40 per 
million in 1994-1997 to 15 in 2006-2008, which is still above the EU 
average (10) but much lower than it was. A similar reduction occurred in the 
two other Baltic States and Slovenia. 
2.1.4.  Ageing 
Increasing life expectancy coupled with a low birth rate is associated with a 
rising median age of the population and a growing share of older people. 
According to the latest regional population projections, the median age in 
the EU will rise from 40 to 45 between 2008 and 2030 and the share of those 
of 65 and over will increase from 17% to 24%. In 2008, only two regions in 
the EU had a share as high as this: Liguria in Italy and Chemnitz in 
Germany. In 2030, in half of the regions, the share will be 24% or higher
56.  
The rising share of older people has already sparked much debate. In 
Member States, where there is still a pay-as-you-go system where the 
employed pay for the pensions of the currently retired, affordability will be a 
growing issue since the employed will have to pay for an increasing number 
of pensions. In countries, where there are funded systems, the funds will 
equally have to cover growing pension numbers and, accordingly, will need 
to generate the increasing income required, which in turn will depend on 
economic performance. As a result, the Lisbon agenda focused on increasing 
the share of people aged 55-64 in employment. In addition, in many Member 
States, proposals to raise the effective retirement age are being actively 
considered and in some cases introduced.  
The regional dimension of ageing has implications for the demand for 
services. An ageing population will require more health care services and 
more and different other kinds of services. Regions with growing numbers of 
older people will have to expand their infrastructure and services and ensure 
that they are accessible.  
                                                 
56  Giannakouris, Konstantinos. Regional population projections EUROPOP2008: Most EU regions face 
older population profile in 2030. Statistics in Focus 1/2010. Luxembourg, 2010.  
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The growth in the number of older people differs considerably between 
regions, not only because of differences in life expectancy but also because 
older people have become more mobile and many have moved to warmer 
climates in the EU. This is evident in many Spanish and French regions 
which have attracted significant numbers of senior citizens from the UK, 
Germany and the Netherlands either for the winter or all year round. 
Although people in the EU tend to move less than their counterparts in the 
US, the freedom of movement  in the EU and the reciprocity of healthcare 
arrangements open up a wide choice of places in which to retire for those 
that can afford it.  
Differences in the share of older people between regions also reflect the fact 
that cities tend to attract more migrants who tend to be younger than the 
resident population than rural areas.  
Box: Sparsely populated regions 
In 2008, 3 million people in the EU, or 0.6% of the population, lived in sparsely 
populated regions
57. There are 18 of these among 1 303 NUTS 3 regions. Most of 
them are located in Northern Europe, five each in Finland and Sweden, in addition 
to three in Spain and the UK, one in Greece and one in France. The biggest is 
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa in Finland with a population of 383  000 and the smallest 
Evrytania in Greece with a population of less than 20 000. 
The small size of their populations generally implies that public service provision 
in these areas is more expensive. Several of the regions are experimenting with e-
services to provide good access to services efficiently.  
Overall, the population in sparsely populated regions remained broadly unchanged 
between 2001 and 2008, but there were differences between them. In particular, 
population grew strongly in French Guyane, rising by around 4% a year, while it 
fell in Kainuu in Finland by almost 1% a year. In half of the regions concerned, 
population increased or remained unchanged, in the other half, it declined. 
The age structure of the regions also varies significantly. Some regions have a 
young population, like, for instance, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa or Lappi where, 
respectively,  14% and 18% of people are 65 or over. In French Guyane, less than 
4% of the population is 65 or more. In other regions, the population is on average 
much older. In the Spanish sparsely populated regions, around one in four is 65 or 
over while in Evrytania, it is one in three. 
 
2.1.5.  Health 
Good health is an important aspect of well-being. People’s self perception of 
their health, however, varies widely. In 7 Member States – Portugal, 
                                                 
57   Sparsely populated areas are regions with a population density below a given threshold. Paragraph 
30  (b) of the Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013 (2006/C 54/08)57 defines low 
population density regions as 'NUTS-2 geographic regions with a population density of less than 8 
inhabitants per km², or NUTS3 geographic regions with a population density of less than 12.5 
inhabitants per km²'.  
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Hungary, the three Baltic States, Poland and Slovakia , between 15% and 
20% of the population perceived their health to be poor compared to an EU 
average of 10% (Figure 1.20). Ireland has the smallest share of the 
population who consider their health to be poor (just 2.5%). 
Figure 1- 20 
Self Perceived Health, 2008
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
E
U
-
2
7
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
M
a
l
t
a
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
S
w
e
d
e
n
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
C
y
p
r
u
s
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
S
p
a
i
n
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
F
r
a
n
c
e
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
G
r
e
e
c
e
I
t
a
l
y
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
P
o
l
a
n
d
L
a
t
v
i
a
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
%
 
o
f
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
good
fair
bad
Source: EU SILC
 
2.2.  Living conditions 
2.2.1.  Unemployment dropped until the crisis 
Unemployment rates declined in most regions between 2000 and 2008 (Map 
1.50). At the EU level, unemployment fell by 2 percentage points over this 
period. The largest regional reduction was in Severoiztochen in Bulgaria and 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie in Poland where the rate fell by over 15 percentage 
points to 8.6% and 7.4%, respectively. Only 36 regions experienced an 
increase of more than 1 percentage point. The increase was largest in Norte 
in Portugal where it increased by 4 percentage points to 8.7%. 
Map 1.49: Unemployment rate, 2008 
Map 1.50: Change in unemployment rate, 2000-2008 
Despite these overall reductions, unemployment in 2008 was still above 20% 
in the French overseas territories and above 15% in Andalucía, Canarias, 
Brussels, Extremadura and Berlin (Map 1.49). Regional disparities in 
unemployment rates were particularly wide in Belgium, Germany, Spain and 
Italy (Figure 1.21). 
Unemployment rates have converged substantially since 2000. The regional 
dispersion in rates narrowed by 30% between 2000 and 2007. In 2008,  
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however, it widened by 7% and in 2009, because of the crisis, it may have 
widened further. 
Figure 1- 21 
Unemployment rate by country and regional extremes, 2008
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Unemployment in the EU has risen rapidly during the crisis to above 10% in 
2010
58 and it is forecast to remain there in 2011. Rates are also forecast to 
remain above 10% in the US, despite much lower unemployment before the 
crisis hit. 
The effect of the crisis, however, varies widely across the EU. Increases in 
unemployment in Ireland, Spain and the Baltic States have been especially 
large, ranging from 7 to 15 percentage points between 2008 and the end of 
2009. As a result, rates are well above 10% in all five countries. In Latvia, 
unemployment was above 20% by the end of 2009 and in Spain, it reached 
20% by mid-2010.  
In the vast majority of Member States, however, increases have been much 
less dramatic. In two thirds of cases, the increase was less than 3 percentage 
points between 2008 and the end of 2009. In Germany and Luxembourg, it 
was less than 1 percentage point, though because of the delayed effect of the 
crisis, rates may still rise in the future. 
Unemployment has a damaging effect on well-being far beyond the loss of 
income. This is all the more the case for so-called discouraged workers, 
those who have given up looking for a job because they consider none are 
available, who are no longer counted as being unemployed but as 
economically inactive.  
                                                 
58   European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Economic 
Forecast: Autumn 2009. European Commission, Brussels, 2009.   
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Unemployment increases the risk of poverty. This is especially so for long-
term unemployment which is particularly high in the French overseas 
departments, the two eastern Slovakian regions and Berlin (Map 1.51). The 
crisis is likely to mean persistently high levels of unemployment and, 
therefore, more long term unemployed and more people at risk of poverty 
across the EU. 
Map 1.51: Long-term unemployment rate, 2008 
Reducing the time needed for the unemployed to find a job and ensuring 
adequate social benefits during their spell of unemployment can greatly 
reduce their risk of poverty. 
The unemployment rate of those under 25 averaged 15.5% in 2008, twice the 
overall rate. In 34 EU regions, more than one in four of those under 25 and 
in the labour force was unemployed (Map 1.52). 
Map 1.52: Youth unemployment rate – 2008 
Map 1.53: Young people aged 15-24 not in work, education or training,  
average 2006-2008 
The unemployment rate of young people covers only those who have entered 
the labour force and are looking for work. It does not cover those who are in 
education or training and not looking for work, nor does it include the 
discouraged ones who have stopped looking for work. The proportion of 
people aged 15 to 24 not in work, education or training includes both of 
these groups and indicates in which regions a significant number of young 
people are neither employed nor acquiring the education and skills for their 
future working careers. In the EU in 2008, this proportion averaged 11% of 
the age group, but it was over 20% in five regions in Bulgaria and five in 
southern Italy. By contrast, it was between 3% and 4% in Prague, Trier, 
Copenhagen and five Dutch regions (Map 1.53). 
Box: The outermost regions 
Outermost regions have a distinct character. They are located far away from their 
national capital and often the rest of the country. Most of them are islands or 
archipelagos and mountainous, with seismic activity and extreme climatic 
conditions. The small size of the local market and (for some of them) their location 
in less developed parts of the world also represent major challenges for their 
development. 
In 2007, around 4.25 million people lived in the outermost regions, 0.9% of EU 
population. In some cases, the proportion of young people is very large and 
growing, such as in French Guyane, where 36% of the population is under 15 and 
population is growing at almost 4% a year.   
In general, the level of development is below the EU average. In 2007, while GDP 
per head in the Canarias was under 8% below, in French Guyane it was over 50% 
below. However, rates of growth are higher and the regions are catching-up with 
the rest of the Union. 
Employment performance is also mixed. In 2008, unemployment was over 20% in  
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all of the French outermost regions and almost 25% in Réunion, whereas in Açores 
and Madeira, it was only 5.5% and 6.0% respectively, well below the EU-27 
average of 7%. 
 
2.2.2.  In search of better opportunities: migration  
Between 2001 and 2007, net migration added almost 0.3% a year to EU 
population and was the main source of population growth. Overall, two 
thirds of all NUTS 3 regions had a positive net inward migration largely 
because of migration from outside the EU (Map 1.54). 
At EU level, there has been a high level of net outward migration from 
regions in the Central and Eastern Member States, while the highest rates of 
net inward migration were, until the crisis, in Ireland, parts of Spain, France 
and Italy. A large part of these migration flows was driven by poor 
employment opportunities in the Central and Eastern countries coupled with 
significant job growth in Ireland and Spain, especially. The crisis has 
reduced these flows and led to reverse migration. 
In a number of Member States, geographic shifts of population are evident – 
in Germany, from east to west, in Sweden, Finland and France, from 
northern regions to southern ones and in Italy, the reverse, from south to 
north.  
At a lower level, shifts to certain cities are evident. In the Central and 
Eastern Member States, there has been net inward migration into every 
capital city region. In Poland, this is also the case for many of the other large 
cities such as Kraków, Łódź, Wrocław, Poznań, Toruń and Rzeszów.  
In the Western Member States, the pattern is less clear, with some cities 
gaining population and other losing. In the UK, several cities have 
experienced outward migration, including most parts of London, 
Birmingham, Coventry, Leicester, Liverpool, Greater Manchester, Belfast 
and Aberdeen. In Germany, some cities have experienced net inward 
migration while, in the surrounding regions, there has been net outward 
migration as in the case of Leipzig or Dresden. In other cases, both the city 
and the surrounding regions have had net inward migration as in the case of 
Munich or Berlin. Other cities have lost population due to outward 
migration, as in the case of Bremen or Chemnitz where population has also 
fallen in the surrounding regions. In France, all but one of the NUTS 3 
regions in Ile de France have lost population because of outward migration, 
while population declined in Copenhagen and the surrounding region as 
well. 
Map 1.54: Net migration into NUTS 3 regions, 2001-2007 
Map 1.55: Natural population growth, 2001-2007 
The natural change in population was negative in almost two-thirds of 
NUTS 3 regions between 2001 and 2007 (Map 1.55). This was especially so 
in the Baltic States, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic,  
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Germany, Portugal and parts of Italy, Spain and France On the other hand, 
there was for the most part natural growth in Ireland and the Netherlands. 
As the main determinant of population change in the EU is migration, 
differences in the overall population change between regions largely reflect 
the extent of this. Only one in five regions with net outward migration have 
had high enough natural population growth to prevent population from 
falling. On the other hand, in only two out of five regions with a natural 
decline in population, net inward migration has been large enough to avoid 
an overall reduction. 
Table 1. 10 Population change, natural change and migration according to the 
urban-rural typology, 2001-2007 
2001-2007
Predominantly 
Urban
Intermediate Predominanlty 
Rural
Total
average annual change in ‰
Total population change 0.4 -1.1 -3.3 -2.5
Natural population change -1.8 -1.2 -1.8 -1.6
Net migration 2.2 0.1 -1.6 -0.9
Total population change 5.9 5.6 3.6 5.3
Natural population change 2.1 0.5 -0.5 1.0
Net migration 3.8 5.1 4.2 4.2
Total population change 5.3 4.1 1.1 3.6
Natural population change 1.7 0.1 -1.0 0.6
Net migration 3.6 4.0 2.1 2.9
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
EU-12
EU-15
EU-27
 
Table 1. 11 Population age structure by type of region, 2007 
2007
Predominantly 
Urban
Intermediate Predominanlty 
Rural
Total
as % of total population
population aged 14 or less 13.4 15.4 16.1 15.4
population aged 65 or more 14.8 14.2 14.7 14.6
population aged 14 or less 16.2 15.7 15.7 16.0
population aged 65 or more 16.4 18.1 19.4 17.6
population aged 14 or less 15.9 15.6 15.9 15.8
population aged 65 or more 16.3 17.2 17.7 17.0
EU-12
EU-15
EU-27
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO  
Population trends in predominantly rural regions in the EU-15 and the EU-
12 follow distinct patterns (Table 1.10). In the EU-15, predominantly rural 
regions on average experienced population growth over the period 2001-
2007 because of net inward migration, which was higher than in 
predominantly urban regions. There was a natural decline in population, 
however, in predominantly rural regions. 
In the EU-12, population declined in predominantly rural regions due to a 
combination of a natural reduction, which also occurred in predominantly 
urban regions, and net outward migration, while there was net inward 
migration in predominantly urban regions.   
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In the EU-12, the population under 15 represents a much larger share of the 
total in predominantly rural regions than in predominantly urban ones: 
16.1% as opposed 13.4%. In the EU-15, the share of population under 15 is 
half a percentage point larger in predominantly urban regions than in the 
other two regional types (Table 1.11). Population of 65 or over is fairly 
equally distributed across the three types of region in the EU-12, but in the 
EU-15 it represents a significantly larger share of the total in predominantly 
rural regions than in predominantly urban ones: 19.4% as against 16.4%.  
Trends in predominantly rural regions in the EU-12 and the EU-15 tend go  
in opposite directions: population decline in one, population growth in the 
other, high outward migration in one, high inward migration in the other, a 
large share of children in one, a large share of older people in the other. 
Accordingly, the EU-27 figures in which these opposing trends are present 
show a much less clear picture of demographic trends in predominantly rural 
regions.  
Map 1.56: Total population change, 2001-2007 
Box : Islands 
Over 21 million people – 4.3% of EU population – lived in island regions
59 in 2007. 
Between 2000 and 2007, island population grew by around 1.1% a year, almost three times 
the EU average growth rate. Islands can be divided into three broad geographical areas, the 
Atlantic, the North and the Mediterranean. However, they differ markedly in their 
population size, ranging from 6.1 million people in Ireland to only 10 000 in El Hierro in 
Spain, which makes comparisons between them very difficult.  
The rate of population growth was particularly high between 2000 and 2007 in small and 
medium-sized islands, of up to 1.6% a year, though population growth has more to do with 
the location of the islands than their size. The highest growth was in Fuerteventura in 
Canarias (5.6% a year) and Lanzarote (4.8% a year). By contrast, population in Bornholm 
in Denmark fell by 0.5% a year.  
Most of the increase in population in most regions is due to net inward migration and in 
many small islands, population would have fallen in the absence of migration. 
The proportion of older people of 65 and over is highest in the smaller southern islands, 
which, to some extent, reflects the inward movement of people to retire.  
As underlined by a recent study
60, islands face challenges to their ecosystems. A number of 
islands have rich and diversified natural assets, notably those in the Mediterranean. 
However, these assets are generally fragile and under various pressures, such as from urban 
                                                 
59   Formally, island regions are defined as one or more NUTS3  regions which consist entirely of one or 
more islands. In practice, this definition covers islands with more than one NUTS 3 region (e.g. 
Sicily), islands corresponding to one NUTS 3 region (e.g. Gozo) and NUTS 3 regions with several 
islands (e.g. Kyklades). It does not include NUTS 3 regions with a major continental part in which the 
island population is marginal. In addition, islands with a fixed link to the mainland such as a bridge, 
tunnel or a dyke are not included. 
60   ESPON 2013 Programme, The Development of the Islands – European Islands and Cohesion Policy,
 
Targeted analysis 2013/2/2, Interim Report, 2010.  
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sprawl, tourism and the construction of second homes, shortage of water, fires, soil erosion 
and pollution of the sea. Climate change is also a concern since islands tend to be more 
vulnerable than the mainland to extreme climatic conditions and rises in the sea level. 
 
2.2.3.  Work life balance 
According to survey evidence, half of the people in the EU find it difficult to 
combine work and family, one in seven very difficult (Figure 1.22). The 
proportion varies markedly between countries. In Finland and the 
Netherlands, less than one in four reported difficulty, whereas in Hungary 
and Portugal, it was three out of four. 
In general, women find combining work and family more difficult than men 
(55% as against 46%) because childcare responsibilities tend to fall on them. 
Lone parents reported most difficulty, as might be expected (49% of men 
and 57% of women). The differences between different types of household, 
however, though significant, are considerably smaller than those between 
countries. 
Figure 1- 22 
Work-life balance in 2008
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Long working days are one of the main reasons for difficulties. In less 
developed countries, people tend to work longer hours than elsewhere, 
possibly to compensate for lower hourly wages. Accordingly, it is mostly in 
the less developed EU Member States that people report the most 
difficulties. There are, however, exceptions, such as Slovakia, where only 
44% reported a difficulty as against an EU average of 55% and 67% in 
Spain.     
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2.2.4.  (Un)Equal Opportunities 
An inclusive society means non-discrimination against minorities. The 6
th 
Progress Report showed that in several Member States, people are not 
comfortable with a neighbour or someone in the highest elected political 
position being of different ethnic origin or, having a different religion or 
belief, a different sexual orientation or a disability. Discrimination on all of 
these grounds is prohibited in the EU
61. A survey conducted in 2008
62 
revealed that in 17 Member States, people felt that at least one type of 
discrimination was more widespread than five years earlier. In almost all 
cases, this included ethnic discrimination, but also in many, discrimination 
on grounds of religion, sexual orientation or gender.  
2.2.4.1. Gender 
Overall in the EU, the unemployment rate of women in 2008 was almost one 
percentage point higher than for men. In 29 regions, however, 
unemployment of women was 5 percentage points or more higher than for 
men. These regions were predominantly in Greece, Spain and Italy (Map 
1.57). These differences, moreover, had nothing to do with differences in 
education attainment.  
Map 1.57: Difference between female and male unemployment rates, 2008 
Map 1.58: Difference between female and male employment rates, 20-64, 2008 
In 2008, women had a lower employment rate than men in every single 
region of the EU. The Lisbon employment target for women was also some 
20 percentage points lower than for men. In 2008, 33 regions had a gap in 
employment rates between men and women of over 20 percentage points. 
Again, these were mainly regions in Greece, Spain and Italy (Map 1.58). 
In terms of education levels, however, women out-perform men in most 
regions. In the EU, for every 100 men aged 25-64 with a tertiary education, 
there are 105 women. For those aged 25-34, there are 126 women with 
tertiary education per 100 men (Map 1.60), compared to only 80 for women 
aged 55-64 (Map 1.59). This tendency is equally evident at regional level. In 
two-thirds of regions, more women aged 25-64 have a higher education 
degree than men. For those aged 25-34, this is the case in almost 90% of 
regions, while for women aged 55-64 this is the case in only 27% of regions.  
Map 1.59: Gender balance of population aged 55-64 with tertiary education, 2008 
Map 1.60: Gender balance of population aged 25-34 with tertiary education, 2008 
There are also, however, more women than men with only basic schooling. 
For every 100 men aged 25-64 who have not completed upper secondary 
                                                 
61  Art. 21 EU Charter of fundamental rights 
62   Special Eurobarometer (269)  
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education, there are 110 women. Equally, in two-thirds of the regions, more 
women aged 25-64 have a low education than men.  
Nevertheless, this situation has changed markedly over time. For every 100 
men aged 25-34 who have not completed upper secondary education, there 
are only 83 women, and in only a third of the regions do more women than 
men have a low level of education  
2.2.4.2. Foreign born 
People born outside the EU – i.e. those with a migrant background – tend to 
have fewer employment opportunities than those born in the EU and often 
face cultural and linguistic barriers to working. On average, according to the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), just under 7% of the working-age population in 
the EU was born outside the EU. The figure is above 10% in only one of 
every six regions, while in half it is less than 5%.  In the Central and Eastern 
countries, apart from the Baltic States, the figures are very small (1% or 
less). The figures tend to be highest in the more developed regions and in 
large cities as well as in tourist regions (Map 1.61). 
People born outside the EU tend to have lower employment rates in most 
Member States (Figure 1.23). In Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Benelux, 
Austria, the UK and France, the employment rate of people aged 15-64 born 
outside the EU is at least 8 percentage points lower than those born inside 
the EU. However, in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus, as 
well as in the three Baltic States, the rate is 4 to 8 percentage points higher. 
One reason for the higher rate in the latter countries may be that those born 
outside the EU tend to live in regions with relatively high employment rates. 
This explains more than half the difference in rates in Spain and more than a 
third of the difference in Italy, though in the other countries, it is not an 
explanation. 
Figure 1- 23 
Difference in employment rates 
between people born inside the EU and outside the EU
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Map 1.61 Population aged 15-64 born outside the EU, 2008 
Map 1.62 US: Foreign-born population aged 18-64, 2008 
The right to move freely within the EU means that people can move to 
where the jobs are or to where jobs are most attractive. People who have 
moved to the EU from the outside, however, tend to face longer distances 
and larger differences in job opportunities and the quality of life if they wish 
to return home.  
Migrants from outside the EU also face more obstacles on the labour market 
than people moving between Member States. The average employment rate 
of those born outside the EU is, therefore, 6 percentage points lower than 
that of migrants born inside the EU. 
As compared with the EU-15, the US has almost twice the share of people 
born abroad (16%). In California, one third of people aged 18-64 were born 
outside the US in 2008 (Map 1.62). The only region in the EU with a similar 
share is Inner London, though California has 37 million inhabitants, Inner 
London 3 million.  
Elsewhere, in New York, New Jersey and Nevada, a quarter of the 
population is foreign born. In the EU, only Vienna, Brussels and Outer 
London have a share as large as this. In the US, only 6 relatively rural States 
have a foreign-born population which is less than 3% of the total
63. In the 
EU, 86 NUTS 2 regions, a third, have figures of less than 3%. 
2.2.5.  Access to services 
Access to basic services, such as compulsory schools, primary health care 
and banking differ both between and within countries. Figures 1.24 –1.26 
show countries ranked according to the proportion of population reporting 
difficulties accessing these services. The differences between countries are 
substantial. For compulsory schools, the proportion varies between 9% in 
Cyprus, Finland and Sweden to 24% in Portugal and Latvia. For banking 
services, they vary from 4% in the Netherlands to 56% in Romania. For 
primary health, the variation is between 6% in the UK and France to 35% in 
Latvia.  
In addition to these differences, the graphs show the proportion of people 
reporting access difficulties by type of area (see box on Degree of 
urbanisation in Section 1.1). Access tends to be more difficult in the thinly 
populated areas, in particular. However, since the share of a country's 
population living in thinly populated areas ranges from zero to two-thirds, 
the bubble size in the graph is adjusted to reflect the share of the country's 
population having difficulty accessing the service living in this type of area.  
For example, in Belgium, 32% of people living in thinly populated areas 
have difficulty in accessing primary health. However, as only 4% of 
                                                 
63   Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North and South Dakota, and West Virginia.  
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Belgium population live in thinly populated areas, the people with difficulty 
accessing primary health in such areas represent only 12% of the total in 
Belgium having this difficulty.  
In some countries, there are negligible differences in the proportion 
reporting access difficulties between the three types of area. This is the case 
in France and the UK for access to primary health care.  
The above figures, however, are based on what people report, i.e. their 
subjective views which may reflect their expectations about access, which in 
turn are likely to vary across countries according to what people are used to. 
Nor do they reveal why people are having difficulties, which may, for 
example, result from physical distance or a problem of affordability.   
Accordingly, the answers do not indicate what can be done to improve the 
situation. 
Policies with an overall equity objective will focus on the types of area 
where most people with difficulty live (the biggest bubble). Policies with a 
concern for territorial cohesion will also focus on reducing differences 
between the three types of area where these differences are large. 
Figure 1- 24 
Difficult access to compulsory schools by degree of urbanisation, 2007
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Figure 1- 25  
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Difficult access to primary health care by degree of urbanisation, 2007
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Figure 1- 26 
Difficult access to banking services by degree of urbanisation, 2007
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Access to a grocery store is particularly relevant for the elderly, those with 
disabilities who cannot afford a car or live in a thinly populated area. A recent 
Commission Report
64highlighted that residents of towns with less than 10 000 
inhabitants were considerably less satisfied with their choice of shops in 2008. It 
indicated that the recent trend to establish small neighbourhood shops in towns and 
villages and a stronger e-commerce sector could help to address this lack of choice. 
Box: Remote rural areas 
Population in the remote rural regions in the EU – those some distance away from a town or 
city of any size - has tended to rise more slowly (in the EU-15) or decline faster (in the EU-
12) than in rural regions close to a city (Map 1.63). In the EU-15, natural population 
growth in remote rural regions is less than in rural regions close to a city. Net inward 
migration, however, is similar. In Central and Eastern regions, by contrast, natural 
population has declined and there has been net outward migration rates in both types of 
region, but more so in the remote regions. 
The effects of remoteness can also be seen in Mexico, Canada and the US (Map 1.64). In 
each case, population increased in rural regions close to a city, whereas it declined in remote 
regions in Mexico and Canada and grew by much less in the US. 
Growth of GDP in rural regions in the EU-15 followed a different pattern. In 2000-2007, 
growth was higher in remote rural regions than in those close to a city (an increase of 0.5% 
as against only 0.1 %). In the EU-12 countries, both types of region grew more slowly than 
others regions, though more so for those close to a city. 
In the EU-15, rural regions close to a city have a higher share of tertiary educated in 
working-age population (21%) as against 18% in remote regions. The share of people with a 
low education is much larger in remote rural regions (46%) than in those close to a city 
(33%). In the CEEC's, the differences in the levels of education are lower. 
Employment also increased by more in remote rural regions in the EU-15 (1.4% a year) 
than in those close to a city (0.8% a year). As a result, the gap in employment rates between 
the two closed almost completely (65-66% in both). Employment in both types of region in 
the EU-12, however, declined at a similar rate, leaving the employment rate in remote rural 
regions (58%) lower than in those close to a city (61%). Remote rural regions, however, 
have larger shares of employment in agriculture, which, especially in the EU-12, includes a 
large share of subsistence farming. 
Map 1.63: Urban-rural typology of NUTS3 regions including remoteness 
Map 1.64: NAFTA: Urban-rural typology including remoteness 
2.2.6.  Safety and trust 
Crime figures influence how safe people feel and levels of trust (Figure 
1.27). Extensive media coverage of violent crime and murders, in particular, 
tends to feed feelings of insecurity, even when crime rates are declining.  
                                                 
64   European Commission 2010 Retail market monitoring report COM(2010)355  
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Fortunately, murder rates tend to be low in the EU. In 20 Member States, 
rates are less than two murders per 100,000 inhabitants (Map 1.65). Only 6 
EU regions had rates of 5 per 100,000 or higher. The three highest rates 
were in Lithuania, Estonia and Corsica at 8 or more per 100,000. In Member 
States, where consistent data are available, murder rates have declined or 
remained low over time. The only exception is Portugal, where murder rates 
have increased by almost 5% a year since 1998. 
The US has a murder rate of 5.5 per 100,000, over three times the EU 
average. Only 7 of the 50 US States have a murder rate under two per 
100,000 (Map 1.66), while in 25 States, i.e. half, the rate is 5 per 100,000 or 
higher. Explanations for this higher rate vary, though they include cultural 
differences, the heterogeneity of US society, higher poverty rates and the 
ease of access to firearms. 
Map 1.65 : Homocide rate in the EU 2005 
Map 1.66 : US: Homicide rate in the US 2006-2008 
Figure 1- 27 
Crime, violence or vandalism by degree of urbanisation, 2008
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Problems related to crime, violence and vandalism are concentrated in 
densely populated areas, where on average one in five people report such 
problems. In intermediate areas, only one in ten reports problems and in 
thinly populated areas, even fewer (Figure 1.28). Problems relating to noise 
and pollution are also much more often reported in densely populated areas 
than in others. 
Figure 1- 28  
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Generally speaking, most people in this city can be trusted, 2009.
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Source: Urban Audit Perception Survey 
Box: The Urban Audit Perception Survey
65 
The Urban Audit Perception Survey measures the satisfaction of the residents of 75 
European cities. Here, their responses to 7 indicators are examined for 16 cities to 
illustrate the situation across the EU. Interviewees were asked to judge their 
satisfaction of the following features of the cities in which they lived: public 
transport, air quality, safety, quality of city government, job opportunities, cost and 
availability of housing and integration of foreigners. The results are plotted in 
cobweb (Figure 1.29) and compared with the median satisfaction in the EU. 
Satisfaction, it should be noted, is not an absolute indicator but a relative measure 
comparing the perceptions of residents with what they expect. For instance, those 
in small cities might be very satisfied with basic public transport services whereas 
those in large cities might expect more.  
Indeed, the size of the city is especially relevant. Air quality, for example, tends to 
be an issue only in bigger cities. Similarly, the cost and availability of housing are 
much more issues in large cities, especially capitals, than smaller ones. 
This is confirmed by the examples of Rostock, Groningen, Leipzig and Piatra 
Neamt which recorded very high levels of satisfaction with both air quality and 
housing availability. 
The problems of poor air quality and housing availability in big cities are usually 
counterbalanced in part by more job opportunities. This is the case, for example, in 
Paris, London and Warsaw, where overall satisfaction is similar to the EU average. 
Some smaller capital cities - Wien, Stockholm and Helsinki - record higher 
satisfaction in the quality of government and people there are generally more 
                                                 
65   The Urban Audit Perception Survey on quality of life in European cities was conducted in 2009 to 
measure the perceptions of quality of life in 75 cities in the EU, Croatia and Turkey. A previous 
survey was done in 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/themes/urban/audit/index_en.htm  
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satisfied than in other capitals. 
Residents of Budapest and Sofia are particularly dissatisfied with the city 
government, safety and air quality, while those in Athens report being very 
dissatisfied on most counts, only public transport and housing registering similar 
levels of satisfaction as the EU average (investment for the Olympic Games might 
be relevant here). 
Satisfaction levels in smaller cities, except for air quality and housing, reflect their 
specific features. Groningen and Piatra Neamt have the most satisfied residents, 
Palermo the least, with Athens just above. 
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Figure 1- 29: Level of satisfaction of residents with aspects  
of quality of life in selected cities, 2009  
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2.3.  Income, poverty and deprivation 
2.3.1.  Income and transfers in kind 
Comparing household income between countries simply in monetary terms 
is distorted because of the failure to take account of the services financed or 
subsidised by government (benefits or transfers in kind), such as healthcare, 
education and child and elderly care.  
Net adjusted disposable household income (Map 1.67) corrects for these 
differences in transfers in kind as recommended by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi 
report. This is critical since it adds an estimated 43% and 39% to net 
disposable household income in Denmark and Sweden, compared to only 
3% in Slovenia and 11% in Greece. In most Member States transfers in kind 
are estimated to add between 15% and 25% to net disposable household 
income.  
Map 1.67: Net adjusted disposable income of private households 
(PPCS), 2007 
Without this type of adjustment, household income is underestimated in 
countries with extensive public services (like the Nordic Member States) and 
overestimated in those where households have to pay for most of these 
services out of their disposable income. 
Disparities in net adjusted household income between regions across the EU 
are less than for GDP per head, but remain substantial. For example, almost 
all regions in Romania and Bulgaria have an income below a third of the EU 
average, while 11 regions in the EU-15 have an income over a third above 
the EU average. 
Box: GDP differs from income 
GDP per head is often used as a proxy for income, regions with a high GDP per 
head being regarded as prosperous. GDP per head, however, is a poor proxy for 
household income.  
Differences in GDP per head explain only 60% of the variation in net adjusted 
disposable household income. The difference in the ranking of regions is also large. 
The ranking of 17 regions is 100 places higher on one measure than the other. The 
ranking of 66 regions changes by more than 50 places. For example, the Brussels 
Region has the third highest GDP per head in the EU but is ranked only 142
nd in 
terms of adjusted disposable household income per head (Map 1.4). In many 
regions, therefore GDP per head does not reflect the relative level of household 
income. 
The top five NUTS 2 regions with the highest GDP per head include four where 
inward commuting inflates GDP per head significantly. As accurate data on 
commuting flows are not available, much of the distortion they create can be 
corrected by calculating the figure for the entire metropolitan region (i.e. including 
some of the surrounding NUTS 2 regions from which commuting emanates) to 
provide a more accurate estimate of their economic activity relative to their  
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population. For example, Inner London has a GDP per head of 336% of the EU 
average, while for the London metro region it is 164% of the average, for Brussels, 
it is 233%, while for the Brussels Metro region it is 147% and for Hamburg, 200% 
and 154%, respectively.  
Income is also not identical to GDP. In two Member States, the difference is 
particularly large. Ireland has the second highest GDP per head in the EU, but its 
gross national income (GNI) per head is 14% lower and only the 8
th highest in the 
EU. Luxembourg's GNI is 25% lower than its GDP. The main difference between 
the two measures is that GNI takes account of the income of companies sent to and 
received from abroad, as well as transfers of individuals, and excludes the 
compensation of employees living outside the country (and so corrects for the 
impact of commuting).  
In 2006, 17% of Luxembourg's GDP consisted of compensation of employees 
living outside Luxembourg. The same differences apply at regional level but 
regional figures for gross income are not available. In many regions, however, it is 
likely that a substantial share of the economic wealth generated there goes to other 
regions and countries. 
 
The adjustments for transfers in kind are currently only available for 23 
Member States. Moreover, transfers in kind cannot be assigned to specific 
households. Accordingly, at-risk-of-poverty rates do not take these transfers 
into account. There is also no information about the regional distribution of 
transfers in kind – the estimates presented here assume that this is in line 
with the distribution of population. 
2.3.1.1.Housing costs not included in income or at-risk-of-poverty rates  
One of the main determinants of people’s well-being and social participation 
is access to affordable and decent housing. Indeed, according to a recent 
Eurobarometer survey, for 26 % of people in the EU the fact that decent 
housing is too expensive is the main reason why people are poor. People 
with incomes below the poverty threshold
66 also spend more on housing in 
relative terms than those above (on average in the EU 33% of disposable 
income as opposed to 17%) and 39% of them report that housing costs are a 
burden (against 7% for those above the poverty threshold). They live in 
worse housing conditions as well, some 27% living in overcrowded 
accommodation, as opposed to 15% of the rest of the population and 38% of 
them are affected by at least one of the housing deprivation factors
67. 
                                                 
66   Measured conventionally as 60% of median equivalised disposable household income in each country 
(‘equivalised’ meaning that an adjustment is made for the size and composition of households). Those 
with income below 60% of the median are referred to as being at risk of poverty. 
67   Housing deprivation factors include: damp walls, leaking roofs or rot in windows, no bath or shower 
in the dwelling; no indoor flushing toilet for the sole use of the household; dwelling too dark. For a 
full analysis of housing costs and housing deprivation, see the supporting document to the 2010 Joint 
Report on Social Protection and Social Exclusion: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=757&langId=en and the 2009 Social Situation Report 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=501&langId=en   
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Housing costs are at present not taken into account at EU level and in most 
countries in the measure of the risk of poverty.  
2.3.2.  Relative poverty: at-risk-of-poverty income relative to the national 
median income 
In 2008, 17% of the EU population had an income after social transfers 
below 60% of median disposable income in the country in which they live – 
the at-risk-of-poverty rate. The rate was 20% for children and 19% for older 
people of 65 and over. For the unemployed, the rate was much higher at 
44%.  
Regional differences are also pronounced. Those at risk of poverty range 
from below 6% of the population in Trento, Praha and Jihozápadat to over 
35% in Ceuta and Extremadura in Spain and Campania, Sicilia and Calabria 
in Italy (Map 1.68). 
Map 1.68: Population at-risk-of-poverty after social transfers, 2008 
Within a country, the level of regional development has a substantial effect 
on the risk of poverty. Less developed regions tend to have the highest rates, 
whereas the most developed regions tend to have much lower rates. This can 
be clearly seen in the UK, Spain, Italy and Germany. 
In some countries, the capital city region has a lower poverty rate than the 
national average, as in Spain, Portugal, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Finland and Sweden. In others, the capital region has a higher rate, 
as in Brussels, London, Vienna and Berlin. In all four cases, this may reflect 
a concentration of those at risk of poverty in deprived inner city areas.  
The at-risk-of-poverty rate is measured against a national benchmark, which 
varies greatly across the EU. If adjusted for differences in the cost of living 
(values expressed in purchasing power standards), the poverty threshold for 
a single-person household varies from about PPS 1900 a year in Romania, 
PPS 2800 in Bulgaria and around PPS 4000 in Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia to over PPS 10  000 in 10 Member States and PPS 16  500 in 
Luxembourg. The poverty threshold is, therefore, 4-5 times higher in the 
countries with the highest income levels than in those with the lowest levels. 
Being at risk of poverty, therefore, means having a very different income 
level in the former than in the latter. 
2.3.3.  Absolute poverty: material deprivation  
Measuring material deprivation rather than the risk of poverty is a means of 
taking account of these differences in absolute income, since it is measured 
in relation to a common set of goods and services. It is defined for 
comparison purposes as the enforced lack of at least three of the nine 
following items: ability to face unexpected expenses, ability to pay for a one 
week annual holiday away from home, existence of arrears on bills 
(mortgage or rent payments, utility bills, or hire purchase instalments or 
other loan payments), capacity to have a meal with meat, chicken or fish 
every second day, capacity to keep the home adequately warm, ability to 
afford a washing machine,  colour TV,  telephone or  car.  
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As such, it takes account of savings and accumulated wealth; which the at-
risk-of-poverty rate does not and which means that a household will not 
necessarily experience material deprivation if their income drops below the 
poverty threshold. It also takes account of people's ability to manage their 
finances
68. Some households with a relatively high income may still 
experience material deprivation because they fail to manage their finances 
properly.  
Some 17% of people in the EU were measured as being materially deprived 
in 2008 according to this indicator. The figure, however, is very much higher 
in the lower income countries than in the more prosperous ones. In the EU-
15, the proportion of materially deprived is much larger in Portugal and 
Greece (22% in each) than the EU-15 average (13%).  
The Europe-2020 objective
69 is to lift 20 million people out of a risk of 
poverty and exclusion. The indicator chosen covers the number of people 
who are either at risk-of-poverty and/or severely materially deprived and/or 
living in households with very low work intensity.  
Map 1.69: Population suffering from severe material deprivation, 2008  
Severe materially deprivation (being unable to afford at least 4 of the 9 items 
listed above) differs considerably between Member States. Less than 2% of 
the population in Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark are 
severely materially deprived, while in Romania and Bulgaria, the proportion 
is over 30% (Map 1.69). 
Figure 1- 30 
Workless households, 2008
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68   OECD Improving Financial Literacy: Analysis of Issues and Policies. OECD, Paris, 2005. 
69   Member States can propose indicators suited to their circumstances and priorities.  
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The share of people in households with a very low work intensity in most 
Member States ranges between 4% and 7%. In Hungary and the UK, 
however, it was over 12% in 2008 (Figure 1.30).  
The combination of the three criteria used in Europe 2020 classifies almost 
one in four EU residents as at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (Figure1.31). 
This share of population varies considerably between just over 15% in the 
Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg to 38% in Bulgaria and 
44% in Romania. 
Figure 1- 31 
People at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion, 2008
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
RO
BG
LV
PL
HU
LT
UK
EL
PT
IT
IE
ES
CY
EE
BE
SK
DE
MT
FR
AT
SI
FI
DK
SE
LU
CZ
NL
EU-27
People in a household at risk of poverty, severely materially deprived and/or with very low work intensity, % of population 
 
 
2.3.4.  Deprivation and poverty by degree of urbanisation 
The share of population experiencing material deprivation is considerably 
higher in thinly populated areas in Romania and Bulgaria than in other parts 
of the two countries (20 and 14 percentage points higher). In most Member 
States, however, material deprivation is the same or lower in such areas 
(Figure 1.32). This is particularly so in countries with relatively low rates of 
material deprivation. As material deprivation declines, therefore, it appears 
that the disadvantages of living in a thinly populated area diminish to such 
an extent that it becomes more prominent in densely populated areas. For 
severe material deprivation, this pattern is even stronger: in two out of three 
Member States severe material deprivation is higher in densely populated 
areas than in thinly populated ones (Figure 1.33).  
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A similar pattern is evident for the share of population that lacks the 
capacity to face unexpected financial expenses (Figure 1.34). Significantly 
higher rates in thinly populated areas occur mostly in Central and Eastern 
Member States. In Western Member States, the rates in these areas are in 
general lower than elsewhere and are higher in densely populated areas. 
The share of population with income below the poverty threshold shows a 
similar pattern but less uniformly (Figure 1.35). This indicator, however, 
suffers from a number of drawbacks when comparing across areas by degree 
of urbanisation, since it does not take account of differences in living costs 
or whether a household owns or rents its home. Since the cost of living is on 
average higher in densely populated areas
70 and more households rent their 
accommodation, the share of people at-risk-of-poverty may well be higher in 
densely populated areas than is shown in the chart once income is adjusted 
for these differences. 
Figure 1- 32 
Material Deprivation by degree of urbanisation, 2008
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Source: Eurostat 
Figure 1- 33 
                                                 
70   See for example the Regional Price Index as calculated by the German Federal Institute for Research 
on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR www.bbsr.bund.be ).  
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Severe material Deprivation by degree of urbanisation, 2008
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Figure 1- 34 
Population without the capacity to face unexpected financial expenses 
by degree or urbanisation, 2008
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Source: Eurostat 
Figure 1- 35  
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Population at-risk-of-poverty by degree of urbanisation, 2008
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Box on Changes in material deprivation,  
at-risk-of-poverty and income in five less developed MS 
In Poland, Slovakia and the three Baltic States, the share of population experiencing material 
deprivation declined by between 15 and 25 percentage points between 2005 and 2008 (though the 
crisis may lead to renewed increases, especially in the three Baltic States). Given that average net 
adjusted household income (i.e. allowing for transfers in kind) per person increased by between 
15% and 34%, over these three years, the highest rises in the EU, this should come as no surprise 
(Table 1.12). 
Table 1.12 
percentage 
point change
In real terms
2005 2008 2005-2008 2005 2008 Change in %
2005-2008
Estonia 27 12 -15 7,476 9,773 28
Latvia 56 35 -21 6,797 9,585 34
Lithuania 52 27 -25 7,980 10,519 28
Hungary 40 37 -3 9,704 10,122 -2
Poland 51 32 -19 7,986 10,007 15
Slovakia 43 28 -15 8,342 10,933 19
* Purchasing power standard for consumers' expenditure
Source: Eurostat
Changes in material deprivation and net household income in five less 
developed Member States, 2005-2008
Material deprivation Net adjusted household income
% of total poulation PPCS per inhabitant*
 
However, only in Poland and Slovakia was there a reduction in the at-risk-of-poverty rate. In 
part, the failure of the rate to fall in the other countries is due to rising average income, which 
increased the poverty threshold significantly each year. Relative to the poverty threshold 
anchored in 2005, however, the share of population at risk of poverty halved in all 5 countries 
(Table 1.13). 
Table 1. 13 
2005 2008
Change in pp 
2008-05
2008, relative to 
2005 threshold
Change in pp 
2008-05
Estonia 18 19 1 5 -13
Latvia 19 26 7 7 -12
Lithuania 21 20 -1 5 -16
Hungary 13 12 -1 9 -4
Poland 21 17 -4 8 -13
Slovakia 13 11 -2 5 -8
At-risk-of-poverty rate, in % of total population
 
In Hungary, the share of population measured as being material deprived fell by only 3 
percentage points over the period, from 40% to 37%. In 2005, it had the second lowest rate of 
these six countries. In 2008, it had the highest rate. Over the period, real disposable household 
income actually diminished, which is the main reason for the small fall. By 2008, therefore, 
income had declined below that in Slovakia and Lithuania. 
The question arises as to whether the rise in income in the 5 countries listed above led to an 
increase in happiness or satisfaction with life. Although the periods do not precisely correspond, 
there are clear signs of increases in happiness in all of them. In Hungary, however, both 
happiness and satisfaction with life declined (Table 1.14). 
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Table 1. 14 
2003 2007
Change 
2007-03 2003 2007
Change 
2007-03
Estonia 6.8 7.4 0.6 5.9 6.7 0.8
Lithuania 6.4 7.3 0.9 5.4 6.3 0.9
Latvia 6.4 6.8 0.4 5.5 6 0.5
Hungary 7.1 7.0 -0.1 5.9 5.6 -0.3
P o l a n d6 . 97 . 40 . 56 . 26 . 90 . 7
Slovakia 6.5 7.5 1.0 5.7 6.7 1.0
Happiness index Life Satisfaction index
 
 
2.4.  UN Human Development Index and Human Poverty Index 
The UN has developed the Human Development Index (HDI) to emphasise the fact 
that aspects other than economic activities and their growth are important for 
development. The HDI is based on life expectancy, GDP per head, literacy and 
enrolment rates. Within the EU, however, this indicator is highly correlated with 
GDP per head; primarily because literacy, enrolment and life expectancy are all 
similarly high from a global perspective.  
To gain a better perspective on human development diversity within the EU, an EU 
regional HDI has been calculated, which includes healthy life expectancy, net 
adjusted household income
71 and low and high educational attainment for people 
aged 25-64. This indicator is less closely correlated to GDP than the UN one and 
provides a complementary perspective.  
The top 10 regions include five English ones, the capital city regions of Sweden and 
France, and two regions surrounding Brussels (Map 1.70). Of these 10 regions, only 
three appear in the top 10 based on GDP per head.  
The bottom 10 regions comprise 7 in Romania, two in Hungary and one in Bulgaria. 
Half of them are also in the bottom 10 regions in terms of GDP per head. 
Map 1.70 EU Human Development Index, 2007 
Map 1.71 UN Human Poverty Index 2, 2007 
The UN has also created a Human Poverty Index
72, which allows for the fact that 
averages can hide large disparities. The Index has one version for less developed 
countries and one for developed countries (HPI 2). This latter index was also 
calculated for all EU regions based on the probability at birth of not reaching 65, the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate, long term unemployment and the share of population aged 
25-64 with only basic schooling.  
                                                 
71   Following the recommendations in the Stiglitz Sen Report. This does create difficulties as data is 
missing for Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg and Romania. For this index, Romanian regions use 
unadjusted disposable household income. For Luxembourg data was based on EQLS. 
72   http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hpi/ .  
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The highest levels of human poverty on this measure are in Portugal, Southern 
Spain, Southern Italy and Greece (Map 1.71). The lowest levels are in highly, 
moderately and less developed Member States – in Sweden, Germany, Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
The striking feature of the HPI and HDI is that they are only weakly correlated. 
Only a few regions score well on both, such as Stockholm, or poorly on both, such 
as Açores. The vast majority combine a high score on one index and a low one on 
the other. This is notably the case in Brussels, Luxembourg, Navarra and País 
Vasco, where the human poverty index is much higher than the human development 
index would imply. 
One of the main reasons for the difference in the two indices is that the HDI is based 
on a per capita average of an absolute measure of income (net adjusted household 
income), while HPI includes a relative measure (the portion of population below the 
national poverty threshold). Accordingly, a region with an unequal distribution of a 
high level of income can have both a high average level of human development and 
a high level of poverty. A region with low income but relatively equal distribution 
of it will have a low HDI and a low HPI. 
The increases in average income in the 5 less developed countries listed above did, 
in fact, lead to higher levels of life satisfaction and happiness, despite the at-risk-of-
poverty rate remaining unchanged. It could be argued, therefore, that improving 
well-being, especially in less developed Member States depends on improving the 
factors behind the HDI and other absolute measures of well-being. 
Relative measures of poverty add nuance and can guide policy choices in situations 
where circumstances are similar. For example, in regions with similar levels of HDI, 
average well-being is likely to be higher in the region with a lower HPI. Relative 
measures, however, are difficult to compare in radically different situations. For 
example, Stockholm and Bratislava have a very similar HPI, yet residents in 
Stockholm report being much more satisfied with their life and happier than in 
Bratislava.  
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Box: Happiness and life satisfaction 
And they lived happily ever after. 
(Traditional ending of a fairytale) 
Life is no fairy tale. Nevertheless, a growing number of academics
73, researchers
74 and politicians 
(OECD 2009) argue that well-being, in the form of a long and happy life, should be an important 
goal of public policy
75 . Research has shown
76  that although more developed countries tend to be 
happier than less developed ones, more economic growth does not necessarily lead to a happier 
population. 
An increase in economic activity does not always lead to more and better jobs. Nor does it 
automatically lead to an increase in average income. In some countries, the benefits of economic 
growth have largely gone to high income groups or to companies, while median household income 
has barely increased or has even fallen. Economic growth can also be accompanied by longer 
working hours, more stress and a deterioration in the quality of life.  
In 2007, the three Member States with the highest scores on the happiness index were the three 
Nordic countries. The three with the lowest scores were Bulgaria, Latvia and Portugal. 
Although overall, happiness tends to be less in the less developed Member States, this is not 
always the case. Malta is an extreme case, ranking only 18
th in terms of GDP per head, but 7
th 
according to the happiness index, while Austria has the 4
th highest GDP per head but ranks 19
th on 
the happiness index. 
Life satisfaction is another frequently used subjective indicator of well-being. It is highly 
correlated with happiness. The three Nordic Member States also had the highest life satisfaction, 
according to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2009. One reason cited for the high levels of 
happiness in these countries is not only their high income but also the relatively equal distribution 
of this. 
The least satisfied Member States were Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Lithuania and 
Romania. These are also among the least developed. However, some countries are far less satisfied 
than their level of development would imply and vice versa. For example, Poland ranked 24
th out 
of the 27 Member States in terms of GDP per head in 2008, but was ranked 16
th in terms of life 
satisfaction in 2009. Portugal was ranked 19
th in terms of GDP per head, but 24
th in life 
satisfaction. 
The impact of the crisis is also evident in the changes in life satisfaction between 2007 and 2009. 
This declined in 23 Member States and remained unchanged in the remaining four. In Romania, 
Latvia, Bulgaria and Portugal, the index fell by 10%. Satisfaction in other domains, such as family 
                                                 
73   Layard, Richard. Happiness: Lessons from a New Science, Penguin, London, 2006. 
74   New Economics Foundation, NEF, National Accounts of Well-being, nef, London, 2009. 
75    Stiglitz, J., Sen, A., Fitoussi, J., Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress. 2009 www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr . 
76   Veenhoven, Ruut, 'Well-being in the welfare state: Level not higher, distribution not more equitable' 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 2000, vol 2, pp 91-125.  
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life, were not much affected by the crisis.  
Being happy is even better if it lasts. The Happy Life Years index combines data on life 
expectancy in good health with the happiness index
77. This reaches 60 or more in the three Nordic 
countries and Ireland, but is only 37 in Bulgaria and Romania. (Table 1.15). 
Table 1. 15 
Happiness
Happy Life 
Years
GDP per 
head Happiness
Happy Life 
Years
Denmark 8.3 61 121 1 5 6 5 1
Finland 8.3 61 118 1 4 7 6 3
Sweden 8.2 63 123 3 1 4 1 3
Ireland 8.0 62 148 4 2 2 -2 0
Luxembourg 8.0 59 150 4 7 1 -3 -6
Netherlands 8.0 62 132 4 3 3 -1 0
Malta 7.9 60 76 7 6 18 11 12
Belgium 7.8 58 116 8 10 10 2 0
France 7.8 58 109 8 9 11 3 2
United Kingdom 7.8 59 117 8 8 8 0 0
Cyprus 7.7 55 94 11 12 14 3 2
Slovenia 7.7 52 89 11 16 16 5 0
Spain 7.6 55 105 13 13 12 -1 -1
Czech Republic 7.5 51 80 14 17 17 3 0
Germany 7.5 55 116 14 11 9 -5 -2
Slovakia 7.5 47 68 14 21 21 7 0
Estonia 7.4 48 69 17 19 20 3 1
P o l a n d 7 . 44 7 5 4 1 72 0 2 5 8 5
Austria 7.3 54 123 19 14 4 -15 -10
Greece 7.3 53 93 19 15 15 -4 0
Lithuania 7.3 45 59 19 23 23 4 0
Hungary 7.0 42 63 22 24 22 0 -2
Italy 7.0 51 103 22 18 13 -9 -5
Romania 7.0 37 42 22 26 26 4 0
Portugal 6.9 45 76 25 22 19 -6 -3
Latvia 6.8 41 56 26 25 24 -2 -1
Bulgaria 5.8 37 38 27 27 27 0 0
Source: Eurostat, EQLS2, DG REGIO calculations
Ranked on Happiness Index
Rank Change in rank vs GDP
2007 Happiness 
index
Happy Life 
Years 2007
GDP per head, 
EU27=100
 
In general, the Happy Life Years indicator is also closely correlated with GDP per head. The 
ranking by GDP per head and Happy Life Years only changes by a maximum of 2 places for 19 
Member States. There are a few striking exceptions. Malta is in sixth place for Happy Life Years 
and 18
th for GDP per head. Austria, which is 14
th on the first and 4
th on GDP per head. Italy and 
Luxembourg drop 5 and 6 places, while Poland and Malta move up 5 and 12 places. It is striking, 
though the levels of GDP per head are similar, Malta is much happier than Portugal and Spain is 
much happier than Italy.  
 
2.5.  Conclusions 
Although the EU has an enviably long life expectancy from a global perspective, 
too many EU regions still have considerably shorter life expectancy than the 
average at birth. The reasons are manifold, ranging from differences in income, 
education and living conditions to differential access to high quality health care. 
Romanian and Bulgarian regions score the worst on health indicators such as infant 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 Veenhoven, Ruut. 2006. 'Quality of life in modern society, Measured with Happy Life Years.' 
in: Yew-Kwang Ng & Lok Sang Ho (Eds.) Happiness and Public Policy, Theory, Case 
studies and Implications Palgrave-Macmillan, New York.  
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mortality and (standardised) mortality rates from cancer and heart disease. These 
indicators, however, are not uniformly high in the more developed parts of the EU. 
Some of the more remote and/or economically depressed regions have poor scores 
on these indicators.  
Road fatalities disproportionately affect young men and significantly reduce male 
life expectancy. The large regional differences in road fatalities, however, are not 
related to the quality of transport infrastructure and are probably more influenced by 
driver behaviour and the extent to which laws are enforced.  
Unemployment declined substantially between 2000 and 2008. Nevertheless, 
regional unemployment rates remained high in Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and 
Southern Spain even before the crisis. Since 2008, unemployment has risen 
dramatically in many Member States, notably in Spain, and the Baltic States, where 
average rates were between 17% and 22% by early 2010. Reaching the Europe 2020 
employment rate target of 75% of people aged 20-64 will require a wide ranging 
strategy. 
Regions with high unemployment rates also tend to have more outward than inward  
migration, although overall regional labour mobility in the EU remains low 
compared to the US. Between 2001 and 2007, most regions in the EU-12 and 
Eastern Germany had net outward migration, especially the predominantly rural 
regions. By contrast, regions in the EU-15 had mostly net inward migration and the 
predominantly rural regions more so than the predominantly urban ones.  
Access to services, such as primary and secondary education, primary health care 
and banking services was typically considered more difficult in thinly populated 
areas, especially in the less developed Member States. In the most developed 
Member States few people experienced difficulties and the differences between 
densely and thinly populated areas were small. Densely populated areas consistently 
had a larger share of their population that reported problems relating to crime and 
pollution.  
Within one generation, women have achieved and surpassed the education 
attainment level of men. In virtually all EU regions, more women than men aged 25-
34 have a university degree or the equivalent, while for women aged 55-64, this is 
the case only in a small minority of regions. This increase in the education 
attainment of women has not yet led to more equal employment rates. In many parts 
of southern Europe, in particular, employment rates of women remain considerably 
below those of men despite increasing over the past decade.  
Prior to the crisis, household income had grown markedly in many of the central 
and eastern Member States. This lifted many people out of (severe) material 
deprivation and increased their overall life satisfaction and happiness. The crisis, 
unfortunately, is likely to have reversed this tendency and increased deprivation, 
especially in the worst affected countries like the Baltic States. 
The relative number of people with income which puts them at risk of poverty (less 
than 60% of national median disposable income) differs not only between Member 
States but also between regions within Member States. In several Member States, 
including in the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany and Poland, the relative number is twice 
as large in the least prosperous regions as in the most prosperous.   
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In most EU-15 countries, densely populated areas have a larger proportion if people 
who are materially deprived than thinly populated ones, while it in most EU-12 
countries, the proportion is larger in thinly population areas.  
The UN human development index (HDI) and the UN human poverty index (HPI) 
highlight both the absolute and relative dimensions of well-being. The first provides 
an index of absolute levels of development, the second focuses on the distribution of 
the aspects which make this up across the population. The analysis here indicates 
that improvements in the HDI in less developed regions can have a strong impact on 
well-being, while in more developed regions a reduction in the HPI, i.e. in 
inequalities,  is more likely to improve well-being.  
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3.  ENHANCING ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Among the main challenges facing regions in the EU are climate change and its impact, 
environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and unsustainable use of natural resources. 
Mitigating climate change and improving resource efficiency, notably by limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to the consequences, have become key priorities 
of the EU. As a result, the White Paper on adaptation to climate change
78 highlights the 
role of environmental capacity, green infrastructure and ecosystem services in 
adaptation, the recognition of regional and urban-rural differences, and the need for more 
strategic, long-term spatial planning and regional development. In addition, there is a 
need for cost-benefit analysis of public investment to consider using an ecosystem-based 
approach for climate change adaptation and mitigation (especially in building green 
infrastructure)
79. 
Measures to encourage the production of renewable energy, energy efficiency and water 
treatment feature prominently among the interventions funded under Cohesion policy. 
However, there are major differences between regions as regards the scope for action and 
the likely consequences of climate change. 
3.1.  Adapting to climate change already underway 
The severity of the impact of climate change will vary across the EU according to 
geophysical vulnerability, the natural and human capacity to adapt, and the level of 
economic development. In the face of these variations, it is crucial for regions to 
plan an adaptation strategy most appropriate for them. 
Regions most vulnerable to climate change are largely located in the South and East 
of Europe. A number of regions in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus 
and Malta will be seriously affected in terms of reduced precipitation and increased 
temperatures. Many of these regions are also highly dependent on vulnerable sectors 
such as agriculture and tourism
80. Less pressure is expected in the North and West 
of Europe except in low-lying coastal regions around the North Sea and in regions 
exposed to coastal erosion around the Baltic Sea. Regions with low GDP per head 
are likely to experience more pressure because of their lower capacity to adapt. 
In the long-term, climate change will increase average temperatures, modify rainfall 
patterns and raise sea levels. Accordingly, the activities most affected are likely to 
be agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy production and tourism. The built 
environment will also be affected by extreme weather, and there will equally be 
direct and indirect effects on human health Major investment will be required to 
combat and prevent drought, desertification, fires, coastal erosion and flooding. 
There are likely to be damaging economic, social and environmental effects, though 
                                                 
78   COM(2009) 147 final, 1.4.2009. 
79    The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity TEEB-CIU, 2010 http://www.teebweb.org//. 
80   For a sectoral economic sensitivity to climate change, see ESPON 2013 Programme, Climate Change 
and Territorial Effects on Regions and Local Economies, Applied Research Project 2013/2/1, Interim 
report, 2010.  
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the increased need for mitigating investment could also boost GDP growth in the 
short term. 
Temperature changes 
The EU has declared an objective of limiting the rise in temperature to 2°C. The 
IPCC (Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change) has prepared climate forecasts 
under several possible future scenarios for 2070-2099. According to the IPCC A1B 
scenario
81, temperatures will rise by 3-5°C in Europe as compared with the average 
for 1961-1990. Only in Ireland and Scotland will temperatures increase by much 
less than in the rest of Europe. The number of nights when the temperature does not 
fall below 20°C is likely to increase, especially around the Mediterranean and in 
Bulgaria and southern Romania, though also in central France and Hungary (Map 
1.72). 
Map 1.72 Projected change in number of tropical nights  
between 1961-1990 and 2071-2100 
Change in snow cover 
As a direct consequence of increased temperatures, the number of days with snow 
cover is likely to diminish, affecting in particular mountain areas, especially in the 
Alps though also in the Pyrenees and Carpathians (Map 1.73).  
Map 1.73 Projected change in annual number of days with snow cover between 
1961-1990 and 2071-2100 
The retreat of alpine glaciers is of particular concern since this will directly reduce 
water reserves, 40 % of Europe's fresh water comes from this source and feeds the 
Danube, Rhine, Po, Rhone and other rivers. Climate change is, therefore, 
threatening the delicate interaction between winter storage and summer release of 
water, resulting in more extreme flows of water with a significant increase in the 
risk of floods and drought. 
The reduction in snow cover will also hit many mountain regions dependent on 
winter sports significantly. The fragile natural environment of mountain areas may 
be affected as well, with direct consequences for biodiversity and local activities. 
Water scarcity 
Water is necessary for life, sustaining ecosystems and regulating our climate. But it 
is a finite resource, and less than 1% of the world’s fresh water is accessible for 
direct human use. Competition for water poses a growing risk to the economy, 
communities and the ecosystems that rely on it. If climate change continues to raise 
average temperatures across Europe, water is expected to become even scarcer in 
many areas, so it is vital to find solutions to protect it.  
                                                 
81   The A1B scenario describes a future world of high economic growth, global population that peaks in 
mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient 
technologies. Major underlying assumptions include increased cultural and social interaction and a 
substantial reduction in regional differences in GDP per head, as well as balance between fossil and 
non-fossil energy sources.  
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A reduction in rainfall is likely to mean an increase in water scarcity
82. Summers are 
expected to become much drier and EU regions as a whole are expected to 
experience a reduction in rainfall of over 20% over the next 60 years and in some 
cases, over 40%. At the same time, precipitation in winter in Baltic and Northern 
Sea regions could rise by 20% or even 40% (Map 1.74).  
Map 1.74 Projected change of temperature and precipitation  
between 1961-1990 and 2071-2100 
The combined effect of over-exploitation, changes in temperature and precipitation 
could affect environmental conditions and biodiversity severely. Some ''semi-arid'' 
regions already exist in Europe (e.g. in Cyprus, Spain and Greece) but by 2100 
Murcia is predicted to have become the first totally arid region in Europe.  
Sicily and Sardinia are likely to become semi-arid, along with southern Romania, 
including Bucharest, and parts of Bulgaria, while Spain and Greece will be almost 
totally ''semi-arid
83''. Moreover, several French regions and parts of central Europe 
could come to be classified as 'dry sub-humid'. As a result, the availability of 
drinking water could diminish, so affecting the health and well-being of people and 
the viability of many businesses. 
Impact on soil quality 
Climate change will put further pressure on the quality of soil and will increase the 
risk of desertification. This already affects the southern Member States and is 
expected to gradually move north. For instance, the changes in rainfall patterns will 
contribute to an increase in erosion of vulnerable soils which often suffer from low 
organic matter content. Moreover, a rise in global temperature will accelerate 
carbon losses from the soil, driving up the concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere.  
Forest fires 
Forest fires are a recurring phenomenon in the EU affecting large areas of the 
Mediterranean. They can destroy soils and release carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere. With changing climatic conditions, the vulnerability of forests to fires 
in Member States which have so far not been endangered is increasing. Fires can be 
detrimental to biodiversity and necessitate huge restoration efforts, in particular in 
Natura 2000 areas where the ‘green infrastructure’ risks becoming fragmented.  
Flood hazards 
                                                 
82   Water scarcity occurs when demand for water exceeds the available sustainable resources, while 
drought refers to a temporary reduction in water availability, for example, when it does not rain over a 
long period of time.. 
83   Ratio of potential evaporation (E0) to precipitation (P), commonly known as the aridity index (φ), in 
(a) the HIRHAM control run (1961-1990) and (b) the scenario run (2071-2100). Values of φ have 
been classified following Ponce et al. (2000) into humid (φ < 0.75), sub-humid (0.75 ≤ φ < 2), semi-
arid (2 ≤ φ < 5) and arid (φ ≥ 5) regions.  
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Flooding of rivers is expected to become more frequent due to more extreme 
weather conditions and continued construction in areas at risk. The most vulnerable 
areas
84 are the Po Valley, areas along the Rhine (especially in France and the 
Netherlands), and lower Loire, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and western Poland, 
together with areas bordering the River Pineios in Thelassia, Greece. As a result of 
climate change, all of Europe will become more susceptible to flash floods. 
In the longer term, the rise in sea levels is expected to lead to the flooding of a 
number of coastal areas, especially in the Netherlands and other low-lying coastal 
areas. 
The threat to tourism 
Changing weather conditions will adversely affect living conditions in many areas, 
especially around the Mediterranean, which could become excessively hot and arid. 
Areas further North are likely to become more attractive for tourists, so damaging 
the economies of present destinations for summer holidays (Map 1.75). 
Map 1.75 Projected change in Tourism Climate Index, 1970-2080 
The climate change vulnerability index 
The combined outcome of these effects is a wide diversity of regional experience. 
Regions subject to the most pressure are generally located in the South and the 
South East of the EU. In particular the regions that appear to be more vulnerable to 
climate change are Extremadura, Algarve, Ionia Nisia, and Thelassia. Many regions 
in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta, however, are also 
likely to be affected significantly (Map 1.76). 
Map 1.76 Vulnerability of NUTS 2 regions to climate change 
3.2.  Limiting future climate change 
In 2007, the European Council adopted an integrated approach to tackling climate 
change and increasing energy security while strengthening EU competitiveness, 
with the aim of transforming the Union into a highly energy-efficient, low carbon 
economy. To this end, a number of targets (so-called ’20-20-20’ targets) were set to 
be met by 2020: 
-  a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels
85; 
-  20% of EU final energy consumption to come from renewable sources; 
-  a reduction in primary energy use of 20% from projected levels to be achieved 
by improving energy efficiency.  
                                                 
84   See http://floods.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. 
85   The EU leaders also offered to increase the EU’s emissions reduction to 30%, on condition that other 
major emitting countries in the developed and developing worlds commit to do their share under a 
global climate agreement. United Nations negotiations on this are ongoing.  
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Binding legislation to implement the 20-20-20 targets was agreed by the European 
Parliament and the Council in December 2008 and became law in June 2009. There 
were four elements to this: 
(1) A revision of the Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), with the number of 
emission allowances available to large emitters being progressively reduced 
from 2013 to 21% below the 2005 level by 2020 and the free allocation of 
allowances replaced by auctioning.  
(2) An 'Effort Sharing Decision’ governing emissions from sectors not covered by 
the EU ETS, such as transport, housing, agriculture and waste, under which each 
Member State committed to a binding national emissions limitation target for 
2020 taking into account GDP per head. These national targets should reduce 
the EU’s overall emissions from these sectors by 10% by 2020 on 2005 levels.  
(3) Binding national targets for renewable energy which collectively should 
increase the share across the EU to 20% by 2020.   
(4) A legal framework to encourage the development and safe use of carbon capture 
and storage (CCS)
86.  
Up until now, the implementation of the EU ETS, which started in 2005, has not 
resulted in a significant change in CO2 prices, partly because the allocations for the 
2005-2007 trading period were above annual emissions while for the 2009-2012, the 
economic crisis reduced emissions below the anticipated level. Allocations and 
external crediting are expected to exceed demand up until 2013
87. The package is, 
therefore, an opportunity to strengthen the EU ETS, since, between 2013 and 2020, 
it should be a key means of reducing emissions to meet the target of 20% below 
1990 levels
88. 
3.2.1.  Less green house gas emissions 
The limitation of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions is a major part of the 
measures to tackle climate change. As a party to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Commission monitors GHG 
emissions in the EU. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-15 also committed 
                                                 
86   CCS is a family of technologies that capture the carbon dioxide emitted by industrial processes and 
store it underground geological formations where it cannot contribute to global warming. Although 
the different components of CCS are already deployed commercially, its technical and economic 
viability has yet to be shown. The EU plans to set up a network of CCS demonstration plants by 2015 
to test its viability. 
87   See I. Curien and Lewis M. (2009), 'The ETS review: unfinished business', Deutsche Bank Global 
Market Research, February 2009. 
88   As recent study also accounts for a 'Carbon leakage' effect, that is the possibility that companies 
decide to transfer their production facilities to countries outside the EU if production costs rise as a 
result of carbon taxes. See ESPON 2013 Programme, ReRISK – Regions at Risk of Energy Poverty, 
Applied Research Project 2013/1/5, Final report, 2010.  
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to reducing emissions by 8% between 2008 and 2012 relative to the 'base 
year'
89. 
In 2008, total GHG emissions by the EU-27 were 11.3% less than in  1990, 
falling by 1.9% between 2007 and 2008. According to the European 
Environment Agency (which monitors performance in meeting Kyoto 
Protocol goals), the EU-15 and the EU-12 are likely to meet their 
obligations. For the EU-15, however, this will partly depend on the success 
of additional measures taken by Member States and on the import of carbon 
credits through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) from developing 
countries with excess supply. The estimated reduction of GHG by 2010 
would only be around 7% relative to the base year with existing measures 
but could reach 13% if supplemented by Kyoto Protocol Flexibility 
mechanisms (reducing it by 2%), carbon sinks (by 1%), credit acquisition by 
EU ETS sectors (by 1.5%) and additional measures (by 15%) (Figure 1- 36). 
Figure 1- 36 : GHG emissions, EU-15 (100 = base year emissions) 
Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EU-15, 1990-2012
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For EU-12 countries, reductions have generally exceeded their targets, 
mainly because of the modernisation of old, polluting industrial plants. 
Between 1990 and 2008, GHG emissions in these countries fell by 27.2% 
(Figure 1- 37). However, high economic growth has led to a steady increase 
in emissions since 2002 and in 2010, the reduction is expected to fall to 21% 
in relation to 1990. 
                                                 
89   For the EU-15, the base year for CO2, CH4 and N2O is 1990; for fluorinated gases, 1995 for 12 
Member States and 1990 for Austria, France and Italy have chosen 1990..  
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Figure 1- 37 : GHG emissions, EU-12 (emissions in 1990=100) 
Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EU-12 1990-2012 
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Reductions in GHG emissions and compliance with the Kyoto targets vary 
widely across Member States. Reductions have been large not only in most 
EU-12 Member States but also in some EU-15 countries, like Germany and 
the UK. Emissions increased in some countries, notably in Cyprus, where 
they rose by over 85% (Figure 1-3838). 
Figure 1-38: Change in GHG emissions, 1990-2008, EU-27 Member States 
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Compliance with Kyoto targets depends in part on the commitment of 
Member States under the Protocol. Variations in the extent of reduction in 
emissions are taken into account by the ‘burden sharing’ mechanism which 
allows some countries to increase emissions while others compensate for 
this by accepting deeper cuts. The large reduction in EU-12 countries has 
meant that they have overshot their targets, as noted above, while for some 
EU-15 countries, compliance will depend on the use of additional measures 
(Figure 1.39). Even so, great efforts are needed to meet the targets in some 
countries like Luxemburg or Austria.  
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Figure 1- 36 Levels of GHG emissions (2008) relative to Kyoto targets, 
EU-27 Member States 
Kyoto Protocol - Commitments and achievements, 2008
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3.2.2.  More renewable energy 
Another important aspect of the agreed package is the aim of increasing 
renewable energy sources. The national targets range from a share of 
renewables in the total of 10% in Malta to 49% in Sweden, while the actual 
shares in 2008 ranged from zero in Malta to 43% in Sweden. The efforts 
required to meet the 2020 target, therefore, vary across the EU, the UK 
having to increase the share by 12.7 percentage points, Romania by only 3.7 
percentage points (Figure 1- 40). 
Figure 1- 40 Share of renewable energy in final energy consumption (2006) 
and distance to cover to meet the 20% target. 
Renewable energy in final energy consumption in 2008 and distance Europe 2020 target
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While there are various sources of renewable energy, the potential of the two 
main ones, wind and solar power, varies across regions.  
Regions exposed to the wind from the North Sea generally have more 
potential from this source (Map 1.77). This also applies to some small 
Mediterranean islands and the southern part of the Baltic. At the same time, 
conditions can change markedly within a short distance and the potential for  
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wind power can sometimes vary substantially within NUTS 2 regions, as in 
many coastal areas in Spain and Portugal.  
Given the high fixed cost of windmill construction and maintenance and the 
minimal running costs, average production costs of wind power fall rapidly 
as output increases. The generating costs are, therefore, lowest in regions 
where the potential use is greatest. The intermittent character of these 
sources of renewable energy makes energy storage a key issue
90. 
Map 1.77 Wind energy potential  
Map 1.78 Average of solar energy resources 
Southern regions of the EU generally have much greater access to solar 
power than those in the North because of the many more sunny days but also 
because of their more southerly position which increases solar irradiation. 
Regions with the highest potential for the generation of solar power are 
mostly located in the Mediterranean, though the potential is also relatively 
high in Bulgaria, Central France, Northern Italy and Romania (Map 1.78). 
More investment, research and technological development in other sources 
of renewable energy, such as wave, tidal, biomass, bio-fuel and geothermal 
power, could also lead to these making an important contribution to the 
production of renewable energy. 
Given the different potential for exploiting different sources, the 
development of intelligent energy distribution networks is central for sharing 
the power generated in different places.  
3.2.3.  Increased energy efficiency 
3.2.3.1.More efficient transport 
Energy efficiency in transport
91 mainly depends on three aspects: the 
technology embodied in vehicles, the modes of transport and the standard of 
the transport network. 
The latest generation of vehicles often embodies technology with higher fuel 
efficiency (i.e. less fuel per unit of distance travelled), while efficient 
transport networks tend to be those with higher rates of vehicle occupancy. 
In addition, trains are generally much more energy efficient than cars and 
lorries for both passenger and freight transport. 
The traffic going by road continues to increase relative to that going by rail 
and inland waterways, in particular for freight (Figure 1- 41 and 1.42). Rail 
transport, however, varies in importance across the EU, accounting for over 
                                                 
90   MacKay, David. Sustainable Energy without the hot air. UIT, Cambridge, UK. 2008  
http://www.withouthotair.com// 
91   This can be expressed in terms of consumption per unit of distance per vehicle, per passenger or per 
unit of cargo transported.  
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20% of freight in most EU-12 countries as well as in Finland, Sweden and 
Germany. 
Figure 1- 41 : Freight Modal split, 2008 
Modal split, freight transport, 2008
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Figure 1- 42 Modal Split, passenger transport, 2008 
Modal split, passenger transport, 2008
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Source: Eurostat 
Policies for increasing the efficiency of modes of transport need to adapt to 
the local situation and will differ significantly between EU-15 and EU-12 
countries. In the EU-15, the road network is generally well developed and 
often extremely dense. As a result, investment in new roads in the EU-15 is 
likely to have only a limited effect on accessibility and congestion; 
especially if not accompanied by measures to encourage modal shifts and 
travel outside of peak hours. The challenge is, therefore, to make modes of 
transport other than roads more attractive and competitive, notably by 
improving the ‘quality’ of service offered, though increasing speed and/or 
the regularity of service and by aligning prices more with the environmental 
cost.   
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In the EU-12, the road network is generally of low standard and its 
improvement partly conditions development prospects of many of the 
regions. The challenge is to do this while minimising damage to the 
environment. 
The environmental impact of the transport sector was examined in the 
TIPTAP ESPON project
92, which investigated a regulatory and pricing 
scenario, in which policies are oriented towards taxation, internalisation of 
transport externalities and incentives for a modal shift towards rail and 
maritime transport
93. This is judged to have a positive outcome for most 
regions, but especially for Ireland, the UK and EU-12 countries, though also 
for Spain, Portugal, Northern Italy and South-Western France, mainly as a 
result of reduced road congestion (Map 1.79). 
Regulatory and pricing measures should reduce traffic across the entire 
transport network and shift travel from roads where they are congested to 
other modes (e.g. in Western Germany, the Netherlands, London, Milan and 
Rome) or other regions distant from the main European centres (e.g. Lisbon, 
Ljubljana, Budapest, Praha, Bucuresti and Sofiya). The scenario shows 
substantial reductions in CO2 emissions, most notably in Spain, Portugal, 
central Italy and Poland. 
Map 1.79: Congestion index on the main road network, 2009 
Rail can also provide an alternative to air transport, especially for 
passengers, though this depends critically on the rail connections between 
urban centres. In practice, there are few flights which are in direct 
competition with rail for journeys of less than 500 km (Map 1.80). In Spain 
and Italy, in particular, air transport is the main form of connection between 
most regions and the capital city (which is usually the national hub for 
international flights). The situation is quite different in France where high-
speed train connections have been put in place and where there is direct 
competition between rail and air between London, Paris, Amsterdam and 
Brussels (Map 1.81).  
Map 1.80: Passengers flights of less than 500km, 2008 
Map 1.81: Highest speed on railway sections according to timetables, 2010 
3.2.3.2.More efficient housing 
Housing, and buildings generally, is another area where major improvements 
in energy efficiency are possible, which can, in addition, increase job 
creation. By improving the energy efficiency of new and existing buildings, 
energy consumption could be significantly reduced. 
                                                 
92    ESPON 2013 Programme, 'TIPTAP: Territorial Impact Package for Transport and Agricultural 
Policies', Applied Research Project 2013/1/6, 2010. 
93   This scenario is based on Low Growth 2030 as defined in TRANSVisions study. TRANS-TOOLS, 
official DG MOVE forecast model has been used to move from policies to the assessment indicators 
above defined.  
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A study commissioned by DG Energy examined current and future potential 
for energy saving in the EU-27 Member States
94. The results show that a 
'High Policy Intensity Scenario', involving the removal of barriers to energy 
efficiency, increased policy effort and low interest rates for investment can 
lead to considerable energy savings, notably in households through the 
adoption of more efficient heating and water heating systems, insulation and 
electrical appliances. 
A policy of diffusing energy saving technologies assumed in the scenario
95 
would enable household energy consumption to be reduced by an estimated 
42% by 2030, though the potential saving in Sweden is much less (29%) 
because of the already strong focus of policy on energy efficiency.  
Potential savings are greatest from improvements in heating systems. The 
hottest countries are generally the least efficient in this regard and, therefore, 
offer the most potential for major savings. There is much less scope for 
energy saving in respect of electrical and electronic appliances since major 
reductions have already been made, though because replacement rates are 
lower in EU-12 countries, potential savings (of 35%) are more than in the 
EU-15 (27%).  
3.2.3.3. Green cities 
Cities will play an important role in combating climate change, since they 
accommodate both a large share of the population and a large share of 
economic activity. As a result, they are also the location of a large 
proportion of GHG emissions. They provide opportunities for energy saving 
measures in, for example transport and heating because of their high 
population density. This is one of the reasons that the EU has set up a Smart 
Cities Initiative
96 as part of its Strategic Energy Technology Plan. 
As emphasised in a recent report from OECD
97, even if there is wide 
variation in their situation, there are at least three areas in which action is 
particularly appropriate in cities: 
                                                 
94    Study on the Energy Savings Potentials in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and EEA 
Countries Final Report, European Commission, Directorate-General Energy and Transport, 2009. 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/studies/doc/2009_03_15_esd_efficiency_potentials_short_report.
pdf 
95   The High policy intensity scenario describes the diffusion of the most energy saving technologies to 
the maximum possible extent from an economic perspective and compares this with a baseline 
scenario which assumes that technology diffusion continues at the same pace as in the past, though it 
takes account of the potential effect of policies already introduced as well as of changes in market 
prices of energy. 
96   http://setis.ec.europa.eu/initiatives/technology-roadmap/european-initiative-on-smart-cities 
97   Lamia Kamal-Chaoui and Alexis Robert (eds.), Competitive Cities and Climate Change. OECD 
Regional Development Working Papers N° 2, 2009, OECD publishing, © OECD.  
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-  GHG emissions are mostly the result of the energy used by lighting, 
heating, cooling and transport. Cities should anticipate future rises in 
carbon prices and favour less carbon-intensive investment; 
-  A substantial part of energy used in cities is related to buildings, so 
increasing their energy efficiency is particularly important. Since there 
tend to be many public buildings in cities, these should be a specific 
focus of attention.  
-  Moving to a low-carbon, and low environmental impact, way of life 
often requires investment for which the benefits only outweigh the cost if 
they are spread across a large proportion of the population. City 
authorities can play a key role in establishing the appropriate structure of 
incentives, such as by subsidising energy audits, adapting regulations to 
encourage energy efficiency and favouring environmentally-friendly 
modes of transport. 
From a household perspective, however, cities already offer a more resource 
efficient way of life
98 and there is an explicit aim in many cases to go further 
in this direction. In January 2008, the ‘Covenant of Mayors’ initiative was 
launched to reduce the impact of cities on climate change, with a formal 
commitment to go beyond the EU objectives for reducing CO2 emissions 
and to prepare a Sustainable Energy Action Plan, as well as to report 
periodically on progress. Over 1 000 towns and cities, with a combined 
population of over 140 million in 36 countries, have signed up to the 
Covenant. In addition, Ministers responsible for urban development decided 
in Marseille in 2008 to establish a common European Reference Framework 
for Sustainable Cities. 
Compact cities tend to be more resource efficient than sprawling ones. The 
Urban Atlas
99 provides a new insight in the different urban forms across the 
EU. Bucharest, for example, is a highly compact city (Map 1.82). Outside 
the city centre, there are only a few isolated houses and other buildings. Its 
urban fabric is concentrated within a radius of 4 km from the centre (see 
figure below map). This tends to reduce the average length of journeys and 
makes public transport more efficient, so reducing energy consumption and 
GHG emissions. 
Brussels, on the other hand, has far more dispersed settlements surrounding 
the city. The density of the urban fabric also quickly diminishes as one 
moves away from the centre. 
In Vienna and Cologne, construction outside the city centre is mostly 
clustered in villages or neighbourhoods with open spaces between them. 
                                                 
98   See for example The Green metropolis by David Owen and work by energy and fuel use by household 
at NUTS 4 level as published by UK Dept of Energy and Climate Change. 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/regional/high_level/high_level.aspx 
99   The Urban Atlas is the first high resolution land use mapping of all major urban agglomerations in the 
EU. It was designed especially to facilitate European wide comparison of urban land use patterns.  
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These centres can be served by public transport more efficiently than where 
settlements are more dispersed. In addition, this clustering of construction 
safeguards the open spaces between these settlements. 
In Warsaw, many of the roads leading out of the city have been built up 
along the sides, though construction is generally of a high density. This type 
of strip development can also be seen outside Lyon and Brussels, but there it 
tends to be of lower density.  
Green urban areas and sports and leisure facilities can make city living more 
attractive and healthy. Cologne, Warsaw, Vienna and Brussels all have many 
parks and leisure areas both close to and further away from the centre. 
Bucharest and Barcelona, by contrast, have relatively few green areas.  
Barcelona and Copenhagen are both located on the sea. Barcelona which has 
the sea on one side and mountains on the other has developed in a compact 
way. Copenhagen has been developed according to a ''five fingers plan'' 
since 1947 to ensure good access to open spaces. Development is 
concentrated along the five fingers with protected stretches of fields, forest, 
urban parks, footpaths and bicycle paths in between. 
Map 1.82: Land use in selected cities, 2006 
Land use can also be improved in a number of cities. Around a third of the 
cities covered by the urban atlas have more than 0.5% of their land which 
could potentially be used more efficiently. In particular, sites which are 
abandoned, such as old industrial plants, factories and warehouses, can 
almost always be developed for use.  
3.3.  Improving environmental quality 
The quality of the environment is mostly conditioned by human activities. 
Improving quality requires both limiting the negative environmental effects of the 
activities concerned and preserving natural assets. At the EU level, this has been 
achieved through both normative requirements, e.g. on the concentration of 
pollutants, and investments in infrastructure. 
3.3.1.  Waste water treatment 
Treatment of waste water is necessary to preserve the quality of water 
reserves, for drinking, use by industry, tourism and agriculture and for 
environmental reasons generally. For urban areas, treatment which removes 
most contaminants from sewage is mandatory so as to protect the natural 
environment
100. 
Overall, close to 90% of urban waste water is treated across the EU-15. 
However gaps still remain. In the case of the EU-12, the Accession Treaties 
provide for staggered transition, extending to 2015 and for Romania to 2018.  
waste water treatment is still well under 100% in a number of urban areas in 
                                                 
100   Directive 91/271/EEC.  
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the EU-12 (Map 1.83).
101 This is particularly so in Romania, where in some 
regions, including Bucuresti, less than 30% of urban waste water is treated. 
Map 1.83: Urban waste water treatment capacity, 2007 
 
3.3.2.   Waste management 
Member States are obliged to establish and evaluate waste management 
plans for all parts of the country. Plans are often made at regional level, and 
in some cases they have been co-financed under Cohesion Policy, especially 
in the EU-12, and southern Member States, where problems remain. Such 
plans are the main vehicle for implementing the central aim of the Waste 
Framework Directive of diverting waste from landfills to recycling and 
recovery.  
The proportion of waste which is recycled is rising, while that disposed in 
landfills is falling. Waste treatment sites are undertaking more recycling and 
more recovery of energy through incineration. At the same time, hazardous 
waste and illegal dumping have become more tightly controlled. Waste 
management also has potentially important economic effects. Solid waste 
management and recycling industries have an annual turnover of EUR 137 
billion, over 1% of EU GDP, and are estimated to have created over 2 
million jobs
102. 
3.3.3.  Air quality 
Good air quality helps to prevent respiratory diseases and premature death.  
The emission of many pollutants as well as the permissible concentrations of 
those pollutants in the air is regulated by EU Directives
 103. There are limits 
on the emissions of several pollutants that can be released into the air as well 
as on the concentration of particulate matter and other damaging pollutants. 
Regions most affected by high particulate matter concentrations are those in 
the central part of the EU, in south and central Poland, in a few parts of 
Hungary and around Bucharest (the most polluted area) (Map 1.84). 
Map 1.84: Concentration of PM10 at surface level, 2009 
                                                 
101   The map describes the treatment capacity of the urban areas in the region and not the treatment 
capacity of the whole territory of the region (urban and non urban areas). 
102   http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/compost/pdf/sec_biowaste.pdf 
103  Pollutant emissions: mainly Directives 2008/1/EC, 2001/80/EC and 2001/81/EC. Ambient air quality: 
mainly Directives 1999/30/EC and 96/62/EC. A full list of relevant legislation can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/legis.htm  
A revision and streamlining of Directive 2008/1/EC, 2001/80/EC and of five other Directives has 
recently been completed. These Directives will be repealed and replaced by the new Industrial 
Emissions Directive. A revision of the air quality framework is foreseen for 2013.  
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Map 1.85: Ozone concentration exceedances in NUTS 3 regions, 2008 
There is much evidence that high ground-level ozone concentrations can 
harm lungs and irritate the respiratory system. A daily concentration limit 
has, therefore, been established, though this is often exceeded in a number of 
regions (Map 1.85). This was especially so in Italian regions in 2008, and to 
a lesser extent in Malta, Bulgaria, Cyprus, some Greek regions and southern 
Romania. Indeed, except for the Spanish regions, almost all the regions in 
the Mediterranean exceeded the concentration limit for a significant number 
of days (15 or more). 
3.3.4.  Land use patterns 
Soil sealing 
Soil sealing refers to the ground being covered with impervious materials. 
This is typically a result of urban development and the construction of 
infrastructure. The ecological soil functions of sealed areas are severely 
impaired or even prevented (e.g. the soil working as a buffer and filter 
system or as a carbon sink). In addition, surrounding soils may be affected 
by changes in water flow patterns or the fragmentation of habitats. Sealed 
soils contribute to increasing flood hazards as the capacity to absorb and 
store excess water is reduced, and run-off therefore increases. 
Soil sealing is particularly high in highly urbanised areas such as parts of the 
Netherlands, North Belgium, West and South Germany and central and 
south-eastern parts of the UK. In Mediterranean regions, soil sealing is 
relatively high along the coasts where rapid urbanisation is associated with 
the expansion of tourism. In EU-12 countries, the extent of soil sealing
104 is 
generally much lower, but it is likely to increase (Map 1.86).  
Map 1.86: Soil sealed area, 2006 
The extent of soil sealing also depends on the way people live and where 
companies locate. Besides the effect of tourism, it can also be caused by a 
combination of lax land use planning and a preference for living and 
working outside city centres, for bigger houses coupled with out of town 
developments, such as supermarkets, leisure centres and the associated 
transport infrastructure. Soil sealing per inhabitant is the lowest in all major 
urban regions (Map 1.87). Although a few rural regions in southern and 
eastern EU regions (in Southern Italy, Greece and Romania) also have low 
levels of soil sealing, overall rural regions have the highest level of soil 
sealing per inhabitant
105. 
Map 1.87: Soil sealing per inhabitant, 2006 
                                                 
104   See State of the Environment Report 2010, European Environmental Agency. 
105   Note that this indicator may be somewhat biased in regions with a small population because part of the 
infrastructure which is responsible for soil sealing (e.g. transport infrastructure) also serves the 
population of neighbouring regions.  
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Natura 2000 and biodiversity 
Natura 2000 is an EU wide network of nature preservation areas. The aim is 
to ensure the long-term survival of threatened species and habitats. 
According to the EU Nature Directives, conservation should be achieved 
while taking account of economic, social, cultural, regional and recreational 
needs. Regions should, therefore, not consider the sites concerned as merely 
areas to protect but as important assets in development strategies: NATURA 
2000 areas could be used for instance to attract more visitors and to develop 
economic activities related to ecotourism, as well as enhancing the quality of 
life of the people living in the regions concerned.  
The Natura 2000 Network currently covers approximately 18% of the land 
area of the EU (Map 1.88). To ensure that biodiversity and ecosystems 
continue to contribute to human and economic prosperity (e.g. through 
pollination, water purification, and flood prevention), these protected areas 
and the wider countryside need to be properly managed. Developing 'green 
infrastructure', avoiding the fragmentation of landscapes and reducing the 
impact of fragmentation through ecological networks, particularly Natura 
2000, is key to maintaining a sustainable environment. 
Map 1.88: Natura 2000 areas, 2009 
The network of protected areas is particularly dense in Slovenia, Spain and 
Bulgaria. Protected areas cover a smaller part of the land area in many 
English and French regions as well as in those in Southern Finland and 
Sweden. However, there tends to be relatively high sensitivity to 
environmental issues in these countries, which leads to areas in addition to 
the Natura 2000 ones being protected. 
3.4.  Conclusions 
Protecting the environment and improving its quality, together with the effect of 
adapting to climate change and mitigating its consequences, are crucial issues for 
EU regions. However, their importance differs substantially across regions.  
The impact of climate change will be most severe in Southern and Eastern European 
regions. They will suffer longer and more severe droughts, with possibility of water 
shortage in the medium-term. Regions that depend on activities directly or indirectly 
affected by increase in temperature and changes in weather conditions (such as 
tourism and agriculture) are particularly vulnerable. Others will face an increased 
risk of natural disasters. These prospective developments need to be incorporated in 
spatial planning and regional development strategies.   
Limiting the extent of climate change will require swift action to achieve the targets 
set out in the EU Climate and Energy Package, which is part of the Europe 2020 
strategy. The ambitious reductions in GHG emissions will depend for their 
achievement mostly on changes in the sectors covered by the emissions trading 
scheme. Nevertheless, reaching the overall emissions reduction target also depends  
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on improvements outside this scheme, particularly in respect of transport and 
buildings, areas where public authorities play a decisive role.  
The production of renewable energy has a strong geographical dimension. Solar 
energy potential, for example, is far greater in the southern regions, while the 
potential of wind power is greatest in areas along the Atlantic and North Sea coasts. 
Regions can, accordingly, play an important strong role in facilitating and 
encouraging renewable energy production.  
Increasing energy efficiency depends on the actions of individuals and organisation 
in both the private and public sectors. The former will invest in energy efficiency if 
they can recoup the cost involved, which depends on energy prices and 
technological advance. In the public sector, authorities should consider the shift to a 
low-carbon economy and the possibility of much higher energy prices when 
deciding their policies and investment, especially in  infrastructure likely to last for 
a great many years.  
The protection of the environment  and its quality still vary greatly across the EU. 
Urban centres continue to suffer from poor air quality. Ozone concentrations often 
exceed EU thresholds in cities, especially in southern Europe, and concentrations of 
particulate matter are too high in many cities, including Paris, Brussels, Milan, 
Budapest and Bucharest. Yet living in city centres, especially in those in compact 
cities, means people usually need to travel shorter distances to get where they have 
to be. This means lower energy use of transport and even more so if journeys are 
made on foot, by bicycle or public transport.  Living in cities also means lower 
levels of soil sealing per person, especially in compact cities.  
Urban waste water is not yet treated adequately in every Member State, especially 
in regions in the EU-12, but also several in the EU-15.  The waste management 
sector, on the other hand, is recycling more waste, relying less on land fill and 
recovering more energy from incineration.   
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CHAPTER II: NATIONAL POLICIES AND COHESION 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
EU Cohesion Policy operates alongside an array of national and regional policies devised 
and implemented in many different places and under widely differing circumstances. 
The objective of promoting harmonious development across the EU and a reduction in 
disparities between regions enshrined in Article 174 of the Treaty is a joint task with 
Member States. According to Treaty (Article 175), the latter should conduct and 
coordinate their policies to attain economic, social and territorial cohesion. 
This chapter examines the contribution of Member States to the pursuit of this objective. 
In doing so, it considers the size and composition of public expenditure over the past 
decade, paying particular attention to investment decisions in key areas for growth and 
employment. It draws a picture of the main features and differences across countries as 
regards government spending and the involvement of regional and local authorities in 
public investment. For the first time, public investment is broken down at NUTS 2 level 
and examined in terms of its variation across regions, its relationship to total investment 
and its contribution to Cohesion Policy.  
A specific issue covered is the role of regional and local authorities in policy 
implementation, particularly in public investment, and in raising revenue, to examine 
whether or not the process of decentralisation of competences which has occurred has 
been accompanied by a transfer of financial resources.  
National responses to the economic recession are also examined. These have varied 
markedly across the EU, in general, in line with the size of the public sector, the fiscal 
‘space’ available to implement ad hoc measures
106 and the relative impact of the crisis. 
The impact on budgets is also specific to each country, though revenue has fallen 
everywhere. The measures taken, however, and the resulting increase in public deficits is 
likely significantly to constrain the room for public investment in future years in most 
Member States.  
The final section summarises the steps made to improve the context in which Cohesion 
Policy operates. While most public policies which have an impact on economic, social 
and territorial cohesion involve spending, there are others that do not which set the 
conditions for successful development. These include measures to improve the 
functioning of labour markets or to boost competition. 
                                                 
106   Fiscal space is the scope for governments to expand expenditure without jeopardising the 
sustainability of its fiscal position or the stability of the economy.  
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2.  NATIONAL  APPROACHES  TO  ECONOMIC,  SOCIAL  AND 
TERRITORIAL COHESION 
The precise policy priorities set by Member States depends not only on the scale of 
regional disparities that exist but also on factors such as social preferences, the division 
of power across the country, the nature of the regional challenges faced and the financial 
resources available. 
The most obvious policy objective associated with cohesion is avoiding excessive 
disparities across regions. This is a constitutional requirement in some Member States. In 
Germany, for instance, the Basic Law refers to the creation of equivalent living 
conditions throughout the country and, under federal legislation, regions should be 
supported if development is below the national average. In Italy too there is a 
constitutional commitment to reducing disparities between regions by channelling 
additional resources to them. In Spain, the Constitution includes the objective of 
promoting 'a more equitable distribution of income' and 'a fair and adequate economic 
balance between the different parts of the Spanish territory'. Other countries, such as 
Greece or Bulgaria, also have explicit constitutional references to regional and social 
inequalities or to the needs of specific areas. Yet, the fact that lagging regions might be 
supported by specific regional policies does not always mean that they are favoured by 
public intervention. 
The past decade has witnessed a gradual shift from policies aimed at reducing disparities 
towards those aimed at strengthening regional and national competitiveness, with a focus 
on exploiting regional potential to contribute to national growth. This is the approach in 
most Cohesion countries where reducing the gap between national GDP per head and the 
EU average is a major objective. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the policy emphasis is on 
seizing opportunities of national significance wherever they happen to be located, while 
in the UK, the aim is to provide 'the environment for business and communities to 
maximise their potential'. 
The aim tends to be pursued through investments in infrastructure and aid to businesses 
targeted at lagging or problem regions. In Germany, for example, funding amounting to 
around 4% of their GDP is channelled to the Eastern Länder under the Solidarity Pact II 
to support investment for economic development. In Spain, the Compensation Fund 
(Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial) is similarly aimed at correcting regional 
disparities through public investment projects, and in Italy, the Fund for the 
Underutilised Areas’ (Fondo per le Aree Sottoutilizzate) is designed to increase 
investment in the lagging regions of the Mezzogiorno, the sum involved amounting to 3-
4% of their GDP over the period 2007-2013 (though this was reduced significantly in 
2009). In Poland too, there is a specific policy for the less developed Eastern regions. 
In Member States with less pronounced regional disparities but geographical diversity, 
regional policies are mostly focused on areas with specific features, often taking the form 
of aid to business. In Finland and Sweden, such aid is directed to firms located in the 
sparsely populated Northern regions. These regions also receive a transport grant to 
compensate for their extra costs of travel. In Denmark too, peripheral areas receive 
additional funding for business development. In France, special measures support areas 
affected by industrial restructuring and assist development in rural and mountain areas as 
well as in Corsica. Similar measures exist in Greece. In Cyprus a significant strand of 
regional policy is aimed at tackling underdevelopment of rural areas. In Malta there is a  
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specific focus on the development of the island of Gozo.  A particular feature of regional 
polices over the past 10 years, is that they have tended to become more extensive 
reflecting the shift to support of endogenous development.
107. Public investment policies 
aimed at reducing territorial disparities need to take increasing account of their effects in 
terms of efficiency and economic growth as well as of their coherence with sectoral 
policies. Fiscal equalisation mechanisms operate in almost all Member States in order to 
ensure an acceptable provision of public goods and services across the country. They 
channel funding towards the less developed areas or those in which the cost of the 
provision is higher. They tend to level living standards by financing local authorities 
which are unable to collect sufficient revenues to finance public goods and services that 
they provide. 
At the same time, sectoral policies may have a considerable impact on cohesion even 
though cohesion-related objectives are rarely made explicit and the effects are often 
unintended. This is, for instance, the case for transport policy. The setting of priorities, 
the favouring of a particular system of transport and the design and implementation of 
projects all have an impact on cohesion which often goes beyond national borders. 
Employment policy can also have significant effects on economic, social and territorial 
cohesion. The demographic structure of the population often differs markedly across 
regions in a country. Equally, unemployment affects different locations and social groups 
unevenly, so that measures adopted by governments to tackle the problem and increase 
labour force participation have an impact on cohesion. The impact may also be 
considerable from other policies such as on education, research and innovation, tourism 
or rural development, though it is frequently not easy to measure. 
3.  PUBLIC SPENDING AND INVESTMENT IN EU MEMBER STATES  
3.1.  "Trends in public expenditure and public investment in the EU" 
The public sector tends to be larger in Member States with the highest levels of 
GDP per head… 
Public expenditure
108 in relation to both GDP and population varies across Member 
States with their level of GDP per head. Expenditure on social protection accounts 
for most of this variation. By contrast, public investment tends to be higher relative 
to GDP, though not population, in the less prosperous countries. This is linked to a 
large extent to EU Cohesion Policy support, which accounts in the Cohesion 
countries for around 55% of public expenditure on environmental protection, over 
                                                 
107   A recent study provides evidence from a number of countries that such polices tend to favour weaker 
regions. See Yuill D, Ferry M and Vironen H (2008) New Policy Frameworks, New Policy 
Approaches: Recent Regional Policy Developments in the EU and Norway, EoRPA Paper 08/1, 
University of Strathclyde. 
108   The definition of public expenditure here is that used in the European System of Accounts (ESA-95). 
It includes all expenditure incurred by General Government; both central and sub-national level 
Expenditure by public corporations or similar bodies is not included.  
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25% of that on transport, telecommunications and energy and around 10% of that on 
human capital development
109. 
Public expenditure declined slightly relative to GDP (by about 1 percentage point) 
over the period 2002-2007 but increased by the same amount in 2008 and jumped in 
2009 mostly as a result of the sharp drop in GDP caused by the recession. Up until 
2008, there was a gradual convergence of both total public expenditure and public 
investment relative to population in Cohesion countries towards the EU average. 
Following the economic crisis, prospects for public investment are bleak in many of 
these countries, underlining the importance of Cohesion Policy support. 
Public investment: A problematic concept in the European System of Accounts 
Public investment is defined in this report as the sum of Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(P51 in ESA-95) and consolidated Capital Transfers (D9_CO), after netting out transfers 
between the different levels of Government. This takes account of the process of 
privatisation in many Member States over the past few decades, which often changes the 
economic category to which expenditure is assigned. Instead of investment being 
associated only with fixed capital formation, it is also associated with transfers to the 
privatised organisations which undertake the investment in place of public authorities. 
Making a sharp distinction between gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers then 
becomes of questionable meaningfulness and the sum of the two together is the most 
relevant concept for identifying overall expenditure on regional development.  
A further consequence of privatisation is that sales of public assets have tended to become 
more important. Since in the ESA 95 system of accounts, these are treated as negative 
expenditure and are netted off gross capital formation in the published figures, the data for 
public investment presented here are also net of this item, which can be large in some 
countries (the UK is an example). The figures, therefore, do not necessarily indicate ‘new’ 
investment as such but might significantly understate this in some cases. With the data 
available, however, it is not possible to judge the size of this distortion and how it affects 
changes in the figures over time. The figures should be interpreted with this in mind.  
 
Total public expenditure amounted to just under 47% of GDP in the EU in 2008 but 
rose to almost 51% in 2009. The collapse of GDP rather than higher expenditure is 
the predominant reason for this. Nevertheless, there are marked differences in the 
scale of public expenditure across Member States which varies from over 58% of 
GDP in Denmark to only just over 40% in Romania, broadly in line with variation 
in GDP per head (Figure 2- 1). Most of the differences are explained by the level of 
expenditure on social protection. 
After the reductions in the run-up to the Monetary Union in 1999, public 
expenditure in the EU remained broadly unchanged relative to GDP for almost a 
decade. In most of the Member States which have joined the Union since 2004, 
however, public expenditure declined relative to GDP up until 2007. In 2009, public 
expenditure rose back to 1997 levels as a share of GDP and public deficits and 
accumulated debts increased dramatically. 
                                                 
109  The Member States which are eligible for Cohesion Fund support in the 2007-2013 programming 
period – i.e. the 12 Member States which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 plus Greece and Portugal.  
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Figure 2- 1 
Total public expenditure as a share of GDP (2009)
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The large differences in GDP across the EU mean that public expenditure needs to 
be expressed on a per head basis in order to capture its size in different Member 
States. The relative level in these terms is even higher in the more prosperous 
countries, their larger GDP per head enabling them to devote more resources to the 
public sector.  
Public expenditure per head in PPS terms in Cohesion countries was on average 
only around half (49%) of that in other Member States in 2009. The gap narrowed 
gradually (from 42% in 2000) up until 2008 (reaching 51%) but widened in 2009 
(Figure 2.2). Accordingly, the largest increases in public expenditure per head over 
the period 2000-2008 occurred in Member States with GDP per head below the EU 
average. These in general experienced the highest rates of economic growth, 
underlining the importance of this for governments to be able to respond to demands 
for more development and social spending.  
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Figure 2- 2 
Graph 2- Total public expenditure in PPS 2000-2009 (EUR per head)
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… but public investment is higher relative to GDP in the less prosperous 
countries 
Public investment accounts for a relatively small share of total public expenditure in 
the EU (just under 9% in 2009). The dividing line between this and current 
spending however, is not altogether meaningful. Expenditure on education and 
training and on R&D is classified as current, even though like capital spending, it 
produces returns over a number of years. Both are at the heart of the Europe 2020 
strategy (as they were in the Lisbon strategy). 
Public investment also remained largely unchanged in the EU relative to GDP over 
the period 2000-2007. Between 2007 and 2009, however, it increased from 3.7% of 
GDP to 4.4%, more proportionately than the rise in total spending (Figure 2.3). In 
EU-12 countries, in particular, public investment has risen as a share of public 
expenditure, especially since their entry into the Union. 
In general, public investment has been consistently higher relative to GDP in 
countries with below average GDP per head. It accounted, on average, for around 
5% of GDP over the period 2000-2009 in Cohesion countries as against under 4% in 
the other Member States. This might reflect relatively low endowment of 
infrastructure and so a greater need for investment than in more developed 
countries.  
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Figure 2- 3 
  Graph 3- Public investment as a share of GDP (2000-2009)
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Accordingly, while public investment per head in PPS terms was on average lower 
in Cohesion countries than in others over the period 2000-2009, the difference was 
much smaller than in the case of total public spending (Figure 2.4). The difference, 
moreover, has narrowed over time, the level in Cohesion countries rising from 64% 
of that in other Member States in 2000 to 75% in 2008, though falling to 69% in 
2009 due largely to the smaller effect of the crisis on GDP in Poland especially. In 
the Czech Republic and Greece, public investment per head was above the EU 
average in PPS terms and in Cyprus and Malta, around the average. By contrast, in 
Denmark, Germany and Finland, it was below the EU average, despite the higher 
level of GDP per head. 
Figure 2- 4 
 
Graph 4- Total public investment in EUR per year per head in PPS 2000-2009
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Public investment has increased dramatically in some Cohesion countries while 
declining in those with high levels of public debt. 
Public investment increased by around 14% in real terms in the EU between 2000-
2004 and 2005-2009
110 (Figure 2.5). The increase was slightly higher in Cohesion 
countries (19%) than in others (16%). 
This average masks significant differences between Member States and, most 
especially, between Cohesion countries. Public investment declined in real terms in 
seven Member States, five of which were Cohesion countries (Greece, Hungary, 
Malta, Portugal and Slovakia). On the other hand, the six countries with the highest 
increases are also Cohesion countries, the rise amounting to over 60% in Poland, 
Estonia, Romania and Lithuania and over 100% in Latvia and Bulgaria, in all of 
them much more than the increase in total expenditure. Among non-cohesion 
countries, the highest growth was in Ireland and the UK (over 45% in both cases). 
There seems to be a negative correlation between changes in public investment and 
public debt levels, suggesting perhaps that the possible need to limit expenditure 
affects public investment in particular. In 2008, Greece, Hungary, Malta and 
Portugal had the highest levels of debt relative to GDP among Cohesion countries 
and public investment declined in all of them, partly perhaps to make room for 
interest payments (which account for over 3% of GDP in Malta and Portugal and 
over 4% in Hungary and Greece), which were relatively small in Cohesion countries 
where public investment increased by most (under 1% of GDP). 
Countries with the highest levels of public investment relative to GDP over the 
period 2000-2009 also had the highest increases in GDP per head (Luxembourg, 
Ireland and the three Baltic States), though whether the former led to the latter or 
vice versa is uncertain. By contrast, only one of the 10 countries with the lowest 
levels of public investment experienced an above average growth of GDP per head. 
This was the UK, where public investment rose over the period. 
                                                 
110   Averages are used to avoid distortions caused by fluctuations in expenditure.  
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Figure 2- 5 
Graph 5- Changes in public investment compared to changes in total public expenditure 2000-2004 and 2005-2009
 (in EUR, 2004 prices)
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3.2.  The case for public investment and the rationale for additionality 
A recurring issue in academic research concerns the net effect of public investment 
on economic growth. Although findings are mixed, a number of recent studies have 
concluded that public investment tends to boost growth, though they also stress the 
importance of the institutional setting (see Box). 
Box: The effect of public investment on economic growth 
On the basis of a critical appraisal of recent theoretical studies on the link between 
government spending and economic activity, Imen and Kuehnel
111 conclude that public 
investment tends to increase the rate of return to private capital and, in the long run, boosts 
economic growth. Several researchers
112 stress the importance of the institutional setting 
for maximising the positive effects of public investment in the economy. One study
113 
claims that there is more consensus in recent literature about the positive effects of public 
                                                 
111   Andreas Irmen and Johana Kuehnel. Productive Government Expenditure and Economic Growth. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 23, Issue 4, pp. 692-733, September 2009. 
112   Acemoglu D., Johnson S. and Robinson J., 2004, Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run 
Growth, in Handbook of Economic Growth, Aghion P. and Durlauf S. (eds.) and  Helpman E., 2008, 
Institutions and Economic Performance, Harvard University Press. 
113   Romp, W., and De Haan J., 2007, Public Capital and Economic Growth: A Critical Survey, 
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 8, pp. 6-52.  
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capital on economic growth. It points out that the effect differs across regions and sectors 
and confirms that it is often dependent on institutional and policy factors. EU Cohesion 
Policy has also been widely analysed. A number of studies have demonstrated that 
investment financed by Cohesion Policy in infrastructure
114 , education
115 and R&D
116  has 
a positive effect on economic performance. 
 
EU Cohesion Policy is aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of regions 
through support for investment to increase their growth potential. To have the 
maximum effect, investments undertaken by national governments should be 
maintained. This is the reason why, under the principle of additionality (Article 15 
of Regulation 1083/2006), it is stipulated that finance from Cohesion Policy should 
not replace equivalent expenditure by Member States, which are required to 
maintain public investment rather than diverting funding to other purposes. 
The 'ex-ante' verification of additionality for the period 2007-2013 indicated that an 
estimated EUR 94 billion or more a year (in 2006 prices) was planned to be invested 
in Convergence regions over the period from national sources, additional to the 
amount financed from Cohesion Policy
117. A mid-term verification of additionality 
will be carried out in 2011 on the basis of public investment since 2007 and the 
prospects up to 2013
118. 
Additionality is critical to maintaining the structural nature of Cohesion Policy, to 
preventing Member States from diverting the finance received from public 
investment to other non structural purpose and to ensuring that it results in higher 
rates of growth enhancing investments. Yet, the current system for verifying 
additionality is often contested on the grounds that results are not fully reliable and 
not comparable across Member States and this is an 'ad hoc' exercise which is often 
cumbersome. 
                                                                                                                                                 
114   Bouvet, F., 2007, Labor Productivity, Infrastructure Endowment, and Regional Spillovers in the 
European Union. In European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Tenth Biennial International 
Conference, May 17-19, 2007, pages 27, Montreal, Canada. 
115  Rodriguez-Pose A. and Fratesi U., 2004, Between Development and Social Policies: the Impact of 
European Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions, Regional Studies, Vol. 38, pp. 97-113. 
116   Hsu F., Horng D., Hsueh C., 2009, The effect of government-sponsored R&D programmes on 
additionality in recipient firms in Taiwan, Technovation, Vol. 29, pp. 204–217. 
117   Carried out by the Commission in cooperation with Member States under Article 15 of the Regulation 
N° 1083/2006. 
118  A revision of the baselines agreed in the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) for the 
period might then be decided in the light of the impact of the crisis on public finances and their 
sustainability over the medium and long term.  
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4.  THE COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN THE EU 
The aim here is to identify the main policy areas accounting for the differences in public 
expenditure across Member States – i.e. whether they are due to investment in physical 
or human capital, current spending on social transfers or debt interest payments (which 
varied from 5% of GDP in Italy – nearly 10% of total public expenditure – and over 4% 
in Belgium, Greece and Hungary to below 1% in the Baltic States and Luxembourg). 
Overall, as noted, expenditure on social protection explains most of the difference in total 
public spending, Countries with below average GDP per head tend to spend more on 
energy, transport and communications, other items of expenditure not tending to vary 
systematically with GDP per head. 
The most common basis of analysing the composition of public spending is through the 
UN Classification of Functions of Government
119 (COFOG). Complete data for all 
Member Sates are available only for the 10 main COFOG Divisions (Figure 2.6). Most 
public investment is concentrated in a few of these, over a third in Economic Affairs 
(mostly in transport). 
Figure 2- 6 
Graph 6 - Public expenditure per COFOG Division in the EU (2008)
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Social protection explains most of the differences in total public expenditure across 
Member States... 
Social protection accounted, on average, for around 39% of total public expenditure in 
the EU and over 18% of GDP in 2008. In the three Member States with the highest levels 
                                                 
119   The expenditure is classified into Divisions (10), Groups (74) and Classes.  
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of spending on social protection (France, Denmark and Sweden), which were also those 
with the highest levels of total public expenditure, it amounted to over 20% of GDP. 
Conversely, it was below 10% of GDP in Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia and Romania and 
averaged under 14% of GDP in Cohesion countries as against over 18% in others. 
Expenditure per person in PPS terms in the former, however, rose from 47% of the EU 
average in 2002 to just over 50% in 2008 (Figure 2- 7). 
Figure 2- 7 
Graph 7- Total public expenditure in social protection as a share of GDP and EUR per 
head in PPS (2008)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
DK FR SE  FI GR AT DE IT  BE HU PT NL  SI UK LU PL MT ES IE CZ LT RO EE BG CY SK LV  EU COH
MS
NON
COH
MS
- 
2 500 
5 000 
7 500 
10 000 
12 500 
Share of GDP EUR per head
Source: EUROSTAT; DG REGIO 
However, differences in public expenditure on social protection may conceal differences 
across countries in the way that protection is provided. In some Member States, the 
private sector plays a significant role in providing social support, while in others, support 
is provided through tax reliefs rather than through public expenditure. 
The inclusion of private expenditure tends to widen the existing gap across Member 
States even further, this tending to be lower in countries with below average GDP per 
head
120. On the other hand, private expenditure narrows differences between Member 
States with GDP per head above average. The private sector share is over 40% of the 
total in Belgium and the Netherlands and only slightly less in Ireland, the UK and Spain 
as against under 30% in France and Sweden and under 25% in Denmark, where public 
expenditure is highest. Tax concessions together with the taxes and social contributions 
payable on social transfers have a similar effect (though a detailed analysis of this goes 
beyond the scope of this report
121).  
                                                 
120  The figures are derived by combining data on Government Statistics in ESA-95 with the European 
System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics- ESSPROS). 
121  Further information may be found in Willem Adema and Maxime Ladaique, 'How expensive is the 
Welfare State?'. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers N°92, 2009.  
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….while public expenditure on physical and human capital is largely unrelated to 
levels of total public expenditure. 
On the other hand, public expenditure on transport, telecommunications and energy as a 
share of GDP tends to be highest in Member States with below average GDP per head
122. 
In the 18 Member States for which full data are available, expenditure in these areas 
accounted for 3.4% of GDP on average in 2008 in Cohesion countries - in the Czech 
Republic, for almost 5.5% - as against just 2.2% in the others. This difference reflects the 
greater need to expand infrastructure in the former. Such investments to population rose 
from 70% of the EU average in 2002 to almost 79% in 2008 in these countries. 
EU funding under Cohesion Policy
123 for transport, telecommunications and energy in 
Cohesion countries amounted to almost 1% of their combined GDP, as against only 0.1% 
in other Member States. As such, it accounted for around 75% of the difference in 
expenditure between the former and the latter in 2008. Public investment as a share of 
GDP in these areas was, accordingly, around 35% higher in Cohesion countries than 
others, with the ERDF plus the Cohesion Fund financing an estimated 28% of total 
investment – almost 40% in Lithuania and just under 35% in Poland (Figure 2.8). 
Figure 2- 8 
Graph 8 - Total public expenditure in transport, communication and energy as a share of GDP and 
in EUR per head in PPS (2008)
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122   Expenditure in these areas is recorded in the COFOG category 'Economic Affairs' which also includes 
agriculture, fishing, manufacturing and construction. Complete data are not available in 9 Member 
States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Germany, France, Netherlands, Romania and Slovakia). 
123   The codes taken into account for the comparison are the following: 10-15 (Information Society), 16-
32 (Transport) 33-43 (Energy) according to the spending categories of Annex IV of the EC Regulation 
N° 1083/2006.  
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Public expenditure on environmental protection tends to be higher relative to GDP in 
Member States with above average GDP per head though not systematically so. In 2008, 
it averaged around just over 0.7% of GDP. In Bulgaria, Estonia and Malta as well as 
Ireland and Luxembourg, the figure was over 1% (Figure 2.9). 
In the Cohesion countries, EU funding accounted on average for over 55% of total public 
expenditure on the environment. This enabled them to maintain expenditure at a more 
comparable level to that in other countries. In 2008, their expenditure per head was 58% 
of the EU average in PPS terms as against 49% in 2002. In the Czech Republic and 
Malta, it has risen above the EU average in these terms. 
Figure 2- 9 
Graph 9- Total public expenditure in environmental protection as share of GDP 
and EUR per head in PPS (2008)
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Public expenditure on education amounted to just over 5% of GDP in the EU in 2008 and 
marginally more in Member States with above average GDP per head than in Cohesion 
countries. In Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Poland, however, expenditure on 
education was above the EU average in these terms (Figure 2.10). Relative to population, 
expenditure on education in Cohesion countries in PPS terms increased slightly relative 
to the EU average between 2002 and 2008 (from 56% to 58%). 
Since only a small part of spending on education is eligible for EU support, Cohesion 
Policy accounted for only a minor part of the difference in expenditure across Member 
States. Expenditure on primary and secondary education makes up most of the total but 
this is largely excluded from Cohesion Policy support. Nevertheless, Cohesion Policy 
financed over 10% of expenditure on education in 2008 in five EU-12 countries as well 
as in Greece and Portugal.  
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Figure 2- 10 
Graph 10- Public expenditure in education as a share of GDP and EUR per head in PPS 
(2008)
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Economic growth enabled public expenditure in key areas for economic and social 
cohesion to be increased in most Cohesion countries 
Total public expenditure in the EU was much the same in 2008 as in 2002 as a share of 
GDP (47%). In real terms, it was around 10% higher, but over 30% higher in Cohesion 
countries, even though as a share of GDP, it declined slightly because of their higher 
rates of growth. 
The increase in expenditure was highest in environment and transport (included in 
economic affairs) at around 12% on average, though over 24% in Cohesion countries. 
The increase was less on education and social protection, below 5% in both, but over 
12% in the latter in Cohesion countries and 7% in education (see Table 2. 1). 
The rise in public expenditure relative to population in Cohesion countries was more than 
double that in other countries in all these areas, especially in those where EU funding 
was most important. This rise occurred despite public expenditure declining relative to 
GDP, reflecting the significant growth in GDP and demonstrating the importance of the 
latter for the ability of governments to increase spending in key areas for social welfare 
and economic development.  
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Table 2. 1: Public expenditure by policy area 
   As a share of GDP  Per head in PPS (2004 prices) 
  2002 2008  2002  2008 
 Economic affairs 
EU  3.9% 4.2%  862.1  967.9 
COH MS  5.0% 5.6%  610.8  758.6 
NON COH MS  3.8% 4.0%  949.7  1038.2 
Environment 
EU  0.7% 0.7%  150.8  168.4 
COH MS  0.6% 0.7%  73.5  91.5 
NON COH MS  0.7% 0.7%  177.7  194.2 
 Education 
EU  5.3% 5.2%  1131.2  1174.8 
COH MS  5.3% 5.0%  631.1  676.7 
NON COH MS  5.3% 5.2%  1305.6  1342.1 
 Social protection 
EU  18.5% 18.2%  3898.7  4089.7 
COH MS  15.4% 15.5%  1839.2  2059.6 
NON COH MS  18.7% 18.5%  4616.9  4771.6 
Source: Eurostat and DG REGIO calculations 
5.  PUBLIC SPENDING AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
5.1.  Decentralisation of public expenditure and investment 
There has been a shift in responsibility for public expenditure from central to lower 
levels of government
124 over recent decades. This trend, however, has not been 
accompanied by increased resources for the latter. Since the 1990s, the share of sub-
national government spending relative to GDP has been fairly stable across the EU 
as a whole, despite the trend decentralisation of competences. In some countries, 
however, it increased significantly (in Belgium, Denmark and Spain) while in others 
it declined (in Ireland, the Netherlands and Austria). 
Less than a third of public expenditure is decentralised… 
Expenditure of sub-national levels of government in the EU accounted for around 
28% of the total in 2009 though with large differences across Member States.   
Expenditure tends to be more decentralised in Member States with a federal system 
(Germany, Austria and Belgium) but also in Spain and the Nordic countries where 
local authorities play an important role in the provision of public goods and 
services. In Denmark, the sub-national level accounted for over 45% of total public 
spending in 2009, in Sweden and Spain for over 40% and in Germany, for over 
35%. By contrast, in EU-12 countries, it averaged around 25%. 
The share of sub-national governments in total expenditure has remained much the 
same over the past decade despite the gradual decentralisation of competences. 
However, in most Member States, there was a trend towards decentralisation of 
                                                 
124   Sub-national levels of Government refer to all administrative levels other than the Central Government 
and Social Security, i.e. mainly regional and local authorities.  
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revenue, if modest in most cases. The most significant decentralisation of 
expenditure occurred in Slovakia and Romania, while decentralisation of revenue 
was most marked in Spain and Sweden. By contrast, expenditure became more 
centralised in Ireland as well as in two federal countries, Germany and Austria (See 
figure 2.11). In sum, devolution of power to sub-national levels of government does 
not always go in parallel with decentralisation of financial resources. The former 
seems to have occurred more than the latter. 
Figure 2- 11 
 
Graph 11 - Sub-national public expenditure as share of GDP in 2009 and change 2000-2009
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Education and social protection are the main items of public expenditure at sub-
national level, accounting on average for around 21% and 19% of total spending at 
this level, respectively. Social protection expenditure at sub-national level is 
particularly important in the UK (28%), Finland (27%), Germany (25%) and 
Sweden (23%). Expenditure on education is the main item at sub-national level in 
most of the EU-12 countries, local authorities being responsible for spending on 
primary and secondary schools. The other areas which account on average for more 
than 10% of total sub-national expenditure are Health (13%) – though over 20% in 
Italy, Sweden, Finland, Spain and Austria – and Economic Affairs (12% - over 20% 
in the Czech Republic and Romania). 
Box: Spain - A rapid decentralisation of public expenditure 
Spain had the highest degree of decentralisation of public expenditure in the EU in 2009 after 
Denmark and Sweden. Public finances have been significantly decentralised over the past 15 
years in parallel with gradual devolution to the regions. For the first time, expenditure of the 
regions (Comunidades Autónomas) overtook that of Central Government in 2008 though it was 
reversed in 2009 due to the impact of the crisis.  
Decentralisation has occurred much faster in Spain in recent years than in the rest of the EU – 
the share of the sub-national level increasing on average by 13 percentage points between 1999 
and 2007 as against just 1 percentage point elsewhere. Public investment followed the same 
tendency, around two-thirds of the total being undertaken at sub-national level.  
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The process of devolution is reflected in the composition of public expenditure in the regions. 
The transfer of education and health to them led in over half of their annual budgets being 
devoted to these, investment in basic infrastructure, included in Economic Affairs, accounting 
for just under 15%. A distinct tendency over the period 2000-2006 was a progressive increase of 
expenditure on health coupled with a relative decline in spending on education and training. 
Figure 2- 12 
Total public expenditure by level (1995-2008)
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...while two-thirds of public investment is decentralised  
Public investment
125 is significantly more decentralised than public expenditure, 
accounting for a larger share of total spending at the sub-national level than at 
central level in virtually all Member States. On average, some two thirds of public 
investment is carried out by sub-national governments in the EU (Figure 2.13). 
The federal countries (Belgium, Germany and Austria) have the largest sub-national 
shares, together with Italy, Spain and France (over 70% of the total in 2009 in each 
case). The share in the Nordic countries is similar to the EU average, while in EU-
12 countries, it is below 50% on average, though over 60% in Poland, Latvia and 
the Slovakia, where there has been a rapid decentralisation of public investment. 
The importance of local government over the past decade has increased too in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania. 
While the above figures provide some insight into the importance of sub-national 
government in public finances, it should be emphasised that decentralisation of 
expenditure and revenue is just one aspect of a wider process. Expenditure at sub-
national level does not necessarily reflect the power of the authorities concerned 
                                                 
125   Public investment here includes only gross fixed capital formation, since there is not sufficient 
information to distinguish capital transfers between different levels of government.  
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over spending which may be limited to following central government instructions 
and implementing programmes decided elsewhere. 
Figure 2- 13 
Graph 12 - Total sub-national public investment as a share of total public investment
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Environmental protection is by far the most decentralised area of spending in the 
EU, almost 80% of expenditure occurring at regional and local level, indicating the 
crucial role of the authorities concerned in tackling challenges like sustainable 
development or climate change. There are, however, a few countries, where 
expenditure is much less decentralised, notably Cyprus and Greece but also Poland 
and the Czech Republic to a lesser extent. 
Around 40% of expenditure on Economic Affairs (mostly transport) is undertaken at 
sub-national level, though more in Federal States, Italy and Spain, reflecting the 
major involvement of regional and local authorities in investment in infrastructure. 
5.2.  Regional breakdown of investment 
As of now, there are no official EU statistics on public expenditure at regional level 
and, accordingly, no consistent and comparable set of data in this regard. This is a 
serious obstacle to analysing the distribution of public expenditure and investment 
across EU regions
126. In the meantime, data at regional level are available only from 
national sources, though not in all cases or on a comparable basis. However, an 
attempt has been made to align national data, where they exist, with Government 
Finance Statistics on an ESA-95 basis in order to give some indication of the scale 
of expenditure and how it varies across regions. 
                                                 
126   The Commission is currently cooperating with Member States to make such statistics available in the 
new ESA-95 Transmission Programme from 2014 on, the aim being that data at NUTS 2 level are 
reported for main categories of public expenditure.  
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Public investment in this section is defined to cover General Government gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) and capital transfers to businesses
127. 
Box: Regionalisation of public expenditure data in Italy 
Italy is an exception among EU countries in having a full set of public expenditure and 
revenue data at NUTS 2 regional level, which has been the case since 1994. 
La Banca Dati Conti Pubblici Territoriali (CPT) provides information on revenue and 
expenditure (both current and capital) of the different public authorities in each region. It is 
coordinated by a Central Technical Unit in the Italian Development and Cohesion 
Department and 21 Operational Units, one per region. These Operational Units collect data 
from public bodies on a harmonised basis. Data cover the public sector, including public 
corporations, and are divided by administrative level, policy area and function, so enabling 
the distribution of public expenditure across regions and its composition in each case to be 
examined. 
 
Public investment is not particularly concentrated in less developed regions… 
While the regional distribution of public investment and changes in this vary across 
Member States, public investment per head was on average higher in 
Competitiveness and Employment (RCE) and Transition regions (TRANS) than in 
Convergence ones (CONV) over the period 2002-2006
128 (Figure 2.14).  Only in 
France and Germany did CONV regions have higher public investment per head. 
This was especially the case in Germany, where expenditure per head was more 
than twice that in other regions in the country. In Spain, Greece and the UK, public 
investment was relatively evenly distributed across regions, while in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, there was significant concentration in capital city 
regions. In consequence, other factors seem to have been more important than GDP 
per head in determining the location of public investment. Accordingly, people 
living in lagging regions often benefit less from public investment than those 
elsewhere, implying a widening of disparities in the endowment of public goods and 
services over time. 
 … as factors other than GDP per head seem to determine the location of public 
investment to a greater extent. 
Public investment seems particularly high in regions with specific geographical 
features, such as the Alpine regions of Tirol in Austria and Valle d'Aosta, Bolzano 
and Trento in Italy. The islands of Corse in France, Sardegna in Italy and Acores 
and Madeira in Portugal also have a higher level than other regions in the respective 
countries. The same is the case in Sweden in respect of the two most northerly 
regions, while in Spain, public investment tends to be higher the lower the density 
of population, with Castilla y León and Aragón having the highest levels per head 
over the period 2002-2006. 
                                                 
127  This means that current expenditure on education and training is excluded, part of which is part of 
cohesion spending though this part cannot be separately distinguished at regional level. 
128  The classification of the current programming period 2007-2013 is used as the different Objectives 
were set using the state of regional disparities in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.  
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Another element which seems relevant is the degree of political and administrative 
autonomy which in some cases overlaps with the geographical features, as in the 
Italian, French and Portuguese regions mentioned above. Other cases include the 
city state of Bremen in Germany or the devolved regions of Scotland and Northern 
Ireland in the UK. 
In some countries, public investment also tends to be concentrated in capital city 
regions in per capita terms, as in Austria, the UK and Sweden as well as in Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Central government investment explains most of 
this, the higher level perhaps reflecting to some extent the large number of 
commuters which add to the need for public goods and services. 
The lack of data on public investment by region, especially that of central 
government, however, in some countries, such as in Germany and France, limits the 
extent to which this tendency can be fully examined. 
EU Cohesion Policy, therefore, operates in different national contexts, where public 
investment is only partially concentrated in less developed regions. Figures on 
public investment per head seem to suggest a relatively limited effort to improve the 
endowment of public goods and services in the regions concerned, which implies a 
risk of widening disparities in terms of development opportunity.  
Box: The case of the Italian Mezzogiorno 
The Mezzogiorno comprises the 8 regions in the South of Italy, all of them recipients of 
Objective 1 support in the 2000-2006 period except Abruzzo and Molise which had 
transitional 'phasing-out' status. Most of the regions were among those with the lowest rate 
of GDP growth in the EU over the period, their average GDP per head in PPS terms 
falling from 76% of the EU-27 average in 2000 to 68% in 2006. 
Although employment rates increased, they remained low as compared with rates in the 
rest of the EU and, indeed, the rest of the country. This was especially so for employment 
rates of women 
The low growth in the Mezzogiorno, however, reflects that in the Italian economy as a 
whole, GDP per head in PPS terms declining from 117% of the EU average in 2000 to 
under 104% in 2006. Indeed, growth in Objective 1 regions in Italy was slightly higher 
over the period than in the Centre and North of the country. Accordingly, it can be argued 
that 'the problem is as much that of the whole Italy as of the Mezzogiorno'. 
Public investment policies at national level did not particularly favour the Mezzogiorno 
over the period. The Government objective
129 of achieving a level of public capital 
expenditure, excluding the specific funds for regional development, in the Mezzogiorno 
higher than in the rest of the country relative to its population was not achieved. Excluding 
public corporations (which account for around 25% of total public investment in Italy), 
public investment per head was lower in the Objective 1 regions (1 198 EUR per head a 
                                                 
129   Legge n° 311/2004 (Legge Finanziaria for 2005) articolo 1, comma 17: 'Per le stesse finalità le 
amministrazioni centrali si conformano all’obiettivo di destinare al Mezzogiorno almeno il 30 per 
cento della spesa ordinaria in conto capitale'. 
130   CONV regions in Italy are Campania, Puglia, Calabria and Sicilia, while Basilicata is as phasing-in 
region. All the remaining regions are RCE ones.  
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year) than in the other parts of the country (1 322 EUR per head) over the 2000-2006 
period. This contrasts with the relative concentration of public investment in less 
developed regions in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in Spain. 
After 7 years of modest growth, the international crisis pushed Italy into deep recession in 
2008, sooner than in most other euro-zone economies. The reduction in economic activity 
extended across all regions, RCE as well as CONV ones
130. The more open (and resilient) 
RCE regions, however, are likely to recover more quickly than the latter. 
 
Map 2.1 Estimated public investment per head in PPS (average 2002-2006) 
Four groups of countries can be broadly distinguished in terms of the scale of 
regional disparities and the regional distribution of public investment over the 
period 2002-2006. 
The first group comprises Member States with large regional disparities in which 
public investment was higher in the less advanced regions. Germany stands out, 
with public investment in the 5 Eastern Länder much higher than in the rest of the 
country. In France, the same was the case in the four outermost regions as well as in 
Corse. 
The second group includes Member States where public investment was not 
concentrated in less developed regions despite significant regional disparities. In 
Italy, public investment per head was slightly higher in the more prosperous regions 
in the Centre and North of the country, being especially high in the affluent regions 
of Aosta, Bolzano and Trento, than in the Mezzogiorno despite the special funds 
devoted to the latter. In Spain, public investment was above the national average in 
the Convergence regions of Galicia, Extremadura and Castilla-La-Mancha but 
below it in Andalucía, the other Convergence region and the most populated in the 
country. In Portugal, the highest rates of public investment by far were in the 
outermost regions of Madeira, with the second highest level of GDP per head in the 
country, and Açores.   
The third group consists of countries with relatively small regional disparities, 
where, in general, public investment tends to be higher in peripheral regions and 
those with specific geographical features. In Austria, public investment was highest 
in the Alpine region of Tirol, in Sweden, in the two northern-most regions and in the 
UK, in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In these countries, however, public 
investment per head was also higher than the national average in the capital region. 
The fourth group includes Member States with GDP per head below the EU 
average, where public investment is concentrated in the capital region. These are 
countries which have joined the EU since 2004. The most prominent examples are 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. 
Figure 2- 14: Public investment in EUR per head per year in PPS 
(average 2002-2006)  
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…and private investment tends to be higher in the most prosperous regions 
Private investment is distributed in a very different way across regions than public 
investment, in that it is highly correlated with the relative prosperity of regions and, 
therefore, tends to be concentrated in the most affluent ones both at national and EU 
level. While public investment is not particularly concentrated in less developed 
regions, it tends to be higher relative to GDP in these than in other regions, so 
helping to strengthen their competitiveness by making them more attractive places 
to live, work and invest in. 
Over the period 2002-2006, private investment in the EU was highest in a broad 
area covering the North-East of Italy, Western Austria and Bayern in Germany and, 
to a lesser extent, in the Flemish part of Belgium and some of the Netherlands. 
These areas have among the highest levels of GDP per head in the Union. The 
North-East of Spain, Ireland and most of Denmark also had relatively high 
investment levels in per capita terms, along with most of the capital city regions and 
a number of conurbations, such as Hamburg, confirming that investment tends 
towards places with high accessibility and good endowment of physical and human 
capital where the business environment is particularly favourable. Private 
investment was equally above average relative to population in the Portuguese and 
Spanish outermost regions, some Alpine regions, and a few Mediterranean islands, 
which are important tourist destinations (the Balearic Islands and Crete, especially), 
indicating that geography is not always an obstacle to attracting investment.  
It was significantly below average relative to population in virtually all Central and 
Eastern European regions (except in some capital cities) as well as in many 
Convergence regions in Southern Europe, in particular, most of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno and the Norte region in Portugal. These regions have GDP per head 
below the EU average and often below the national average. (Note that there are no 
regional data on investment available for the UK and Bulgaria.)  
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Box: Capital Stock 
The endowment of physical capital is a major factor of growth for regional economies. 
Capital stock statistics are available at the national level for most EU countries but are 
severely lacking for regions and where they exist, the methods used to produce them are 
generally not consistent across countries. 
A pilot study commissioned by DG REGIO tested the feasibility of producing comparable 
estimates of the capital stock for NUTS 2 regions. After reviewing the main approaches 
used for estimation, the Perpetual Inventory Method (see OECD Manual on capital stock 
estimation, OECD 2001, 2009) was selected as the one most in line with data availability 
and allowing the widest geographical coverage.  
Using data from Eurostat or other publicly available sources wherever possible, the study 
produced capital stock figures for the all EU NUTS 2 regions. Analysis suggests that the 
estimates are generally robust and give rise to the following observations. The capital stock 
is invariably larger in the EU-15 than in the EU-12, with some exceptions like Mazowiecke 
in Poland. A large amount of capital is concentrated in the highly industrialised north 
western part of Germany, as well as in the south west around Frankfurt. There is also a large 
net capital stock in Northern Italy, the South of France and some Spanish regions, like 
Cataluña and Castilla y Leon.  
The estimates were also used to compute the capital to labour ratio, which reflects the extent 
to which regional economies have predominantly capital or labour-intensive technologies. 
The ratio tends to be higher in the more developed Member States and lowest in regions 
where labour is less costly. Clusters of regions with a relatively high capital-labour ratio are 
in Austria, West Germany, and the Nordic countries. The ratio is also high in Ile de France 
and Provence-Côte d'Azur and Inner and Outer London. 
Map 2. 2: Private investment per head (PPS), average 2002-2006 
The public sector is critical to sustaining investment in many European regions… 
Accordingly, public investment has an important role in these regions in increasing 
their endowment of infrastructure and so improving the competitiveness of 
businesses located there and making them more attractive for the private sector to 
invest in. 
It is also worth noting that public investment is relatively important in a number of 
non-Convergence regions with particular geophysical features, such as the Northern 
regions of Sweden, Corse in France and the Alpine regions in Italy as well as those 
undergoing industrial restructuring such as Nord-Pas-de-Calais in France or Liège 
in Belgium. 
…and European Cohesion Policy is very often behind this substantial public 
support to investment in regions. 
The ERDF and the Cohesion Fund account for a significant share of public 
investment in less developed regions across the Union The two together over the 
2000-2006 programming period accounted for over 40% of public investment in 
Convergence regions in Portugal, for over 30% in most regions in Greece, 20-25% 
in the Spanish Convergence regions, around 15% in the Italian Mezzogiorno and 
around 10% in Eastern regions in Germany. In the last, however, this was in the 
context of high concentration of national public investment in these regions. In EU-
12 countries, they were responsible for over 20% of public investment in Latvia,  
162 
Lithuania and many regions in Poland. The share, moreover, is likely to be 
significantly larger in the present programming period, because of the larger sums 
involved and the possible adverse effects of the crisis on national funding. Indeed, 
in a number of these countries, Cohesion policy is likely to be main source of 
finance for public investment in this period. It accounted already for a substantial 
part of the total gross fixed capital formation
131 (GFCF) of the public sector in 2009. 
Cohesion policy amounted to 90% of total public GFCF in Lithuania and to over 
50% in Hungary, Portugal, Estonia and Slovakia. 
EU Cohesion Policy is not only important for the less prosperous regions in the 
Union. It is equal to 25% of the public investment undertaken by regional 
governments in non Convergence regions in Spain and France (and over 30% in 
Catalonia and Aquitaine). In addition, in the West Midlands and London, it is 
estimated to be responsible for around 15% of public expenditure on environmental 
protection. 
EU funding is also significant in respect of investment in human capital, improving 
the adaptability of workers and assisting disadvantaged groups into employment. In 
regions in the Centre and North of Italy, it is estimated to account for some 25% of 
public expenditure and in the Brussels region for around 10%. 
Map 2. 3: Share of ERDF and Cohesion Fund in total Public Investment 
5.3.  Current spending and cohesion 
Regional and local governments, which are mainly responsible for the provision of 
public goods and services, often face significant financial constraints despite high 
levels of GDP per head. One reason is that the number of people using public 
services is markedly higher than the number of inhabitants, which is typically the 
case in capital cities and other metropolitan areas. Another possible reason is the 
high debt level of many local and regional governments. 
Their ability to raise revenue from their own sources is also in many cases less than 
suggested by their GDP per head. The base for regional and local taxes is often 
property and/or the income of those living there which may differ greatly from 
GDP. Indeed, the endowment of public goods and services and the ability to provide 
them seems to be more correlated with income per head than GDP per head. 
                                                 
131  While the scope of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund is larger than GFCF it gives an 
indication of the relative importance of the policy in total public investment.  
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GDP, income and the provision of public goods and services 
The provision of public goods and services is important for increasing the development 
opportunities and standard of living in regions. A high GDP per head does not necessarily 
ensure sufficient provision for people living in the region. 
GDP per head, which tends to be the indicator used to measure the relative prosperity of 
regions, relates to the income generated by the production of goods and services in the 
region in relation to the population living there, The GDP generated in a region, however, 
does not necessarily all go to people living in a region. Some of it may go to people outside 
who work in the region but live elsewhere – i.e. to those commuting into the region to work 
who are partly responsible for the GDP generated there. Some of it will take the form of 
company profits which may then be transferred to other regions, or even to other countries. 
Some of it may also be transferred out of the region by individuals, in the form, for 
example, of remittances abroad. The income available to households in a region, therefore, 
differs from GDP.  The relationship between GDP per head and disposable household 
income at regional level is, therefore, by no means a systematic one.  The final 
determinants of the income which households have available to spend are the taxes levied 
by government and the transfers paid, both of which can vary markedly across regions. 
Regions with a high GDP per head do not necessarily have a high level of disposable 
household income per head, nor does a low GDP per head necessarily imply a low level of 
household income and low living standards. 
 
GDP is more concentrated than income in all Member States. 
Economic activity, and therefore, GDP, is more regionally concentrated than either 
population or income in the EU. As a result, regional disparities in GDP per head 
are wider than differences across regions in income per head. The main reasons for 
this, as indicated above, are commuting, which effectively transfers the income 
generated by GDP from regions where people work to those where they live, the 
transfer of company profits and, most importantly, at least at NUTS 1 and 2 levels, 
government taxes and transfers. The latter include both those intended to make 
regional income levels more equal and those associated with the social protection 
system. 
Disparities in GDP per head between NUTS 2 regions are widest in Belgium, 
Slovakia and Romania, in each case because of a high concentration of economic 
activity in the capital city region relative to population. GDP per head in the latter is 
around twice as high as the national average in all of them since many of the people 
responsible for producing GDP live in neighbouring regions. Conversely, regional 
disparities in GDP per head are relatively narrow in the Netherlands partly because 
GDP and population are distributed across regions in similar ways and commuting 
between regions (rather than within them) is much less. 
Commuting is important in narrowing regional disparities, especially in some 
Member States.  
Commuting plays an important role in reducing disparities in income across 
NUTS 2 regions in a number of countries. Commuting tends to push up GDP per  
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head in capital city regions and to reduce it in surrounding regions, which tend 
accordingly to have the highest levels of primary income per head relative to GDP 
per head. In Austria, for example, because of commuting to Vienna, income per 
head in Burgenland is 42% higher than GDP per head and in Niederösterreich, over 
26% higher. Equally, in the Wallonne region in Belgium, primary income is over 
21% higher than GDP. Similar differences are evident in other countries, especially 
those where the capital city region is relatively small in geographical terms and 
surrounding regions, correspondingly more important sources of labour
132. In the 
EU as a whole primary income is about 8% less dispersed than GDP across regions. 
The government taxes and transfers systems are even more important in 
narrowing income disparities across regions at both the national and EU level  
Disparities in disposable income per head across regions are narrower than in either 
GDP per head or primary income in all Member States as a result of government 
taxes and transfers redistributing income. The same applies across the EU as a 
whole. Regional disparities in disposable income across regions are about 18% less 
than disparities in GDP. 
Average GDP per head in the 10% of regions with the highest levels in PPS terms 
was 4.5 times the average in the 10% of regions with the lowest levels  in 2007. In 
terms of disposable income, it was 3.9 times higher
133. 
The redistributive effect of taxes and transfers is especially large in Denmark which, 
as a result, has the narrowest disparities in disposable income per head across NUTS 
2 regions in the EU. The effect is only slightly smaller in Sweden, Austria, France 
and the Netherlands. By contrast, the redistributive effect is relatively small in 
Spain, Italy and Romania which have the widest income disparities across regions in 
the EU, along with Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria
134. 
It is equally important to take account of the effect of transfers in kind which is not 
captured by these figures. In all countries, education and healthcare are provided 
free of charge and, accordingly, contribute significantly to economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. The quality of these services varies both within and between 
countries which should ideally be taken into account when assessing income 
disparities. Equally, social services, such as child or elderly care, are provided free 
or well below cost in some countries – the Nordic countries especially – but not in 
others , so effectively adding to income much more in the former than the latter. 
Ignoring these services distorts comparisons across countries –and in some cases 
across regions – though lack of data makes it difficult to incorporate them in the 
analysis.  
                                                 
132   For this reason, the analysis is made at NUTS I level in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands as well 
as Belgium. These are the four Member States with the highest rates of population density in the EU. 
133   The 20% of regions with the highest and lowest levels of GDP per head and income per head is here 
calculated in terms of population rather than the number of regions so as to take account of the very 
different population sizes of NUTS 2 regions. 
134   There are no data available for Greece.  
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Sixteen of the 20 regions in which taxes and transfers have the most effect are either 
Convergence or Transition regions, government interventions increasing disposable 
income per head by at least 9%. These include Asturias in Spain, Calabria in Italy, 
Wales and Northern Ireland in the UK, the Finnish region of Itä-Suomi and the two 
eastern regions of Hungary. In four of the East German Länder, the increase is over 
15%. 
The number of NUTS 2 regions (132) in the EU in which disposable income per 
head is increased relative to GDP per head is much larger than the number (50) in 
which it is reduced, reflecting the greater concentration of economic activity than of 
population. 
In sum, household income per head in the EU is significantly more equal across 
regions than GDP per head, principally because of the net effect of taxes and 
transfers. This effect, however, varies markedly across countries, as does the scale 
of commuting, which is important in transferring income generated in capital city 
regions in particular to surrounding areas in a number of countries. 
Developments since 2000 indicate a gradual reduction in regional disparities in the 
EU in both income and GDP. 
Map 2. 4: Net effect of taxes and public transfers, 2007 
Capital city regions: A particular kind of administrative entity 
Capital city regions across the EU share a number of features. In nearly all Member States, 
they have the highest GDP per head as a result of the higher concentration of economic 
activity in them than of population. Berlin is the main exception. GDP per head in Lazio in 
Italy and Madrid in Spain is also not the highest in these countries, though well above the 
national average. 
Large inflows of commuters occur daily into capital city regions from neighbouring ones, 
pushing up GDP per head in the former and reducing it in the latter. There are 12 capital 
city regions among the 20 regions in the EU where primary income per head is furthest 
below GDP per head. Brussels is the prime case, with GDP per head almost twice the 
national average and primary income per head 7% below this. In London, GDP per head is 
178% above the national average, primary income, 71% above, in Praha, the figures are 
109% above and 47%, respectively, and in Wien, 34% above and 4% above. These large 
differences partly reflect the relatively small geographical size of the cities concerned and 
the fact that they do not constitute coherent functional regions. Other geographically larger 
capital city regions, defined in NUTS 2 terms, have smaller commuter inflows (much of the 
commuting occurring within the region), though still significant in some cases, such as Ile 
de France and the regions in which Budapest, Warsaw and Athens are situated. In all of 
them, the gap between their primary income per head and the national average is over 10% 
smaller than that between their GDP per head and the national average. 
Capital city regions also tend to transfer significant income to other regions through the 
operation of the fiscal system, which reduces their disposable income. Berlin, Brussels and 
Athens are the only exceptions. The amount of transfer is especially large in Romania, 
Slovakia and the UK, disposable income per head in the capital being reduced by over 15% 
in each case. It is slightly smaller, in France, Hungary and Poland, where the reduction is 
over 10%. 
This outflow of income may affect the ability of the authorities in capital city regions to  
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maintain the public services needed by the people working in the region as well as those 
living there or may result in relatively high taxes on residents to finance these services. 
6.  NATIONAL POLICIES AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
6.1.  The economic crisis and the national stimulus plans 
The EU economy in 2009 experienced the worst recession since the Second World 
War. GDP shrank by over 4% and unemployment rose to 10% by the end of the 
year. The effects, however, were moderated by the European Economic Recovery 
Plan
135 (EERP) endorsed by the European Council in December 2008. This had two 
main elements:  
•  a major injection of purchasing power to boost demand in the short term and 
restore business and consumer confidence  
•  short-term measures to strengthen EU competitiveness in the longer term.  
The former involved a budgetary expansion of EUR 170 billion from national 
sources with an additional EUR 30 billion from EU sources, much of it in the form 
of accelerated Cohesion Policy payments (see Box).  
Many Member States adopted national stimulus plans… 
From autumn 2008, many Member States adopted stimulus packages, amounting 
together to some 1.5% of EU GDP in 2009 and much the same in 2010. The size, 
however, varied markedly, tending to be larger in countries with more fiscal leeway 
(Figure 2.15).  
In five Member States (Luxembourg, Cyprus, Poland, Sweden and Finland) the total 
stimulus amounted to over 2% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, while in 11, it was under 
1%,  and in three of these (Greece, Romania and Lithuania) below 0.5%. 
The nature of the measures adopted also differed. They can be divided into four 
main categories: 
•  support to households (about 0.5% of GDP 2009-2010),  the main measure, 
accounting for around a third of the total stimulus and consisting mostly of 
temporary tax and social contribution reductions and special support to low-
income households;  
•  increased public investment (around 0.3% of GDP 2009-2010), consisting of 
new or accelerated projects, mostly on infrastructure;  
•  business support (0.4% of GDP 2009-2010) to provide temporary assistance to 
sectors most affected such as the car industry; 
•  labour market measures (0.25% of GDP 2009-2010) to alleviate the social 
impact of the crisis.  
                                                 
135   A European Economic Recovery Plan. COM (2008) 800 final.  
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The relative weight given to each of these varied between countries depending on 
the specific impact of the crisis. In Austria, Luxembourg, Finland, and the UK, 
support was concentrated on households, in Sweden, Hungary, Denmark and the 
Czech Republic, mainly on the labour market, in Slovenia and France, on businesses 
and in Poland, on public investment. In Germany, Spain and Belgium, there was a 
relatively even spread across the measures. 
Figure 2- 15 
Graph 14- Fiscal stimulus by MS and area as % of GDP (2009-2010)
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Source: Public finances in the EMU 2010- European Commission  
As in the case of other measures, the priority given to public investment differed 
markedly across countries, with a number of Cohesion countries (Greece, Latvia, 
Romania, Hungary and Lithuania) not being in a position to expand expenditure 
because of the limited fiscal space for action. 
Most of the increase in public investment took the form of infrastructure projects, 
many of which were already under preparation. The main exception was in 
Germany, where priority was given to projects for increasing energy efficiency in 
line with Commission guidelines. Only a few countries (Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Latvia among the Cohesion countries) adopted measures to boost R&D 
significantly. 
The packages have prevented GDP from falling further and job losses and firm 
closures from being larger. Since they are temporary, most of the measures will 
come to an end in 2011 as economic growth picks up. 
… in which regions played an active role in countering the effects of the crisis 
Much of the response to the crisis was at national level. Regional and local 
authorities, however, also played an important role in some countries, especially in 
those with a significant degree of fiscal decentralisation. 
Major stimulus packages were initiated in a number of regions. All regions in Italy 
for instance introduced their own packages, amounting to some EUR 5.5 billion 
overall or around half of the total stimulus. Significant stimulus packages were also 
implemented in all the German Landër, Vlaanderen (Belgium), Gelderland  
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(Netherlands) and Scotland and Wales (UK). They included, in general, the same 
types of measure as at national level, with a particular focus on infrastructure 
projects. In Spain, many regions also introduced temporary tax rebates and other 
support for the car industry to complement national government measures. In the 
EU-12, the only example of direct regional support was in Slovenia
136. 
BOX: EU COHESION POLICY IN THE RECOVERY PLAN 
In 2009, EU Cohesion Policy was a key part of the European Economic Recovery Plan Significant 
advance payments from Cohesion Policy were made in 2009, allowing more money to be directed to 
priority projects (total payments of EUR 11.25 billion, of which EUR 6.25 billion was in response 
to the crisis). For many 2000-2006 programmes, the eligibility date was extended to give more 
opportunity for funding to be absorbed and many Member States increased the speed and amount of 
advance payments to recipients to help them cope with the recession. 
At the end of 2009, over EUR 93 billion had been allocated to specific projects on the ground, 
equivalent to over 27% of the total funds allocated for the whole of the 2007-2013 programming 
period.  
The biggest injection of funds was in the Baltic States which were hit most severely by the 
recession, payments amounting to around 4% of GDP in Estonia and Lithuania and 2.5% in Latvia. 
Payments were also over 2% of GDP in Hungary and Poland. The highest rates of absorption are 
evident in countries hit hardest by the recession, namely in Ireland, Estonia and Lithuania, where 
investment declined by over 35% in each case and consumption by over 10%.  
Most of these countries had only limited fiscal space for counter-cyclical measures and their 
national stimulus packages were among the smallest in the EU  
The composition of spending was largely in line with the European Economic Recovery Plan and 
the Europe 2020 objectives. Around EUR 60 billion was allocated to projects in areas related to the 
latter. In particular, 28% of the projects financed involved support to innovation and businesses and 
around 20%, upgrading human capital. In addition, around half of the funds allocated to making 
places more attractive went on clean transport (rail), the environment and cultural and social 
projects. 
The absorption of funds was particularly high in respect of support to businesses, on which over 
36% of the funds allocated over the programming period had already been committed by 2009, as 
well as investment in human capital (25% of funds being absorbed).  
EU funding accounted for a large part of total public investment in 2009 in many Member States 
where budget constraints limited the amount of national spending and are likely to continue to do so 
in coming years because of the need to reduce government borrowing. In these countries, therefore, 
EU funding is key to ensuring some stability in public investment levels and, accordingly, a crucial 
part of economic recovery. 
 
6.2.  The effects of the economic crisis on public finances and the prospects 
for public investment 
Public finances have been affected dramatically by the sharp economic downturn 
which started in 2008. All Member States had budget deficits in 2009 (in some - 
Ireland, Spain, Greece and the UK – amounting to over 10% of GDP) and all of 
them are expected to do so in 2010 and 2011. The average deficit across the EU was 
6.9% of GDP and is expected to rise to 7.5% in 2010. Accumulated public sector 
                                                 
136   Grzegorz Gorzelak and John Bachtler: 'The financial and economic crisis in Europe and its regional 
dimensions and policy responses'.  
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debt averaged 73.5% of GDP in 2009 and it is expected to rise to over 83% in 2011 
unless there is a change in policy. 
Public deficits and public debt are problematic legacies of the crisis… 
The deterioration of public finances is expected to continue until at least 2011 
despite the fiscal consolidation envisaged in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes recently adopted. The increase in public sector debt by 2011 is on 
average projected to be around 25 percentage points of GDP relative to 2007 in the 
EU and over 70 percentage points in Ireland, over 50 percentage points in Latvia, 
over 40 percentage points in the UK and only slightly less in Spain and Greece 
(Figure 2.16). 
Figure 2- 16 
Graph 15 - Public debt as a % of GDP
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Despite the stimulus packages adopted by many Member States, only a limited part 
of the projected increase in debt is due to additional government expenditure. The 
main part results from reduced government revenue from taxes and social security 
payments as a result of the economic downturn (the so-called automatic stabilisers 
which prevent economic activity falling even further). There is also, of course, a 
'denominator effect' caused by the decline in GDP in 2009. 
High levels of public debt are one of the main legacies of the crisis over the medium 
term, putting the sustainability of public finances at the forefront of the policy 
agenda. Recovery of the economy, and in the tax base, together with a withdrawal 
of stimulus measures will not in most cases be sufficient to reduce public debt back 
to pre-crisis levels. To achieve this will require a protracted adjustment
137. 
… which threatens public investment in the coming years 
                                                 
137   See European Economic Forecast- Autumn 2009. European Commission.  
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There are serious risks that such adjustment will lead to reductions in public 
investment, just as occurred in similar periods of budgetary consolidation in the 
past. This was the case, for instance, in the 1990s when public debt was reduced to 
comply with the Maastricht criteria required to join the Monetary Union. This risk is 
especially serious in Member States where public debt has increased by most. 
Empirical evidence shows that countries with high levels of public debt tend to have 
lower levels of public investment, especially in times of fiscal consolidation. 
A 'golden rule' of economics, however, is that 'productive' public expenditure should 
not be cut as severely as other elements in times of budget restraint, since this may 
stimulate higher rates of growth in the longer term, which are essential for 
budgetary consolidation to be sustained
138. Indeed, reducing public investment is 
likely to make it harder to reduce government borrowing levels over the long-run 
because of its depressing effect on growth (see Box). 
Box Public investment and budgetary consolidation 
Economic studies suggest that cutbacks in public investment in infrastructure and education 
may have damaging effects on economic growth in the longer-term which may more than 
outweigh the short-term reduction in the budget deficit. For instance, Zagler and 
Durnecker, 2003) show the long run growth effects of government expenditure of public 
investments in infrastructure and education. This is very relevant because it pushes the 
research agenda on fiscal policy issues from a purely short run view to a more long run 
perspective. Growth-enhancing public investment, while causing short run budget deficits, 
has a positive effect not only in economic growth but also in the increase of tax revenue. If 
public investment is cut for budgetary purposes until levels of significant underinvestment, 
there is a risk that revenues fall more than the immediate improvement in the cash deficit as 
a result of lower economic growth. These authors show that the effects of cutting public 
investment are negative not only in terms of economic growth but also for the budgetary 
position of the country. Accordingly, if this is the case, the conclusion is that there is not a 
'trade-off' between public investment and fiscal consolidation in the medium and long run 
but just the reverse. Resuming economic growth is a must for a sustainable consolidation of 
public finances and public investment can play a significant role in the recovery of the 
economy. 
 
The impact of the crisis on public finances was less for regional and local 
authorities than for central government in 2009. 
Regional and local governments have been affected to varying extents by the 
economic downturn, depending on its scale, the composition of their expenditure 
and their sources of revenues. Overall, however, the effect was less than on central 
government in 2009.  
Public expenditure increased by 2.2% in nominal terms in the EU in 2009. In the 
three Baltic countries, expenditure declined. The overall increase in expenditure was 
larger for central governments (up by 2.6%) than for sub-national levels (up by 
                                                 
138   Mitns and Smart (2006).  
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1.7%). Only in Malta, Austria and the Czech Republic, was the increase more for 
the latter than for the former (Figure 2.17).  
Public investment in the EU rose in 2009 for both central and sub-national levels of 
government by slightly more than total expenditure, reflecting the stimulus 
measures. There were, however, big differences between Member States. Public 
investment declined in many Cohesion countries, by as much as 35% in Latvia and 
Lithuania and by over 20% in Estonia, just under 20% in Ireland and close to 15% 
in Bulgaria. The biggest increases also occurred in two Cohesion countries, Cyprus 
(36%) and Poland (22%), where the effect of the crisis was much more modest.  
Revenue of sub-national levels of government was affected by the crisis only to a 
small extent, since in general this depends less on taxes than on central government 
transfers, which account for over 40% of their total revenue. These increased in 
2009 despite the crisis, in many cases as part of national stimulus measures, though 
they fell markedly in the three Baltic countries because of the depth of the recession 
Despite the generally small impact of the crisis on the financial resources of sub-
national governments in 2009, there is concern about prospective reductions in the 
coming years, especially in countries with large deficits and high levels of debt. 
Sub-national governments are responsible for a large part of public investment and 
for the provision of public goods and services important to social welfare and to 
improve development opportunities. In many cases, much of their revenue comes 
from central government. While regions with significant fiscal autonomy were hit 
most by the economic downturn in 2009, they may fare better than others during 
economic recovery if national budgets are consolidated at the same time. 
Figure 2- 17 – Changes in revenues and expenditures of sub-national levels of 
Government in 2009 compared to 2008 
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7.  STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL COHESION  
Government intervention in pursuit of cohesion objectives does not only entail public 
expenditure. It also includes measures to set the structural conditions for a more efficient 
allocation of resources. Their effective design and implementation is necessary not only  
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for sustained growth but also to maximise the impact of public investment. They may 
even provide a greater impact in regions with higher levels of unemployment and higher 
potential for growth. Structural reforms are therefore not only important for growth as a 
whole in the EU but also to tackle regional disparities.  
Cohesion policy provides a significant demand stimulus in the short term in many EU 
Member States. The associated risks in terms of inflation and current account imbalances 
can be reduced by appropriate flexibility-oriented structural reforms and stability-
oriented policies. It is the synergy between an EU cohesion policy channelled towards 
the most productive human and physical capital investment (complemented by national 
public investment) and supportive fiscal and structural reform policies that can have a 
lasting effect  on the supply side of the economy. 
Member States have implemented a number of structural measures as part of their 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs) in recent years, the second set for the years 2008-
2010 being formulated under the renewed Lisbon Strategy and focused on growth and 
employment. Priorities are establishing well-functioning labour and product markets, 
creating an environment favourable for businesses and innovation and increasing 
competition.  
An adequate institutional framework and efficient public administration are repeatedly 
identified as prerequisites for creating an environment favourable for growth and 
competitiveness and for fully realising the benefits of public investment and, in 
particular, EU Cohesion Policy. The reform of public administration has a prominent 
place on the agenda of many Member States, especially those for which structural 
weaknesses in this area constitute an impediment to achieving their economic 
development objectives.  
Member States have made progress in adopting coherent and integrated approaches to 
R&D and innovation… 
Research and innovation are critical to an advanced knowledge intensive economy based 
on the production of goods and services of high value added.  
Member States have increasingly become aware that enhancing their economic 
performance and responding to societal needs will require R&D policy to be placed in a 
broader context and to be developed in a coherent way with other policy areas. The 
revamped Lisbon process has shown its usefulness by encouraging a common orientation 
of policy and the setting of a limited number of quantified targets but at the same time 
leaving Member States free to experiment and design specific measures suited to their 
economic structure, institutional features and national priorities. National R&D strategies 
have evolved gradually towards a more coherent and complex policy mix, cutting across 
different Ministries and involving changes in the institutional setting. In this context, the 
investment funded under Cohesion Policy is likely to have a greater impact. 
…even though expenditure on R&D has remained below the Lisbon objective 
The target of increasing total expenditure on R&D to 3% of EU GDP has been 
maintained in the Europe 2020 Strategy. All Member States have set their own national 
targets, which are in most cases lower than 3%. Progress in increasing R&D has been 
very slow, expenditure rising only marginally from 1.8% to 1.9% of GDP over the period 
2000-2008. In general, the substantial increases in R&D spending have taken place in 
countries where R&D expenditure was relatively low. At the same time, government  
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funding of private R&D is increasingly taking the form of indirect measures, such as tax 
incentives, rather than direct ones
139. 
R&D expenditures and policies are at risk of being downsized due to the enormous 
strains on both public and private budgets. In this context, it is important for Member 
States to build on their progress and tackle weaknesses, in order to sustain current 
positive trends and to continue them beyond 2010. 
Many regions are increasingly involved in R&D and innovation policies 
Many regions have come to play a key role in innovation policies of Member States. 
They have developed their own innovation strategies relying on existing strengths and 
local potential. They tend to concentrate on selected areas or on technologies focussed on 
specific sectors. The main goal of regional involvement is to promote technology 
transfer, innovation and commercialisation. Such involvement in research policies and, 
more particularly, in the European Research Area, however, has had mixed results. A 
potentially important development is that regions in federal countries have been given 
increasing responsibility over basic science and university funding. By contrast, regions 
which simply implement national top-down policies for research and innovation have no 
way of involved in their own policies other than participating in EU funded projects
140.  
Progress have been made in the modernisation of higher education systems 
The post-2000 period has seen widespread policy activity in pursuit of reforms to foster 
the excellence of the public research base, particularly as regards universities. The 
modernisation of universities was part of the Lisbon Agenda.  
European universities have implemented major policy changes concerning their 
governance, funding and human resources policies. Increasing competition has driven 
universities to develop strategies to attract students, researchers and funding and to raise 
their scientific profile. In most countries, the institutional autonomy granted to 
universities has been reinforced. This has involved more competitive and output-oriented 
methods of coordination between the State and higher education institutions and among 
the latter themselves. It has also involved a corresponding reorganisation of decision-
making processes within the institutions. University funding has changed, with a decline 
in block grants and a growth of competitive funding and finance from contracts. 
However, Member States still face challenges in modernising higher education. The 
economic crisis has led to significant cutbacks in spending which may put at risk the 
progress already achieved. The strategic framework for European co-operation in 
education and training (’ET 2020’), adopted by the Council in May 2009, underlines the 
                                                 
139   See "Trends in R&D policies for a European knowledge-based economy". JRC Scientific and 
Technical Reports. European Commission. 
140   See "Contribution of policies at the regional level to the realisation of the European Research Area". 
ERAWATCH, a joint initiative of the European Commission's Directorates General for Research and 
Joint Research Centre. European Commission. 2009.  
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need to continue with the modernisation agenda for higher education and to improve the 
quality and efficiency of education and training
141.  
Business potential has been gradually unlocked, especially in SMEs 
Businesses in the EU are confronted daily with a range of obstacles which limit their 
activities. These restrict their ability to operate internationally and reduce the impact of 
ERDF support to enhance the competiveness of firms. Firms often have to deal with 27 
different legal systems for the same transaction as well as having to cope with 
administrative burdens and the associated costs, including when starting up a business. 
These tend to offset the support provided under Cohesion Policy to increase firm 
competitiveness (EUR 70 billion in 2007-2013). These problems affect SMEs, in 
particular, which are a main focus of policy and impede their ability to grasp the 
opportunities created by the Single Market.  
In the second set of National Reform Programmes, some progress has been made in 
improving the business environment in a number of Member States, partly because of a 
greater focus on creating more favourable conditions for SMEs as a response to 
economic downturn. In 2009, there were 18 Member States  whichhad introduced one-
stop shops for starting up businesses, with the average time for starting a private limited 
company being reduced to 8 calendar days as against 24 days in 2002 and the average 
cost being halved to EUR 417. While there has been a major change in the regulatory 
culture in the EU over this period, much remains to be done to simplify the business 
environment and reduce the administrative burden. 
The first step towards a comprehensive policy framework for SMEs across the EU was 
the adoption by the Commission of the Small Business Act in June 2008. Several 
measures included in this document have already been introduced, such as reduced VAT 
rates in June 2009.  
Access to finance for SMEs has become even more important in the crisis and most 
Member States have taken measures to facilitate this, mainly through extending schemes 
guaranteeing loans to SMEs, interest rate subsidies and increasing the credit earmarked 
for SMEs. Nevertheless access to finance still remains fragmented and out of line with 
current needs, especially for start-ups and small loans (micro credit).  
…but competition policies have progressed relatively slowly. 
Competition policies, and preventing restrictive agreements between firms as well as 
monopolies, are intended to ensure that markets provide the right environment for 
investment and innovation and, accordingly, for growth and employment. In the absence 
of competition, there is a risk that public investment and aid to business will not produce 
the expected effects in this regard. 
Measures adopted by Member States in this area have often been general in scope, 
focusing either on implementing the existing acquis, in particular as regards 'network 
industries’ (i.e. energy, transport and telecommunications) or on enforcing competition 
policy. 
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The regulation of professional services still remains restrictive in a number of Member 
States, so hampering competition. The implementation of the Services Directive should 
bring about visible improvements by facilitating the establishment of services in other 
countries and the provision of cross-border services. Progress has been made in most 
Member States in this respect, but there remain a number of Member States who have 
still to implement the Directive fully. There has been an increase in financial integration, 
though at different speeds across sections of the market. In particular, retail banking 
remains fragmented, though a number of Member States have taken specific action to 
correct this, such as Poland which abolished regulations limiting investment in retail and 
wholesale markets. Some Member States have taken measures to remove barriers to 
market entry by new operators and the expansion of existing ones. Opening up network 
industries and services to competition has been slow and significant obstacles to market 
entry remain. While many Member States have sought to increase competition in gas, 
electricity and telecommunications, there remain restrictions due to 'bundling' (especially 
in the gas, electricity and rail sectors) as well as a need to set up clearly mandated and 
independent regulatory authorities with adequate resources. 
In addition, very few Member States have introduced measures to improve the 
functioning of public procurement markets or intellectual and industrial property rights 
regulations, or to speed up standardisation. 
Structural improvements in the functioning of labour markets help to increase 
employment… 
Raising employment levels is one of the most effective ways of generating economic 
growth and increasing social inclusion. Some 75 EUR billion is allocated under Cohesion 
Policy in the current programming period to employment policies and upgrading human 
capital. This is intended, inter alia, to increase lifelong learning, help disadvantaged 
groups into jobs and support active ageing. 
The potential gains from such funding will not be fully realised if parallel legislative and 
institutional reforms are not made to modernise labour markets and social protection 
systems. The effects of training programmes in helping people who are unemployed are 
limited if there are barriers and disincentives to take up employment. Equally, support for 
active ageing has little point if there is compulsory retirement at 60 or 65. In sum, the 
right conditions need to be put in place to facilitate employment, whether into a first-time 
job, a return to work after a break or remaining in work longer. 
These conditions entail appropriate levels of labour cost, modern forms of work 
organisation, the removal of barriers to entering the labour market or leaving it 
temporarily, and labour market flexibility combined with employment security 
(‘flexicurity’). Active inclusion policies are also important to increasing participation and 
strengthening social cohesion. 
Despite the increase in employment rates over the past decade, the economic downturn 
has underlined the need to reinforce efforts in two areas: (1) implementing integrated 
‘flexicurity’ pathways to smooth transitions between jobs or from unemployment or 
inactivity into work, and (2) ensuring better matching and upgrading of skills, which is 
important to get the unemployed into work and improve security of employment. 
through increased efforts to establish flexicurity …  
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One of the most important developments in labour market policy under the Lisbon 
Strategy has been the adoption of common flexicurity principles, which help meet the 
need for both enterprises and workers to adapt to structural change. Most Member States 
have developed comprehensive strategies in this regard or are in the process of so doing 
but still have to implement the reforms set out in these strategies. 
For example, some Member States have introduced or announced reforms to develop 
flexible contractual arrangements, while improving the protection of the workers 
concerned or have revised Labour Codes. There is in general a move from passive to 
active labour market policies, which are becoming increasingly oriented towards 
prevention and early intervention with emphasis on training. Innovative measures to 
increase mobility between occupations, especially for young people, are also being taken 
in some countries.  
In addition, many Member States have reformed their tax and benefit systems to make it 
more attractive to work and to encourage the unemployed and inactive to get a job. 
Policies to 'make work pay' have been introduced and efforts have been made to increase 
the take-home pay of low-wage earners. On the tax side, widespread efforts have been 
made to reduce the tax wedge, in particular for low wage earners, young people, older 
workers and disadvantaged groups.  
…and address persisting structural weaknesses in labour markets 
Some progress has been made in promoting a lifecycle approach to work. Most Member 
States have implemented pension reforms which strengthen incentives to work longer 
and encourage employers to retain older workers .However, progress in advancing 
gender equality has been limited and most countries are far from adopting a full gender 
mainstreaming approach to employment policies and undertaking systematic gender 
impact assessments of policy measures. 
Advances have also been made in some Member States in combating youth 
unemployment through improved vocational education and training schemes aimed at 
ensuring a better match with labour market needs and in providing personalised guidance 
and support. 
Some effort has gone into improving the organisation of work in a number of countries to 
the benefit of both workers and employers, while regional mobility has been encouraged 
through subsidising the costs of commuting, increasing cooperation between regional 
employment services, language training and subsidising housing costs.  
Despite the measures listed above, structural problems persist. Labour markets continue 
to be segmented in a number of Member States, participation in life-long learning 
remains low almost everywhere, youth unemployment is high in many parts of the EU 
and education and training systems remain insufficiently responsive to labour demand.  
While much has been achieved, the pace of implementing reforms has been slow and 
uneven. 
Although the Lisbon Strategy has helped forge consensus around the EU over the need 
for reform, progress in implementation has been slow and uneven across Member States 
and policy areas. In particular, reform in policy areas important for cohesion (R&D and  
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innovation, business environment, internal market and competition, and the better 
regulation agenda) has lagged behind that in the labour market.  
The implementation of structural reforms in support of economic growth, employment 
and cohesion will continue under the Europe 2020 strategy. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of these reforms needs to be faster for them to have a significant impact 
on economic and social cohesion and the performance of Cohesion Policy and a closer 
link between the latter, structural reforms and fiscal policies could strengthen the 
effectiveness of policy and boost long-term growth. 
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
Regional development policies were increasingly oriented over the last two decades to 
stimulating endogenous development through support to areas of comparative advantage 
rather than on compensating for disadvantages. 
Under this new paradigm, public investment has proven essential for the development of 
lagging regions. Cohesion Policy allocations alongside its principle of additionality 
ensure that less developed countries enjoy higher rates of public investment relative to 
the size of their economies. This is mostly the reason why, on average, public investment 
is higher relative to GDP (though not per head) in Cohesion countries than in the rest of 
the EU and has, moreover, increased relative to population over the past decade. 
A number of recent studies have concluded that public investment tends to boost growth 
under certain conditions among which good institutional governance is critical. Evidence 
shows a positive correlation between rates of public investment and rates of economic 
growth over this period, suggesting both that public investment is important for 
convergence and that growth is important for public investment. Therefore, it is 
important to maintain the concentration of public investment, in particular Cohesion 
Policy, on less developed Member States and regions to strengthen economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. 
Regional and local authorities are key actors of development. Public investment is 
significantly more decentralised than public expenditure in virtually all Member States. 
On average, some two thirds of public investment is carried out by sub-national 
administrations in the EU. 
Higher rates of public investment in Cohesion countries are mostly due to expenditure on 
infrastructure, notably transport networks. This reflects the lack of endowment of 
physical capital in less advanced Member States and the crucial role of cohesion policy 
in narrowing this gap.  
Unlike in the case of EU cohesion policy, the relative prosperity of regions is not a major 
determinant of their access to national funds for investment, except in Germany and, to a 
lesser extent, in France. Other factors such as geophysical features, the extent of fiscal 
and political autonomy or the attraction of capital cities seem to be at least as important 
determinants of the geographical distribution of investment. In other words, cohesion 
does not seem to be a major determinant in decisions on public investment in many 
Member States. 
The economic crisis led most national governments and some regional authorities to 
introduce 'ad hoc' stimulus packages in order to counter the effects on growth and  
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employment. Public investment was an important component of these. The legacy of the 
crisis, however, is a dramatic increase in government borrowing and debt, mostly 
stemming from a fall in tax revenue. Reducing government deficits in the coming years 
to more sustainable levels is likely to put pressure on public expenditure programmes and 
on public investment in particular.  
Accordingly, cohesion policy which accounts for a substantial proportion of financing 
for investment in many countries is likely to become increasingly important in the future. 
On the other hand, the fiscal and budgetary constraints of Member States will have a 
significant impact on the environment in which cohesion policy will operate.  
It is important that Member States bear in mind the potentially significant role of public 
investment in this new context. In any case, the system for the verification of 
additionality needs to be revised. Currently, the system is contested on grounds of 
reliability and full comparability between Member States, in view of its ad-hoc nature 
and complexity. A reform of the system is necessary with a view to making it more 
reliable, transparent, simple and proportional. 
Structural and institutional reforms are of major importance for maximising the impact of 
cohesion policy. Yet, the pace of reform over the past decade has been relatively slow in 
some critical areas. This affects the impact of the policy 'on the ground'. The Europe 
2020 strategy has set a new framework to which cohesion policy needs to adapt. A 
central element in the reform of the policy will be to establish closer links between the 
design and implementation of the policy and the macroeconomic objectives and the 
structural as well as institutional reforms pursued in this context. 
Conditionality in the current 2007-2013 programming period for cohesion policy is 
confined to the macroeconomic criterion linked to the Cohesion Fund (apart from the 
administrative requirements relating to financial management and control systems). For 
cohesion policy post-2013, it is desirable to explore whether this kind of macroeconomic 
conditionality should be extended and if so how. There is also a need to examine the 
desirability of introducing conditionality for other purposes, such as to give an incentive 
for structural and institutional reforms in areas closely linked to the operation of 
cohesion policy with the aim of making the policy more results-oriented and of trying to 
ensure maximum value for money.  
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Chapter III: Other European Union policies and cohesion 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic, social and territorial cohesion is a key objective of the EU
142, which cuts 
across all policies. According to Article 175 of the Treaty, 'The formulation and 
implementation of the Union's policies and actions and the implementation of the 
internal market shall take into account the objectives set out in Article 174 (i.e. the 
strengthening of economic, social and territorial cohesion) and shall contribute to their 
achievement.' 
While each policy has its own objectives, there is a growing need for the overall strategy 
pursued by the EU to become more effective, which has been given added weight by the 
adoption of the Europe 2020 headline targets.  
This chapter examines the interaction between different policies and the extent to which 
other policies reinforce the effect of Cohesion Policy on the objectives of the latter, 
focusing in particular on their effect in reducing regional disparities.  
Taking a slightly different approach than in previous reports, this chapter distinguishes 
policies which have an explicit spatial (regional) dimension as such from those which 
only have a partial spatial dimension and those which are ‘spatially blind' 
143, i.e., 
policies which do not distinguish between different parts of the EU.
144 
This chapter does not argue that policies need a spatial dimension as such. Many policies 
do not have a spatial dimension nor a spatial impact, such as for example intellectual 
property rights. However, a greater awareness of potential territorial impacts can improve 
policies and facilitate coordination between them. This could be achieved by carrying out 
territorial impact assessments as described at the end of this chapter. 
2.  POLICIES WITH AN EXPLICIT SPATIAL DIMENSION 
2.1.  Competition  
Competition policy is designed to ensure that the internal market remains an open 
one, with equal opportunity for firms to compete in whichever place they are 
located and from whatever Member State they originate. The intention is to stop 
                                                 
142   Article 3(3) of the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that 'The Union shall promote economic, social 
and territorial cohesion'. This is further developed in Article 174: 'In order to promote its overall 
harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening 
of its economic, social and territorial cohesion.' 
143   An agenda for a reformed Cohesion Policy by Fabrizio Barca, 2009. 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/barca_en.htm  
144   For a similar approach see chapter 3 of The territorial dimension of environmental sustainability. 
Technical report No 9/2010, EEA, 2009, Copenhagen 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/the-territorial-dimension-of-environmental-sustainability .   
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both the protection of national firms and the more prosperous regions from 
outbidding less prosperous ones in terms of the financial inducements offered. As 
government intervention is necessary in some cases, however, the Treaty provides 
for situations where State aid is considered compatible with competition in the 
internal market. A number of exemptions to the general prohibition on aid are, 
therefore, specified. Accordingly, State aid can be used, for example, to provide risk 
capital and funding for R&D and other investment, which contributes to the pursuit 
of the Europe 2020 objectives by encouraging the adoption of more innovative and 
greener technology. 
In 2008, State aid amounted to EUR 52.9 billion
145, or EUR 113 per head of 
population. In the three years 2006-2008, it was an average of 0.4% of EU GDP a 
year, but the exceptional measures to combat the crisis pushed it up to 2.2% of EU 
GDP in 2008.  
State aid differs across Member States. The amount in 2008 ranged from over EUR 
300 per head in Denmark and over EUR 200 per head in Sweden and Malta to less 
than EUR 50 per head in Latvia, Romania, Estonia and Bulgaria, reflecting 
differences in policy approaches as well as levels of economic prosperity. Despite 
generally higher State aid figures per head in the EU-15, the EU-12 Member States 
accounted for some 13% of the total in 2008, much more than their share of EU 
GDP (8%), reflecting the larger share of population covered. 
Regional aid 
The Commission Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013
146 set out the 
principles for determining whether or not aid for the economic development of 
disadvantaged areas, and the support for investment or new enterprise creation 
which it entails, is compatible with internal market rules. The maximum intensity of 
aid allowed is higher in regions with lower GDP per head and in the outermost 
regions. Member States are encouraged to concentrate aid on multi-sectoral schemes 
which are part of national regional policy and which normally do not require 
notification to the Commission. 
In the three years 2006-2008, aid for regional development amounted to EUR 11.3 
billion, up 14% on the previous three years. The share of regional aid in the total aid 
increased from 18% to 22% between the two periods. Greece, Poland, Portugal, 
Sweden and the Czech Republic were the largest contributors to the increase. 
Aid in disadvantaged regions 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (in Article 107(3)(a)) allows aid that 
promotes the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment (category ‘a’ regions) 
(see Map 3. 1). In practice, the areas concerned are defined as NUTS 2 regions with 
a GDP per head of less than 75% of the EU-25 average, which broadly correspond 
                                                 
145   Excluding railways. The total including railways is EUR 67.4 billion. 
146   OJ C 54, 4.3.2006, p. 13.  
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to Convergence regions (including Phasing-out regions). In 2008, aid in these 
regions amounted to almost EUR 14 billion. 
Aid in ‘category a’ regions increased by a quarter between 2007 and 2008 (from 
EUR 11 billion), though the longer-term trend is downwards (from an average of 
EUR 17 billion in 2003-2005 to EUR 13 billion in 2006-2008).  Member States 
differ in terms of the level of aid in such regions, reflecting differences in regional 
policy, the extent to which aid is used to support development and the size of the 
eligible population
147. 
Map 3. 1: Regional aid 2011-2013 
Differentiated state aid possibilities for islands, sparsely populated areas and other 
regions categorised by geographical isolation  
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (in Article 107(3)(c)) allows aid to be used 
to facilitate the development of certain other areas, where it does not significantly 
affect competition (category ‘c’ regions). The areas concerned include those regions 
with a GDP per head below the EU-25 average, those with unemployment over 15% 
higher than the national average or those undergoing major structural change or in 
serious relative decline, as well as regions with low population density, islands with 
a population of 5000 or less and regions similarly isolated geographically, regions 
neighbouring category ‘a’ regions. Aid in these c regions totalled around EUR 7.4 
billion in 2008 (i.e. just over half that in category ‘a’ regions), down by 23% from 
2007. 
State aid and the Lisbon objectives 
A new General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) was introduced in 2008
148, 
giving automatic approval for a range of aid measures without the need for prior 
notification. Such a block exemption does not have a spatial dimension since it 
applies in all regions. 
The GBER covers aid to SMEs, research, innovation, regional development, 
training, employment and risk capital, as well as aid for environmental protection, 
entrepreneurship, business start-ups in assisted regions, and issues such as the 
difficulties of women entrepreneurs to access finance.  
The reform introduced by the GBER was aimed at redirecting aid towards the 
Lisbon objectives by encouraging Member States to focus on assistance that will be 
of real benefit to competitiveness, job creation and social and economic cohesion. 
At the same time, it reduced the administrative burden for public authorities, aid 
recipients and the Commission alike. The GBER unified and simplified previous 
rules, and enlarged the categories of state aid covered by the exemption. Almost 
19% (EUR 10 billion) of aid to industry and services was already block exempted in 
                                                 
147  It should be noted that aid in category ‘a’ regions might be used for purposes other than regional 
development. 
148   http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/reform/reform.cfm  
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2008 under the previous regulations as compared with 13% (EUR 6.3 billion) in 
2007 and 6% (EUR 3 billion) in 2006. 
A Best Practice Code and a Simplified Procedure were introduced in 2009 to 
facilitate the treatment of State aid cases and accelerate the process. Measures 
eligible for simplified treatment include certain aid for SMEs, the environment, 
innovation and restructuring. In addition, guidelines for State aid for investment in 
broadband networks were recently adopted
149 to accelerate and extend their 
deployment and so contribute to both the short-term recovery and long term 
competitiveness of the EU economy as part of the European Economic Recovery 
Plan
150. 
2.2.  Transport  
Investment in transport inevitably affects some regions more than others, though the 
selection of routes and places to invest in at the EU level has largely been 
determined by objectives other than reducing regional disparities, though it has 
undoubtedly assisted the development of the less developed countries. 
Transport policy is centred on completing the trans-European transport network 
(TEN-T), which is aimed at ensuring that the transport system in place enables the 
internal market to function smoothly and that the main centres of population and 
economic activity are reasonably well connected.  
Since 1996, when the policy was initiated, some EUR 400 billion has been invested 
in the network, almost a third coming from EU sources
151, much of it from the 
Cohesion Fund, which is confined to financing investment in Member States with 
relatively low income levels. As a result, national rail and road networks have 
become better interconnected. 
An efficient transport network is important for sustained economic development and 
territorial balance. The focus of the TEN-T policy, however, has been on 
strengthening links across the EU rather than on improving the accessibility of 
lagging regions as such, though it has undoubtedly contributed to this, not least 
through the investment financed by the Cohesion Fund . These countries – Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and (up until 2003) Ireland and the EU-12 countries since 2004 – 
were also the ones with transport systems most in need of expansion and 
improvement. Thus, it has been left to Cohesion Policy, and in particular to the 
ERDF and Cohesion Fund, to strengthen transport links both within regions and 
between regional networks and national and European ones. 
The challenge now is to respond effectively to the growing need to reduce emissions 
from transport and to save energy by encouraging a shift from road to rail, in 
particular, though also to waterways and maritime transport, while at the same time 
                                                 
149   http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/specific_rules.html#broadband 
150   This includes EUR 1.02 billion through the EAFRD that Member States could allocate, among other 
priorities, to the development of broadband internet in rural areas 
151   Grants from the TEN-T budget, the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund, 
plus loans from the European Investment Bank.  
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meeting the need for improvements in the transport network in less well endowed 
regions. This is especially the case in the EU-12 countries, where road as well as 
rail networks are in a poor state of repair and wholly inadequate to meet the 
demands imposed on them as their economies grow and develop. 
2.3.  Environment  
The main political driving force for improving the quality of the environment and 
human health is the EU Treaty, and body of EU legislation adopted under it which 
must be implemented by Member States. EU environmental policy is pursued 
through Action Programmes, the 6th one covering the period 2002-2012, the aim 
being to further the EU Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS). It covers a wide 
range of activities ranging from protecting ecosystems and biodiversity to 
improving water supply and the treatment and reducing noise pollution. It aims to 
reduce environmental disparities in the EU, which directly contributes to cohesion 
in that it will make lagging areas more attractive as well as healthier places to live 
and work. 
Natura 2000 is a good example of a policy with a strong spatial dimension. It is an 
EU-wide network of nature protection areas established to assure the long-term 
survival of Europe's most valuable and threatened species and habitats. Natura 2000 
is not a system of strict nature reserves where all human activities are excluded. 
Whereas the network certainly includes nature reserves, most of the land continues 
to be privately owned and the emphasis is on ensuring that future management is 
sustainable, both ecologically and economically. 
Framework Directives, moreover, require public authorities to draw up plans for  
management of water, flood risk, waste and air quality in cities as well as marine 
management to achieve a set of environmental objectives, so encouraging the 
formulation of integrated development strategies for particular areas. River basin 
management plans, for example, may lead to better coordination of their use by 
agriculture, tourism, shipping, hydropower and so on, while those for air quality 
might lead to the development of public transport, more green spaces and bicycle 
lanes. 
Up until now, the EU biodiversity policy was driven by the EU 2010 target – to halt 
biodiversity loss in the EU by 2010 – set by the Heads of State in 2001. The EU 
Biodiversity Action Plan was put in place in 2006 to accelerate progress towards 
this target and took an integration approach. For the period post-2010, the 
Environment Council on 15 March 2010 agreed a new vision for 2050 and target for 
2020 for biodiversity, – halting the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of 
ecosystem services in the EU by 2020,and restoring them in so far as it is feasible, 
while stepping up the EU contribution to averting global biodiversity loss. 
In addition, there are plans for a new strategy for the prevention of natural and man-
made disasters
152, which involve heavy costs for some regions (total losses from 
                                                 
152   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 23 February 2009 - A EU 
approach on the prevention of natural and man made disasters COM(2009) 82 final  
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natural disasters are estimated to amount to at EUR 112 billion over the period 
1998-2008 and to have led to 98,000 deaths)
 153. 
2.4.  Maritime Policy 
EU Integrated Maritime Policy is a new approach developing all marine-related 
activities in a sustainable manner. It uses cross-sectoral tools such as maritime 
spatial planning, integrated surveillance and marine knowledge, which will improve 
the way that our oceans are managed. The Commission has also made first steps 
towards implementing this policy on a regional basis, notably in the Baltic Sea and 
the Mediterranean.  
The objective of this new approach is to identify EU actions that have an impact on 
the sea and to promote coherence across sectors and areas of activity. In addition, it 
aims to boost the maritime economy, protect and restore the marine environment, 
strengthen research and innovation and foster development in coastal and outermost 
regions
154.The success of this approach depends to a large degree on its interaction 
with other policies. For example, Cohesion Policy during the 2007-2013 
programming period  had already funded up to end-December 2008 already funded 
a total of 1,131 projects relating to maritime policy representing an investment of 
almost EUR 1.2 billion 
155.  
2.5.  Common Fisheries Policy 
The objective of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
156 at present is to ’...ensure 
the sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources’ by ‘contribut(ing) to 
efficient fishing activities within an economically viable and competitive fisheries 
and aquaculture industry, providing a fair standard of living for those who depend 
on fishing activities…’ One of the four main pillars of the policy consists of 
structural measures to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion. 
The European Fisheries Fund (EFF), which supports the policy, amounts to EUR 
4.3 billion for 2007-2013. Three pillars of the EFF contain measures supporting the 
fisheries sector (in particular, with regard to the fishing fleet, aquaculture, 
processing and organisation of the sector), while the fourth pillar consists of 
structural measures to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion. This is 
intended to assist the development of coastal areas in which fishing is an important 
part of economic activity and to help improve the quality of life there. 
To reach these goals, it has set up Fisheries Local Action Groups, to draw up 
integrated local development strategies to help maintain viable coastal communities 
by diversifying activities and creating alternative jobs. The total public budget for 
                                                 
153   European Environment Agency (2010) Mapping the impact of recent natural and technological 
disasters in Europe. An overview of the last decade. Version May 2010. 
154   Progress report on the EU's integrated maritime policy. COM(2009)540  
155    Policy Research Corporation based on the database on EU funded projects. 
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/study_d_base_en.html 
156   COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002.  
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this is around EUR 826.6 million and some 130 Action Groups have so far been set 
up of the 240 which are eventually expected. 
3.  POLICIES WITH A PARTIAL SPATIAL DIMENSION 
3.1.  Research and technological development  
Policies to promote research and technological development along with innovation 
(RTDI) inevitably affect some regions more than others. The regional dimension, 
however, is not a central aspect in the design of policy and in determining the 
allocation of EU funding for research, which is a significant part of the overall EU 
Budget (see Error! Reference source not found.). 
The 7th Research Framework Programme (FP7) has a budget of some EUR 50 
billion for the period 2007-2013. Its objective is to help to make the EU the leading 
research area in the world through supporting research excellence wherever it takes 
place. The Risk-Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF) provides EUR 10 billion in the 
form of loans to projects which involve a relatively high degree of risk  
The Capacities specific programme of FP7 has a budget of some EUR 4 billion, 
which is intended to enhance research and innovation capacity throughout Europe 
and ensure its optimal use. 
Support is provided for a range of activities such as encouraging greater 
involvement of SMEs in research activities (EUR 1.3 billion); supporting the 
creation of large-scale, pan-European research infrastructure identified in the ESFRI 
roadmap
157, as well as optimising the use of existing infrastructure (EUR1.8 
billion); strengthening the R&D potential of European regions by promoting, 
through the Regions of Knowledge action, the emergence of regional research-
driven clusters (involving the triple helix of researchers, businesses and the public 
authorities) (EUR 126 million) and unlocking and developing the research potential 
in Convergence and outermost regions by supporting, through the Research 
Potential Action, excellent research entities in the regions concerned (EUR 340 
million). 
As the bulk of the funding for RTDI under cohesion policy is allocated to spending 
categories that reflect the areas of intervention under the Capacities programme 
there are clear complementarities between the two funding sources. 
There is also, however, likely to be some indirect effect on strengthening cohesion 
from other FP7 programmes: ‘Cooperation’ (which supports trans-national 
collaboration), ‘Ideas’ (which supports basic research across the EU) and ‘People’ 
(which supports the development of researchers across the EU). 
 Equally, part of the ‘Cooperation’ programmes consists of research in the social 
sciences (‘Research in Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities, with a budget of 
                                                 
157   European Strategy Forum for Research Infrastructures: http://cordis.europa.eu/esfri/roadmap.htm   
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EUR 623 million in 2007-2013)
158. The projects supported include studies of 
economic growth, regional performance, regional innovation systems, urban 
problems and rural regions under pressure from globalisation and are designed to 
increase understanding of economic and social issues. There are a number of 
studies, moreover, specifically on social cohesion, including the impact of 
inequality, the social exclusion and integration of young people and social cohesion 
in cities. 
Analysis of FP6 ICT programmes
159 indicated that the participation of EU-12 
countries in projects alongside more advanced countries was an important 
opportunity for these countries to improve the skills of their researchers, their 
infrastructure and the capacity to produce new products and processes. 
Map 3.2: 6
th FP, funding per head (index)  
Map 3. 3: 7
th FP, funding per head (index) 
3.2.  Innovation and entrepreneurship  
The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) is intended to 
increase the competitiveness of firms in the EU through helping them to innovate. 
Funding amounts to EUR 3.6 billion in the period 2007-2013. The main targets are 
SMEs with support going to help them invest in eco-innovation and energy 
efficiency and renewables as well as to provide  better access to finance, business 
support services and ICT. The main instruments used for innovation policy are: 
•  financial instruments (amounting to around EUR 1 billion) for SMEs and 
innovation,  
•  the Enterprise Europe Network to bring together national and regional business 
and innovation support providers across the EU (and beyond) and to improve and 
broaden their support with a trans-national perspective,  
•  platforms and networks for innovation policy makers (PRO INNO Europe
160), 
agencies (Europe INNOVA
161), the provision of policy and statistical analysis on 
innovation (e.g. the Regional Innovation Scoreboard
162) and the European 
Cluster Observatory, grants for eco-innovation, market replication projects and 
ICT related pilot projects.  
                                                 
158  Detailed descriptions of the relevant research projects can be found on the Socio-economic Sciences and 
Humanities website at the address: http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/research_en.html 
159  'Watching IST innovation and knowledge: FP6 impact analysis study': 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/impact/documents/wing-pilot-fp6-final-report-18-12-09.pdf 
160  PRO INNO Europe is intended to become the focal point for innovation policy analysis and 
cooperation, with a view to learning from the best and contributing to the development of new 
innovation policies. 
161  Europe INNOVA is a European initiative which is intended to be the laboratory for the development, 
testing and promotion of new measures to support innovation. 
162   See: http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/regional-innovation-scoreboard   
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The Lead market initiative
163 has set up networks of public authorities to provide 
advice on the procurement of innovative solutions, which is a good example of how 
national or regional public authorities can boost innovation. In the same vein, the 
programme has supported the European Enterprise Awards since 2006, which go to 
the best initiatives undertaken by public authorities to promote entrepreneurship and 
small businesses. More than 300 initiatives in the 29 participating countries take 
part in the competition every year and winners serve as role models for regions 
across Europe
164.  
There has been increasing recognition in recent years of the need to improve the 
complementarity between FP7, the CIP and Cohesion Policy
165, which led to the 
Commission Communication 'Competitive European Regions through Research and 
Innovation'
166, which emphasised the need for Member States and regions to 
coordinate their use of the different funding sources more effectively.  
3.3.  Information Society and Media 
ICT is a major source of economic growth and is directly responsible for 5% of EU 
GDP. There are large disparities between countries and regions, however, as regards 
the rate of adoption of ICT and of modern telecommunications in particular. The 
extent of broadband coverage is, therefore, much less in Convergence regions (47% 
of the population covered in 2009) than Competitiveness ones (68% covered)
167, 
though there is some evidence of catching up.  
The evidence is that managing authorities in less advanced regions have difficulty in 
absorbing funds available for improvements in ICT infrastructure because of a lack 
of skills and experience
168.   
The Digital Agenda highlights the action needed from national, regional and city 
authorities to help close the gap and prevent it from widening further.  This Agenda 
includes the following targets for 2020, (i) all Europeans should have access to 
                                                 
163   See: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/lead-market-initiative/index_en.htm  
164  This exchange of best practice has already led to the replication of successful projects, such as the Y4 
entrepreneurship development project from Central Finland which has inspired and supported similar 
projects in Finland and in Portugal. 
165  The issue has been examined in reports of the European Parliament ('Synergies between the EU 7
th 
Research Framework Programme, the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme and 
the Structural Funds', ITRE Committee, European Parliament, May 2007), the European Research 
Advisory Board (Energising Europe’s Knowledge Triangle through the Structural Funds,: April 2007) 
and the Scientific and Technical Research Committee of the EU (How to make better coordinated use 
of FPs and Structural Funds to support R&D, CREST, May 2007). 
166   COM(2007) 474 of 16.08.2007 
167   Digital Competitiveness Report, 2010.  
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agenda/documents/edcr.pdf  
168   Further evidence of the gap between convergence and competitiveness regions comes from a recent 
study on EU spending on ICT under structural and rural development policies.  
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internet speeds of 30 Mbps or more and (ii) 50% or more of European households 
should subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps. 
In addition, the 2007 Commission Communication on pre-commercial 
procurement
169 highlighted the extent to which public procurement of R&D across 
the EU, of which ICT accounts for 20%, falls below that in the US. The bulk of 
public procurement occurs at local and regional level, where less innovation-minded 
authorities in the EU-12 countries spend considerably less than those in the EU-15. 
Because of the fragmentation of demand, cooperation between regions on pre-
commercial procurement is essential to achieve enough critical mass for innovations 
to reach wide markets. The intention is, therefore, to support authorities in 
coordinating their procurement of ICT under the FP7 programme. 
3.4.  Poverty and social exclusion 
Social inclusion policies, both at EU and national levels, tend to focus on specific 
groups of disadvantaged and vulnerable people (such as lone mothers, elderly 
people living alone, migrants, homeless people, ethnic minorities and people with 
disabilities). One of the Europe 2020 headline targets is to lift at least 20 million 
people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion.  
Such a focus tends not to have a spatial dimension, measures being directed at 
helping those concerned wherever they live. There is a growing awareness, 
however, of the concentration of social exclusion in particular places, particularly in 
inner city areas and deprived neighbourhoods. Such concentrations also occur in 
rural areas, mostly in the EU-12 where economic activity is limited and few 
employment opportunities outside subsistence farming exist. The analysis carried 
out in the context of the Open Method of Coordination
170 on Social Protection and 
Social Inclusion shows this clearly. This provides the basis for policy cooperation in 
this area in pursuit of broad common objectives and which forms the central plank 
of EU social policy, since competence in this area resides mainly with Member 
States.  
It is increasingly recognised, therefore, that the nature of disadvantage affecting 
people in situations of poverty and social exclusion is influenced by the area where 
they live. The link between individual circumstances and local situations runs both 
ways. A concentration of disadvantaged people in certain neighbourhoods results in 
increased pressure on public services, reduced economic activity and private 
investment, the emergence of ghetto situations and an erosion of social capital. At 
the same time, living in deprived areas means reduced access to jobs, often 
inadequate public services, stigmatisation and discrimination. The concentration of 
disadvantage also appears to be a persistent phenomenon which can spread from 
one generation to the next. Social policies, therefore, need to tackle the territorial 
                                                 
169   COM(2007) 799 'Pre-commercial procurement: driving innovation to ensure high-quality public 
services in Europe': http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/home_en.html 
170   The Open Method of Coordination essentially provides a means for Member States to exchange 
information and views on social policy on the basis of a common set of agreed indicators of various 
aspects of social developments and to subject their policies to a peer review process managed by the 
Commission.  
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aspects of disadvantage if they are to succeed in helping people in the places where 
they live and to encompass the regeneration of deprived areas as well as support to 
the people concerned themselves.  
This approach is also promoted through the common principles on active 
inclusion
171, which emphasise the importance of local and regional circumstances 
and the need to ensure access to quality services.  Area-based social policy was one 
of the main themes of the 2009 European Roundtable on Poverty and Social 
Exclusion organised by the Swedish Presidency, which called for increased efforts 
to combine ‘people-based’ and ‘place-based’ approaches in the social OMC, as well 
as in Cohesion Policy.  
3.5.  Employment  
Employment policy represents a central means of tackling issues of poverty and 
social exclusion, since unemployment, or inactivity, is a major cause of both. On 17 
June 2010, the European Council raised the employment target to 75% for people 
aged 20-64. Greater participation of the young, older people and the low-skilled and 
the better integration of legal migrants can make an important contribution to this 
target. To improve the integration of migrants, the Commission approved the 
Stockholm programme
172 in 2010 and will follow this up with an EU agenda for 
integration in 2011.  
The focus of the European Employment Strategy (EES) is, however, national rather 
than regional, even if it is most relevant in areas of high unemployment and its 
success is judged inevitably in terms of reducing disparities in employment and 
unemployment rates within, as well as between, Member States. Like social policy, 
it operates through the Open Method of Coordination, since competence for 
employment remains with Member States, though the ESF provides financial 
support to assist the pursuit of EES objectives (see Chapter IV below). 
The essence of the strategy is that well performing labour markets are key to 
increasing employment and furthering social and economic cohesion, but these need 
to be accompanied by measures to support people should they lose their jobs. This 
flexicurity approach, combining active labour market measures (especially 
education and training) with adequate unemployment insurance and effective 
employment regulation, reduces the risk of exclusion and helps, and encourages, 
people to move between jobs and from inactivity and unemployment into the labour 
market. Moreover, flexible forms of work organisation both help to increase 
productivity by enabling labour input to be adjusted to the flow of work and assist 
people to reconcile work with family responsibilities.  
Flexicurity is accompanied by measures to encourage labour mobility, in the form 
of an international job placement service (EURES – which held details of 805,000 
job vacancies across Europe in August 2009) as well as through support for the 
freedom of movement of workers and the removal of obstacles to occupational 
                                                 
171   See the Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2008 (2008/867/EC), the Council Conclusions of 
17.12.2008 and the Parliament Resolution of 6.5.2009 (2008/2335(INI)). 
172   COM(2010)171  
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mobility, and the ‘New skills for new jobs’ initiative. The latter is aimed at 
anticipating future labour market needs and encouraging education and training 
systems to become more responsive to the prospective demand for particular skills. 
The emphasis, however, is primarily on general tendencies across the EU as a whole 
rather than on the potential variations in skill needs  across countries and, indeed, 
regions. 
3.5.1.  The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) helps workers who 
have lost their job as a result of changing global trade patterns to find 
another one quickly. When a large enterprise shuts down or a factory is 
relocated to a country outside the EU, or a whole sector loses many jobs in a 
region, the EGF can help the workers made redundant to find new jobs as 
quickly as possible. A maximum amount of EUR 500 million a year is 
available to the EGF to finance such interventions. The economic crisis has 
led to a massive loss of employment across Europe. This was reflected also 
in the applications for EFG in 2009 and 2010 where three quarters of them 
were related to the crisis. In 2007 and 2008, all the applications were related 
to the field of Trade. 
The automotive industry was one of the hardest hit by the crisis and it is the 
sector which had the highest share of all applications (18%). Together with 
textile industry it accounted for more than a third of all applications 
followed by the printing and mechanical industry with each having a share 
of around 10%. Since its creation in 2007, the EGF has received 63 
applications by the Member States. Spain, the Netherlands and Ireland 
introduced respectively 10, 9 and 65 applications while Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Malta, Slovenia, Finland, and Sweden only introduced one each.  
The EGF funds active labour market measures such as job-search assistance, 
occupational guidance, tailor-made training and re-training including IT 
skills and certification of acquired experience, outplacement assistance, and 
the promotion of entrepreneurship and aid for self-employment.  It can also 
provide special time-limited measures, such as job-search allowances, 
mobility allowances or allowances to individuals participating in lifelong 
learning and training.  
The EGF does not fund passive social protection measures such as 
retirement pensions or unemployment benefits. 
3.6.  Education  
Policy on education and training is intimately linked not only with enterprise and 
innovation but also with employment and social inclusion policies, since it is 
regarded as a central means of achieving the objectives of the latter two. Its 
overriding aim is to encourage lifelong learning in Member States, which retain 
competence in this broad area (though in some Member States, responsibility lies at 
the regional or local level), again through the Open Method of Coordination. As in 
the case of employment and social policy, the focus is almost entirely at the national 
rather than at the regional level, even though significant disparities exist in 
education attainment levels and rates of school drop-out across regions within  
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countries – in some degree mirroring disparities in economic conditions – as well as 
between countries. 
Nevertheless, education and training is a key element in strengthening social and 
economic cohesion and the various Initiatives included in the Lifelong Learning 
Programme (such as Erasmus and Leonardo da Vinci) increase the opportunities 
available to young people, who could subsequently benefit from EU research 
scholarships, to attain a high level of education
 173. Moreover, a set of targets has 
been agreed with Member States to increase education levels and reduce drop-outs 
by 2020: 
•  at least 95% of children between the age of four and starting compulsory primary 
school should participate in early childhood education;  
•  the share of 15-years olds with inadequate abilities in reading, maths and science 
should be less than 15%;  
•  an average of at least 15 % of people aged 25-64 should participate in lifelong 
learning 
•  the share of early leavers from education should be less than 10%;  
•  the share of 30-34 year olds with tertiary education should be at least 40%.  
•  These last two are also Europe 2020 headline targets. 
3.7.  Gender equality 
Over the last decade, greater participation of women in the labour market has been 
the crucial factor for achieving the Lisbon targets on employment. Participation by 
women in the labour market has increased steadily over the last few years, 
approaching 60 % on average in the EU
174 (which was the 2010 Lisbon target
175). 
Addressing gender equality at national and regional levels in the national reform 
programmes has helped to better identify the contribution of gender equality to the 
objectives in terms of employment, growth and social inclusion and so has had a 
positive impact on European social and economic cohesion
176.  
Equality policies can have a significant effect on individuals, firms, regions and 
countries
177. In many countries, a positive correlation exists between high levels of 
                                                 
173   7
th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development : Marie Curie actions 
174  59.1 % in 2008 with huge difference between Member States, see SEC(2009)1706 'Annual report on 
equality between women and men 2010'. 
175  The age group (20-64) covered by the Europe 2020 strategy employment rate target of 75 % differs 
from the Lisbon target which covered the 15-64 age group. On the basis of the 2020 target, the female 
employment rate has risen from 57.3 % to 62.5 between 2000 and 2009. 
176  Smith, M., 'Analysis note: gender equality on the labour market: challenges of the EU after 2010', 
European Commission's Network of Experts on Employment and Gender Equality issues, July 2009. 
177 Smith, M. and F. Bettio, 'Analysis note: the Economic case for Gender Equality', European 
Commission's Network of Experts on Employment and Gender Equality issues, August 2008.  
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economic activity (GDP per head) and higher labour market participation by women 
and men. There are several factors which could lead to gender equality policy 
contributing to economic growth, , such as through measures to help balance work 
and family life and the design of tax systems which can increase the participation of 
women in the labour market, resulting in higher employment and so increased 
growth
178.  
Member States which have put reconciliation policies in place have succeeded in 
raising both participation rates of women and men and fertility rates. The EU has 
recently helped to improve the framework conditions for supporting reconciliation 
between work and private life. The Directives giving the self-employed and their 
partners the right to maternity leave for the first time and strengthening the rights to 
parental leave are important in this respect
179. Gender equality enables a more 
coherent social model to be developed, with investment in social infrastructure to 
support working women and men and to promote sustainable employment and 
social reproduction
180. 
3.8.  Health  
Health forms part of human capital and constitutes a key determinant of growth and 
competitiveness as well as of individual well-being. Wide disparities exist between 
Member States and regions in terms of health status and the quality of health 
services, which have important implications for economic, social and territorial 
cohesion.  
In 2007, the Commission adopted a new Health Strategy for the period 2007-2013 
aimed at fostering better health and increasing healthy life years, reducing health 
inequalities, protecting people from health threats and supporting technological 
innovation in healthcare systems. Although the strategy does not have cohesion as 
an explicit aim, a central aspect is to reduce inequalities in access and affordability. 
The approach to achieving this aim is set out in the Commission Communication 
‘Solidarity in health: reducing health inequalities in the EU' (COM(2009) 567) 
which identifies wide gaps in health between Member States and regions as well as 
between social groups as a threat to the EU's fundamental values. It puts forward a 
range of measures to be taken by the EU and Member States, including through 
Cohesion Policy. Reducing health inequality is equally an objective of the Health 
Programme 2008-2013. 
Related to this, a European Health Information system has been put in place to 
monitor developments in the situation across Member States and regions. The 
system comprises 30 health indicators, most of which are available at regional as 
well as national level. 
                                                 
178  Löfström, Asa (2009), ‘Gender Equality, Economic Growth and Employment’, Swedish Presidency of 
the European Union, 2009. 
179  COM(2008) 635 final, Directive 2010/18/EC implementing the revised Framework Agreement on 
parental leave, OJ L 68/13, 18.3.2010; Directive 2010/../EC on self-employed women and helping 
spouses, OJ reference to be added once published 
180  Social reproduction designates the processes which sustain or perpetuate characteristics of a given 
social structure or tradition over a period of time.  
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3.9.  The Common Agricultural Policy 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is made up of two pillars (agricultural 
support and rural development), with distinct but complementary objectives.  It has 
a total budget of EUR 413 billion (in current prices) for the period 2007-2013.  
Agricultural support 
The first pillar of the CAP is financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
(EAGF) with a budget of EUR 313 billion. It consists mainly of direct payments to 
farmers, along with a small number of market management measures.   
Map 3. 4: CAP Pillar 1 expenditure per utilized agricultural area, 2000-2006 
Direct payments to farmers help to sustain employment in agriculture. They also 
ensure that farmers continue to undertake important land management functions 
across the EU and support the viability of rural areas.   
The agricultural and food sectors combined accounted for some 18.6 million jobs in 
the EU in 2005 (just under 9% of total employment) and for 4% of GDP. There are, 
however, significant variations between countries in the importance of the two 
sectors, this being greater in the EU-12 than in the EU-15.  
The structure of agriculture is different in the EU-12, consisting of with very small 
holdings mixed with large-scale enterprises. In Romania and Bulgaria, around two-
thirds of farms are classified as semi-subsistence and over half of them in the other 
EU-12 countries as against only around 16% in the EU-15. 
Productivity gains from developments in crop and animal genetics as well as 
mechanisation, together with economic pressure, have led to a considerable 
structural reduction in employment over last decades. In recent years, the CAP has 
certainly contributed to cushioning this process by slowing down labour outflows, 
whilst increasing productivity, competitiveness and sustainability. 
The principal beneficiaries of the first pillar of the CAP in 2008 were, as in the past, 
France (21.5% of the total), Germany (14.6%), Spain (13.1%) and Italy (10.2%). 
Financial support per ‘annual work unit’ (AWU – i.e. per person employed on an 
annual equivalent basis) was higher in the northern Member States than in the 
southern and EU-12 countries. Support per hectare was more balanced, though EU-
12 Member States, where direct payments were still being phased in, received 
considerably less per hectare than EU-15 ones (see Map3.4). 
Rural development 
Map 3. 5: CAP Pillar 2: EAFRD expenditure per head, 2007-2009 
The territorial elements of the CAP are concentrated under the rural development 
pillar, which is entirely focussed on rural areas, which Member States have to define 
in their programmes. In addition, this pillar provides more support to farmers in less 
favoured areas (see Map 3.6) and it invests in structural measures (investment in 
farms, marketing and processing) in rural areas and promotes local development 
under the Leader Initiative. For the period 2007-2009, the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) expenditure per head tends to concentrate in  
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specific regions, in particular in more remote regions and regions which do not 
include many large cities (see Map 3.5). NUTS 3 regions which include the capital 
or a large city typically have lower expenditure per head in most Member States. 
Map 3. 6: Map of Less Favoured Areas 
A budget of some EUR 91 billion was allocated to the EAFRD for 2007–2013, with 
a minimum of EUR 31.2 billion going to Convergence regions. This was increased 
by EUR 4.4 billion in 2009, in part by reducing the amount available under the first 
pillar, in order to reinforce expenditure on climate change, renewable energy, water 
management, biodiversity and innovation, the development of broadband in rural 
areas as well to assist dairy farmers hit by the crisis. 
Most of the EU-12 countries, including Poland, Bulgaria and Romania have 
allocated an above average amount to the broad objective of 'improving the 
competitiveness of agriculture and forestry', while  Poland, Bulgaria and Romania 
are also among those allocating most funding to the objective of 'improving the 
quality of life in rural areas and diversifying the rural economy'. This objective 
accounts for some 13% of overall EAFRD financing in the EU for the period and it 
is estimated that it will result in the gross creation of some 320,000 new jobs, with 
over 240,000 of these being in Convergence regions
181.  
3.10.  Climate  
Climate policy has two main aims – to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to 
adapt to the consequences of future climate change. The way that both of these aims 
are pursued affects regions differentially.  
Reducing the use of fossil fuels in order to cut greenhouse gas emissions implies a 
need for restructuring in regions where the industries concerned are concentrated. 
At the same time, it will tend to increase growth in regions where renewable energy 
sources are located, which are not necessarily the same. 
Regional and local authorities have an important role to play in taking measures to 
reduce emissions, since they are largely responsible across the EU for housing, 
public buildings, local transport, local taxes and charges and spatial planning. On an 
initiative of the European Commission, over 1750 mayors of municipalities have 
already agreed to going beyond the emission reduction targets defined for the EU 
and have signed a commitment to this effect
182. 
The need to adapt to climate change also varies across regions. The evidence is that 
the Mediterranean Basin, the outermost regions and the Arctic are the most 
vulnerable, while mountain areas in particular the Alps, many islands and coastal 
areas and densely populated floodplains face particular problems
183. The 
                                                 
181  It is not always possible to match national or regional rural development programmes to the areas 
covered by the Convergence objective because the areas in which the programmes are implemented do 
not correspond with NUTS 2 regions. 
182   The Covenant of Mayors. 
183   COM(2009) 147 final White Paper Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for 
action  
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Commission White Paper on adapting to climate change again emphasises the role 
of regional and local authorities in this and encourages the formulation of national 
and regional adaptation strategies by 2012
184. 
4.  POLICIES WITHOUT A SPATIAL DIMENSION 
4.1.  Single market 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) helps to establish stable financial conditions 
across the EU which is important for the sustained growth of both Member States 
and regions. In the EMU, Member States cannot rely on exchange rate adjustment 
anymore to adjust to macroeconomic shocks. Fiscal policy can be used for 
stabilisation only if its room for manoeuvre as defined by the Stability and Growth 
Pact is not exhausted. This implies that flexible labour and product markets and 
hence structural reforms improving their flexibility should play a vital role in 
avoiding widening differences in competitiveness, economic activity and 
employment in the euro area. This applies to differences both between countries and 
between regions within countries.  
Cohesion policy can support regions to tackle their fundamental structural problems 
which inhibit the competitiveness of their producers, and it can also provide support 
to a part of the structural reforms improving the flexibility of labour and product 
markets. However, for cohesion policy to have a lasting impact on the supply side 
of the supported economies, it needs to be complemented by stability-oriented 
prudent fiscal policy and adequate structural reform policies. Such a supportive 
policy framework can not only support the attainment of the long-term impact of 
cohesion policy, but it can also alleviate the potential short-term risk associated with 
the inflation induced by the inflow of large-scale capital transfers into euro-area 
economies. 
While differences in economic performance between countries which are part of the 
euro area have decreased over time, there is scant evidence on the specific impact of 
the EMU on regional disparities. At the same time, the evidence is that transparency 
of costs and the reduction in exchange risks resulting from monetary union have 
brought to the fore the role of specific regional characteristics as factors in 
determining the potential for regional development.  
4.2.  Trade 
EU trade policy applies across the whole Union and is therefore a clear example of a 
policy without a spatial dimension. Trade can help to build a stronger EU economy, 
if its exports are sufficiently competitive abroad. In relation to its size, the EU is one 
of the most outward-oriented economies in the world.  
Like the European Single Market, the EU' openness to trade and investment has 
been a major catalyst for growth over the last two decades. Trade alone explains a 
quarter of the productivity gains which have occurred across the EU in recent years, 
                                                 
184   Op, cit.  
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through stimulating greater competition, specialisation in higher value added areas 
and innovation.  
4.3.  Energy  
EU energy policy also has potentially important differential effects on regions but 
has no regional dimension as such. The objectives are to maintain a competitive 
energy sector and achieve a sustainable and secure supply. Policy is implemented 
through various Directives, Regulations and Communications which are aimed at 
creating a single energy market in the EU so as to bring down prices for businesses 
and consumers alike, increasing the efficiency of energy use, reducing 
environmental impact and raising the share of renewables in energy supply. The 
latter might contribute to economic development in less favoured regions by helping 
them capitalise on their natural resources (such as solar power, wind or biomass). 
4.4.  Economic and Monetary Union  
Economic and Monetary Union helps to establish stable financial conditions across 
the EU which are important for the sustained growth of both Member States and 
regions. At the same time, by removing the possibility of exchange rate adjustment, 
it puts the onus on flexible labour and product markets to adjust to external shocks 
through reductions in wages and prices so as to avoid widening differences in 
competitiveness, and, therefore, in economic activity and employment. This applies 
to differences both between countries and between regions within countries. These 
can equally be moderated by movements of labour from the weaker to the stronger 
regions as well as by price and cost adjustments, with Cohesion Policy being relied 
upon to tackle more fundamental structural problems which inhibit the capacity of 
producers in a region to compete in the internal market. 
While there is some uncertainty about the effect of EMU on differences in economic 
performance between the countries which are part of the Eurozone, this is all the 
more the case as regards its effect on regional disparities. At the same time, the 
evidence is that the transparency of costs and the reduction in exchange risks 
resulting from monetary union have brought to the fore the role of specific regional 
characteristics as factors in determining the potential for regional development. 
4.5.  The Lisbon Strategy 
The re-launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 improved the overall consistency of 
the economic policy framework of the Union
185. It was considered to be important 
to achieve greater ownership of the Lisbon objectives on the ground and therefore to 
increase the involvement of regional and local actors and the social partners. Many 
policies under the Lisbon strategy need to be implemented at sub-national level, 
particularly those in areas where proximity matters, such as innovation and the 
knowledge economy, employment, human capital development, entrepreneurship, 
support for SMEs, and access to risk capital financing, or in areas where local or 
regional authorities  have competence (for example, education or health). 
                                                 
185  High-Level Group chaired by Wim Kok (2004): Facing the challenges: the Lisbon strategy for growth 
and employment. http://europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/index_en.html  
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Map 3. 7: Lisbon Index 2008 
Map 3. 8: Change in Lisbon Index 2000-2008 
The position of regions in relation to the key Lisbon targets depends on their overall 
level of development. The convergence regions tend to score much lower on all 
these indicators (see Table 3.1). Nevertheless, they made considerable progress in 
this regard between 2000 and 2008. The Lisbon Index measures the distance of 
regions from eight Lisbon targets (see Table 3.1). A region scores 100 if it has 
reached all eight targets, while the region farthest away from all eight score s zero. 
The Convergence regions increased their score by seven points over the period, 
almost as much as the RCE regions, indicating that all regions contributed to the 
pursuit of the Lisbon Strategy and not only the more developed. 
Table 3.1: Lisbon Index 2008 and change 2000-2008 
EU-27 Convergence Transition RCE
Employment rate for men aged 15-54 85 76 71 75 80
Employment rate for women aged 15-54 64 64 57 59 69
Employment rate for people aged 55-64 50 46 40 44 49
Early school leavers aged 18-24* 10 14 15 19 12
Secondary educational attainment for people  aged 20-24 85 78 80 72 78
Life long learning participation of people aged 25-64 12.5 9.4 5.3 8.6 11.6
Business expenditure in R&D in % of GDP 2 1.2 0.4 0.5 1.4
Government, higher education and non-profit expenditure in 
R&D in % of GDP 1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7
Lisbon index in 2008 100 68 38 42 70
Change in the Lisbon index between 2000 and 2008 11 7 10 9
Lisbon 
Target
2008
 
In 2008, only three regions reached all eight targets: Länsi-Suomi in Finland and 
Östra Mellansverige and Västsverige in Sweden. Between 2000 and 2008, the five 
fast movers were all Spanish regions which increased their score by between 27 and 
36 points. However, the crisis led to sharp falls in employment rates in Spain and, 
accordingly, adversely affected their performance in reaching the employment 
targets. 
5.  ASSESSING TERRITORIAL IMPACTS  
Both policies with and without an explicit spatial dimension could benefit from an 
assessment of territorial impact. Before deciding on a particular policy, such an 
assessment could show in a quantitative or qualitative way which areas or regions might 
face the highest costs or enjoy the largest benefits. After a policy has been implemented, 
the assessment could reveal whether the implementation of the policy has led to an 
unbalanced impact territorial impact across the EU.  
The majority of the stakeholders in the debate on the Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion 
186 as well as Member State experts
187 have argued that the European 
                                                 
186   A summary of the contributions has been published by the Commission within the 6
th progress report 
on economic and social cohesion, COM(2009) 295, June 2009. 
187  See Annex and the Report on the EU Seminar on Territorial Impact of EU policies 5 March 2009, 
Amsterdam, Action 2.2 of the Action Programme for the implementation for the EU Territorial 
Agenda  http://www.eu-territorial-agenda.eu/Summary%20Documents/Action%202-
2_%20Report%20EU%20Seminar%20Territorial%20Impact%20(3)_05032009.pdf   
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Commission should improve the territorial dimension of its impact assessments. This 
would not require a new instrument. Simply ensuring that the territorial dimension in the 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)
188 and the impact assessment (IA) is given 
appropriate attention could already have significant benefits. Currently, the impact 
assessment guidelines contain several elements with clear territorial relevance. When a 
single Member State or region is disproportionately affected, this should be mentioned. 
Where such disparities appear to be significant, they should be analysed as they may be a 
reason to adapt the initiative, for instance to offer mitigating or transitional measures for 
the ‘outlier’. The IA guidelines also offer more specific guidance on assessing territorial 
impacts (see Box). Addressing these issues in a coherent manner and, where possible, 
mapping the results could enhance the quality and scope of these assessments.  
Box - Examples of territorial elements to be considered in the Commission ex-ante 
impact assessments
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IMPACTS KEY  QUESTIONS 
ECONOMIC: 
Specific regions or sectors 
–  Will it have a specific impact on certain regions, for 
instance in terms of jobs created or lost? 
–  Is there a single Member State, region or sector which 
is disproportionately affected (so-called 'outlier' 
impact)? 
SOCIAL: 
Social inclusion 
–  Does it affect equal access to services and goods?  
–  Does it affect access to placement services or to 
services of general economic interest?  
–  Does the option affect specific localities more than 
others? 
ENVIRONMENTAL: 
Land use 
–  Does the option have the effect of bringing new areas 
of land (‘greenfields’) into use for the first time?  
–  Does it affect land designated as sensitive for 
ecological reasons? Does it lead to a change in land 
use (for example, the divide between rural and urban, 
or change in type of agriculture)? 
 
Member States can also develop and their assessments of territorial impacts for two 
reasons. First, they have more detailed knowledge of their territory which allows them to 
undertake a more specific impact assessment. Second, the concrete impact of EU 
legislation depends on how Member States transpose EU directives into national law.
190 
                                                 
188   Directive 2001/42/EC 
189   Based on the EC Impact Assessment Guidelines SEC(2009)92  
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm  
190   See also Zonneveld, W. – Waterhout, B.  EU Territorial Impact Assessment: Under What Conditions 
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th European Congress of the Regional Science Association, 25-29. August 2009, Lodz, Poland  
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A good example of a national assessment of territorial impacts is the Dutch Quick 
Scan
191 approach which combines quantitative and qualitative methods.  
A simple approach is being tested by an ESPON study which will assess the sensitivity 
of regions to a number of specific policies and (non-spending) directives. An example of 
such an approach is the ex-post assessment of the impact of the ozone air quality 
directive (2002/3/EC). This directive is aimed at reducing exposure to high ozone 
concentrations in cities. Combining the population share in cities and the number of days 
in which ozone concentration exceeds this threshold provides an indication of which 
regions will be most affected by the directive (see Error! Reference source not found.). 
An alternative ozone directive could consider setting more differentiated targets 
according to the initial levels in each city. This would reduce the cumulative long-term 
exposure in the cities that have relatively high average ozone concentrations but which 
do not exceed the maximum threshold.  
Map 3. 9: Ozone concentration exceedances in cities over 50 000 inhabitants, 2008 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Some policies have an explicit territorial dimension, like transport or environmental 
policy. This means that during the policy design phase, the territorial impact of this 
policy was considered and the policy was adjusted to ensure that the policy has the 
highest impact and the territorial distribution of this impact is balanced. Nevertheless, 
policies with a spatial dimension can still have adverse territorial impacts, for example, 
due to unforeseen effects or changes in the context. As a result, it remains important to 
evaluate the territorial impacts of policies with a spatial dimension once they have been 
implemented. 
Other policies only have a partial territorial dimension, such as those relating to research, 
innovation, information society and health. For example, EU health policy provides EU 
residents with certain rights in all EU Member States, but it also considers specific 
territorial issues such as cross-border health care. The Digital Agenda fears that high-
speed broadband infrastructure may not be constructed in remote or rural regions without 
public intervention, which is why it adopted the objective that everyone in the EU should 
have access to this type of internet. Another example is the Common Agricultural Policy 
which provides direct support to farmers under pillar one based in a uniform manner, 
while some of the support under pillar two is differentiated according to the type of area. 
Policies with a partial spatial dimension should consider the territorial impact of their 
entire policy during the design phase and include the territorial dimension in their ex post 
evaluation. 
Some policies cannot distinguish between different parts of the EU, which is the case for 
the single market or trade. However, this does not mean that these policies do not have a 
spatial impact. For example, further trade liberalisation may lead to concentrated job 
                                                 
191   See for example, Quickscan energie en ruimte. PBL The Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency, 2010. http://www.pbl.nl/nl/publicaties/2010/Quickscan-energie-en-ruimte-Raakvlakken-
tussen-energiebeleid-en-ruimtelijke-ordening.html   
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losses in a particular area. To reduce such negative social impacts in specific areas, the 
EU has set up the Globalisation Adjustment Fund.  
In short, this chapter has shown that some EU policies have an asymmetric territorial 
impact and that for some of these concrete steps have been taken to avoid an excessive 
concentration of costs of benefits. This implies that new policies which are likely to have 
an asymmetric territorial impact could benefit from an explicit discussion of this impact 
during the policy design phase.  
Furthermore, all types of policies, be they spatially blind or spatially targeted, should 
include a territorial dimension in their ex post assessment which would allow catching 
both intended and unintended spatial impacts.  
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Chapter IV: Impact of Cohesion Policy 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Cohesion was a goal of what later became the European Union from the start. In 1957, 
six countries signed the Treaty of Rome which said they were anxious "to strengthen the 
unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the 
differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less 
favoured regions".  
The goal was motivated by a concern that less developed regions would be unable to 
benefit from economic union, a concern which underlay the creation of Cohesion Policy 
and which was expressed in the Thomson report of 1973: "No Community could maintain 
itself nor have a meaning for the people which belong to it so long as some have very low 
standards of living and have cause to doubt the common will to help each Member State 
to better the condition of its people".  
Successive enlargements have substantially increased the extent of regional disparities in 
the EU. When Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the Union in 1981/86, the proportion of 
the population living in a region with GDP per head 30% below the EU average jumped 
from 12.5% to 20%. The last two enlargements dramatically widened regional 
differences and further strengthened the need for a policy aimed at ensuring development 
in all regions. This need was also recognised in the Lisbon Treaty which added the aim 
of territorial cohesion to those of economic and social cohesion. 
How do these aims fit together? 
The overriding objective of Cohesion Policy is to achieve the harmonious development 
of the Union and its regions, through: 
•  increasing competitiveness especially in less developed regions 
•  expanding employment and improving people's well-being  
•  protecting and enhancing the environment  
•  Economic and social cohesion are closely associated with the first two goals. 
Territorial cohesion is associated with the third goal as well as with using a more 
integrated and territorial approach to policy making.   
The integrated and territorial approach 
To pursue regional development effectively requires close coordination of public 
policies. For example, while investment in both infrastructure and education can 
contribute to development, the effect of coordinating the two is greater than undertaking 
the two separately. Such coordination, moreover, needs to occur at the regional level so 
as to ensure that investment is targeted at the most relevant factors within an integrated 
development strategy.  
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The territorial approach also implies a need for the different levels of government, local 
and regional as well as national and EU-level, to work together to ensure consistency 
between policies. This co-ordination can occur at the local level with an integrated local 
development strategy supported by local authorities and other local actors. However the 
geographic scale can change with the policy field. In some cases – environmental 
protection, for example – it might require a strategy spanning macro-regions, such as that 
covering the Baltic Sea area. 
In similar vein, for regional policy to be coherent across countries, strategies need to take 
account of those being pursued elsewhere. Accordingly, Cohesion Policy supports the 
development of trans-regional coordination to ensure that potential conflicts are avoided 
and synergies are realised. 
The evidence presented below often relates more to economic and social cohesion than to 
territorial cohesion, which only became a Treaty goal of the policy at the end of 2009. 
Evidence on the impact of the territorial approach is most obvious as regards issues such 
as local development, territorial co-operation and sustainability.  
1.1.  Investing in green, smart and inclusive growth - the main lines of 
spending 
Cohesion Policy is the main EU measure for pursuing balanced and sustainable 
growth across Europe. The funds at its disposal amount to some EUR344 billion in 
the current 2007-13 period (Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1), over a third of the EU budget 
– a tangible sign of the Union’s commitment to regional development and social and 
economic cohesion. 
Figure 4- 1 
Distribution of Funds by Objective
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Table 4. 1: Distribution of Funds by Objective, 2007-13 (in EUR billion) 
Objectives All 
Funds 
ERDF ESF  Cohesion  Fund 
All Objectives  344.3  198.8  76.0  69.6 
Convergence (1)  281.5  159.9  52.0  (2)  69.6 
Regional Competitiveness & 
Employment (3) 
55.0 31.0  23.9   
European Territorial Cooperation (4)  7.8  7.8     
Source: Programmed expenditure. These figures can be slightly smaller than the financial 
perspectives, since they do not include money de-committed or not yet programmed. 
(1)  Includes phasing out regions 
(2)  The correspondence between Convergence regions and Cohesion Fund countries is 
approximate, not 1-to-1. 
(3)  Includes phasing in regions 
(4)  Does not include EUR 0.9 billion for co-operation with third countries. 
The main elements are the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
European Social Fund (ESF) divided between:  
•  The Convergence Objective (EUR 212 billion over the 2007-13 period
192) 
covering the 100 least prosperous NUTS 2 regions with a total population of 170 
million. These are the regions with GDP/head of less than 75% of the EU 
average; 
•  the Regional Competitiveness and Employment (RCE) Objective (EUR 55 
billion
193), aimed at assisting other regions in the EU to compete and maintain 
jobs in a global economy; 
•  the European Territorial Cooperation Objective (EUR 7.8 billion
194) for   
strengthening cooperation across borders and exchanging experience across the 
EU; 
In addition, the Cohesion Fund (EUR 70 billion) supports investment in transport 
and environmental infrastructure in the 15 Member States with the lowest levels of 
national income (less than 90% of the EU average)
195. 
 
                                                 
192   Including the 16 regions "phasing out" over the period 
193   Including the 13 regions "phasing in" over the period 
194   Plus EUR0.9 billion for co-operation with third countries under ENPI and IPA, making a grand total 
of EUR8.7 billion  
195  Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Spain is eligible for phasing-out funding. There is 
therefore a close, but not exact, correspondence between eligibility for the Cohesion Fund and for the 
Convergence Objective.  
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Contributing to smart inclusive growth
196  in Eastern Germany
197 
The East German Länder received EUR 18.6 billion from the ERDF and the ESF in the 
2000–2006 period. Except Berlin, all of them were eligible under Objective 1. In the 2007–
2013 period, Cohesion Policy amounts to EUR 16.6 billion, all the regions receiving 
support under the Convergence Objective, except Berlin (Competitive) again and 
Brandenburg–Südwest (Phasing Out). 
In 2000–2006, Cohesion Policy accounted for a third of the total support to 
entrepreneurship, a quarter of that to R&D and a fifth of that for urban development. It also 
accounted for 50% of investment in vocational training and 10% of funding for active 
labour market policies. 
The contribution of Cohesion Policy to the economic development of Eastern Germany is 
demonstrated by a number of indicators. For example, support to business helped to create 
91,000 jobs. Industrial sites covering around 3,250 hectares were created or renovated. 
Some 3,300 km of roads were constructed or upgraded. Over 2.6 million people 
participated in activities aimed at assisting the unemployed into work and at developing 
human resources. Estimates by the HERMIN macroeconomic model (see Chapter IV.6) are 
that the measures supported by Cohesion Policy had a significant impact on GDP and 
employment creation. 
GDP in Eastern Germany grew rapidly during the years following reunification but by 
1996, the growth rate was already below 2% and it fell to close to zero in the early 2000s. 
The recovery from 2006, when GDP grew by 2.8%, was halted by the economic crisis. 
Population has been declining since unification. By 2008, it was nearly 9% lower than in 
1991. The decline coupled with GDP growth led to GDP per head rising to 116% of the EU 
average in 1995, but it then fell to 95% in 2000 and 88% in 2008. The level, however, 
varies from 87% of the EU average in Brandenburg–Nordost to 117% in Berlin. The 
employment rate followed a similar path to economic growth, falling below 60% of 
working-age population in the early 2000s and rising to 68% in 2008. 
The massive investment in construction in Eastern Germany has led to the gap in 
infrastructure endowment with the Western part of the country being virtually closed. 
However, to strengthen competitiveness and to face the challenges from globalisation, 
demographic trends, climate change and energy scarcity, there is need to strengthen 
productive potential. This applies, in particular, to human capital, innovation capacity and 
transport links within the region. Although a third of working-age population is highly 
educated, due to a lack of demand on the labour market, many of those concerned leave the 
region to work elsewhere (brain-drain).Gender equality and lifelong learning also need to 
be improved further. 
There is equally a need to increase innovation and the marketing of new products so as to 
make full use of the investment in R&D as well as to create stronger links between business 
and research. 
 
                                                 
196   Anforderungen und Handlungsoptionen für den Einsatz der europäischen Strukturpolitik in den Jahren 
2014-2020 in den neuen Bundesländern einschließlich Berlin (GEFRA, EMDS, IFS, MR), 2010 
197  Thüringen, Dresden, Chemnitz, Brandenburg – Nordost, Brandenburg – Südwest, Sachsen-Anhalt, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin  
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Achieving the cohesion objectives is complex. Every region has specific needs and 
different regions face different challenges. Economic development, moreover, has to 
be sustainable and, accordingly, compatible with social and environmental 
objectives as well as with territorial cohesion, which entails minimising spatial 
disparities and ensuring access to basic services. 
Correspondingly, spending under Cohesion Policy covers a broad mix of measures, 
though four broad policy areas account for more than 80% of the total: 
•  Support to enterprise and innovation, which are the motors of economic 
development and the source of tax revenue to support social spending, 
environmental protection and balanced territorial development. This includes 
direct financial aid to investment and R&D, but also, increasingly, non-financial 
assistance, in the form of networking and innovation systems, business advice 
and incubators. 
Planned investment in this area amounts to some EUR 79 billion over the 2007-
13 period and is the largest single item of expenditure in almost all regions. 
•  Transport infrastructure to link regions internally and to the outside world. 
Support is given to investment in roads and rail, though also in urban transport, 
ports and airports and in links between different transport modes. 
Planned investment amounts to some EUR 76 billion over the 2007-13 period, 
mostly in the EU10, where road and rail networks are in need of modernisation, 
though also in many southern regions where investment programmes have 
stretched over several programming periods and are nearing completion. 
•  Human capital development which is a key source of growth in all Member 
States and regions in Europe as well as means of strengthening social cohesion 
and equal opportunities and improving the adaptability of workers and 
entrepreneurs to economic change. 
Planned investment over the 2007-2013 period amounts to EUR 68 billion, 
funding going to support many different forms of vocational education and 
training, structural reform in labour market and education and training systems 
and groups of people that face particular problems on the labour market, like the 
long term unemployed, those with disabilities and migrants. 
•  Environmental protection to ensure the sustainability of economic development 
as well as to make regions more attractive places to live and work.  
Planned investment amounts to some EUR 62 billion over the 2007-13 period to 
a large extent in waste, water and waste water treatment, especially in less 
developed regions. In other regions, support goes mainly to measures such as 
urban regeneration, the reclamation of old industrial sites, energy saving and 
environmentally-friendly investment in enterprises. Nearly half of the Member 
States
198 have included indicators for greenhouse gas emissions in their 
                                                 
198   Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK  
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programmes. In addition, Cohesion Policy provides support to training to raise 
skills and employment in this broad area. 
The relative scale of spending on these main policy areas has tended to remain 
similar over time (Figure 4.2). There have, however, been shifts in emphasis in line 
with the Lisbon agenda, most notably from support of businesses to support of 
innovation, much of it targeting SMEs. 
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1.2.  Evaluation – understanding and finding ways to improve the effects of 
intervention 
Evaluation methods: building up a picture over time
199 
Evaluation attempts to build up a picture of the economic, social and environmental 
impact of Cohesion Policy. This serves the twin goals of accountability ("what has 
                                                 
199   For further information see the evaluation website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evaluation_en.htm 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=701&langId=en&internal_pagesId=616&moreDocuments=y
es&tableName=INTERNAL_PAGES   
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been achieved with taxpayers' money?") and learning ("how could policy be 
improved?"). 
Impact, however, is difficult to measure, since Cohesion Policy is only one 
influence among many. Global economic developments, technological change, 
macroeconomic policy and so on also exert an influence, as does individual and 
company behaviour. Moreover, the full impact of Cohesion Policy, especially as 
regards support for innovation and transport, can only emerge over the long-term. 
There is therefore no easy way of measuring the impact of Cohesion Policy. Instead, 
a variety of methods are used to build up a detailed picture over time: 
•  Regional statistics indicate what has happened in terms of GDP, innovation, 
productivity, employment and unemployment, the natural and built environment 
and so on, but they do not measure the contribution of Cohesion Policy to the 
changes. 
•  Monitoring of programmes records the activity and output of Cohesion Policy – 
how much was given in R&D grants and what firms report doing with these? 
How many kilometres of road have been built? Were there delays in 
implementation? How many people have been trained? 
•  Where the data exist, entities supported can be compared with similar ‘control’ 
ones to estimate the impact of policy
200. 
•  Ex post cost-benefit analysis may be able to estimate the contribution of 
infrastructure to the wider economy. 
•  Macro-economic models, which attempt to replicate the main economic 
mechanisms, can be used to try to capture the effect of policy on the economy
201. 
•  Some models can help to analyse possible reforms with respect to their impact on 
the labour market as well as on firms and households
202. 
•  Case studies, including interviews with stakeholders, can be used to gain an 
insight into the factors underlying the quantified developments and the 
contribution of policy to these. 
                                                 
200  This ‘counterfactual’ method is being tested in a variety of settings, including enterprise support, 
urban regeneration and assistance to minorities 
201   DG Regional Policy uses two macro models (HERMIN and QUEST) as well as a model on transport 
investment (TRANSTOOLS). 
202   Such a model has been developed recently and applied to 6 Member States: Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK, which have different socio-economic features and which may be 
representative of the other countries in the EU.  
208 
 
Cutting edge econometric techniques demonstrate the contribution to economic growth and 
convergence 
A recent academic study of the dynamics of regional GDP growth in the EU15 (see figure)
203 
found a sharp jump between those regions in receipt of Objective 1 funding over the period 1995-
2006 and other regions. Comparing regions near the cut-off for eligibility for Objective 1 
funding, GDP of Objective 1 regions grew at an average of 0.6-0.9 of a percentage point
204 more 
than similar regions above the cut-off. 
This implies something like an extra 10% addition to GDP over the two programming periods 
concerned (1994-99 and 2000-2006). 
The scale of this effect is much larger than the amount of funding involved (or the direct stimulus 
to demand from this) which suggests that it mostly reflects a strengthening of the supply-side of 
the economy in the regions concerned. 
 
Figure 4- 3: A comparison of the growth rates of Objective 1 and other regions, 1995-2006 
 
All of these methods have their uses. Monitoring, for example, is an essential 
management tool to track programmes but monitoring indicators (e.g. km of road) 
say nothing about the social or economic impact of policy. 
Since no single method can indicate the impact of policy, "triangulation", 
comparing the results of different methods, is an important part of the evaluation 
process. 
                                                 
203   Measuring the Effects of European Regional Policy on Economic Growth: a Regression Discontinuity 
Approach" Busillo, Muccigrosso, Pellegrini, Tarola, Terribile (2010) 
204   The range of estimates was generated  using a variety of parametric and non-parametric techniques  
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The European Commission alone cannot deliver all the evidence on the performance 
of Cohesion Policy. It, therefore, encourages Member States to carry out evaluations 
and, where possible, to use rigorous methods to do so. The more evaluations that 
deliver credible evidence on different aspects of the policy, the greater the 
possibility of building a picture of its overall performance as a basis for improving 
policy in the future. 
The main results of the ex post evaluations of Cohesion Policy (see box) form the 
core of this chapter
205 and are presented under five central and interrelated themes: 
•  Economic development, including transport and cross-border links 
•  Social inclusion, including training and local development 
•  Environmental protection and the green economy 
•  Governance, including partnership arrangements 
•  Macroeconomic modelling results 
These are considered in turn below. 
The ex post evaluation of the 2000-2006 period 
The evaluation of Cohesion Policy is an immense undertaking. The ex post evaluation of the 
ERDF for 2000-2006 alone generated 105 in-depth case studies and examined some 29,500 
monitoring indicators from 382 programmes
206. For the ex-post evaluation of the ESF, 49 
case studies were undertaken and more than 2,000 measures from 238 programmes were 
examined. 
The evaluation of the ERDF could not cover all the details of Cohesion Policy between 
2000 and 2006 in more than 230 Objective 1 and 2 programmes. Instead, it focused on the 
main policy areas and issues in 14 studies, ranging from enterprise support to equal 
opportunities, assessing the contribution of the policy to the development of lagging regions 
(Objective 1) and the process of restructuring (in Objective 2 areas). 
The ex post evaluation of the ESF likewise could not examine in detail every aspect of its 
contribution to 238 Objective 1, 2 and 3 programmes (including the EQUAL Initiative). 
Five evaluations were undertaken to assess the results of ESF support and its effect on 
cohesion. A preparatory study focussed on the availability and reliability of data. Two 
evaluations examined ESF support to the Open Method of Coordination in Social Protection 
and Social Inclusion and the impact on the functioning of the labour market and support for 
investment in infrastructure and systems for human capital development. Two further 
evaluations examined the ESF and the EQUAL Community initiative. 
Other evaluations assessed the effects of INTERREG and URBAN, while the Cohesion 
Fund is being examined in three studies due to be completed in early 2011. 
                                                 
205   For details and reports, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/rado2_en.htm 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=701&langId=en 
206   230 Objective 1 and 2 programmes, plus Interreg and URBAN programmes  
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2.  STRONGER ECONOMIES 
Growth of regional economies was the original focus of the ERDF and remains a key 
priority, generating jobs and funding social spending, and environmental protection, as 
well as social cohesion and cleaner, more efficient technologies, which, in turn, 
contribute to growth. 
This section reviews the contribution of Cohesion Policy to growth, beginning with 
support to enterprise and innovation and going on to investment in transport which is 
important for accessibility and efficient internal links. It ends by considering the 
contribution of Interreg to cross-border cooperation and exchange of experience. 
2.1.  Strengthening SMEs and competitiveness 
Enterprises and innovation are key to growth. If lagging regions are to catch up and 
others are to maintain competitiveness, encouraging the growth of efficient and 
innovative firms is essential.  
The rationale for support to enterprise rests on several areas of market failure: 
•  Since many of the basic conditions for innovation are public goods, there is a 
role for public intervention to boost investment in them. 
•  Since SMEs and – most of all – start ups typically have difficulty accessing 
finance, especially for innovative, and risky, ideas, public support can reduce the 
difficulty and absorb some of the risk.  
•  Since SMEs and start-ups face difficulties and costs in obtaining advice, 
information and expertise, public intervention can provide access to these. 
•  Since, in addition, SMEs are the main source of jobs in the EU and a breeding 
ground for business ideas
207, the focus of policy is, therefore, on them. In the 
2000-2006 period, they received around 83%
208 of Cohesion support to 
enterprise and the figure in 2007-13 is likely to be similarly high. 
In all Member States, the overriding aim of enterprise support is to increase 
productivity and competitiveness with a view to sustainable growth and 
employment. This mirrors the Lisbon goals and in some countries (notably 
Germany, Poland and Luxembourg) the link has been made explicit. 
Map 4. 1 Planned investments of Cohesion Policy in RTD, innovation,  
enterprise environment, 2007-2013 
                                                 
207   European Charter for Small Enterprises, European Commission, Directorate General for Enterprises. 
208    Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy 2000-2006, Work package 6 on enterprise   
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htm  
Since the study examined the 2000-2006 Cohesion Policy period, Member States refers to the EU-25.   
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In Poland, for example, the 2004-2006 programming documents emphasised the 
reliance of the economy on firms in traditional industries able to compete only in 
terms of cheap labour. Since low incomes are not a socially sustainable form of 
comparative advantage, firms need support in order to invest in new technology and 
more efficient methods of production. 
Solid achievements: jobs and productivity 
Evaluation evidence
209 indicated the following achievements from enterprise 
support over the 2000-2006 period: 
•  the creation of 1.4 million gross jobs, recorded by Member States over the 
period, an estimated 1 million due to enterprise support 
•  An estimated 230,000 enterprises (mainly SMEs) received direct financial 
support - mainly grants but also loans or venture capital 
•  An estimated 1.7 million enterprises (again, mainly SMEs) received advice, 
expertise and support for networking 
Long-run impacts are more difficult to measure and need to be explored on a case-
by-case basis. But there is a growing body of evidence that support to SMEs in 
particular can have significant effects (see box). 
Positive results from a rigorous and innovative evaluation of enterprise 
support in Eastern Germany 
In Eastern Germany, an innovative study
210 compared enterprises assisted to similar ones 
not assisted in a control group. According to the study, an average grant of roughly EUR 
8,000 per employee generated around EUR 12,000 of additional investment, a clear 
leverage effect. As a result, enterprises assisted invested around EUR 20,000 per employee, 
nearly 2.5 times as much as non-assisted enterprises. Though employment gains were 
significant, the main effect was on increasing productivity. This demonstrates that, even in 
a regional context where grants are common, they can be effective. 
                                                 
209   Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy 2000-2006, Work package 6b on the 30 largest enterprise 
progammes http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htm  
210   Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy 2000-2006, Work package 6c "An exploratory study using 
counterfactual methods on available data from Germany" 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htm   
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Structural change: invest in the future 
Managing and facilitating structural changes in economic activity was an explicit 
aim of Objective 2 in 2000-2006. And the adaptability of workers, firms and other 
organisations was one of the five core policy areas for the ESF. As economies 
modernise, shifts of labour and capital to more efficient uses are essential to sustain 
growth and attain higher living standards. 
But there can also be significant adjustment costs, in the form of job displacement 
and premature scrapping of capital, which often fall on a small section of the 
population. It is therefore important to manage change in a way that limits, or takes 
account of, these costs. 
The ex post evaluation
211 found that Objective 2 programmes were successful in 
managing structural change when: 
•  they focussed efforts on innovation, the capacity of SMEs to absorb new 
technology, fostering clusters, internationalisation  and the creation of new jobs 
rather than on safeguarding jobs in ailing industries – on investing in the future 
instead of the past. 
•  policies were pursued over the long term. This was the case in Pais Vasco, 
which, for decades, has pursued a policy encouraging adaptation to structural 
change and globalisation, which requires solid commitment from all sides. 
The evaluation found that, even where Cohesion Funding was relatively small, it 
could be a catalyst for change. Evidence from successful regions underlined the 
importance of long-term planning. Cohesion Policy played a key role in setting the 
                                                 
211   Ex post evaluation, Work Package 4 " Structural Change and Globalisation" 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp4_en.htm   
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agenda and giving regional stakeholders the chance to meet and consider 
development strategies. 
Since the shift of resources to more productive activities is an integral part of 
structural change, measures to help increase the adaptability of workers and 
organisations are of strategic importance. There can also, however, be significant 
adjustment costs in the form of job losses, in particular. These often fall on the less 
favoured sections of the population, raising concerns about equity.  
The 2000-2006 ex-post evaluation of the ESF found that overall expenditure on 
measures to support the adaptability of organisations
212 amounted to EUR 33.1 
billion and reached 18 million people over the period, while spending on measures 
to increase worker adaptability totalled 65,8 billion and assisted 37 million people 
in 335,000 organisations. 
Training for micro-enterprises 
An evaluation of ESF support to enterprises
213 in Poland found that it provided a strong 
stimulus for micro businesses to train their employees. Some 41% of the micro-sized 
enterprises (those with under 10 people employed) receiving support had not engaged in 
training before (as compared with 20% of small, 13% of medium-sized and only 6% of 
large ones). Similarly, an evaluation of the Sachsen ESF programme for 2007-2013 found 
that half of the firms receiving ESF support had no prior engagement in training.
214 
 
2.2.  More support for innovation 
Cohesion Policy is the largest EU source of finance to support RTD and 
innovation
215. A significant shift occurred between the past and present 
programming periods (see Figure 4-  55) from general support to enterprises 
(typically a grant to modernise or expand their capital base) to a broader range of 
measures targeted at innovation. These more innovative measures include: 
•  grants for research, collaboration, and capacity building, both to the private 
sector and to research institutions; 
•  investment in formal education and, vocational education and training so as to 
equip workers with the qualifications and skills required; 
                                                 
212   Both public and private sector 
213   Bernard Brunhes International (2010) “Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU: The European 
Social Fund: developing human potential in research and innovation". 
214  ISW, Begleitende Evaluierung für den Europäischen Sozialfonds im Freistaat Sachsen, Evaluierung 
der Prioritätsachse A, Endbericht, September 2009. 
215   The Seventh Framework Programme for RTD, and the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme, 
are the other main sources.  
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•  indirect measures, such as support for business services, technology transfer, 
networking and research infrastructure; 
•  venture capital and loan funds, sometimes to a particular sector such as 
biotechnology. 
Figure 4- 5 
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However, support to enterprise, innovation and RTD remains inextricably linked. 
Some EUR 60 billion in the current 2007-13 programming period is planned for 
RTD and innovation – EUR 25 billion of this going directly and indirectly to firms.  
Across the EU, cohesion programmes emphasise stimulating research and 
innovation as well as technology transfer. This applies equally to enterprises 
(particularly SMEs), to research centres and institutes of higher education. 
Moreover, there has been a proliferation of programmes for improving innovation 
through cooperation and networks. 
A recent study of cohesion policy performance in the 2007-2013 period
216 
concludes that the ERDF provides important support for RTDI policy across the 
EU, not only in financial terms – which is significant – but also in stimulating the 
development of more coherent strategies at regional level which take into account 
local characteristics and the needs of businesses. The regional dimension of 
innovation policies has grown in recent years with the support of the ERDF. While 
more advanced Member States spend more on innovation and reap significant 
benefits in terms of the multiplier effect on private investment, convergence regions 
are now creating the preconditions for innovation in terms of institutions and 
absorptive capacity, collective action and human resource development. The 
Structural Funds are essential drivers in this process. 
                                                 
216   Expert Evaluation Network delivering Policy Analysis on the Performance of Cohesion Policy 2007-
13, Synthesis Report on Innovation, 2010  
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In the Convergence regions alone, EUR 47.6 billion has been allocated to 
innovation – a significant stimulus. Many Convergence regions suffer limited 
capacity. This can stem from limitations in the economic base or in higher education 
and research centres, or both
217. In peripheral regions, moreover, it can be difficult 
to establish a critical mass of knowledge, capital and skills. In the EU-12, there is 
much potential (including a skilled work force) but limited experience and 
institutions devoted to RTDI. 
In Competitiveness regions, funding is particularly concentrated on innovation - 
EUR 13.4 billion, or 24% of the total allocated. In France, for example, Cohesion 
Policy enabled continued financing of innovation despite the financial crisis
218. 
Cohesion Policy has boosted R&D in Thuringia (Germany) 
An innovative evaluation
219 used control groups to assess the impact of direct grants to 
enterprise R&D in Thüringen over the period 2000-2006. 
The results were very positive. On average, an R&D grant of roughly EUR 8000 per 
employee was almost completely "additional", generating a similar increase in total R&D 
investment. This counters an all too frequent assumption that firms take public money for 
investments they would have made anyway, sooner or later – so called "deadweight". 
As a result of ERDF support, assisted firms invested some 2.5 times as much in R&D as 
non-assisted firms. Although the results are a little less dramatic than for general 
investment grants (there is no leverage effect – cf box above), the study noted that 
increased R&D spending by enterprises is likely to generate greater spillovers to long term 
regional growth. 
Figure 4- 6 
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217   Strategic Evaluation on Innovation and the knowledge based economy in relation to the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds, for the programming period 2007-2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/strategic_innov.pdf  
218   Strategic report on innovation (previously cited) p 26-27 
219   Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy 2000-2006, Work package 6c "An exploratory study using 
counterfactual methods on available data from Germany" 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htm#6c   
216 
Support to innovation and enterprise in Italy
220 
In Italy over the period 2000-2006, some EUR 1.3 billion of the EDRF went to a 
programme supporting RTD and higher education in Objective 1 regions, mainly in 
investment grants to SMEs. Total funding, including from national government and private 
sources, amounted to 0.7% of the GDP of these regions in 2004. 
Research on over 250 firms receiving support found that over two-thirds (69%) of projects 
were of a high and medium-to-high tech nature and that the nearly 100 projects financed 
(from research activities to commercialisation of results) had positive results, from 
commercial use of research to an impact on suppliers. 
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Delays in ICT measures being tackled by innovative financing  
The recently published 2010 Strategic Report on the implementation of Cohesion 
programmes
221 reveals that on average, only 22% of Structural Funds for ICT services and 
18% for broadband infrastructure have been allocated to projects against an EU average for 
all other measures of 27%. One reason is the substantial difficulties managing authorities 
face in the planning and management of broadband projects. In addition, in the current 
economic climate local and regional authorities tend to have more difficult in finding 
matching funds for these projects.  
In 2011, the European Commission will publish guidance on broadband investment for local 
and regional authorities to encourage the full absorption of EU funds. Further, guidance will 
be provided on public-private partnerships and other financial instruments such as matching 
funds. 
                                                                                                                                                 
220  See Ismeri Europa – Nova, Intermediate evaluation of NOP SIL, 2005 and Ismeri Europa – IZI, 
Intermediate evaluation of NOP Research. 
221   See: COM(2010)110 and Staff Working Document SEC(2010)360: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/reporting/cs_reports_en.htm   
217 
Developing human capital 
The ESF complements ERDF support in respect of research and innovation through 
a specific focus on the development of human capital and, in particular, the 
education and training of people and the development and adaptation of education 
and training systems. The impact of the ESF is most evident as regards international 
mobility, the modernisation of tertiary education, the increase in the skills of 
students and researchers and the transfer of knowledge between research institutes 
and businesses. 
In 2000-2006, 18 Member States (out of 25) used cohesion support to invest in 
human capital in research and innovation. Some EUR 3.4 billion of ESF was 
allocated, national and private co-financing adding EUR 3.1 billion. Over 3.1 
million people are estimated to have participated in the measures concerned.  
Tertiary education, in particular, is a crucial component of a successful innovation 
policy and ESF co-financing led to EUR 3.5 billion (including the national 
contribution) over the 2000-2006 period going on three main types of intervention: 
raising skills profiles and increasing research capacity, increasing the mobility of 
researchers and encouraging international cooperation, and making higher education 
accessible to everyone and promoting equal opportunities. Almost 2 million people 
were assisted by these measures. 
 
Support for technological employment 
Almost 10  000 new firms in Finland were helped by ESF support over the 2000-2006 
period
222. In Sweden over 50 technology centres were supported, as well as over 80 new 
firms
223. In addition, almost 600 cooperation and network projects were funded. 
Available data indicate that almost 70,000 researchers were helped with the support of ESF 
funding to research and innovation in 7 Member States (Germany, Spain, Finland, France, 
Sweden, Slovakia and the UK),.Over 40,000 people gained a qualification and almost 
60,000 found a job following participation in ESF-funded activities.  
The ESF also supported initiatives to launch “competence centres” in Sweden and 
Germany. Support for the ‘Transfer of knowledge and competence to support regional 
structural change’ measure in Schleswig Holstein in Germany led to 8 networks and 5 
competence centres being set up in areas such as medical technology, tissue engineering, 
hydrogen and fuel cell technology and wind power. 
                                                 
222   Bernard Brunhes International (BBI), 2010. “Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU: The European 
Social Fund: developing human potential in research and innovation". 
223   2000SE192DO001, OP, Öarna, Sweden.  
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Bridging the public/private research divide in Italy 
In Italy, 34 measures, with a total budget of EUR 1.8 billion, were implemented in different 
regions to improve tertiary education and research conditions by providing a link between 
the school system, universities, the training sector and businesses. Almost 600,000 
participants were involved and almost 28,000 projects were funded. A broad range of 
activities were supported: 
•  promoting higher and university education by establishing new programmes for post-
secondary and post-tertiary education and Masters courses; 
•  innovative projects to facilitate exchange between research and business; 
•  facilitating exchange of practice between research institutes; 
•  post-secondary training (post diploma) and post-tertiary education; 
•  integrating academic programmes with regional vocational training systems in order to 
create a link with the labour market. 
 
2.3.  A variety of tools, including financial engineering 
Indirect support – advice, networking, clustering and incubation – can be as 
effective as direct financial aid 
Direct measures (mostly grants but also loans and equity) were the mainstay of 
support to enterprise and innovation in the early 2000s, and accounted for some 
69% of such spending over the period 2000 to 2006. However, indirect measures 
increased from some 17% of enterprise and innovation spending in EU-15 
Objective 1 regions in 2000 to 28% in 2006 and from 37% to 45% in Objective 2 
regions. This trend seems to be continuing in the 2007-13 period. 
Indirect support includes: 
•  Advice, training, mentoring or consultancy services 
•  Clustering and networking 
•  Infrastructure and support services such as business incubators 
These measures are often combined - specialist advice, for example, with financial 
support to convert a new idea into a commercial success. 
By their very nature, indirect support measures tend to have effects only over the 
long-term, but the (limited) evidence available suggests that they are no less 
effective per Euro than direct financial assistance
224. For example, in Merseyside 
                                                 
224   Ex post evaluation of ERDF 2000-2006: WP6b "the 30 programmes spending the most on enterprise 
assistance"  
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(UK), 37% of SMEs receiving advice experienced an increase in employment 
growth and 63% an increase in turnover. 
The intensity of support provided can vary considerably. In the 30 largest enterprise 
support programmes in 2000-2006, 387,000 firms were assisted, implying that over 
600,000 firms in the EU as whole received support over the period
225. 
A Baltic Sea Region Programme for Innovation, Clusters and SME-Networks 
This flagship project is aimed at fostering R&D and transnational clusters, collaboration on 
innovation and networks of SMEs. It is jointly led by Sweden and Lithuania and its goal is 
to establish "a new Baltic Sea Region brand", building on "smartness", research, innovation 
and co-operation. The long term aims are capacity building, stronger international 
competitiveness, increased foreign investment and world-class firms in some strategic 
sectors. 
ESF support for knowledge and technology transfer between research centres and 
businesses, including the creation of competence centres, amounted to over EUR 3 
billion over the period, leading to over 50.000 new jobs in the regions and countries 
where the measure was monitored. 
Support to innovation in Poland 
In Poland, 234 projects were funded under the “Regional innovative strategies and 
knowledge transfer” measure, aimed at expanding innovation capacity in the country by 
strengthening cooperation between research centres and businesses
226. The measure funded 
traineeships as well as scholarships for PhD students and supported exchange of 
information and the transfer of innovations to local firms. As a result, 381 firms signed 
agreements with universities and other research centres to support innovative joint projects. 
Financial engineering – a growing and effective form of support 
Access of SMEs to finance and risk capital is essential if their potential to contribute 
to economic growth and competitiveness is to be realised. Venture Capital and loan 
funds, moreover, help move a region away from a subsidy culture towards one that 
rewards ambition and risk-taking. Moreover, money can be recycled back into a 
"legacy fund" and reused in the future. 
Loan and equity finance
227 are relatively common in some Member States (the UK 
and Germany, especially) but rare in others. Many schemes and pilot projects 
however, are starting to appear, with EUR 3 billion earmarked for venture capital 
funds in the 2007-13 period. 
                                                 
225   On the assumption that a similar rate of support for a given amount of expenditure also applied in the 
other programmes not covered by the evaluation. 
226   2003PL161PO001, PC, Integrated Regional Development, Poland 
227   Loans are repayed, usually at generous terms. Equity finance means that, in return for the money, the 
venture capital fund takes a stake in the company. The distinction between loans and equity, while 
clear enough on paper, is sometimes not so cut and dried in practice. In fact, umbrella funds  
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Evidence
228 suggests that both instruments lend themselves primarily to 
modernisation, innovation and capital deepening, the main effect, accordingly, 
tending to be on productivity growth rather than on job creation (though this may 
occur in the longer term as firms grow). 
One of the main positive effects is the building of a strong venture capital market in 
the region. A striking example is the North East (of England) Co-investment Fund, 
launched in 2005 in a region where the last investment firm closed in 1999, leaving 
a lack of corporate finance professionals with a knowledge of the local market. The 
ERDF helped to set up the fund and to develop the local knowledge and networks 
necessary to manage it, so contributing to the creation of a venture capital market in 
the region. 
Set-up costs can mean that loan and venture capital funds are slow to develop – 
especially in regions where they compete with grant schemes which are obviously 
more attractive to firms. Moreover, it can be difficult to identify suitable projects, 
without funding those which could have been funded from commercial sources. The 
scarcity of credit over the recent past, however, has made EU support even more 
important. 
JEREMIE and JASMINE: Cohesion Policy supporting financial engineering 
JEREMIE and JASMINE are joint financial engineering initiatives between the European 
Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and its venture capital arm, the 
European Investment Fund (EIF). 
JEREMIE 
The "Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises" invests in SME 
expansion and innovation, as well as new business creation. Holding funds are created, 
which in turn provide equity, loans or guarantees. 
Improving SME access to finance was a Lisbon priority but one for which programme 
authorities lacked both expertise and access to risk capital. JEREMIE was designed to help 
to overcome these difficulties by creating a framework for cooperation with specialised 
financial institutions, the EIF and EIB, as well as other international financial institutions. 
The EIF and DG REGIO started to prepare the ground in 2006. The first steps included 
assessing the demand for SME financial instruments in regions and Member States (the so 
called "evaluation studies") and advising interested Managing Authorities on practical 
arrangements for the implementation of these JEREMIE funds. 
The second phase, consisting of implementing the initiative, began in 2009. EUR 3.2 
billion has already been committed under the 26 signed JEREMIE holding fund 
agreements. Of this, EUR 2.1 billion is managed by national or regional financial 
institutions acting as holding funds, using Cohesion Policy money. 
The remaining EUR 1.1 billion is managed by the EIB. To date the EIF has signed 11 
                                                                                                                                                 
sometimes offer the option of combining equity with loans or the option to convert between equity and 
loans. 
228  http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp6_en.htm#6b   
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agreements with Member States and regions, seven of these agreements are with EU-12 
countries, 
JASMINE 
"Joint Action to Support Micro-finance Institutions in Europe" provides additional funding 
and technical assistance to non-bank microfinance institutions . The goal is to help the 
institutions concerned to increase their access to private capital markets, to expand and to 
become sustainable. 
JASMINE is a 3-year pilot initiative running from 2009 to 2011, managed by the EIF. 
There are 2 elements: funding support and technical assistance. 
Under the funding support, the EIF has already signed a EUR 1.8 million investment with 
Coopest, an EU-based investment fund, providing financing to small microfinance 
institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, equity operations for greenfield 
microfinance institutions have been approved to reinforce the capacities of four 
microfinance institutions across the EU. 
The technical assistance pilot consists of assessments and ratings (free-of-charge) to 
selected JASMINE beneficiaries (non-bank micro-credit providers active in the EU 27). 
Following this evaluation phase, beneficiaries benefit from training tailored to the specific 
needs of each JASMINE Beneficiary, as identified during the assessment/rating phase. In 
total at least 30 non-bank microfinance institutions will receive technical assistance during 
the pilot phase.  
In addition, some market development services have also been set up to increase the 
visibility of the European microfinance market (creation of a web-based European 
microfinance database) and to promote exchange of best practices (organisation of specific 
workshops and creation of a helpdesk for microfinance practitioners). 
 
Monitoring systems must keep pace with new tools 
Historically, the success of enterprise support has been measured in terms of jobs 
created, or even jobs safeguarded. This has been true of both the day-to-day 
management (monitoring) and the longer-term assessment (evaluation) of the 
support. Other possible indicators of success – such as productivity, profits, added 
value and innovation – have been monitored only in a few cases.  
With the growing focus on innovation, an increasing proportion of support to 
enterprises is aimed at increasing productivity and competitiveness rather than at 
directly creating jobs, at least in the short-term, though the objective is that in the 
long-term employment will be increased on a sustainable basis as a result of 
increased competitiveness.  
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Measurement systems, however, have not kept up with this new reality. Despite the 
focus on competitiveness and productivity, most programmes continue to measure 
their impact in terms of jobs created. The risk is that this serves to distort the 
direction of policy on the ground towards a focus on the short rather than the long-
term and on maintaining declining activities rather than supporting diversification 
into new ones (see Box).  Evaluation evidence suggests a need for greater clarity in 
the future on the objectives of enterprise and innovation support with a 
correspondingly greater commitment to rigorously evaluating the effects of 
intervention. 
What gets measured, gets done – two examples from Italy 
The Italian law 488/92 for local enterprise development was evaluated
229 using a control 
group of non-assisted firms. Assistance had a significant positive effect on turnover, 
employment and investment in supported firms, but labour productivity growth was less 
than in non-supported firms. The evaluation concluded the likely reason for this to be that 
jobs created was the main result indicator and that this was a clear signal of priorities to 
programme and project managers.  
The evaluation contrasted this with a small measure to promote e-commerce in Piemonte. 
Here the indicator was increased sales, the result being that turnover rose by 5% in 
supported enterprises. 
 
Box: The EIB and EU cohesion policy 
The European Investment Bank (EIB), as the European Union's investment bank, currently 
provides funding to the EU27 as well as to acceding and candidate countries in order to 
support Cohesion policy.; EIB loans are an important complement to grant instruments in 
Cohesion policy, as they provide a useful intermediate instrument between these and loans 
from commercial banks.  
The EIB’s remit and support is wide. Beyond TENs, energy and climate change as well as 
support to environmental protection and sustainable communities, it encompasses financing 
projects in the knowledge economy (Lisbon agenda) education and training, R&D and 
innovation and ICT, including financing of SMEs. Between 2007 and 2009 more than half 
of EIB lending was directed to investment projects in energy and transport. Support to 
competitiveness and the knowledge economy also represents an important part of EIB 
lending activities in convergence regions. 
The importance of EIB support has been further accentuated by the financial crisis and as a 
consequence, lending to Convergence regions has been stepped up as part of the EIB 
contribution to the EU Economic Recovery Plan. In 2009, lending to Convergence regions 
totalled EUR 29.0bn, i.e. 41% of total EIB annual lending, funding 135 projects. Since the 
beginning of the current programming period, EIB lending to Cohesion countries has 
reached EUR 65.9 bn, and a total of 339 projects have been supported. 
Total EIB support to Cohesion policy (Amount signed EUR million) 
                                                 
229   Pellegrini & Centra (2006) Growth and efficiency in subsidized firms. Paper prepared for the 
Workshop "The Evaluation of Labour Market, Welfare and Firms Incentives Programmes", May 11th 
- 13th 2006, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti - Venezia.  
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  2007 2008 2009 
Cohesion countries  11 690.5  75%  16 398.3  77%  22 838.0  79% 
Non-cohesion countries  3 897.9 25% 4  884.0 23% 6  212.0  21% 
Total  15 588.4    21 282.3    29 050.0   
Share of EIB Structural funds co-financing (SPL) 
  2007 2008 2009 
Cohesion countries  1 583.0  100%  2 612.0  65%  2 472.0  97% 
Non-cohesion countries  0  0%  1 400.0  35%  75  3% 
Total  1 583.0    4 012.0    2 547.0   
Including global loans for SMEs & Mid-cap 
Figure 4- 8: Sectoral breakdown of EIB support to Cohesion policy  
(cumulative amount 2007-2009 
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The current 2007-2013 programming period has introduced a greater role for the Bank in 
common initiatives implemented with the Commission to bolster convergence through 
advisory services, financial engineering and customised financial products, especially in 
the EU12 countries. It involves planning and programming, including technical assistance 
in the preparation of projects, project appraisal and financial engineering and monitoring. 
There are four specially conceived Cohesion Policy Joint Initiatives, the so-called “4 Js”, 
originating from partnerships established between the European Commission (EC), the 
EIB/EIF and other international financial institutions. They are (i) JASPERS - Joint 
Assistance to support Projects in European Regions (EIB, EC, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and KfW Bankengruppe); (ii) JESSICA - Joint European 
Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (EIB, EC and Council of Europe 
Development Bank), (iii) JEREMIE - Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium 
Enterprises initiative (EIF, EC); and (iv) JASMINE - Joint Action to Support Micro-
Finance Institutions in Europe (EIF and EC). 
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But there are also a number of risk-sharing instruments such as Risk Sharing Finance 
Facility (RSFF) and Loan Guarantee for TEN Transport (LGTT) addressing 
complementary EU objectives and developed in partnership with the Commission. 
Financial engineering has provided new revolving instruments allowing a better matching 
between the type of funding and the nature of activities and ensuring market impact and 
leverage of EU financial resources. 
Building on established technical assistance products, new technical assistance activities, 
usually closely linked to projects financed by the EIB, are being developed. The European 
Local Energy Assistance facility (ELENA) is an example of a new product that will 
support public investment in energy efficiency, renewable energy sources and clean 
transport. The European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) is another initiative developed in 
partnership with DG Regio. EPEC supports Public Private Partnerships for infrastructure 
investment by sharing and transferring knowledge, experience and best practice. 
In terms of European territorial cooperation, the EIB has been a key partner in the design, 
launch and implementation of the EU Baltic Sea Strategy (BSS) and acted as a pathfinder 
for the new macro-regional strategy developed by the Commission at the request of the 
European Council. The EIB is contributing to this Strategy via its lending activity, 
development of technical assistance, reinforced cooperation and participation with the 
Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) in the Financial Expert Group for BSS, and further 
participation in relevant Northern Dimension Fora. The EIB is making a similar 
contribution to the Danube strategy. 
2.4.  Transport infrastructure 
Efficient transport systems are equally important for sustained regional 
development. Indeed, many of the problems faced by lagging regions stem from 
inadequate transport links. 
Map 4. 2 Planned investments of Cohesion Policy in transport infrastructure,  
2007-2013 
The transport network in a region is as important as links to the outside and tends to 
determine the ease of access of businesses and people to support services of various 
kinds as well as social and cultural amenities. Rural areas often depend on access to 
regional centres, while urban areas need a good public transport system to function 
effectively.  
There has been a growing concern, however, over the past decade to reduce 
transport emissions and save energy, which has led to an increasing need to shift 
between modes of transport – notably from road to rail. Environmental 
considerations have also led to an expansion in urban public transport systems, 
which needs to be further strengthened in the future. 
Investment in transport infrastructure is particularly important to Convergence 
regions (formerly Objective 1). The largest share of funding continues to be spent 
on roads, though the share of rail is substantial.  
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Figure 4- 9 
Planned expenditure 2007-13, € billion
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Source: expenditure plans, including Cohesion Fund 
Transport problems in the EU10
230 were particularly pressing at accession. The 
main deficiency was not so much gaps in the network, but general deficiencies.  
Journey times tended to be long both because of the poor state of repair of roads and 
railways and because they were not designed for present traffic volumes. There 
were, in particular, few dual carriageway roads and even fewer motorways. In 
Poland, for example, there were just 358 kms of motorway in 2000 – only just over 
a third of those in Denmark despite having a population 7 times larger. 
Road building – much achieved in the EU-15, much to be done in the EU-12 
Despite substantial investment in Objective 1 regions in previous programming 
periods, there remained major disparities in endowment across the EU at the 
beginning of the 2000-2006 period as regards both fast means of travel between 
regions and efficient connections within them. This was particularly the case in 
Greece and Ireland as well as in the EU-10. 
The emphasis on road means that Cohesion Policy was a major source of finance for 
motorway building. Of the 6034km increase in Cohesion countries (4954km in the 
former Cohesion Four
231, 1080km in the EU10), some 4691km (77% of the total) 
was co-funded by the ERDF and Cohesion Fund. As a result, the motorway density 
in these countries went from 90% of the EU average in 2000 to 111% in 2006. 
Some 2080 km of extra motorway were built in Spain, linking major cities in 
Andalucia in particular and boosting development in the surrounding regions. 
In the EU10, most of the funding focussed on bringing the normal road network up 
to international standards, reducing average travel time in the Czech Republic, for 
                                                 
230   The EU10 refers to those Member States acceding in 2004, that is the current EU-12 minus Bulgaria 
and Romania. This classification is of significance in the 2000-2006 period only, where these 
countries had the common experience of joining in the middle of the programming period. 
231   Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland.  
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example, by 7%. Almost 100,000 km of road were built or reconstructed in the 
2000-2006 period with the aid of the ERDF, though only 13% of this was new 
construction. Motorway density in these countries grew from 31% to 34% of the 
EU25 average over the 2000-2006 period. 
While the funding provided under Cohesion Policy has improved the EU transport 
network and helped to support economic and development in the regions assisted, it 
is clear that in terms of motorway density, they have now largely caught up with the 
more developed regions. The road network in the EU-12 still needs substantial 
improvement, but increasingly transport investment needs to focus on delivering 
sustainable transport solutions at both national and regional level.  Explicit account 
has to be taken of the need to reduce carbon and other emissions, relieve congestion 
and secure improvements in road safety, which involves investment in modes other 
than road. 
Rail  
Over the 2000-2006 period, 56% of all new high speed rail links in the EU15 were 
co-financed by the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund. In Spain in particular, the high 
speed network expanded from 471km to 1594km and this increase was wholly co-
financed by Cohesion Policy. 
These new links have led to a dramatic reduction in journey times: between Rome 
and Naples (nearly halving the journey time, from 114 minutes to 65 minutes), as 
well as between Madrid and cities in Andalucia (the journey time from Madrid to 
Malaga fell by a third, from 240 minutes to 160 minutes). 
The ERDF and Cohesion Fund also helped to finance the improvement of around 
7,260 km of non-high speed lines. A significant investment in a context where the 
overall rail network was reduced by 1,500 km because of rationalisation. 
Though high speed rail can have a dramatic effect on journey times, the ERDF 
evaluation found that investment projects should be examined and justified on a 
case-by-case basis, only providing funding in cases where regional development is 
stimulated beyond the main centres served, leaving the development of the EU 
strategic rail network to be financed from other sources (e.g. the Cohesion Fund and 
the TEN-T budget). In any event, investment in standard rail is often a better choice, 
achieving similar results more cheaply and with less delay. 
Urban public transport – a good investment 
At the beginning of the 2000-2006 period, there were acute problems of congestion 
in major cities in Objective 1 regions, especially in Athens and Dublin but also in 
Lisbon and Thessaloniki. According to the ex post evaluation, Cohesion Policy co-
financing of investment in public transport systems in these cities brought 
significant gains in both economic and social terms. 
A good example is the extension of the Athens metro (see box), together with the 
construction of the tramway and the renewal of the bus and trolley bus fleets, which 
has substantially reduced traffic in the city below what it otherwise would be.  
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Athens Metro 
Traffic congestion is an acute problem in Athens. The construction of the Athens 
Metro, including the extensions co-financed by the ERDF and Cohesion Fund over 
the 2000-2006 period, served to reduce the number of car journeys in the city by an 
estimated 120,000 a day. This has cut journey times by an average of 20 minutes, 
relieved pressure on car parking space and reduced traffic emissions by an average 
of 25%.  
The continuing increase in car ownership, however, conceals these gains. 
Nevertheless, as compared with what the situation would be without the metro, it 
has markedly improved the quality of life for those living in Athens. It has also 
added to tourist numbers, created, directly and indirectly, an estimated 600 
permanent jobs and boosted the economic development of areas not previously 
accessible by public transport. 
Ports and airports – the best investment is their link to the wider network 
In the case of other modes of transport, the contribution of the ERDF is more 
difficult to assess, but it helped to finance the modernisation of 31 airports across 
the EU, almost all of them in Objective 1 regions, and some 45 ports, 33 of them in 
Objective 1 and 12 in Objective 2 regions.  
However, ex post evaluation concluded that the economic and social benefits of 
such investment are not so clear.  In fact, because for airports and ports there is 
often a commercial return from expansion, the social and economic benefits for the 
region in question need to be demonstrated before funding is given. 
The evaluation also found that improving multi-modal links sometimes yields more 
benefits than expansion of the port or airport itself. At the very least, connections to 
road and rail should be improved at the same time as facilities are expanded. 
Management and strategic co-ordination are challenges 
Managing transport projects is often challenging because their typically high costs 
and long completion times. This is especially so for new infrastructure, where the 
process of construction from planning to completion might take 10 years or more, 
spanning more than one 7-year programming period, which might in itself lead to 
major projects being postponed in favour of minor ones. At regional level, a further 
challenge is to coordinate expenditure with national transport policy and to ensure 
that the two are coherent. 
2.5.  Interreg and territorial co-operation 
From Community Initiative to a full Objective of Cohesion Policy 
Borders place artificial barriers in the way of development. Overcoming these 
barriers and fostering transnational and inter-regional linkages has long been an 
important aim of Cohesion Policy. In 2007, Territorial Co-Operation became one of 
the three Objectives of the Policy.  There are 3 main strands:  
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•  Strand A (cross-border co-operation) is aimed at "filling the gaps" created by 
borders which cut off communities in economic, social and cultural terms. The 
ex post evaluation noted that cross-border areas were often neglected by national 
policies and, as a result, their economies often lagged behind. ERDF financing in 
the current period amounts to EUR 5.6 billion. 
•  Strand B (transnational co-operation) is aimed at promoting collaboration across 
large groupings of regions. The 13 programmes, which have a budget of EUR 1.8 
billion, cover areas such as the Baltic Sea, Alpine and Mediterranean regions. 
•  Strand C (interregional co-operation plus Interact, ESPON and, in the current 
period, URBACT (various exchange and analysis networks), with a budget of 
EUR 445 million, is aimed at improving the effectiveness of cohesion policies 
through exchange of experience between regional and local authorities.  
The evaluation
232 of Interreg III in 2000-2006 gives important insights into the 
achievements of the previous round of programmes as well as ideas for 
improvements. Over the period, it contributed to the creation or safeguarding of 
115,200 jobs and nearly 5,800 new businesses with another 3,900 assisted. Over 
544,000 people attended events on cooperation issues.  
Cooperation was further assisted by the creation of nearly 12,000 networks, leading 
to some 1,285 separate plans being formulated dealing with cross-border or 
transnational issues and almost 63,000 agreements being concluded. 
Over 18,000 km of roads, railways or pathways were built or upgraded in border 
areas, along with investment in telecommunications and environmental 
improvement, and over 25,000 local and regional initiatives supported  
Interreg, therefore, extended well beyond mutual learning, supporting a large 
number of innovative projects in the EU-15, while in the EU10, it initiated new 
forms of cooperation between the areas concerned and established arrangements for 
longer-term collaboration. 
There were more difficulties in establishing the institutional arrangements for 
cooperation in the new border areas (i.e. between EU-15 and EU-12 regions) and 
agreeing common strategies and objectives. 
The evaluation also concluded, however, that policy learning would have been 
enhanced if better links had been established with mainstream programmes, since  
all too often, the knowledge gained from the experience of undertaking programmes 
stayed within the Interreg community. 
Main areas for further development 
The lessons learned from the evaluation for the future design and conduct of policy 
were: 
                                                 
232   http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/interreg_en.htm   
229 
•  Territorial co-operation needs to have clearer and more realistic policy goals that 
are in line with the resources available, which means inter alia recognising the 
difficulties created by differences in circumstances between regions, such as 
between EU-15 and EU-12 regions. 
•  To be more effective, programmes need to define better and more focussed 
strategies, which means identifying the needs in the cooperation areas and 
defining concrete and measurable targets. This is critical if the effect of 
interventions is to be quantified. 
•  The measures funded need to be better coordinated with other EU-assisted 
programmes in the co-operation areas to ensure their compatibility and to realise 
potential synergies. 
•  The evidence is that the exchange of experience and good practice which is a key 
feature of interregional programmes is valuable and could usefully be extended 
to mainstream programmes to improve policy-making.  
3.  WORKING FOR THE WELL-BEING OF EU CITIZENS 
The ESF is the main EU source of finance to directly support individuals and their access 
to employment, education, training and equal opportunities as well as structural reforms. 
The ex post evaluation of the ESF found that support increased the national action taken 
in pursuit of EU priorities, extended its scope, supported policy reforms and innovation, 
and promoted good governance through the partnership principle and innovations in 
procedures. 
Map 4. 3 Planned investments of Cohesion Policy in human capital, 2007-2013 
Employment is an important concern of people across the EU. The ESF has been 
addressing this concern since it was established helping the unemployed to find jobs, 
workers to keep their jobs, the disadvantaged into work and the conciliation of family 
and work life and stimulating the modernisation of employment, training and education 
systems. 
The ESF supports people 
In the 9 years 2000 to 2008, the ESF assisted more than 82 million
233 people in various 
ways. In Ireland, Portugal and Spain, every year one tenth of the working age population 
received ESF support. In the EU as a whole, nearly 50% of participants were women, 
while in some Member States (Malta, Lithuania, Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Austria) 
this rose to over 55%. Some 60% of participants were unemployed. About 40% of them 
                                                 
233   75 million were supported under the programming period 2000-2006; 7.2 million people have already 
received support under the programming period which started in 2007. No data is available on the 
number of persons assisted under the 2000-2006 programmes in 2007 and 2008. These figures do not 
take into account double counting, the extent of which is unknown: participants may have benefitted 
from more than one ESF intervention.  
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found a job immediately after the end of the intervention, and evaluations
234 show that 
many more achieved this step within 12 months of the end of the measure.  
In the present programming period, the share of inactive receiving ESF support has 
increased relative to 2000-2006. In 2007 and 2008, a third of all participants in supported 
schemes were inactive as against only 6% in the previous period. In 2009, the share 
increased to 42%. 
The ESF extended the scope of national programmes, supporting groups included people 
with disabilities (e.g in UK and Ireland), long-term unemployed and women (e.g. in 
Hungary), prisoners (e.g. in Malta and Italy), young people without basic qualifications 
(in the Netherlands), people in jobs (in Estonia), and small and micro-sized enterprises 
(in Germany, Sweden, Belgium). 
The ESF ex-post evaluation of the 2000-2006 period estimated that 65% of the working-
age population in the EU live in places where Public Employment Services have been 
improved with support from the ESF and 68% where training systems had been 
improved, while improvements in education systems covered 25-30% of the population 
aged 6 to 18. 
3.1.  Integration into the labour market  
The ESF helps people enter or return to the labour market through supporting active 
labour market policies (ALMP), including through measures to prevent and combat 
unemployment, increase employment and maintain employability. These measures 
were implemented to a large extent by Public Employment Services (PES) across 
the EU.  
In 2000-2006, EUR 18 billion were allocated to ALMP. For 2007-2013, the share of 
programmes which involve ALMP has increased to 90% against 71% in 2000-2006.  
The ESF was used in 2000-2006 to provide: 
•  personalised services and integrated action plans; 
•  training for the unemployed, those at risk of unemployment, and the inactive; 
•  incentives for direct job creation and to safeguard employment, promoting 
business start-ups, assisted employment and the inclusion into the labour market 
of those excluded; 
•  active measures for specific target groups, such as young or people with 
disabilities. 
About 28 million people participated in ALMP activities co-funded by the ESF over 
the period, half of them women, three out of four unemployed and four out of 10, 
                                                 
234   In fact, typically half or more of the unemployed participants find employment within 12 months of 
completing an intervention. This varies by programme and by type of unemployed person (long term 
unemployment in particular can be very challenging) but the range is 40 to 80%.  Source: Bernard 
Brunhes International (2010) “Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU: The European Social Fund 
and Active Labour Market Policies and Public Employment Services").  
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young people under 25
235. On average, a third of the unemployed in the EU 
participated in ESF supported programmes each year. Evaluations carried out by 
Member States illustrate the positive effects of support. As noted above , around 
40% of the participants in training programmes found a job immediately afterwards, 
and many more in the months following. 
ESF support went particularly to measures targeted at disadvantaged groups needing 
assistance to find a job, such as the long-term unemployed. In Austria, 64% of 
women and 60% of men found employment within 9 months after completing 
training under the ‘Prevent and combat unemployment’ priority. Monitoring over 
the subsequent 9 months showed that 69% of the people concerned stayed in 
employment for more than 3 months. In the UK, a survey carried out among 
participants in measures supported by the Objective 3 programme in England, open 
to both the employed and unemployed, indicated that the proportion employed   
among those completing courses, rose from an initial 41% (when entering the 
course) to 56% at the time of leaving and 61% 4-8 months later. The programme, 
however, had less of an effect on the inactive. Some 19% of participants in 
measures were inactive on entry, this only falling to 14% at the time of leaving and 
rising marginally to 15% 4-8 months later
236. 
An evaluation of ESF support for measures combining reduced working time 
("Kurzarbeit") in Germany concluded that, on average, a slightly larger share of 
people completing ESF schemes (44%) were in employment two years afterwards 
than those in completing national schemes (just under 40%)
237.  
Many ESF assisted measures involved the personalisation of support, in order to 
ensure a better match between people’s skills and available jobs. This often carried 
over into training, training for a specific job being offered before that intended to 
increase a person’s general employability.  
An evaluation of the training for the unemployed in Italy found that those 
completing a training course were significantly more likely to have found a job one 
year after than those in the control group.
238 A similar evaluation in Germany of 
further vocational training for the unemployed concluded that, compared to 
unemployed non-participants, participants in ESF supported measures were more 
successful on average in the labour market over the medium and long run.
239. 
The ESF was also used to support to business creation. An evaluation of the 
Hamburg OP for 2007-2013, covering support for business start-ups, concluded that 
                                                 
235   BBI study "ESF, Active Labour Market Policies and Public Employment Services", January 2010. 
236   Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report No 376, European Social Fund Objective 3, The 
2005 Beneficiary Survey for England, 2006 
237   IAB Forschungsbericht 3/2009, Qualifizierungsmaßnahmen während Kurzarbeit nach endgültigem 
Arbeitsausfall.  
238   Study on the return on ESF investment in human capital, draft final report, June 2010, p. 76.  
239   IAB Forschungsbericht 1/2009, Evaluation der Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung im Rahmen des 
ESF-BA Programms.  
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ESF assisted projects tailored their support to the specific needs and characteristics 
of migrants in general and female migrants in particular, unlike national 
programmes, which were not flexible enough to address the specific needs of the 
target group concerned
.240.241  
Germany: the “Thüringen model“ 
The German Federal Employment Office (Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit), in cooperation 
with municipalities in Thüringen, implemented a range of projects to integrate the 
unemployed directly into the labour market. The three-phase model combined initial 
qualification, job placement and accompanying training on the work place. This multi-stage 
approach was designed following a study demonstrating that short-term qualifications 
tailored to the needs of individuals and a specific work place were the most likely to 
succeed. A survey conducted 4 years after the scheme being introduced found that 42% of 
participants found a job within 6 months after completing training. 
Fostering people's mobility 
Geographical and occupational mobility can help to increase people’s chances of 
finding a job, raise their professional qualifications and achieve a better match with 
job requirements. In the previous programming period, almost 220,000 people were 
reported as being assisted to move abroad or into a new job by ESF-supported 
mobility measures, either in the form of grants or scholarships or incentive schemes. 
A further 450,000 received training or guidance that increased their possibility of 
moving. Almost 17,000 organisations (mostly firms) participated in mobility related 
support measures. 
242 
Improving the work-life balance 
The balance between working and private life has become an increasingly important 
element of individual well-being over the years. This is particularly the case for 
those with caring responsibilities, for whom support has made it possible for them 
to enter or return to the labour market. Such support has helped an increasing 
number of women take up employment and, accordingly, has been a key factor in 
raising GDP per head. 
Over the 2000-2006 period, EUR 1.2 billion of ESF financing, 26% of the budget 
for gender measures, went to improving the work-life balance through support to 
child care, and flexible forms of employment and working time arrangements. The 
ESF played a special role in facilitating pilot projects, such as in Greece where full-
time primary schools and day care were introduced for younger children to allow 
mothers to work. 
                                                 
240   "Ad-hoc-Evaluierung der Aktion A.5 – Forderung des Unternehmergeistes – im Rahmen des ESF-OP 
Hamburg 2007-2013"  
241   PAG Uniconsult, The Impact of Structural Funds on Employment, Final Report, August 2007. 
242   BBI study The ESF and labour mobility, 2009.  
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Childcare provisions in Ireland 
In Ireland, half of the ESF measures on gender were aimed at improving the quality of 
childcare provision in disadvantaged areas by assisting community based projects to fund 
salary costs of qualified childcare workers. This led not only to an increase in the children 
cared for but also to a number of local childcare networks being established (20 
partnerships were set up in the Southern and Eastern region and 17 in the Border, Midland 
and Western region) and to more national non-statutory childcare organisations being 
supported (7 in both regions). 
The England survey of beneficiaries of the ESF Operational Programme for 2000-
2006 found that one in five (22%) participants had caring responsibilities which 
limited their daily activities and the work they could do. Most of these were women 
(76%) and one in four (24%) lone parents. As a result of the measures, the women 
concerned either found work, or were more willing to look for work or felt they had 
a better chance of finding work. 
The ESF as a catalyst for change: support to systems 
The effects of the ESF are more difficult to quantify in the case of innovative 
measures or structural reforms but are often sustained over a longer period and have 
greater leverage effects. 
ESF assistance to employment and education systems was aimed, on the one hand, 
at improving institutional arrangements so as to improve the matching of demand 
and supply in the labour market and, on the other, at modernising training and 
education systems so that they included the qualifications needed in a globalised 
economy and adapt quicker to changes in job profiles. Funding was used to: a) 
foster local initiatives and networks better to anticipate labour market developments 
by harnessing the strengths and competences of different stakeholders; b) support 
the modernisation of systems, such as reforming Public Employment Services (PES) 
into needs-driven providers instead of inflexible bureaucracies, and c) support the 
modernisation of professional qualification schemes so that they are more capable 
of adapting in the future and reflect the permeability of education and training 
systems. 
Over the 2000-2006 period, around EUR 5.1 billion was spent on reforming labour 
market and education systems
243, 55% of this on improving the conditions for 
employment growth, 24% on local employment initiatives and 21% on modernising 
the PES. 
Both the scale and pattern of ESF expenditure on the reform of systems differed 
between Member States, reflecting the fact that labour market institutions are 
complex and rooted in national traditions. Modernisation efforts have to take this 
into account and adapt. The effects of ESF in this regard have to be judged against 
this background. 
                                                 
243   BBI ESF, Active Labour Market Policies and Public Employment Services, January 2010.  
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The Public employment services in Poland 
The performance of the PES in Poland has improved since 2004. Support to job–seekers 
and training of the unemployed has been extended increasingly to include active labour 
market policy measures and support to employers has also been extended. To achieve this, 
almost 20,000 PES employees were trained to acquire new skills and competences and the 
entire organisation was restructured. Without the ESF, neither would have been possible 
within a short period of time. Surveys among the unemployed and employers have 
recorded a higher level of satisfaction with PES services. 
 
While in Poland the ESF has been used to reform the whole of the PES, shifting the 
focus from passive to active measures, in the EU 15 especially, it has been used to 
support organisational innovation and to fill specific gaps (see Box on Flanders and 
Brandenburg). 
Career guidance in Flanders and Brandenburg 
In Flanders, 16 career guidance centres, spread across the region were co-financed by the 
ESF over the 2000-2006 period. The most tangible effect is the establishment of career 
guidance in the region. 
In Brandenburg, new types of service for SMEs were tested by the INNOPUNKT pilot 
project. These included counselling, career guidance and placement, coaching and training. 
According to an evaluation, 60% of these services will continue after ESF support has 
ended, and 85% of beneficiaries considered that the services were both sustainable and 
useful for the future. 
 
3.2.  Social Inclusion 
One of the tasks of the ESF is to reinforce the social inclusion of disadvantaged 
people, to make sure that they have a better chance of staying in work over the long-
term. The ex post evaluation of 2000-2006 concluded that considerable efforts went 
into measures relating to social inclusion, especially after the mid-term review of 
programmes.  
For the 2007-2013 period, all Member States have an ESF priority on social 
inclusion (amounting to EUR 9 980 million), or at the very least plan significant 
measures in this respect within broader priorities (e.g. Denmark). In Spain, an entire 
Operational Programme has been dedicated to "Counteracting Social Exclusion". 
Activities target a broad range of disadvantaged people, such as ethnic minorities, 
migrants, people with health problems or disabilities, ex-offenders, older people, the 
homeless, lone parents and carers.  
The ERDF equally provided financial support for the social integration of 
vulnerable groups, complementing the activities of the ESF in this regard by 
funding investment in infrastructure. For example, programmes in Eastern Scotland, 
Liguria and Gelderland included the construction of community centres which  
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catered for the specific needs of migrants. In addition, the Don Bosco Institute in 
Genoa (Liguria) provides a wide range of services (education, sporting and cultural 
facilities and practical assistance) to various sections of the population, including 
both young and older people and those with disabilities as well as migrants). 
The ex post evaluation on ESF support to the Open Method of Co-ordination in 
respect of social inclusion indicated that the main types of intervention were those 
included under the headings “Reducing unemployment and increasing 
employability” and “Tackling disadvantages in education and training”. An online 
survey carried out as part of the evaluation
244 revealed that the young unemployed 
(49%) and the long-term unemployed (45%) were the main target groups. 
An evaluation of ESF support in London concluded that ESF-financed measures 
focused on young people with the lowest formal qualifications. Around 67% of 
participants from this group achieved a basic skills qualification (Skills for Life), 
while much lower success rates were recorded for national programmes targeted at 
other groups (e.g. the homeless - 28 % and families - 23%). The same was the case 
for ESF-financed measures targeted at migrants (24%) and ethnic minorities (20%). 
The evaluation suggested that for these particular groups, the need is to change 
prevailing cultural attitudes and to direct intervention to this end. 
Social inclusion in England 
The Objective 3 programme for 2000-2006 in England allocated a large share of the ESF 
budget to people with difficulties entering the labour market. Overall, two-thirds of 
participants experienced one or more disadvantages – being lone parents or carers, 
belonging to an ethnic minority, or having a disability or long-term health condition. Some 
29% of participants were disadvantaged in one respect, 21% in two and 16% in three or 
more. Those with multiple disadvantages were more than twice as likely to have been 
inactive on entry to the programme and much less likely to have been employed (12% as 
against 40%).
245 The evaluation found that ESF-funded projects engaged successfully with 
participants with multiple disadvantages and identified the added value of the ESF in terms 
of: 
•  the provision of services to a more people; 
•  a higher quality of provision, including: a broader range of  services on offer,   
•  a stronger focus on individually tailored support, more intensive support, better quality 
equipment; 
•  more leverage of additional funding. 
 
Integrating people with special needs 
In 2000-2006, some EUR 3.7 billion of the ESF, together with EUR 4.8 billion of 
national and private co-funding, went on measures for people with disabilities. 
                                                 
244   Ex-post evaluation of the support of ESF to the social OMC, p. 38-39. 
245   Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report No 376, European Social Fund Objective 3, The 
2005 Beneficiary Survey for England, 2006  
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An evaluation of the effects of the ESF 2004-2006 programme in Estonia on people 
with special needs concluded that an individual approach was key and that for those 
with multiple disadvantages, it was necessary to adopt a case-by-case approach so 
as to find the most efficient solution
246. 
Every Spanish OP in 2000-2006 contained a 'pathways' measure targeted 
specifically at people with disabilities. While there was some variation in emphasis, 
a common approach was followed across OPs. This included counselling, insertion 
services, promotion of self-employment and teleworking and enhancement of 
service provision to people with disabilities. Social services were used to support 
people seeking training and basic competences of job seekers were developed 
through vocational workshops. 
The pathways approach - Conciliation Famille Handicap (France) 
Pathways approaches are designed to move people closer to the labour market, by 
transferring them from protected to non-protected work and finding them employment in 
social economy organisations or as self-employed.  
The project gave support to families (particularly mothers) with children with disabilities 
by providing information and training on disability. The ultimate aim was the upgrading 
and formal recognition of the skills of the parents concerned. Parent associations and 
training centres co-promoted the project and worked with companies employing parents of 
children with disabilities to encourage them to adapt their working hours and conditions. 
 
Integrating migrants and minorities into the labour market 
Cohesion Policy has played an important role in supporting the integration of 
migrants and minorities
247. The ESF regulations for the periods 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013 contain provisions for supporting both either indirectly, through 
measures combating social exclusion or directly by identifying them as target 
groups. 
For the period 2000-2006, 12 Member States
248 collected data on migrants and 
minorities, 1.2 million participating in ESF programmes. Spain alone accounted for 
58% of them, followed by Italy (14%) and Greece (8%). Measures were aimed at 
people or systems. They included developing inter-cultural education in schools and 
tailoring support to needs. 
                                                 
246   Evaluation of Results of Labour Market Projects Intended for Persons with Special Needs, Supported 
by Resources of Measure 1.3 of Estonian Single Programming Document 2004–2006, and Their 
Applicability in Policies, Research summary. 
247  EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Third Annual Report on 
Migration and Integration, COM(2007) 512 final, Brussels, 11.9.2007.  
248   Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Sweden  
237 
Integrating Immigrants into the Swedish work force  
The project focused on immigrants who had poor language skills and in some cases, mental 
or physical difficulties. The idea was to apply the “supported employment method” to the 
group. The method, already successfully used with those with disabilities, involves an 
individual coach to accompany participants first to their work placement, and subsequently 
to their new place of employment to support them through the difficult early stages of 
finding and maintaining a new job. Key to the method is that the coach should themselves 
have an immigrant background. 
Helping asylum seekers in Greece 
In Greece, an EQUAL project was designed to tackle the problem of the dramatic increase 
in asylum seekers, who have difficulties in finding a job, even after obtaining a work 
permit, and who are often discriminated against, with the result that they can in many cases 
obtain only temporary low skilled jobs. Many of them have multiple disadvantages – they 
do not speak the local language and lack certified educational qualifications and work 
experience. The project culminated in the creation of an electronic network and common 
online database connecting all organisations providing services to asylum seekers. The 
referral system developed by the project was also innovative, in that it not only registered 
the request for asylum but followed it up until it was treated by the relevant official. 
 
Roma are one of the largest minority groups in a number of Member States, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2000-2006, however, ESF Managing 
Authorities in only 5 Member States reported on participation of Roma in supported 
measures –Finland (500 participants), Greece (33,000), Hungary (23,000), Ireland 
(7,000) and Spain (35,000)
249. 
Actions supporting Roma people 
The Roma are one of the largest ethnic minorities in the EU. They often live in 
marginalised areas and in poor socio-economic conditions.  The social exclusion of Roma 
is caused by a combination of factors: low education levels, high unemployment (close to 
80-90% in some areas of Central and Eastern Europe), poor health and wide-ranging 
discrimination. Because of this, they have high mortality rates and 10-12 years lower life 
expectancy than the norm. 
The segregation of Roma is one of the most important barriers to their social inclusion. 
Roma children who are enrolled in segregated schools often end up in unemployment or 
outside the labour market altogether. Roma communities in segregated neighbourhoods 
have limited access to basic services and to labour market opportunities. 
Member States are making different uses of the ESF to tackle the specific problems of 
Roma.  
In Hungary, support has been implemented through “Fighting social exclusion by 
promoting access to the labour market", one of the priorities of the 2004-2006 ESF 
Operational Programme. With the aim of those excluded from the labour market, measures 
                                                 
249   BBI, The European Social Fund and Roma: Background Report developed under the “Reporting on 
ESF interventions in the EU” project. Contract VC/2007/0555. Approved Draft, Brussels 15 March 
2010.  
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were targeted at the most disadvantaged, including Roma. Support was give, for example, 
to NGO initiatives in education and training and social services. The 2007-13 Hungarian 
"Social Renewal ESF OP" contains a specific measure for "Reducing the segregation of 
severely disadvantaged and Roma pupils" by increasing their access to public education 
through: 
•  detection of negative selection mechanisms that exist at system level and strengthen 
segregation; 
•  support for civil initiatives aimed at reducing discrimination in education; 
•  extending the range of schools engaged in integrated education by means of the 
formulation and application of an appropriate quality assurance and verification system;  
•  preventive programmes (mentor-sponsoring programmes, the development of tuition 
networks, support for dormitory programmes and mobility) to encourage enrolment in 
pre-school of multiple disadvantaged children; 
•  analysis of the reasons for dropping out of secondary school; 
•  dissemination of “A new chance”, and “A second chance” type programmes offering 
flexible and personalised learning paths for getting young people who have dropped out 
of the education system back into school. 
 
EQUAL 
The EQUAL Community Initiative was about promoting change and fighting 
discrimination and exclusion in the labour market. The ex-post evaluation concluded that it 
was very successful in enabling the development and mainstreaming of a large number of 
useful innovations. A database of EQUAL good practices has been left for policy-makers 
and practitioners. The evaluation reported 924 innovative approaches, 783 of them linked 
to social inclusion and 141 to equal opportunities, as well as 285 successful cases of 
"mainstreaming", 211 linked to social inclusion, and 74 to equal opportunities. 
EQUAL had positive effects on policies and systems rather than on job creation. These 
included legislative changes (e.g. facilitating the provision of innovative credit and support 
mechanisms for the unemployed, migrants and Roma; and fiscal incentives to increase the 
labour market participation of vulnerable groups), new policies, the inclusion of EQUAL 
principles in new policies and new ESF operational programmes. It also had effects on 
education and training systems and labour market intermediation and support services and 
led to some operational changes in employment and public services. EQUAL, in addition, 
contributed to increasing the quality of governance and professionalism of civil society 
organisations. It was an important means of capacity building for those that participated in 
the programmes - especially in the EU10 –and had a long-term effect in raising awareness 
and changing mindsets. 
Moreover, EQUAL was a source of Community added-value by acting as a catalyst for 
funding for groups that would not have received much otherwise, providing resources for 
new areas of intervention, creating new partnerships, raising awareness of new ways of 
doing things and stimulating changes in ways of thinking, developing practical solutions to 
problems and filling gaps in national policies or complementing national measures. 
However, the long-term effect of EQUAL on the situation of vulnerable people is not 
expected to be significant because it involved small-scale, pilot projects and depended on 
the integration of these into national or regional ESF programmes.  
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3.3.  Demographic change 
Demographic change has become increasingly prominent on the policy agenda. 
First, working-age population is set to decline in many parts of the EU and the 
number of people beyond retirement age to rise. This is a challenge for the 
economy, as well as for health and social services and communal amenities. 
Secondly, the significant migration flows both from developing countries outside 
the EU and within the Union from East to West since 2004 has given rise to 
concerns about integration and the pressure on infrastructure (on housing, schools 
and so on) in destination countries and about loss of skilled and educated labour in 
the countries left behind. 
Demography was not an explicit theme in the EU Guidelines for the 2000-2006 
period. Nevertheless, it featured in programmes in many regions (often implicitly) 
in the EU-15 and in some in the EU10 from 2004 onwards. An evaluation
250 found 
that measures addressing demographic issues indirectly accounted for 23% of total 
ERDF financing in a sample of regions. 
This illustrates a strength of the "bottom-up" approach of Cohesion Policy, that even 
when a theme is not an explicit priority in the regulations, there is the flexibility for 
regions to take it up.  
Demographic trends show common features across the EU, but individual regions 
are affected in different ways. Ageing and migration flows have stronger and more 
immediate effects in some parts than others. Demographic issues have come to the 
fore in Poland and the Baltic States especially and are likely to feature more in 
Cohesion Policy in the future. 
Measures meeting the needs of an ageing population 
The ERDF supported the provision of care facilities for the elderly in rural and 
urban disadvantaged areas in a number of regions in 2000-2006. For example, in 
Castilla y León, it co-funded the construction of 47 health centres and the 
enlargement and refurbishment of 91 others, 24-hour medical attention centres and 
hospitals providing care at local level for elderly, people with disabilities and other 
vulnerable groups. This reduced the need for travel to larger towns to access health 
care, while equally reducing the work load of carers (mainly women) in the rural 
areas concerned. It also created some 2,900 jobs, mainly for women. 
Older workers aged 55 years and over accounted for around 4% of all participants in 
ESF measures (over 300  000 people
251) in 2007 and 2008 when the new 
programmes were still starting up, most of them on training courses or receiving 
advice aimed at enabling them t remain in employment longer.  
                                                 
250   Ex post evaluation: gender equality and demographic change 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp7_en.htm 
251   Source: AIR reports. Because participants' age is not always recorded, the true figure is likely to be 
higher.  
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The ex-post evaluation of 2000-2006 found that ESF supported-measures 
contributed to extending the working lives of older people as well as to pursuing the 
Healthcare and Long-Term Care Open Method of Co-ordination Objectives
252 in 5 
countries, in particular (Greece, Finland, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden). 
BOX Synergy between Cohesion Policy and the Healthcare and Long Term 
Care Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) Objectives 
In Finland, the ESF contributed to the pursuit of healthy lifestyle objectives by 
encouraging cooperation between workplaces, rehabilitation centres and healthcare 
services. In Poland, it supported the development of human resources in screening 
centres and other healthcare institutions. In Sweden, it was focused on helping to 
develop the local healthcare system and in Portugal, where an entire programme 
was devoted to healthcare, high quality human resources in the care sector. 
 
Measures for maintaining demographic balance in regions 
A key aspect of responding to demographic change at regional level is to try to 
maintain a reasonably balanced age distribution of the population, to encourage 
young people to stay and to ensure not only that there are sufficient employment 
opportunities for people of working age but also adequate social and cultural 
facilities. Accordingly improving the attractiveness of a region through creating or 
upgrading social infrastructure and social services is an important part of Cohesion 
Policy.  
In Gelderland in the Netherlands, for example, the ERDF supported investment in 
cultural centres in small villages and towns, making it more attractive for younger 
people to seek work in the area. As a by-product, it also created employment 
opportunities for vulnerable groups. The provision of day-care facilities enabled 
more women to work, while elderly people had access to more convenient care 
facilities.  
The local provision of education and training can also be important in that it tends 
to reduce "educational commuting" while improving the employability of young 
people, so making the region more attractive for businesses to locate there. In 
Salzburg, the ERDF supported the upgrading of a vocational centre for 
apprenticeships by funding the acquisition of machinery in the “Mechatronic 
Cluster”, each young person being guaranteed a job in a local firm after finishing 
(around 100 young participate in the programme every year). In Salzburg too, the 
EDRF helped to construct a training centre which provided IT courses attended by 
100 people over 60 each year.  
                                                 
252   The objectives focus on issues related to access, quality and sustainability of healthcare and long-term 
care.  
241 
3.4.  Equal opportunities 
Horizontal measures can work, but need a concrete implementation strategy – they 
require sustained commitment and active partnership with relevant stakeholders. 
Ensuring that women and men have equal opportunities to access a good education, 
get a decent job, or pursue a fulfilling career is a goal in its own right and essential 
to securing a just and equitable society. But it is also important for economic 
reasons. Not only is it likely to add to the work force but it will also tend to increase 
the skills available and, accordingly, help to raise the rate of growth and to improve 
competitiveness. 
The ESF has played an important role in supporting gender equality policies and 
gender mainstreaming in Members States, in particular by helping women into 
employment, especially from vulnerable groups such as migrants, promoting their 
lifelong learning, combating gender segregation in career selection and professions, 
supporting their participation in science and technology as well assisting them to 
start up businesses.  
Evaluations show that the ESF has helped challenge existing practices in all 
Member States with respect to gender equality issues. Indeed, in many cases, gender 
equality was neither at the forefront of the political agenda nor recognised by the 
public generally as being important. In the 2000-2006 period, a total of EUR 4.4 
billion of ESF financing, or 7% of the total, went on measures to promote gender 
equality and gender mainstreaming, including reconciliation measures. The EQUAL 
Initiative added an extra EUR 753 million (15% of its budget). The largest 
expenditure on gender-related measures was in Germany, accounting for 25% of the 
total across the EU. In some Member States, such as Belgium, a large number of 
measures were undertaken on gender mainstreaming and in Flanders, a monitoring 
system was set up to track these.  In Sweden and Denmark, gender issues were fully 
mainstreamed and there were, therefore, no specific measures. 
The ERDF has contributed to gender mainstreaming in all relevant areas, in 
particular, in the provision of support to education and training, to women 
entrepreneurs and to investment in care facilities.  
Evaluation
253 of a sample of regions suggests that ERDF measures in the 2000-2006 
period addressing (directly or indirectly) gender equality accounted for 21% of total 
funding. The evaluation found that the effective implementation of the principle of 
gender equality requires effort, political leadership, long-term commitment and – 
above all – sound measures. Gender equality issues were explicitly included in the 
conception of most programmes in the 2000-2006 period, but evidence is more 
mixed when it comes to follow through in implementation and results. 
The need for long-term effort and commitment continues in the current period. 
Article 16 of Regulation EC 1083/2006 requires that gender equality, non-
discrimination and accessibility for people with disabilities be taken into account in 
all stages of programme implementation. Though it is clearly too early to measure 
                                                 
253   Ex post evaluation: gender equality and demography change 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wp7_en.htm   
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effects, evaluation
254 evidence on their inclusion in measures is mixed. While all 
programmes mention gender equality and gender mainstreaming, there is less 
evidence that gender equality considerations have been taken into account in the 
implementation of the programmes.  
The evaluation of the implementation of the cross-cutting themes
255 under the 
Welsh Objective 1 and 3 programmes in 2000-2006 found that project managers 
often paid only lip service to the horizontal issues, including equal opportunities, 
because they found it difficult to see how they could be applied in a horizontal 
manner in practice. In most cases (70% of those examined), equal opportunities 
were treated as a horizontal priority without a specific strategy. In 22% of the 
programmes examined the three themes were included as statements of intent 
without clear targets, relevant selection criteria or obligations in terms of 
monitoring. Only 8% of the programmes integrated the three themes in a 
comprehensive strategy with clear identification of problems and quantified targets. 
Nevertheless the evaluation considered that the high profile of the issues in the 
Programmes has raised their importance and has meant that project sponsors have 
been encouraged to take account of them
256. 
Discrimination is perceived differently across countries. While in the EU-15 the 
focus of non-discrimination measures tends to be on women, migrants and the 
elderly, in the EU-12 the focus is more on ethnic minorities, especially the Roma 
(see box above). 
Case studies suggest that effective involvement of relevant stakeholders in the 
design and implementation of measure is crucial if they are to be effective. 
However, while involvement of stakeholders in equal opportunity programmes was 
relatively high, this was less so in respect of minorities, migrants and people with 
disabilities. 
Specific actions are effective – especially childcare and support to women 
entrepreneurs 
Specific, tangible measures are often an essential complement to horizontal ones. 
The evaluation of Article 16 found that programmes in the current period are 
centred on public transport, child care facilities, social services and support for 
entrepreneurship. 
The regional case studies carried out as part of the ERDF evaluation for 2000-2006 
identified a number of positive outcomes from support, including: 
                                                 
254   Study on the translation of Article 16 on the promotion of gender equality, non-discrimination and 
accessibility for disabled persons into Cohesion Policy Programmes 2007-13 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/eval2007/art16_gender_en.htm 
255   The horizontal themes under the programmes were equal opportunities, environmental sustainability 
and ICT. 
256   Ecotec, Cross-cutting themes research project, final report, April 2006.  
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•  the creation in Eastern Scotland, of over 2  000 new businesses managed by 
women and the introduction by some 600 organisations of "active people friendly 
policies" to help manage the work-life balance; 
•  the creation in Norra Norrland in Sweden of  nearly 100 IT jobs for women and 
over 1000 new businesses managed by women; 
•  The creation in Southern and Eastern Ireland of over 400 new childcare facilities 
and the upgrading of 800 more. 
The regional case studies showed strong evidence of both job creation and business 
start-ups for women as a result of support for both "hard" measures (direct 
investment aid, physical infrastructure, purchase of machinery, etc.) and "soft" 
measures (advice, support for networks and associations of women business owners 
and mentoring activities by and for women). They also indicated that support was 
most effective when it combined both hard and soft measures. For example, many 
women entrepreneurs - as men – encounter difficulties in maintaining and sustaining 
a business, especially in meeting the financial and administrative requirements. 
Such problems usually stem either from lack of experience and knowledge or from 
difficulties in accessing finance. Soft measures tackle such obstacles and increase 
the effectiveness of the hard measures. 
The data available for the ESF for the period
257 suggest that support for gender 
measures assisted 4.6 million people of which 76% were women and that over 
800,000 women participated in measures supporting entrepreneurship. In Spain, 
150,000 participated in such measures and 5,500 SMEs were assisted. In France, 
some 220,000 women received support in this regard. 
Limited data are available on the jobs created. In England, the 2005 beneficiary 
survey for the Objective 3 programme for 2000-2006 found that female participants 
in relevant ESF supported activities were more likely to gain qualifications than 
men (73% as against 62%).  The most significant employment outcomes occurred in 
the more innovative projects, which were usually smaller and followed a more 
integrated approach (i.e. those providing multiple-level support to individuals in a 
personalised way). 
Evaluations also tend to highlight the less tangible effects of ESF-supported 
measures in this area – in particular the empowerment of women and their sustained 
commitment to looking for work and remaining, and progressing, in employment. 
This empowerment stems from the skills that they acquire, their higher self-
confidence and new aspirations, including, in some cases, pursuing further 
education, and new opportunities for reconciling work with family obligations. 
These positive consequences are a latent force for increasing employment in the 
longer- term. 
For the 2007-2013 period, EUR 2.4 billion, (3% of the total ESF budget) has been 
allocated to broad priority of improving access to employment, increasing 
sustainable participation, progress of women in employment to reduce gender-based 
                                                 
257   Bernard Brunhes International (BBI), 2010. “Reporting on ESF interventions in the EU: The European 
Social Fund: Women, gender mainstreaming and reconciliation of work and private life".  
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segregation in the labour market and reconciling work and private life. In Denmark 
and Sweden, however, gender equality is considered a priority across the whole OP, 
so has no specific budget allocated to it.  
Both the ESF and EQUAL have had important institutional and policy effects as 
regards gender equality as evidenced by new legislation, new policy processes being 
adopted, new organisations being set up and existing approaches being adapted.   
However, more could be done – small scale measures and general statements are 
no substitute for a more comprehensive approach 
As noted above, progress is mixed and more could be done. All programmes include 
some kind of formal commitment, many are provided at least some social 
infrastructure and care services, which have clear benefits locally. But a complete 
translation of Article 16 into practice requires effort and long-term commitment, 
backed by a comprehensive strategy, with a specific budget and quantified targets. 
For example, only 8% of the ERDF programmes have gone this far in the 2007-13 
period. 
3.5.  Local development 
Local development is a model which can be applied to a wide range of activities. 
The key features are: 
•  A well defined local area, usually small scale. 
•  A strong partnership with, and the close involvement of, all the relevant local 
actors, mobilising their unique strengths and local knowledge. This work often 
requires a degree of capacity building and administrative support from larger 
units. 
•  An integrated strategy tackling the various challenges facing the area. This 
strategy should be developed in close partnership between the various local 
public and private actors, as well as different administrative levels (local 
authorities and territorial units of central or regional government). 
A good example of the model in practice is the second round of the Urban 
Community Initiative ("URBAN II") in 2000-2006. Local partnerships were 
encouraged to develop an integrated approach to the social, economic and 
environmental challenges facing deprived urban areas, an approach which was 
‘mainstreamed’ in the ERDF in 2007-13.  
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Local development and local partnership – the example of URBAN II 
A striking conclusion from the ex post evaluation of URBAN II is that the success of 
projects did not depend on the specific issue concerned or the specific means of tackling – 
successful projects covered a wide range of issues and means. The key feature was local 
leadership and local ownership. They were in line with local perceptions of need, with the 
involvement of local people and organisations in both their design and implementation. 
Unsuccessful projects were usually imposed from above with little local involvement. 
The involvement of local authorities was a key factor. The ex post evaluation noted that 
80% of URBAN II programmes were led by the local authority concerned – and case 
studies revealed a clear difference in effectiveness between these and the minority of 
programmes which were not. 
In addition, over 80% of the local partnerships could be defined as inclusive, involving a 
wide range of interests such as community groups, private firms, employment agencies, 
training providers development agencies and specialist professionals. The voluntary sector 
was involved in the implementation of many projects, which had a spill-over benefit in 
terms of building the capacity of local partners for other projects in the future. 
Larger partners (e.g. city or regional authorities or development agencies) often played a 
key role by:  
•  providing expertise and helping build the capacity of local participants; 
•  sustaining projects in the longer term – 60 % of URBAN II projects continued after 
funding ended and the support of a larger partner was usually key to this; 
•  helping to provide favourable economic conditions in the wider city or region – the 
evaluation highlighted the strong influence on local areas of the situation in surrounding 
areas. 
 
Local employment initiatives were an important facet of the ESF too, helping to 
boost job creation and improve the matching of supply and demand at local level. 
They took different forms across the EU. In Germany, Spain, Greece and Belgium, 
for example, partnerships were set up between local public and private stakeholders. 
In other countries, employment and/or business creation networks, human resource 
development foundations or 'houses of employment' were established.  
In 2000-2006, 16 of the 25 Member States used the ESF to support urban areas and 
local employment. The amount allocated was over EUR 11 billion, (11% of the 
total) and overall 1.8 million people participated in the initiatives: 80% of them 
unemployed, 50% long-term unemployed and 53% women. 
The participation figures, however, do not convey the importance of the initiatives. 
As in the case of URBAN, by involving stakeholders in a common strategy, these 
ESF Initiatives, together with the Territorial Employment Pacts, yielded results that 
intervention at regional or national level could not achieve. An evaluation of ESF 
funded projects in East London highlighted the establishment of strong partnership  
246 
working as a key strength along with the use of local support services, particularly 
in engaging with young people.258 A common evaluation finding was that local 
initiatives and territorial pacts led to greater specialisation and better adaptation to 
labour market needs. 
Territorial Employment Pacts in Asturias 
The Territorial Employment Pacts (TEP) in Gijón and Avilés (Asturias) are examples of 
the adaptation of support to the specific economic and territorial characteristics of the 
region in two main respects: 
•  They focused on local employment problems and, specifically, on the in unemployed 
with special needs. 
•  During the implementation of the main measures in the TEP (financing and hiring 
people for training and work experience) the profile of the target groups changed 
significantly. Initially there was a strong emphasis on training and employing under-
qualified people at risk of exclusion in municipal activities (such as gardening, urban 
maintenance, construction and social assistance) However, it was also discovered that 
such experience was very useful for recently qualified students as a way of helping them 
into employment. In a second stage, therefore, students were also supported. 
 
The partnership principle and exchange of experience were central aspects of 
LEADER, which was designed to help those on the ground and to implement 
innovative strategies for sustainable development in their local area. LEADER is an 
integral part of the rural development policy financed under the EAFRD.  
Local Development is also at the core of the Fisheries Local Action Groups that 
have been established with support of the Axis 4 of the European Fisheries Fund in 
order to alleviate the negative effect of the crisis of the fishing sector in fisheries-
dependent areas. 
Local development measures were also an integral part of INTERREG and continue 
to be so in the cross-border strand of the Territorial Cooperation Objective. 
The local development model is a strong feature of Cohesion Policy. It mobilises 
the strengths, knowledge and enthusiasm of local people. It encourages better 
choices and "joined-up actions" and local measures which are more coherent, 
effective and cost efficient. It also serves to boost the democratic and civil 
participation aspects of Cohesion Policy and gives a high visibility to Community 
intervention in some of the EU areas facing the most difficult challenges. 
However, successful local development measures require sustained, long-term 
commitment, from different levels of government as well as from local people. The 
success of projects is heavily dependent on an enabling and supportive framework, 
but also on training and building the administrative capacity of local participants.  
                                                 
258   BMG Research, Evaluation report: ESF-funded projects in East London, September 2008.  
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3.6.  Urban regeneration 
The example of URBAN II 
The second round of the URBAN Community Initiative, "URBAN II", ran from 
2001 to 2006 and was aimed at assisting neighbourhoods in crisis. Those selected 
had a wide range of social and economic problems, including high unemployment 
(an average of 17% across URBAN II) and a poor urban environment. Green 
spaces, for example – an indicator of the environment and amenities – were only 
half the average for all cities in the EU for which data are available (10.5% of total 
surface area, as opposed to 20.5%). 
Le Havre, France – an example of the problems facing neighbourhoods in crisis 
In 2001, the area supported in Le Havre had traditional industries in decline, 
unemployment at 21% and a high benefit dependency rate. Low education levels, a high 
crime rate and lack of an enterprise culture hampered recovery. The quality of the physical 
environment was poor – including land pollution and many vacant and derelict buildings. 
 
URBAN II provided support amounting to EUR 754 million, rising to EUR 1.6 
billion with co-funding, to 70 programmes across the EU-15 over the period, The 
areas in question had a total population of 2.2 million. There were three main areas 
of spending (Figure 4.6): 
•  Physical and environmental regeneration projects to reverse urban decay and 
investment in transport hubs and new transport facilities and in new community 
facilities (museums, libraries, crèches). The ex post evaluation recorded, for 
example, 2,314,000 square metres of buildings converted and renovated and the 
creation of 3,238,000 square metres of green space. 
•  Building the local economy by providing business support services, and 
incubators for new businesses, as well as training. The ex post evaluation 
recorded 108,000 people trained and 6,000 businesses supported over the period, 
resulting in 2,000 jobs created. 
•  Social inclusion. Of the 108,000 people trained, more than half were from 
vulnerable groups and were helped to overcome illiteracy and continue their 
education or to enter the labour market for the first time. Moreover there were 
247 projects to reduce local crime, including the provision of street wardens, 
CCTV, landscaping and street lighting, in collaboration with community groups 
and neighbourhood watches. 
Inclusion and local services  
Social inclusion projects helped to reduce crime, improve educational performance, 
improve the skills of local people and support disadvantaged groups in various 
ways. They also built up the capacity of civil society groups and the voluntary 
sector.  
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In Scotland, a large majority of deprived households (77%) are concentrated in 
urban areas, half of them in Glasgow. In order to improve their situation, ESF 
activities included support to those aged 12-16 in school in the form of careers 
advice and guidance in order to reduce early school leaving. Public authorities also 
played an important role in helping those excluded to find jobs and in addressing 
skills deficits and other barriers to employment (such as a lack of social skills). 
Some 1,067 ex-offenders, 451 homeless people and 363 drug users participated in 
the measures, out of over 53,000 who were assisted. More than 7,000 companies 
were actively involved in the initiative.
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2007-2013: URBAN enters the mainstream… 
Following the success of URBAN II, urban regeneration has been included in the 
mainstream of the ERDF, with an expanded budget
260 - around EUR 10 billion 
being allocated to urban development at Priority Axis level. Possible operations at 
sub-Priority Axis level increase the total to an estimated EUR 30 billion. 
More than half of the ERDF programmes have an identifiable urban dimension, and 
explicitly address urban challenges. Operations range from the regeneration of 
disadvantaged areas to actions boosting innovation and competitiveness in urban 
growth poles. Roughly half of Cohesion Programmes include provision for the 
JESSICA initiative (see box). 
The ESF too has been used to support actions in education, training and 
employment in deprived urban areas. In particular, the ESF puts emphasis on social 
inclusion of disadvantaged people through the involvement of local communities 
and companies and the promotion of local employment initiatives. In the 2007-2013 
period, 22 out of the 27 Member States have specifically foreseen support to urban 
areas and local employment initiatives in their operational programmes. 
JESSICA – financial engineering at the service of Europe's cities 
The "Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas" is a joint initiative 
of the Commission, the EIB (European Investment Bank) and the CEB (Council of Europe 
Development Bank) to increase the use of financial engineering for sustainable urban 
development and regeneration. JESSICA gives managing authorities the possibility of 
using outside expertise, including in the private sector, to bring not just money but 
associated skills and resources. 
Nine JESSICA Fund agreements have already been signed with the EIB as fund manager. 
In addition, three other operations are being implemented by national or regional financial 
institutions (Brandenburg, East Midlands, Estonia). 
At present, over EUR 1.1 billion is already committed under JESSICA fund agreements. 
Operations in the pipeline suggest that this could reach EUR 1.8 billion by end-2010. An 
advantage of financial engineering is that in 2015 there will be a "legacy fund" for 
reinvestment in further urban regeneration actions. 
                                                 
259   BBI study, ESF support to urban areas and local employment, p. 42. 
260   A first full picture of mainstreaming can be found in the Working Document “Fostering the Urban 
Dimension – Analysis of the Operational Programmes co-financed by the European Regional 
Development Fund (2007-2013)”.  
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… but the local development model – key to URBAN success – needs further work 
As indicated above, the ex post evaluation of URBAN II found that the key factor 
behind successful urban regeneration projects was local involvement. Creating local 
partnerships entailed much effort. For example, in just one initiative (in Burnley in 
the UK), 134 people became involved in community management. 
In the 2007-13 programmes, however, direct local involvement has started at a low 
level and the option of delegating responsibilities to local authorities has been used 
in only a few cases. Even informally, most cities have so far had a limited role in 
policy design and implementation and there are few signs of active participation of 
local residents. It remains to be seen how the mainstreaming of the measures will 
work out in the longer term. 
Good practice for partnership in the mainstream: Nordrhein-Westfalen in Germany 
Nearly 30% of the programme is allocated to “Sustainable urban and regional 
development”. The programme is built directly on previous experience with Dortmund 
URBAN II, involving an integrated approach with strong local partnership. Evaluations 
show that previous interventions created a leverage effect for public and private 
investment, increased economic activity and improved the quality of life. 
 
3.7.  Rural areas 
Figure 4- 10 
Aid intensity of ERDF, CF and ISPA according to the 
urban-rural typology in the EU-25, 2000-2006
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Rural areas are a key element in any strategy for sustainability and territorial 
balance. There is increasing emphasis on tailoring policy to the specific features of 
regions – rural regions often share particular strengths and assets, on which 
Cohesion Policy can build. Equally, the growing focus on sustainability means that 
development should not be at the expense of the rural environment or endanger 
social cohesion. 
The situation of rural areas, however, differs greatly across the EU. They vary from 
remote areas in population decline (such as in Romania, eastern Poland, and 
northern Sweden and Finland.) to more central areas with population increase (e.g. 
in northern Greece and southern Sweden and Finland). In some areas, tourism 
predominates, in others agriculture and forestry. 
There is therefore no single "one size fits all" strategy for rural areas, although a 
recurrent theme is the need to maintain economic activity (or access to economic 
activity) along with services and social amenities (such as child-care, care for the 
elderly and leisure facilities). In addition, there is usually an implicit concern to 
preserve the rural character of the area and for development to involve local 
participation (the "local development model") rather than being imposed from 
outside. Finally, rural depopulation is a major concern in the Mediterranean for 
forest management and fire risks. 
The task of supporting rural development was divided in the 2000-2006 period 
between the ERDF, ESF and EAGGF (guidance section only
261). The EAGGF 
guidance section focussed on support for farming activities and their conversion, 
including the maintenance and reinforcement of a viable social fabric in rural areas, 
the ESF on developing human capital, while the ERDF assisted a broad range of 
measures, including: 
•  The creation of new economic activity, tourism and regeneration of polluted or 
damaged areas 
•  Transport links, often the lifeline of rural communities and economies 
•  Access to social and environmental infrastructure and services 
In Andalucia, for example, ERDF support to business was found by the evaluation 
to have been of key importance for the local economy. Measures included co-
funding premises for craft businesses and small-scale firms, investment in hotels 
and catering, improvements to villages, the construction of community centres and 
the provision of support services for SMEs. 
                                                 
261   Within the EAGGF, only the Guidance Section was implemented in the framework of cohesion 
policy, providing support in the then Objective 1 areas.  The EAGGF Guarantee section, separate from 
cohesion policy, provided support in non-Objective 1 areas and for certain types of rural development 
measures across the EU.  
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Promoting economic activity in the Centre region of France 
The ERDF was mainly used to attract new companies, in particular small firms with under 
10 employees, and to provide them with the necessary infrastructure and services. Other 
measures were aimed at improving the attractiveness of rural areas for businesses. 
The effect was particularly pronounced on the distributive trades and the crafts sector. 15 
ORACs (Opérations de restructuration de l’artisanat et du commerce – actions for the 
restructuring of crafts and trade, especially local suppliers) were co-financed, which 
brought together representatives of the various local authorities and of local businesses. 
The ERDF also co-financed many tourist projects which had a measurable impact on 
increasing the number of visitors (e.g. bringing some of the numerous visitors to the Loire 
chateaux to visit the rural areas of the region). 
Source: ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy, WP9 
 
Better access to services often took the form of improvements in water supply and 
wastewater treatment, but many other measures were also co-funded across the EU, 
including: 
•  the renovation of rural villages in many areas across the EU,  
•  the restoration of historical buildings and monuments in rural towns in Italy co-
financed under both Objective 1 and Objective 2,  
•  support for social infrastructure in rural areas in Portugal, in particular, and to a 
lesser extent in Greece; 
•  support for social infrastructure in the form, for example, of childcare centres and 
catering facilities in the Centre region of France; 
•  support to social infrastructure in rural areas in the EU10 countries, especially in 
Estonia, where over 40% of the ERDF in remote rural areas was allocated to this, 
though also in Lithuania, where the proportion was over 20%.  
Such actions contributed to improved living conditions and more balanced territorial 
development as well as strengthening social cohesion. 
4.  PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
Regional economic growth without sound management of the environment is not 
sustainable. As well as being important in its own terms, a good environment is an 
essential input to the quality of life and the attractiveness of regions. Environmental 
problems entail social costs, hold back local business expansion and deter outside 
investment.  
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Figure 4- 11: Cohesion Policy Spending on environment by sub-theme,  
2007-13 (EUR billion) 
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Source: spending plans 
Some EUR 50 billion has been allocated to environmental protection and risk prevention 
over the 2007-13 period under the ERDF and Cohesion Fund (Figure 4.11),with a further 
EUR 0.8 billion going to renewable energy and EUR 2.5 billion to help SMEs adopt 
environmentally friendly processes and develop environmentally-friendly products. 
Map 4. 4 Planned investments of Cohesion Policy in environment, 2007-2013 
The largest programme is the Polish infrastructure and environment OP, with a total of 
EUR 28 billion coming from the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund.  Although it includes 
infrastructure of various kinds, a majority of the operational priorities (7 out of 13) 
concern the environment, including energy efficiency, water and waste management, 
environmentally-friendly transport and habitat protection. 
Traditionally the focus of support has very much been on environmental infrastructure 
(notably clean drinking water supply, waste water treatment and household and industrial 
waste management), especially in Objective 1, or Convergence, regions. Increasingly 
however the focus is also on renewable energy, green transport, the green economy and a 
greener governance of Cohesion Policy. 
4.1.  Water and waste infrastructure – a significant investment 
A large amount of funding under Cohesion Policy goes to investment in water 
supply, wastewater treatment, sewerage and solid waste management (Figure 4.12), 
to assist lagging regions comply with EU standards, the so-called "acquis". This was 
a key reason for setting up the Cohesion Fund in 1993. The rationale is essentially 
to improve the environment per se, rather than to increase economic development, 
though it undoubtedly makes the areas in which this occurs more attractive places to 
live and work.  
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Figure 4- 12: Infrastructure for water, waste water and solid waste 
 - main sources of investment 2000-2006 
 
Source: ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy 2000-2006 
The ERDF and the Cohesion Fund
262 together invested EUR 27.4 billion in this area 
over the 2000-2006 period, accounting for 14% of all investment of this kind across 
the EU, and typically a third of the investment in Cohesion Countries. 
The result has been a significant improvement in environmental infrastructure 
across the EU. The total additional population connected to wastewater collection 
and treatment of an adequate standard is estimated at least 40 million (12% of the 
population) over the period 2000-2006; the ERDF and Cohesion Fund being 
involved in financing over half of this total. At the same time, at least 20 million 
people were connected to a clean supply of drinking water and 964 unauthorised 
landfills were closed or rehabilitated. 
The private sector has become increasingly involved with application of polluter 
pays principles, though this varies greatly between countries. It was especially 
important in the EU10 in 2000-2006, as well as in many more prosperous EU-15 
countries, accounting for almost a third of investment. The private sector is most 
important in the waste treatment industry, where there are signs of a "European 
waste market" emerging. 
User charges tend to cover a large part of maintenance and operating costs, so 
ensuring financial sustainability. These, moreover, create an incentive for efficient 
                                                 
262   The impact of ERDF and CF projects cannot always be neatly separated. In many cases the two funds 
financed different elements in the same system, e.g. ERDF supported collection and CF supported 
treatment facilities.  
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use and management of resources, though there is still a major role for the public 
sector and Cohesion Policy both to reduce financial uncertainty over the operation 
of the infrastructure and to ensure that users can afford to pay by covering the 
difference between costs and affordability, to ensure that people use the facilities. 
Costs depend on the capacity installed, and the ex post evaluation noted the 
difficulties of estimating the correct capacity in advance because of the need to 
forecast demand over a long time horizon. Moreover, demand is affected by user 
reactions to charges and possible changes in these, as well as by migration. 
Cohesion Policy can play a role not only in mitigating the consequences of these 
risks but in encouraging more realistic long-term planning. 
4.2.  Regeneration and environmental protection 
Over the 2000-2006 period, EUR 11.5 billion of ERDF financing was allocated to 
planning and rehabilitation, of which the renewal of urban areas was the largest area 
of intervention (EUR 4.5 billion). The two other main areas were the protection and 
improvement of the natural environment (EUR 2.8 billion) and the reclamation of 
old industrial and military sites (EUR 2.2 billion).  
These activities were very important in Objective 2 regions: mainly in urban areas 
(25% of all ERDF support for the environment) and in cleaning up industrial and 
military sites (21%). 
The measures concerned were aimed primarily at improving living conditions in the 
areas and their attractiveness for tourists and for companies contemplating 
investment. Their economic impact tended by their nature to be limited to the local 
area and was usually greater when targeted at very specific problems, such as the 
pollution of coastal areas with significant tourist activity. 
4.3.  A greener economy and long term economic development 
An increasing focus of Cohesion Policy is the green economy and translating EU 
technical know-how into globally competitive resource efficient production, in line 
with the Europe 2020 objectives. 
Cohesion Policy measures cut across traditional sectoral boundaries – creating a 
competitive, greener economy requires the installation of high-speed internet, the 
development of smart transport systems, increased energy efficiency and use of 
renewables, environmentally-aware public procurement and well functioning 
administrations. To achieve this requires an integrated framework for investment, 
combining expenditure in different areas (innovation, human resource development, 
business support, infrastructure etc.) in a coherent policy package that fits the 
national, regional or local context and meets local needs.  
Cohesion Policy provides such a framework by integrating policies in different 
areas into a single development strategy which takes account of the real needs and 
conditions on the ground.  
In particular, Cohesion Policy can help regions realise the potential of the green 
economy as a new source of growth.  Promoting eco-innovation and new green jobs, 
especially in SMEs is a high priority. In the 2007-13 period, Cohesion Policy is 
contributing EUR 2.5 billion to support the development of environmentally- 
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friendly products, processes and services in SMEs, as well as research and 
innovation in green technologies. 
Promoting the low carbon economy in the East of England 
The 2007-13 programme is focused on helping to achieve low carbon economic growth. It 
comprises enterprise and innovation initiatives with the main selection criteria for projects 
being the potential to reduce the region’s carbon footprint and to integrating economic, 
environmental and social goals. A major project is the creation of a low carbon venture 
capital fund of around EUR 20 million, operated by the Low Carbon Innovation Centre. 
The programme is aimed at putting the region at the forefront of innovation in low carbon 
growth, clean technology and renewable energy. 
 
Lahti Science and Business Park (Finland) 
Funding of EUR 1.5 million went to develop the Lahti Cleantech Science and Business 
park in the 2000-2006 period. The aim was “intellectual cross fertilisation” between 
different areas of expertise and to encourage innovation and development of environmental 
technologies by bringing together small and large firms, universities and regional 
authorities. A research agenda was established together with a professorship in waste 
management and a Master’s programme in environmental technology. 
The result was the creation of 170 new jobs and 20 new clean-tech companies and the 
attraction of investment of over EUR 30 million. The ERDF has, therefore, contributed to 
the formulation of a coherent innovation strategy and the transformation of Lahti into a 
leader in environmental innovation and an attractive centre for companies engaged in this 
activity. 
 
4.4.  Green governance 
The environmental challenge cuts across borders. Cohesion Policy, with its 
numerous cross-border, transnational and interregional programmes, provides a 
means for new types of green cooperation. An example is the EU Baltic Sea Region 
Strategy for improving the environmental state of the Baltic, which is the first EU 
strategy designed at the level of a "macro-region" involving neighbouring countries 
such as Russia. 
In addition, Cohesion programmes are "green-proofed": prior to approval by the 
Commission, in the sense that Member States have to submit a strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA)
263 to demonstrate that their programmes respect 
EU environmental rules. An environmental impact assessment (EIA)
264 must also be 
carried out for certain schemes, such as major transport projects. Beyond this, 
                                                 
263   Directive 2001/42/EC 
264   Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended  
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environmental sustainability remains one of the two cross-cutting principles for all 
co-financed actions
265. 
Applied strategically
266 green public procurement
267 can improve the 
competitiveness of suppliers of goods and services. A range of techniques and 
methods are already available
268 and European Public Procurement directives allow 
public authorities to take environmental and social considerations into account in 
their purchasing procedures. Cohesion Policy can help tackle the challenge of 
training and informing officials in charge of public purchasing at all levels of public 
authorities. 
In this vein, nearly half of the Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and the UK) have included indicators for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions into their Cohesion Policy programmes. France, for example, has 
developed a carbon evaluation tool to estimate CO2 emissions produced by all 
projects funded with EU support
269 and the Interreg project GROW has developed a 
statistical tool for regional environmental accounting involving several countries
270. 
Networks of Environmental Authorities have been established in several countries 
(ES, IT, UK, PL, DE), as well as at EU level, the European Network of 
Environmental and Managing Authorities
271. 
Project sustainability assessment tool in Brandenburg 
A good practice example is the project sustainability assessment tool developed under the 
ERDF for the Brandenburg Objective 1 Programme in Germany in 2000-2006, which has 
become a standard monitoring method in the 2007-13 period. The managing authority is 
seeking to develop the tool further and make it a legally binding part of the project 
approval process. The financial institution that developed the tool is considering extending 
it to other funding programmes. 
 
5.  GOVERNANCE 
Well-established, efficient and effective governance systems are a pre-condition for the 
success of Cohesion Policy. This is not just a question of ensuring that the funds 
                                                 
265   Article 17 of the General Provisions Regulation1083/2006/EC 
266  Report by the European Network of Environmental Authorities (ENEA) on "Improving the climate 
resilience of Cohesion Policy funding programmes"  
267   COM (2008)400 final, 16.7.2008, section 5.2, pp.8-9 
268  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm  
269   "NECATER". For more information, see: 
http://www.datar.gouv.fr/
IMG/Fichiers/DEVELOPPEMENT_DURABLE/Necater_presentation.pdf  
270   http://www.grow3c.com/project_detail.php?id=21 
271   http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/cohesion_policy_en.htm  
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allocated are spent in the ways agreed, but also of ensuring that the strategy is well 
designed and coherent, the relevant participants are mobilised, high quality projects are 
selected and rigorous monitoring and evaluation systems are established to ensure that 
programmes are on track to achieve the objectives set. 
Day-to-day management of Cohesion Policy on the ground is delegated to Member 
States and regions under the principle of shared management. Management systems are, 
therefore, a function partly of Cohesion Policy regulations and partly of the institutional 
and administrative context in each Member State. 
Shared management is a challenge in terms of ensuring the active involvement of all the 
key actors, including civil society. But it gives an opportunity for increasing ‘ownership’ 
of programmes on the ground and for strengthening their effectiveness and efficiency.  
It also generates spillover benefits to national policies. By creating procedures for the 
discussion and formulation of strategies, project selection, monitoring and evaluation as 
well as by allocating funds for administrative capacity building, Cohesion Policy helps to 
strength the policy-making and management ability of the authorities concerned. 
Accordingly, Cohesion Policy can help to improve the effectiveness of policies in other 
areas.  
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Centralised sectoral policies and decentralised integrated ones: getting the balance right
272 
Highly developed Member States rely more on integrated policies to achieve synergies between 
different policy goals in different parts of the country. In the process, they often give regions a 
larger role in policy design and implementation. Less developed Member States rely more on 
nation-wide sectoral policies. As they develop, the benefits of avoiding negative externalities and 
creating synergies tend to outweigh the costs of integration and decentralisation. As a result, they 
may also shift towards more integrated and decentralised policies. 
This shift can clearly be observed in transport policy. For example, the development of the 
French high-speed rail network started in the 1950s as a national policy with the main goal of 
reducing travel times by rail. During the 1980s and 1990s, the policy changed and incorporated 
other goals such as improving development in depressed cities or regions and reducing pollution 
by shifting travel from cars and airplanes to high-speed rail. 
In addition, regional and local authorities became active partners in the preparation and 
identification of new links and stations. In several cases, this has allowed a strong synergy to 
emerge between rail investment and urban development, for example, in Lille and Lyon.  
This shift towards more integrated and decentralised policies can also be detected in innovation 
policies. Sweden and Finland, two of the global top performers in innovation, have shifted the 
emphasis of policy away from simple sectoral measures such as R&D support to creating 
regional innovation systems. The focus is on investing in a long-term partnership between firms, 
research centres and the public sector (the ‘triple helix’ or knowledge triangle) to improve not 
just innovation in the firms involved but the competitiveness of the region as a whole. 
This is not to say that centralised sectoral policies do not play an important role, but more and 
more Member States recognise that they are a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective 
and efficient policy making which recognises spatial differences and the need for coordination 
between different measures. 
 
5.1.  Effective governance and results based management  
The quality of public management has improved in the EU10 
The ex post evaluation in 2000-2006
273 showed that the EU10 countries successfully 
put in place a system in the period for managing the EU funding available and to 
comply with regulatory requirements. This was a big achievement in itself given the 
short programming period and the lack of prior experience of handling the much 
larger sums allocated to them than involved in pre-accession aid. 
Though there were initial problems, the new systems were working reasonably 
effectively by the end of the period as a result of learning by doing and some reform 
                                                 
272   See Forthcoming study Intralab: In search of inspiring policy practices by Ecorys. 
273   European Policies Research Centre: Ex Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 2000-2006 
Co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, Work Package 11: Management and 
Implementation Systems (July 2009).  
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of public administration, largely triggered by Cohesion Policy management 
practices. The evaluation found evidence of improvements which extended in many 
cases to national policy, such as: 
•  better strategic planning and more efficient coordination and collaboration 
between authorities; 
•  simplification of procedures, more openness, transparency and accountability and 
provision of better guidance. The evaluation noted, for example, reductions in 
processing times for applications and claims; 
•  improved management practices, staff expertise, professionalism and human 
resource management; 
•  strengthened and broader partnership, with, for example, extensive regional 
involvement in project implementation in the Czech Republic and Poland; 
•  more systematic monitoring and evaluation. 
Nevertheless, the evaluation found that there was still room for improvement and 
continuous investment in this broad area is necessary, especially in Bulgaria and 
Romania which only started the process in 2007. 
… and continue to improve in the EU-15, where there are spillover benefits to 
national policies 
In the EU-15, the evaluation found further improvements in strategic management 
of programmes in 2000-2006, particularly in terms of better planning, increased 
partnership and more evaluation. The quality of monitoring also improved, but some 
factors hindered its further development, over-complicated indicator systems, IT 
operational difficulties and data inconsistencies. 
The evaluation showed that Cohesion Policy in the EU-15 also had positive 
spillover effects on domestic management practice. These were particularly evident 
as regards strategic planning, the quality of monitoring and evaluation and the 
extent of partnership. In addition, they included institutional changes such as the 
creation or strengthening of territorial bodies and the establishment of new 
coordination arrangements. There was also evidence of changes in the 
administrative culture, with more positive attitudes towards monitoring and 
evaluation. 
Spillovers tend to become more visible over time – improvements detected in the 
2000-2006 period often originated in the previous period and are continuing in 
2007-2013. The influence on other policies was strongest when driven by 
committed policy managers and where the scale of Cohesion Policy funding was 
significant.  
Spending the funds is not enough – performance and quality are of prime 
importance 
Compliance with the regulations and maintaining the pace of spending dominated 
programme management in many Member States, with excessive focus on financial 
absorption at the expense of the effective of expenditure.  
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While spending funds in time and in line with financial and auditing rules are both 
essential preconditions for the success of Cohesion Policy, there is a need to put 
more emphasis on performance. It is therefore important to improve programme 
design, monitoring and evaluation, to invest further in institutional and 
administrative capacity and to encourage exchange of experience as well as to 
strengthen the professionalism of those concerned.  
An example is the 'Regions for Economic Change' initiative, cofinanced by the 
ERDF, which promotes good practice in managing Cohesion Policy programmes. 
The initiative was a response to the general recognition of the need for a more 
coordinated approach to exchange of good practice and more effective networking 
between regions to improve the quality of programmes. 
The initiative has introduced new ways of making regional networks more dynamic 
and to help them to work closely with the Commission, test innovative ideas and to 
transfer them into the programmes themselves. It also includes communication 
activities such as a web site, a database of case studies and the RegioStars Awards 
scheme. 
5.2.  Administrative costs are relatively low 
The administrative costs of Cohesion Policy are similar to or lower than those of the 
funding schemes of other international organisations, e.g., the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme or the International Monetary Fund. A recent study for 
the European Commission
274 estimated the total costs for the administration of 
Cohesion Policy in 2007-2013 at just 3.5% of the total budget.  
Programme management accounts for most of the workload (80% of the total) and 
most of the costs (78% of the total). The most time-consuming tasks within this are 
project selection and the verification of deliverables. Both costs and workload, 
however, vary between Member States and programmes, the former as a result of 
differences in salary levels, the workload because of: 
•  Geographical scale: national programmes generally have a lower administrative 
workload per EUR of total budget than regional programmes which, in turn, have 
a lower workload than territorial cooperation programmes. This is at least partly 
because programmes with national coverage usually focus on a particular policy 
area rather than a number of these. Furthermore, territorial cooperation 
programmes often have a broad scope and involve coordinating many 
participants. 
•  Financial scale : in general, the smaller the programme, the larger the share spent 
on administration, simply because of economies of scale – management, 
certification and audit include many tasks which do not vary much with the size 
of the programme. 
                                                 
274   SWECO Ltd: Regional governance in the context of globalization: reviewing governance mechanisms 
and administrative costs (March 2010).  
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•  Policy areas covered: in general, programmes focused on infrastructure or the 
environment have lower administrative workloads than those focused on 
innovation or capacity building. Innovative projects (which are intellectually 
challenging and often require specialised expertise and much co-ordination) are 
particularly management-intensive. ‘The same can also apply to training. 
A significant finding is that different management systems, in particular  centralised 
as against regionalised, are not associated with major differences in administrative 
costs. 
In itself, the application of EU regulations does not add notably to the 
administrative workload. On the other hand, "gold plating", where national 
regulations go beyond what is necessary, could increase the administrative burden 
considerably. 
Box: Cohesion Policy – a valued partner of local government 
To assess the value of EU funding, the Local Government Association (LGA) in the UK 
conducted a survey in 2009 of 450 local authority staff with at least 7 years experience of 
EU projects. 
The survey covered all the main EU funding programmes, including the ERDF and ESF. 
The 157 responses received demonstrated that local authorities appreciated the benefits 
from EU programmes and considered that EU funds should continue to play a strong role 
in regional development after 2013.  
•  93% of respondents agreed that their local authority values the support from the funds 
for local communities.  
•  49% of respondents reported that EU funds allowed them to undertake projects which 
would not normally qualify for national funding. They also indentified a stable 7-year 
funding period and the ability to lever in matching-funding as key advantages. 
•  There was high awareness of the ERDF and ESF (73%) as compared with other EU 
funds for specific purposes (typically between 10% and 20%). 
•  88% of respondents expressing a view stated that they would increase or at least 
maintain their current level of involvement with EU funds after 2013. 
•  On the other hand, 62% of respondents felt that Cohesion Policy administrative 
requirements were too complex relative to the size of funding and. 95% considered that 
the associated administrative burden can dissuade voluntary and local organisations 
from applying for funds. 
The survey, the first of its kind to be undertaken, provided valuable evidence for the LGA 
in discussions with central government and the EU.  The LGA intention is to explore the 
possibility of an EU-wide survey being undertaken in the future. 
Full results are available at: www.lga.gov.uk/euregionalpolicy 
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5.3.  Partnership 
Broad partnership with a wide range of actors has long been a key principle of 
Cohesion Policy since the mobilisation of the skills and knowledge of the various 
partners has the potential to make both planning and implementation more effective. 
It can also make the programme more inclusive, allowing partners to think beyond 
their own particular interests and come to a more strategic, "regional viewpoint". 
The ex post evaluation
275of 2000-2006 found that the application of the partnership 
principle was a widely recognised added value of Cohesion Policy, especially in 
local development measures
276. 
The ex post evaluation found that partnership increased in the 2000-2006 period in 
the EU-15 with greater involvement of local and regional  bodies, businesses, social 
partners and other organisations. In Spain and France, for example, a system of co-
responsibility between regional and central governments was introduced which 
allowed regions to take on more of the strategy design, monitoring, reporting and 
managing, which increased their skills and capacity in these respects. 
Partners improve programmes: the case of the environment in Poland 
Environmental issues can be particularly challenging in terms of project preparation. All of 
the Polish programmes in the 2007-2013 period (except for the technical assistance 
programme) had environmental experts in their Monitoring Committee, whether from 
NGOs or the academic and research community. Their input was found to be invaluable, 
notably during the planning phase and in establishing the selection criteria for projects. 
Partners improve programmes: the case of innovation in France 
The Directorate General for Regional Policy and the French authorities ("DATAR")   
established in 2005 a working group to help regions formulate their innovation strategies. 
This was extended to include other public bodies, businesses, universities and research 
centres. The initiative laid the groundwork for putting in place strategies for the 2007-13 
period. 
 
In most of the EU-15, the involvement of partners was found to be stronger in the 
development of strategies and programme design than in implementation. An 
exception was in Finland where, through the Oulu Growth Agreement model, the 
involvement of local actors, especially business, was strong in the implementation 
stage as well. 
The application of the partnership principle was challenging for many EU10 
countries in the 2004-2006 period since they largely lacked a partnership tradition 
and established means of identifying and involving partners. Moreover, partners 
                                                 
275   European Policies Research Centre: Ex Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 2000-2006 
Co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, Work Package 11: Management and 
Implementation Systems (July 2009). 
276   http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/urban_ii_en.htm   
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sometimes found it hard to influence decisions, especially at the beginning of the 
period, when their knowledge of Cohesion Policy was limited. 
These challenges were less pronounced in countries where there was experience of 
domestic policy consultation forums. In Malta, for example, the Council of 
Economic and Social Development established a forum for consultation and social 
dialogue in 2001. Similarly in Poland, a Cohesion Policy Working Group was set up 
within the existing Tripartite Commission for Socio-Economic Issues, involving 
representatives of government, trade unions and employers, to support the 
implementation of Cohesion Policy.  
An indicator of the success of the partnership principle is that the ex post evaluation 
found partner involvement to be generally higher in EU programmes than in 
domestic policies, though there are examples of the principle spreading to domestic 
regional development policies: 
•  the attribution of increased powers to regional self-governments in the 
negotiation and implementation of Contrats de Projets Etat-Région (CPERs)
277 in 
France, together with more negotiating powers to the regional Prefects;  
•  the devolution in England of responsibility for regional policy to Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs), leading to increased cooperation with local 
authorities and organisations in the regions.  
5.4.  Institutional capacity building 
Effective public policies require a competent and efficient administration, that is 
impartial and client oriented. Strengthening institutional and administrative capacity 
while creating a stable business environment facilitates structural adjustment and 
contributes to growth and jobs. 
In the 2000-2006 period, the ESF played an important  role in the modernisation of 
public administration.In Portugal, it took 11 procedures and 78 days to start a 
business in 2005. With the introduction of the one-stop shop, supported by the ESF, 
it now takes only 7 days and only seven procedures to be completed. As a 
consequence, the total cost of setting up a business has declined significantly. 
In the 2007-2013 period, a new ESF priority on Institutional Capacity has been 
introduced for Convergence regions and Cohesion Member States, aimed at 
strengthening the capacity of public administration and public services at national, 
regional and local level. Four Member States have devoted an Operational 
Programme to Institutional Capacity (Hungary, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria) and 
in many others, it is priority within OPs. 
The Institutional Capacity priority supports investment in human capital 
development and ICT in administrative and public services at all territorial levels. 
The aims are to improve legislation, facilitate business creation, increase the 
effectiveness of the management of public policies and improve the services 
                                                 
277   "Contrats de Projets Etat-Région" – formal agreements between the state and region on a multi-annual 
programme around themes of common interest.  
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provided to individuals and businesses generally by cutting red tape. The focus in 
the OPs across the EU is: better regulation (in Poland, Cyprus and Slovakia); 
reinforcement of the judiciary system (Slovenia and Poland); capacity building of 
employment institutions (Malta and Slovenia); ethics and integrity   (Poland and 
Hungary); reduction of administrative burden for business (Latvia and Lithuania) 
and enhancing the level of transparency and anti-corruption (Italy and Romania). In 
Bulgaria, the ESF is providing support for a full review of the national 
administration that could serve as basis for structural reform. 
Improving Administrative Capacity in Bulgaria 
The ESF programme in Bulgaria includes a broad range of measures to support of the 
ongoing administrative and judicial reforms in the country. Its goal is to introduce specific 
tools for policy making and implementation (impact assessment, public consultations, 
policy evaluation, public-private partnerships) in the everyday administration of policy at 
central, regional and local level. It is also intended to strengthen organisation and 
management of human resources in public institutions, provide training for civil servants 
and magistrates and improve service delivery, as well as to develop a common 
methodology for functional review and its application. The OP, in addition, is aimed at 
improving management of courts and their human and information resources and is 
supporting a number of training programmes for improving the knowledge of magistrates 
about different areas of European law. 
 
6.  CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL AND GLOBAL GROWTH 
6.1.  Using macroeconomic models to estimate effects 
Cohesion Policy aims to improve the economic performance of regions in terms, in 
particular, of GDP, employment, productivity, investment and the trade balance. 
Since these and other macroeconomic factors interact at the regional, national and 
EU level and are affected by a range of influences both internal and external, the 
only way of examining the effect of Cohesion Policy on them is by using macro-
economic models 
Two macroeconomic models – HERMIN
278 and QUEST – are used to do this
279 
concentrating on the convergence objective. HERMIN is a macro econometric 
                                                 
278   For a description of the HERMIN model and the results of the ex-post impact evaluation of the 2000 – 
2006 programming period, see: European Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy, 
Analysis of EU Cohesion Policy 2000-2006 using the CSHM: Aggregate impacts and inter-country 
comparisons, 2009. 
Link: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2006/wp3_hermin_aggregate.pdf 
279   For a description of the QUEST model and the results of the ex-post impact evaluation of the 2000 – 
2006 programming period, see: Varga, J., in ’t Veld, J.  (2010). The Potential Impact of EU Cohesion 
Policy Spending in the 2007-13 Programming Period: A Model-Based Analysis. ECFIN European 
Economy Economic Paper, no. 422 . 
Link: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2010/index_en.htm  
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model with neoclassical features on the supply side. QUEST is a New-Keynesian 
micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model with  endogenous 
growth. The use of two different models with very different assumptions about how 
economic forces work makes the results more robust. 
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that both HERMIN and QUEST do not 
measure the impact of policy, they model it. So far as possible, the properties of the 
model are in line with empirical evidence, though this is not always unambiguous. 
However, the incorporation of a number of assumptions about the workings of the 
economy, even if reasonably plausible ones is inevitable. 
Like any evaluation method, macroeconomic models have their strengths but need 
to be used with other evaluation methods to complete the picture. This especially so, 
since Cohesion Policy has goals which go much further than only GDP growth. 
Figure 4- 13 
Average share of Cohesion Policy expenditure as % of GDP, 2000 - 2006
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Source: HERMIN 
Any assessment of macroeconomic impact must start from the actual expenditure 
funded by Cohesion Policy (see chart). Since funding in the EU10 countries only 
became substantial after they joined the EU in 2004, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland and the regions in East Germany and Southern Italy (Mezzogiorno) were the 
main recipients in the 2000-2006 period (Figure 4.13). 
In the 2007–2013 period, the situation is very different. The EU-12 countries now 
account for just over half of Cohesion Policy expenditure, with much of the rest 
going to the EU-15 countries or regions listed above (Figure 4.14).  
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Figure 4- 14 
Average share of Cohesion Policy expenditure as % of GDP, 2007 - 2013
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6.2.  Macroeconomic impact of the 2000-2006 programmes 
When assessing the impact of Cohesion Policy, there is a need to distinguish 
between the short-term (largely ‘demand-side’) effects and long-term (largely 
‘supply-side’) effects. The short-term effects occur during the period when the 
programmes are being implemented. Expenditure on, for example, road construction 
or training schemes, tends to boost output and employment (e.g. of construction 
workers or trainers) which creates additional demand. As firms as well as 
individuals earn more, they also invest and consume more, which further adds to 
output (the so-called Keynesian multiplier effect). This effect largely occurs in the 
implementation period when expenditure is taken place, though can extend beyond 
it because of multipliers. For the 2000-2006 programmes, the implementation period 
lasted until the end of 2009 (Figure 4.15).  
The demand-side effect can be seen in the HERMIN model especially which has a 
strong focus on this. According to HERMIN, Cohesion Policy is estimated to 
increase GDP in the main recipient Member States by an average of 1.2% each year 
over the course of the spending period. These effects, it should be emphasised are 
cumulative, so that by 2009, GDP in these countries is estimated to have been 
around 11% higher than it otherwise would have been as a result of Cohesion 
Policy.  
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Figure 4- 15 
Average annual impact on GDP, 2000 - 2009
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Source: HERMIN, QUEST 
As would be expected, the impact in the different countries is closely related to the 
scale of funding. However, there are differences in the results of the two models. In 
HERMIN the financing costs of cohesion spending are ignored. In QUEST the 
EU15 Member States also contribute to the financing costs of Cohesion spending 
and as a result net Cohesion receipts for these countries are smaller than the gross 
receipts shown in the section above and simulated in HERMIN. Also, in QUEST, 
the stimulus to demand is estimated to be less than in HERMIN because Cohesion 
eexpenditure leads to real appreciation of exchanges rates (in those countries not 
part of the Euro zone) and crowding out of some private expenditure and therefore 
the effect on output is smaller. The short-term demand-side effect, though positive, 
is not the 'raison d'être' of Cohesion Policy, which is bring about structural change 
and long-term growth through ‘supply-side’ effects –a better transport system, a 
stronger enterprise base, an increased rate of innovation and more skilled people. 
These effects in improving the productive potential of regional economies are long-
lasting. 
The estimates of the two models of the effect on GDP of Cohesion Policy for the 
2000-2006 period in 2014, 5 years after spending came to an end, again differ 
(Figure 4- 16). 
In this case, QUEST estimates the effect on GDP to be bigger, largely because, 
being an endogenous growth model, it captures the impact of investment in human 
capital development and RTD on growth. HERMIN, on the other hand, assumes that 
the effect from investment gradually declines over time. The clear message, 
however, is that, under different assumptions about how economies work, Cohesion 
Policy has strong effects on GDP and growth – both in the short term and in the 
long term. Even under the HERMIN model's more conservative assumptions, 
Cohesion Policy over the 2000-2006 period resulted in a return of EUR 2.1 for each 
euro invested. According to QUEST, the return in 2009 is the equivalent of EUR 1.2  
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per euro invested. However, by 2020, the return is estimated at EUR 4.2 per euro 
invested. 
Figure 4- 16 
Impact on GDP, 2014
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Source: HERMIN, QUEST 
Cohesion Policy also helped to increase the level of employment. HERMIN 
estimates that in 2009, the number employed was 5.6 million higher as a result of 
policy in 2000-2006 (see Figure 4- 17), or an average of 560 thousand more a year 
than without Cohesion Policy. 
Figure 4- 17 
Cohesion Policy induced employment creation, 2000 - 2009
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6.3.  The macroeconomic impact of Cohesion Policy 2007 - 2013
280 
As a result of larger funding in the EU-12 in the 2007-2013 period, the expected 
impact of Cohesion Policy on their GDP is much bigger than in 2000-2006. As 
before, HERMIN estimates larger demand effects during the period, though the 
effects estimated by both models are significant for all countries and in line with 
spending (Figure 4.18). 
Figure 4- 18 
Average annual impact on GDP, 2007 - 2016
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Source: HERMIN, QUEST 
Again, there are significant and persistent long-run effects on GDP estimated as 
well as a substantial impact in the short-term. 
The application of a HERMIN-type model in Poland shows that these results are 
reproduced at the regional level
281. Estimates of the cumulative results of 
expenditure in 2004-2006 and 2007-2013 indicate that all Polish regions are likely 
to derive considerable gains to GDP from Cohesion Policy.  
The gains depend in part on the scale of spending, but also on the economic 
structure and spending profile of the region. Central and western regions, with 
sizeable manufacturing sectors, are estimated to benefit most, while eastern regions  
with large agricultural sectors and smaller and less efficient manufacturing sectors 
                                                 
280   A forthcoming working paper, based on the HERMIN model, will provide a detailed description of the 
country results and the main features of the beneficiary economies. 
281  Zaleski, J. (2009): "Regionalisation of the HERMIN macro-economic modelling framework in 
Poland", Paper presented at the Sixth European Conference on Evaluation of Cohesion Policy, New 
Methods for Cohesion Policy Evaluation: Promoting Accountability and Learning, Warsaw, 
November 30-December 1, 2009. Full technical details are available on the WARR web site 
www.hermin.pl   
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the least, although the estimated effects here are still significant, ranging from 8% to 
12% of GDP. 
Map 4. 5 Impact of Cohesion policy in Poland: cumulative effect on GDP in 2013 
Map 4. 6 Impact of Cohesion policy in Poland: cumulative effect on unemployment 
in 2013 
6.4.  Impact on net contributors and on the EU-27 
Cohesion Policy, of course, also affects the countries which are net contributors and, 
accordingly, have higher taxes than they otherwise would in order to provide the 
finance required. The countries concerned, however, tend to have more advanced 
economies, producing many of the kinds of capital goods and services that are 
required by the net recipient countries as they develop. As a result, the effect on 
them of needing to raise finance is mitigated by their increased exports.
282  
This is confirmed by the HERMIN model, which indicates that the boost to exports 
is significant, though more in some countries than others, depending on trade 
relations
283. For instance, France and the UK gained considerably from their relative 
high trade with Spain and Ireland, respectively, while Germany exports relatively 
large amounts to most of the net recipient countries (Figure 4- 19). 
Figure 4- 19 
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The QUEST model has been used to estimate the net effects of Cohesion Policy on 
the EU economy as a whole. The cumulative net effect on the GDP of the EU-25 of 
                                                 
282   The impact of Cohesion Policy on the net donors can take also other forms (e.g. procurement contracts 
being awarded to contractors from donor states). 
283   Study for the European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department B: 
Structural and Cohesion Policies, Regional Development, The Economic Return of Cohesion 
Expenditure for Member States, 2009.  
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the 2000-2006 programmes expenditure is estimated at 0.7% in 2009 (i.e. GDP was 
higher to this extent as a result of policy). This was estimated to rise to 4% by 2020. 
In the EU-15 alone, the estimate is a cumulative net effect on GDP of just over 3% 
by 2020. 
Table 4.2 Cumulative net effect of Cohesion Policy on GDP 
 – long term gains in QUEST 
   2000-09  2000-15  2000-20 
EU-15 0.5  1.9  3.3 
EU-10 3.7  10.2  15.9 
EU-25 0.7  2.4  4.0 
Note: Cumulated % change in the level of GDP as compared to a non Cohesion Policy baseline 
Source: Varga J., In't Veld J., A model-based analysis of the impact of cohesion Policy expenditure 2000-06: 
Simulation with the QUEST III endogenous R&D model, European Commission, Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, 2010 
Box on RHMOLO 
The impact of investments in the TEN-T network in five countries (Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) spread out over time, as shown by a prototype of 
a new regional model, RHOMOLO
284. In the first place, these investments lead to 
significant reductions in transport costs in the areas where they take place but also in others 
given the general improvement of the transport network (see Map 4. 7).  
Reduced transport costs facilitate trade as well as movements of people which results in 
significant increase in GDP. In the short term, the impact is generally bigger in the areas 
which directly benefit from the improved transport network, like for instance Warmińsko-
maruskie in north-eastern Poland or Moravskoslezsko in the Czech Republic (see Map 4. 
7).  
In the medium and long term however, GDP gains progressively build up, because these 
investment need time to reach their full impact. Moreover, due to inter-regional spill-overs, 
the positive impact on GDP slowly spreads in space to other neighbouring regions, even to 
regions where no investment took place (like for instance Zachodniopomorskie in north-
western Poland). In the end, taking all direct and indirect effects into account, Polish and 
Hungarian regions gain most from these investments in the TEN-T network.  
The models used so far to evaluate the impact of EU Cohesion Policy are based on national 
economies without much consideration for sub-national variation. As a result, they did not 
capture the heterogeneity often present at regional level or other links like inter-regional 
spill-overs or migration. 
RHOMOLO can simulate the impact of Cohesion Policy on EU regions through actions 
that: 
•  build up the infrastructure, human capital stock and R&D capacity; 
•  increase the region's attractiveness for productive activities and employment; 
•  shift national expenditures between regions or policy domains due to co-financing; 
•  lower the cost of transport between regions. 
 
                                                 
284   As developed by Commission, DG for Regional Policy,  in close co-operation with JRC-IPTS and a 
consortium led by TNO  
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The model has the ambition to not only assess the economic, but also the social and 
environmental impacts at the regional level. Its main characteristics are: 
•  use of the regional economy at NUTS 2 (NUTS 1 for Germany) as the basic building 
block; 
•  inclusion of elements of endogenous growth theory, in which human capital and 
knowledge gains sustain regional growth as well as elements from the new economic 
geography, with agglomeration and dispersion forces determining the distribution of 
firms and workers in space; and  
•  explicit links between regional economies through trade and migration flows in a 
general equilibrium setting, allowing for imperfect competition and frictional 
unemployment. 
•   
 
Map 4. 7 GDP change due to TEN-T investments in short,  
medium and long term 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
Cohesion Policy has a broad vision. This vision encompasses not just the economic 
development of lagging regions and support for vulnerable social groups, but also the 
social and environmental sustainability of development and respect for the territorial and 
cultural features of different parts of the EU. The breadth of vision is reflected in the 
variety of Funds, of programmes, of areas of intervention and of partners. 
In terms of the regional economy, Cohesion Policy has created some 1 million jobs in 
enterprises across the EU, as well as perhaps adding as much as 10% to GDP in 
Objective 1 regions in the EU15. As various studies indicate, this tends to boost the trade 
and exports of net contributor countries, offsetting their contribution to the funding the 
policy. 
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement: grants to enterprise and R&D are a useful 
tool, but too often in the past they have been used at the expense of other instruments. 
The trend towards a more balanced mix, including financial engineering (loans and 
venture capital) as well as "indirect" instruments (i.e. non-financial instruments such as 
advice, networking and clustering) is a welcome one. The European Commission, in 
close partnership with the EIB, is actively encouraging such diversification through 
initiatives such as JEREMIE, JASMINE, JASPERS and JESSICA. 
In addition, past Cohesion Policy investment in motorways and roads in the less 
developed parts of the EU15 means that the job is now largely done. Investment should 
shift towards more environmentally-friendly modes of transport (notably rail and urban 
transport systems), though in the EU12, the need to improve transport links considerably 
remains a challenge. 
Cohesion Policy also trains around 10 million people a year, with a strong focus on 
young people, the long-term unemployed and the low-skilled. Through various local 
development initiatives, Cohesion Policy has a strong track record of cross-border co-
operation, regenerating deprived urban neighbourhoods, and contributing to access to 
services in rural areas.  
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Involving regional and local communities is key for improving policy in the future. 
Evaluation evidence has clearly demonstrated that the active participation of people and 
organisation on the ground at regional and local level, from the design to the 
implementation stage, is a crucial success factor in making development initiatives work. 
In fact, such partnership is one of the key sources of the added-value of Cohesion Policy, 
mobilising their skills and knowledge to make programmes more effective and inclusive. 
In terms of protecting the environment, more than half the Member States are tracking 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as a target in their Cohesion Policy 
programmes for the 2007-2013 period. More than 23 million people were connected to 
wastewater collection and treatment systems and at least 20 million people connected to 
clean supply of drinking water through ERDF and Cohesion Fund support in 2000-2006. 
As a result, Cohesion Policy has helped many regions to meet the requirements of EU 
environmental Directives. This has also improved the quality of tne environment and the 
quality of life. However, the sustainability of the facilities constructed needs more 
carefully consideration: investment in environmental infrastructure was sometimes made 
without clear plans for long term financing.  
In terms of management, strong and sound administration at national, regional and local 
levels is important for the success and lasting effect of cohesion policy. While 
evaluations have found that the new EU12 countries in particular have made very 
significant strides in the years since accession, there is a need for continued and 
intensified effort to ensure that the administrative capacity is there at all levels to deliver 
cohesion policy effectively throughout the EU. 
A recurrent evaluation finding across all areas of investment was a preoccupation with 
"absorption", i.e., with spending the money more than focusing on what the programmes 
are actually designed to achieve. While the former is obviously a precondition for 
success, the latter is ultimately what matters. For example, monitoring systems typically 
prioritise spending and outputs (such as the number of people trained or kilometres of 
new roads constructed) rather than results (such as the number of people getting a job 
after training or the amount of journey time saved) let alone on impacts (the effect of a 
better trained work force or more efficient transport networks on regional development). 
Cohesion Policy needs to cultivate a focus on performance. This has to start from 
programmes identifying only a limited number of policy priorities (concentration) with a 
clear view of how they will be achieved and how their achievement will contribute to the 
economic, social and territorial development of the regions, or Member States, 
concerned. 
Monitoring and evaluation systems need to be improved across the EU to track 
performance and to help redirect efforts as necessary to ensure that objectives are 
attained. This requires a clear strategic vision of what the programme aims to achieve 
and how success will be recognised and measured (proper target setting). It also requires 
a greater recourse to rigorous evaluation methods, including counterfactual impact 
evaluation, cost benefit analysis, beneficiary surveys, as well as a more rigorous use of 
qualitative methods such as case studies.  
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